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This thesis examines how Baathist decision-makers expanded the Iraqi armed forces through 
security cooperation between 1968 and 1990. 
  
Current literature on military assistance looks primarily at supplier perspectives.  When 
recipients are discussed, they are often portrayed as "satellites" of their military suppliers, who 
manipulate them into following policies which are detrimental to their national security and 
economic interests.  This thesis questions this theoretical approach by looking at the growth of 
Iraqi military power between 1968 and 1990.  Despite having a diminutive military force at the 
start of this period, during the 1980s Iraq emerged as the second largest military importer in the 
world and was able to defeat an adversary three times its size, Iran.  By 1990 Iraq possessed the 
fourth largest military in the world.  Earlier studies of Iraq's unprecedented military expansion 
were conducted before access to Baathist decision-making was available.  Consequently, 
previous accounts focused on supplier policies (Smolansky, 1991; Timmerman, 1992; Jentleson, 
1994).  Contrary to such accounts, this thesis argues that the expansion of the Iraqi armed forces 
was the direct result of Baathist policies.   
 
Analysing newly available primary sources, including hundreds of high-level Iraqi government 
files obtained after the 2003 Gulf War, this thesis reveals the Baathist strategy for acquiring 
military power through security cooperation.  It shows why Iraqi leaders were motivated to 
expand the armed forces in the first place; how they minimised supplier influence, mitigated 
defence dependence through diversification and indigenous production, and sustained high-levels 
of economic growth; and how they used foreign assistance to improve Iraqi military 
effectiveness.  By bringing new details to light on Baathist-era Iraqi military imports policies, 
this thesis challenges conventional thinking regarding supplier-recipient dynamics and calls for 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Between 1968 and 1990, the Iraqi armed forces grew from one of the smallest militaries in the 
Middle East to, by some estimates, the fourth-largest in the world.1  During the late 1960s and 
mid-1970s, the Iraqi armed forces struggled to maintain internal security.2  Once that goal was 
achieved, however, the goals and ambitions of the Baathist regime expanded.  The Iraqi armed 
forces grew from an estimated 82,000 military personnel, less than 500 main battle tanks, a 
handful of light armoured fighting vehicles, 215 aircraft, and 20 helicopters in 19683 to about 
1,000,000 active military personnel, 5,500 main battle tanks, 1,500 armoured infantry fighting 
vehicles, 689 combat aircraft, and 489 helicopters by 1990.4  In 1990, Iraq had a larger arsenal of 
conventional weapons than each of its regional adversaries and competitors, including Egypt, 
Iran, Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.5  In addition, during the late 1980s, the Iraqi 
                                                 
1 Lester Brune, America and the Iraqi Crisis, 1990-1992: Origins and Aftermath (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 
1993), 46. 
2 For a history of the Iraqi armed forces between 1920 and 1968, see Ibrahim al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, Iraq’s 
Armed Forces: An Analytical History (London: Routledge, 2008), 13-103. For an account of Iraqi defence 
expenditures and military imports during the same period, see Timothy Hoyt, Military Industry and Regional 
Defense Policy: India, Iraq and Israel (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), 115-125. 
3 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance 1968 (London: Brassey’s, 1968), 43-44. 
4 IISS, Military Balance 1990, 105-106. 
5 IISS, Military Balance 1990, 97-122. 
Page 10 of 355 
 
military engaged in a series of successful military operations that ended the war against Iran, a 
country over three times its size in terms of population, economic output, and territorial size.6  
Kenneth Pollack, a scholar who is generally critical of Iraqi and Arab military effectiveness, 
writes that between 1968 and 1990 “the Iraqi armed forces rose from incompetence to become 
probably the most potent military ever wielded by an Arab government.”7  The expansion of the 
Iraqi armed forces and their improved performance on the battlefield was paralleled by other 
demographic and socioeconomic changes happening in Iraqi society.  Between 1968 and 1988 
Iraq’s population doubled, its economic output grew by over fourteen times and per capita 
income increased by nearly eight times.8   
Neither the growth of the Iraqi armed forces nor its achievements on the battlefield could 
have been possible without external military assistance.  Andrew Feinstein estimates that 
between 1980 and 1990 alone, Iraq spent roughly $50 billion (in constant 2011 U.S. dollars) on 
the import of conventional weapons and $15 billion on unconventional weapons.9  Only India 
imported more weapons than Iraq in the entire period between 1968 and 1990.10  Although Iraq’s 
indigenous military industry was able to manufacture some weapons (for example, ammunition, 
light arms, and some modified long-range missiles), it was not able to meet the entire demand of 
the Iraqi armed forces.  Consequently, on a yearly average during the 1980s Iraqi spending on 
                                                 
6 Iran’s population and GDP were roughly three times the same figure of Iraq in 1988. World Bank Data, Iran and 
Iraq, 1988. 
7 Kenneth Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 
2004), 552. 
8 In 1968, Iraq’s population was roughly 9 million, its GDP was $3.2 billion, and GDP per capita was $344.  In 
1988, its population, GDP, and per capita income were 17 million, $43 billion, and $2,604, respectively.  World 
Bank Figures, 2014.   
9 Andrew Feinstein, The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2011), 398.  All 
dollar values in this research refer to U.S. dollars. 
10 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), TIV of Arms Imports to the Top 50 Largest Importers, 
1968-1990.  Data generated on July 24, 2013.  SIPRI provides all of arms imports figures in 1990 constant dollar 
values. 
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arms imports accounted for about one-half of the state’s defence budget, which itself made up 
between one-quarter and one-half of Iraq’s GDP.11  As Andrew Pierre points out, during the 
1970s and 1980s, “practically all of Iraq’s arms [and] the technology used to manufacture 
weapons domestically came from abroad.”12   
Foreign military assistance is often viewed as an effective instrument of foreign policy by 
policymakers and academics.  U.S. officials, for example, claim that arms transfers are “an 
indispensable component” of their foreign policy,13 while scholars of the international arms trade 
argue that military aid allows suppliers to exercise political, economic, or military influence over 
recipient states.  William Mott, a scholar who examines U.S. and Soviet military assistance 
during the Cold War, writes that: 
Not strictly limited to a donor-recipient relationship, the concept of supplier influence is structurally 
implicit in all arms transfers, [whether they are] grants and gifts, concessionary credits, or cash sales.  
Every supplier [expects] to exercise palpable influence on recipient behaviours, policies and 
strategies corresponding to its market share based on the total of military assistance and arms sales 
to a buyer-recipient.14 
 Given the size of Iraqi arms exports between 1968 and 1990, one would expect that Iraq’s 
military suppliers wielded considerable influence over Baghdad’s policies during this time 
period.  Although various Western policymakers and analysts believed that Iraq was a “client-
state” of the Soviet Union during the 1970s,15 the ruling Baathist regime ultimately undertook 
policies which did not line up with the objectives of its military suppliers.  For example, in 1974 
the Iraqi government launched a counterinsurgency campaign against Kurdish parties that were 
                                                 
11 Hoyt, Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy, 130, table 4.5 and author’s calculations. 
12 Andrew Pierre (editor), Cascade of Arms (Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC: 1997), 3. 
13 U.S. Government, President Reagan’s Directive on Arms Transfer Policy (July 8, 1981.) 
14 William Mott, Soviet Military Assistance (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2001), 38. 
15 For examples of authors who argued that the Soviet Union was successful in using military aid to gain influence 
in the Gulf, see Anne Kelly, “The Soviet Naval Presence during the Iraqi-Kuwaiti Border Dispute: March-April, 
1973,” Centre for Naval Analyses: Professional Paper (1974); Dennis Ross, “Considering Soviet Threats to the 
Persian Gulf,” International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981); and George Lenczowski, “The Soviet Union and the 
Persian Gulf: An Encircling Strategy,” International Journal, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Spring 1982.) 
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previously supported by the Kremlin.  During the mid-to-late 1970s it suppressed the Soviet-
backed Iraqi Communist Party and publicly condemned Soviet policies in the Arab and Muslim 
worlds.  In 1980 Baghdad ordered the invasion of Iran without first consulting Moscow, in 
contravention of the 1972 Soviet-Iraqi Treaty, which is discussed in further detail below.16  
Meanwhile, during the 1980s, Washington hoped to gain influence over Iraq by sharing 
intelligence with Baghdad on Iranian troop movements, selling equipment that could be used for 
military purposes, and pressing various European governments to provide military aid to Iraq.  
Despite this, the Baathist regime largely refused to stop its proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, cease using chemical weapons against the Kurds, or curb its support of international 
terrorism.17  It is clear that the Iraqi government did not simply follow the policy prescriptions of 
its military suppliers and instead pursued its own independent political, military, and economic 
policies.   
 Much of our contemporary understanding of Iraq during this time period comes from 
literature published between the mid-1970s and 1990s, which often focused on the interests that 
supplier states had in “arming Iraq.”  Such perspectives, however, miss a crucial piece of the 
puzzle: the Iraqi perspective.  My analysis fills that gap by addressing one primary question: to 
what extent did Iraq’s military suppliers have an impact on Baghdad’s political, economic, and 
military policies, and if they did not, how come?  Put differently, was Baghdad’s security 
cooperation strategy between 1968 and 1990 primarily driven by Iraqi government decisions, or 
was it the result of “foreign manipulation” by its military suppliers?  The analysis below 
                                                 
16 Oles Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: the Soviet Quest for Influence (Durham; London: Duke University Press, 
1991), 37-229. 
17 Evan Resnick, “Strange Bedfellows: U.S Bargaining Behaviour with Allies of Convenience,” International 
Security, Volume 35, Number 3 (MIT Press: Winter 2010/11), 144-184; Bruce Jentleson, With Friends Like These: 
Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982-1990 (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1994). 
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provides a literature review that looks at existing scholarship on Iraq’s relationship with foreign 
military suppliers in the period under study.  Thereafter, the substantive chapters follow a 
thematic approach that address five key sub-questions which are essential to answering the 
primary research questions above. 
1. What was the overall strategic context in which Iraqi leaders pursued military 
assistance? 
2. How did foreign military aid influence Iraq’s internal politics and foreign affairs? 
3. How did Iraqi leaders mitigate the dependence generated by security cooperation? 
4. What role did military imports play in the socio-economic development of Iraq and 
its trade relations with military suppliers? 
5. What was the military impact of security cooperation on the Iraqi armed forces? 
LITERATURE REVIEW: CONTENDING PERSPECTIVES ON IRAQI MILITARY IMPORTS, 
1968-1990 
Numerous accounts have been published about the expansion of the Iraq’s armed forces from the 
perspective of its military suppliers.  For example, present scholarship covering the Iraqi military 
build-up examines the various strategic interests that the Soviet Union,18 United Kingdom,19 the 
                                                 
18 For example, see Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, and Francis Fukuyama, The Soviet Union and Iraq Since 1968 
(Santa Monica: Rand, 1980.) 
19 Chris Cowley, Guns, Lies, and Spies: How We Armed Iraq (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992); David Leigh, 
Betrayed: the Real Story of the Matrix Churchill Trial (London: Bloomsbury, 1993); and Davina Miller, Export or 
Die: Britain’s Defence Trade with Iran and Iraq (London: Cassell, 1996.) 
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United States,20 France,21 Italy, 22 and more broadly European and North American states23 had 
in “arming Iraq.”  Within available literature, there are broadly three contending perspectives on 
Iraqi military imports between 1968 and 1990, all of which focus on the supplier side of the arms 
transfer equation.  The first two schools of thought tout the arming of Iraq as a “success story” 
for its suppliers, i.e. the suppliers created a “pliable state” in Iraq or they were able to benefit 
commercially by selling arms to Baghdad.  The third school of thought argues that Iraq’s military 
build-up was the result of suppliers’ “failed policies,” i.e. military suppliers tried to create a 
“puppet regime” in Iraq but instead created a monster. 
The first school of thought highlights the political motives that drove suppliers to arm 
Iraq, such as U.S.-Soviet competition for influence in the Gulf region or as part of a Western 
effort to contain Iran.  In essence this school of thought has argued these military patrons did a 
good job in controlling the political (or strategic) policies of their client.  For example, Anne 
Kelly argues that arms transfers allowed the Soviet Union to exercise some political leverage 
over Iraqi foreign policy during the 1970s, most notably in pressuring Iraq to withdraw from 
Kuwait in 1973.24  Similarly, during the early 1980s, Dennis Ross wrote that not only has Soviet 
military assistance provided Moscow “access to the Persian Gulf,” but it also enabled the 
Kremlin “to manipulate local regimes [e.g. Iraq] with threats.  In this sense, arms transfers are an 
integral part of a general Soviet strategy of coercion designed to increase Soviet leverage over 
                                                 
20 Rick Francona, Ally to Adversary: An Eyewitness Account of Iraq's Fall from Grace (Naval Institute Press, 1999) 
and Jentleson, With Friends Like These. 
21 David Styan, France and Iraq: Oil, Arms and French Policy Making in the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 
2006.) 
22 Marco De Andreis, Italian Arms Export to Iraq and Iran (Roma: CeSPI, 1988.) 
23 Kenneth Timmerman, The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq (London, UK: Bantam, 1992) and Mark 
Phythian, Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam’s War Machine (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, 1997.) 
24 Kelly, “The Soviet Naval Presence,” 11. 
Page 15 of 355 
 
regional states,” 25 such as Iraq.   That the Soviet Union accounted for most of Iraqi military 
imports during much of the 1970s was often taken as evidence that Baghdad was a “client” of 
Moscow.  For example, Andrew Pierre noted that of all the countries in the Middle East, Iraq 
was “most within the Soviet orbit” because of the close security cooperation between Baghdad 
and Moscow during the 1970s.26  George Lenczowski writes that during the 1970s the Soviet 
Union used arms transfers to local states as part of a plan to dominate the Persian Gulf “either 
directly or through the instrumentality of client and satellite local regimes,” such as Iraq.27   
Alongside the “successful arming of Iraq” narrative there is a second school of thought 
that emphasises the economic (rather than purely political) benefits that incentivised supplier 
states to export arms to Iraq.  During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Baghdad started to import a 
greater amount of Western military equipment and training.  One of the most cited accounts of 
Iraqi arms imports in this time period is provided by Kenneth Timmerman.  As an investigative 
journalist, Timmerman provides a myriad of details on the types of military equipment that Iraq 
imported during the 1970s and 1980s and on the commercial motivations that drove French, 
Soviet, German, American, British, and other countries’ aerospace and defence industries to 
provide advanced military equipment to Iraq.  As with other supplier-focused literature, 
Timmerman argues that the West “created Saddam Hussein step by step, piece by piece.”28  
Unlike the politically oriented literature, however, Timmerman argues that supplier policies 
towards Iraq were driven more by commercial motivations (the “greed of Western businesses,” 
as he calls it) than political objectives.29   
                                                 
25 Dennis Ross, “Considering Soviet Threats to the Persian Gulf,” International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), 
172. 
26 Andrew Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982.) 
27 Lenczowski, “The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf,” 310. 
28 Timmerman, The Death Lobby, 13.  Emphasis added. 
29 Timmerman, The Death Lobby, 11- 12. 
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Timmerman’s account, written shortly after the 1990-1991 Gulf War, has served as an 
important reference point for contemporary academic analyses of Iraqi security cooperation 
policies during the period between 1968 and 1990,30 the development of Iraq’s military 
industry,31 and more general literature on arms transfers.32  Timmerman’s account is generally 
reliable, although it has a number of limitations.  During the 1980s, Timmerman spent six years 
conducting research, including hundreds of interviews with intelligence analysts, diplomats, 
government officials, and arms merchants who told him what weapons the Iraqi government was 
buying and how it was using it.  He also cross-referenced information obtained through his 
interviews with data provided by reputable organizations tracking arms transfers such as the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Military Balance, published by 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).    
One limitation to Timmerman’s research is that, as he admits in the book, he often does 
not name his sources due the sensitivity of the subject matter.  Furthermore while providing a 
good overview of the interests of supplier states in arming Iraq, his research is incomplete 
because it does not adequately explain the strategic motivations that drove Iraqi leaders to 
acquire foreign military aid and the challenges that they faced in procuring such support.  When 
Timmerman does analyse Iraqi perspectives on foreign military aid, his analysis is quite 
simplistic.  For example, he writes that “from the day the Baath party seized power on July 17, 
1968, all of Iraq’s ‘scientific, industrial, and economic progress’ had been devoted to [feeding] 
Saddam’s quest for absolute power.  Power that came from the end of a gun.”33  Analysis that 
                                                 
30 Examples include Resnick, “Strange Bedfellows,” and Miller, Export or Die. 
31 For example, see Hoyt, Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy, 115 – 163. 
32 For example, see Ian Anthony, “The Conventional Arms Trade” and Lawrence Freedman and Martin Navias, 
“Western Europe” in  Pierre (editor), Cascade of Arms, 15- 41 and 151- 171. 
33 Timmerman, The Death Lobby, 494. 
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personifies Iraqi political-military decision-making in Saddam Hussein ignores the wider 
historical and strategic context between 1968 and 1990.  In fact, during this period Baghdad used 
the military largely to fight the same battles that previous Iraqi governments used them for in 
preceding decades (e.g. counterinsurgency against the Kurds, confrontation with Kuwait, 
involvement in an Arab-Israeli war, and military conflict with Iran).  Timmerman also misses the 
wider strategic context in which Iraqi government officials made their decisions, for example 
how Baathist leaders viewed regional and international threats. 
Another weakness of the currently-available scholarship on Iraq is that it is relatively 
dated.  Most of the aforementioned books that have looked at expansion of the Iraqi armed forces 
between 1968 and 1990 were published during the 1990s, often just after the first Persian Gulf 
War.  In many accounts that relied on evidence from before the fall of the Saddam regime, one 
gets the sense that the expansion of the Iraqi armed forces was almost exclusively a function of 
the policies of suppliers, who were motivated by either political or economic interests.  New 
information has been brought to light regarding Iraqi strategic thinking during the Baathist reign 
since Timmerman and others have examined Iraqi political-military decision-making during the 
1990s.  As discussed in further detail below, the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq has given us data 
that was not available during the time that Timmerman and his contemporaries were 
investigating the Baathist regime.   
The third school of thought argues that Iraq’s patrons were unsuccessful in controlling 
their client.  The basic assumption here does not change from the previous two schools (i.e. it 
was supplier interests that drove Iraq’s military build-up, not decisions made by Iraqi leaders), 
but the conclusion of the narrative here is slightly different: rather than creating a puppet, this 
narrative argues, Baghdad’s patrons created a monster which they could no longer control.  
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Unlike Timmerman’s account, this school of thought generally overlooks the commercial profits 
of Iraqi arms imports and instead focuses on the political, or strategic, dimensions.  For example, 
Evan Resnick argues that the United States, despite playing a key role in Iraq’s military build-up, 
was unable to achieve the objectives that justified its strategy (e.g. stopping Baghdad’s 
sponsorship of international terrorism or its weapons and ballistic missile programs).34  Resnick 
concludes that the U.S. attempt to transform an adversary into an “ally of convenience… 
inadvertently resulted... in the creation a stronger adversary…  Nearly a decade of virtually 
unconditional U.S. strategic support dramatically increased Iraq’s military power,” without 
providing tangible benefits to U.S. national security.35   
Similarly, Bruce Jentleson argues that “American policy toward Iraq from 1982 to 1990 
failed” because it led to the creation of a powerful rogue state which posed a menace to U.S. 
allies in the Persian Gulf and broke international norms by using weapons of mass destruction 
against foreign troops and its own population.36  Jentleson’s account is similar to that of Mark 
Phythian, who points out that the 1990-1991 Gulf War was the result of a failed Western military 
aid policy towards Iraq during the 1980s.37  Authors such as Resnick, Jentleson, and Phythian all 
argue that the United States did have interests in developing military ties with Iraq, but contrary 
to the “successful arming of Iraq” narrative, these authors note that Washington “failed” in its 
bargaining with Baghdad.38  In other words, the United States and its allies contributed to the 
arming of Iraq but they were unable to get any policy concessions in return, i.e. they were not 
able to stop Iraq’s support of international terrorism or its development of weapons-of-mass 
                                                 
34 Resnick, “Strange Bedfellows,” 144-184. 
35 Resnick, “Strange Bedfellows,” 181. 
36 Jentleson, With Friends Like These, 250. 
37 Mark Phythian, Arming Iraq. 
38 Resnick, “Strange Bedfellows,” 181. 
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destruction.  Similarly, some scholars who have examined Iraqi-Soviet security cooperation 
during the 1970s and 1980s found that Moscow was unable to exercise significant influence over 
Baghdad.  For example, examining Iraqi-Soviet relations between 1968 and 1990, Oles 
Smolansky concluded that Moscow derived negligible military, economic, or political benefits 
from exporting arms to Baghdad.39  Similarly, Francis Fukuyama found that “Baghdad's 
dependence on the Soviet Union has been more apparent than real” and that Moscow’s “arms 
transfers have not proven a particularly effective source of influence” over Iraq.40   
A major shortcoming in understanding Iraqi military power is that all three schools of 
thought above focus on the supplier side of Baghdad’s military build-up.  That the policies of the 
recipient state have not played a leading role in the story of its own military build-up has been, in 
part, a function of the secrecy of the Baathist regime.  As discussed in greater detail below, that 
veil of secrecy has been lifted over the past few years: the National Defense University’s 
Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC), based in Washington, DC, currently houses an 
archive containing tens of thousands of Iraqi government documents from the period between 
1968 and 2003, which were transferred to the United States following the 2003 Gulf War.  A 
limited number of works based on the archive have been published, most extensively by David 
Palkki, Kevin Woods, Hal Brands, and Joseph Sassoon.41  Most of these authors research have 
looked at topics other than Iraqi military aid policy.42  For example, Woods and his team’s 
                                                 
39 Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, 290. 
40 Fukuyama, Iraq and the Soviet Union since 1968, v and 75, respectively. 
41 For examples of works based on the Saddam Hussein Collection, see Kevin Woods, David Palkki, Mark Stout, 
The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant’s Regime, 1978-2001 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011); Hal Brands and David Palkki, “‘Conspiring Bastards’: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic View of 
the United States,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 36, Issue 3 (June 2012), 625-659; and Joseph Sassoon, Saddam 
Hussein's Baath Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.) 
42 One exception is Joseph Sassoon’s article on Iraqi-German cooperation during the 1970s and 1980s, which is 
discussed more in chapter five.  See Joseph Sassoon, “The East German Ministry for State Security and Iraq, 1968–
1989,” Journal of Cold War Studies (Winter 2014), Vol. 16, No. 1, 4-23. 
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publications have tended to focus on military planning and operations, such as Iraqi decision-
making as it pertains to military preparations for the first and second Gulf Wars,43 the 
perspective of Iraqi generals during the Iran-Iraq War,44 and Baghdad’s sponsorship of 
terrorism.45  Even though Iraq ultimately became well-known for its wide arsenal of 
conventional and unconventional weapons, no archival research of the collection has been 
conducted to understand how it actually acquired this arsenal. 
The opening of the Saddam Hussein Collection (SHC) changes much of our previous 
understanding of Baathist political-military decision-making and the Iraqi armed forces between 
1968 and 1990.  For example, in 2013 Ibrahim al-Marashi, a noted scholar of Iraqi military 
history, published a book chapter on the Iraqi military in which he noted that his analysis of 
newly “declassified Iraqi documents revealed a dramatically different picture of Iraqi political-
military communications and strategy from 1980 to 2003” than the one presented prior to the 
opening of the SHC.46  Meanwhile, analysing the SHC, Caitlin Talmadge concludes that the Iraqi 
military was “quite effective on the battlefield” during the 1980s as a result of the changes 
undertaken by the Iraqi government “with respect to promotions, training, command 
arrangements, and information management in the military.”47  In Talmadge’s description, the 
Iraqi armed forces are presented as a much more flexible learning organization than the one 
                                                 
43 See Kevin Woods, et al, Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior 
Leadership (Naval Institute Press, 2006), and Kevin Wood’s The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic 
Plan for the Persian Gulf War (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2008.) 
44 Kevin Woods, Williamson Murray, Elizabeth Nathan, Laila Sabara, Ana Venegas, Saddam’s Generals: 
Perspectives of the Iran-Iraq War (Institute for Defense Analyses, 2011.) 
45 Kevin Woods et al., Saddam Hussein and Terrorism, Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents, 
Volumes 1-5 (Institute for Defense Analyses, 2007.) 
46 Ibrahim al-Marashi, “Lessons Learned: Civil-military relations during the Iran-Iraq War and their influence on the 
1991 Gulf War and 2003 Iraq War,” 17, in Nigel Ashton and Bryan Gibson (editors), The Iran-Iraq War: New 
International Perspectives (Routledge, Oxon: 2013.) 
47 Caitlin Talmadge, “The Puzzle of Personalist Performance: Iraqi Battlefield Effectiveness in the Iran-Iraq War,” 
Security Studies, Volume 22, Issue 2 (May 8, 2013), 180-221. 
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presented in Pollack’s description of the Iraqi armed forces as largely an ineffective and 
inflexible organization during much of the 1980s.48  
Many of the previous attempts to analyse Iraqi decision-making during this period were 
based primarily on official Iraqi media sources, which were in essence propaganda outlets for the 
Baathist regime.  For example, in 1991 Oles Smolansky published the most comprehensive book 
on Iraqi-Soviet relations, which was largely based on reading official government 
pronouncements in Moscow and Baghdad and information that appeared in the Soviet and Iraqi 
press.  As Smolansky points out in the preface to the book, “Since access to relevant Soviet and 
Iraqi source material remains closed... research had to be conducted primarily in Soviet and Iraqi 
(as well as general Arab) public sources [which normally] operated under strict government 
supervision [and] reflected the current party line.”49  The lack of access to internal Iraqi 
government documents which Smolansky faced in conducting his research in the early 1990s is a 
gap which my research seeks to address.  Similarly, in their political biography of Saddam 
Hussein, Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi cite public Iraqi sources, such as the Baghdad Domestic 
Service, Al-Jumhurriya (“The Republic”), or Al-Thawra (“The Revolution”), all of which served 
as the mouth-pieces of the Iraqi government.50  Julian Schofield’s more recent research is based 
on his analysis of Iraq’s political-military decision-making between 1968 and 1990 on literature 
that was mostly written during those decades, when there was limited access to Iraqi officials.51   
                                                 
48 For example, Pollack writes that “the Iraqis simply did not learn from one battle to the next.  Each time they 
committed the same errors they had the last time.”  See Pollack, Arabs at War, 202.  Pollack’s book was published 
prior to the opening of the SHC. 
49 Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, x-xi. 
50 Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein—a Political Biography (New York: The Free Press, 1991.) 
51 Julian Schofield, Militarization and War (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 127-140.  Despite having 
published the book (which was based on his PhD thesis) in 2007, Schofield cites only one article that was written 
after 2000: Kevin Woods’ 2006 article in Foreign Affairs, which is based in part on research of the SHC. 
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While public Iraqi government sources are useful in understanding the ideological 
underpinnings of Baathist policies, as research of the Hussein archive shows, they do not always 
reveal the true motivations of the Iraqi government.52   In fact, while some SHC documents 
confirm previous assumptions regarding the Iraqi regime, others illustrate that internally the 
Baathist leadership had a very different perspective or strategy than the one they portrayed 
outwardly.  The lack of understanding of Baathist decision-making between 1968 and 1990 has 
resulted in the personification of Iraqi policies in the one leader that Western audiences 
ultimately became familiar with: Saddam Hussein.53  Consequently, many accounts of Baathist-
era Iraqi decision-making have argued that the whole of Iraq was simply governed by one 
person,54 who some view as an irrational megalomaniac.55  My analysis shows a more nuanced 
and complex account of Iraqi decision-making between 1968 and 1990, whose policies and 
objectives were more rational and pragmatic than previously thought. 
IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH 
Since its invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Iraq has often been on the front page of international news 
and at the forefront of academic analysis.  Nevertheless, the 22-year build-up that preceded this 
                                                 
52 One of the few Western researchers during this period who was able to gain access to the elite Iraqi policymaking 
circle was Christine Moss Helms.  In the early and mid-1980s Moss conducted an interview with Iraq’s then- 
President Hussein, Tariq Aziz, and other top Baathist officials, and wrote a book in the following year that was 
sympathetic to the Iraqi government.   See Christine Moss Helms and Saddam Hussein, President Hussein 
Interviewed by American Researcher (Baghdad: Dar al-Mamun for Translation and Publishing, 1983), and Christine 
Moss Helms, Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab World (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1984.)  
53 The list of books written about Saddam Hussein is too long to list in full.  Two frequently-cited accounts of 
Hussein’s role in Iraqi decision-making include Jerrold Post and Amatzia Baram’s Saddam is Iraq: Iraq is Saddam 
(Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: USAF Counterproliferation Centre, 2002) and Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi’s 
aforementioned political biography of Hussein. 
54 For example, see Jerrold Post and Amatzia Baram, Saddam Is Iraq: Iraq is Saddam (Maxwell Air Force Base, 
Ala.: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2002.) 
55 This was especially true following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, after which Iraq became known as a 
“rogue” or “pariah state.” For example, see Elaine Sciolino, The Outlaw State—Saddam Hussein’s Quest for Power 
and the Gulf Crisis (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1991.) 
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period has too often been ignored.  Analysing Iraq’s military build-up between 1968 and 1990 
can help shed light on three subject areas.  First, this research can help improve our 
understanding of a crucial (though now largely overlooked) part of Iraqi history.  As was pointed 
out above, much of the current analysis of Iraqi history does not adequately capture the 
perspective of the Baathist leadership.  The opening of the SHC presents an opportunity to re-
examine why and how Baathist leaders turned Iraq into the military power that it ultimately 
became during the late 1980s. 
 Second, my research can shed light on military aid as an instrument of foreign policy and 
when it can be an effective instrument of policy, a subject that has taken on heightened 
importance in light of recent events in Egypt.  As will be shown in the next chapters, military aid 
is often perceived by policymakers in supplier states as useful means to exercise leverage over 
recipients.  For example, in testimony in front of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee in 
April 2013, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry noted that because of U.S.-Egyptian security 
cooperation, during the Arab Spring “we had Majors who could talk to each other, we had 
Colonels who could call on the phone [and attempt to influence the Egyptian military’s 
actions.]”56  Nevertheless, despite attempts by American policymakers to use military aid to call 
for free-and-democratic elections in Cairo,57 in December 2013 Egypt’s interim government 
designated the main opposition party, the Muslim Brotherhood, a “terrorist group” and banned it 
from running in elections.58  Given the scale of U.S. military aid which was provided to the 
Egyptian armed forces, it seems counter-intuitive that Washington was not able to exercise more 
                                                 
56 Remarks by U.S. Secretary John Kerry, quoted in Gregory Kausner, “Opportunities and Challenges in Security 
Cooperation,” State Department (April 24, 2013) < http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/2013/207939.htm.> 
57 See, for example, John McCain and Lindsey Graham, “Cut off aid to Egypt, Senate leaders say,” Washington Post 
(July 12, 2013) and Peter Baker, “A Coup?  Or Something Else?  $1.5 Billion in U.S. Aid is on the Line,” The New 
York Times (July 4, 2013), A11. 
58 See “Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood declared ‘terrorist group,’” BBC News (December 25, 2013.) 
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influence over political decision-making in post-Arab Spring Egypt.  By shedding light on the 
behaviour of the Iraqi government vis-à-vis military imports, this research argues that supplier 
states must combine their military aid policies with a pragmatic understanding of the recipient 
state’s politics. Abstract visions, such as the promotion of Western-style democracy, cannot be 
accomplished without regard for domestic idiosyncrasies. 
Finally, this research sheds light on the utility of defence dependence theory, which is 
discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.  Defence dependence theory (the predominant 
school of thought in current scholarship on arms transfers) essentially argues that the import of 
arms only exacerbates the political, military, and economic problems of a recipient state.  
Additionally, the theory argues that arms imports allow for a strong supplier to manipulate a 
weak recipient into following policies which do not serve its interests.  As Herbert Wulf, a 
defence dependence theorist, writes: 
Importing sophisticated arms from industrialized countries is by no means a panacea for the 
defence of a nation’s sovereignty against outside aggression.  On the contrary, the importation of 
modern arms allows for an intensified penetration by metropolitan countries into societies in the 
underdeveloped world.  Instead of the establishment of political and military independence, new 




In addition, Nemat Shafik has argued the attempt of “modern Arab governments… to 
secure weapons from their erstwhile enemies [has] deepened [their] technological dependence 
and accelerated the dismantling of the Arabs’ own economic and social systems.”60  I will 
examine whether defence dependence theory’s primary assumptions regarding the motivations of 
recipient-states regarding recipients’ behaviour held true in the case of Iraqi military imports 
between 1968 and 1990.  In addition, I will test whether Iraq’s primary military suppliers were 
                                                 
59 Herbert Wulf in Harkavy and Neuman (Editors), Arms Transfers in the Modern World, 246. 
60 Nemat Shafik, “Technology: A Disintegrative Factor in the Arab World,” in Michael Hudson (editor), The Middle 
East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 260. 
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able to influence Baghdad’s foreign, domestic, economic, and military policies during this period 
as defence dependence predicts. 
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
Between 1968 and 1990, Soviet and U.S. political-military policies contributed most to the build-
up of Iraqi military power.61  Therefore, it is appropriate to use the terminology regarding 
military aid used in either of these countries.  In U.S. government parlance, military assistance 
falls under the umbrella of “security cooperation,” a term which has been adopted in the 
academic community62 and by the media63 to discuss the exchange of defence articles and 
services across borders.  More specifically, the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
(DSCA) defines security cooperation as, 
All [Defence Department] interactions with foreign defence establishments to build defence 
relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military 
capabilities for self-defence and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime 
and contingency access to a host nation.
64
 
Security cooperation involves activities such as the training, advising, and equipping of 
foreign militaries, hosting joint military exercises, and sharing military intelligence, which will 
be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.  In this research, security cooperation will be 
used to describe any defence relations between a supplier and a recipient that are primarily meant 
                                                 
61 Both were also the largest military suppliers in this period.  U.S. conventional arms accounted for roughly 32.6% 
and Soviet military exports made up 37.2% of global arms transfers.  SIPRI, 1968-1990. 
62 For example, see Derek Reveron, Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the 
Changing Face of the U.S. Military (Georgetown University Press, 2010), 104-105. 
63 For an example of the usage of security cooperation in the media, see “US Senate panel backs Ukraine aid, 
hurdles remain,” Agence France Presse (March 12, 2014) Accessed: March 15, 2014 < news.yahoo.com/us-
lawmakers-split-over-imf-reforms-ukraine-aid-171220159.html > 
64 U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), The Management 
of Security Cooperation “The Green Book,” 31st Edition (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio: 2012), 1.  
Hereafter this will be referred to by itself unofficial name, Green Book. 
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to enhance the military capabilities of the recipient state and promote either the geopolitical, 
economic, or military interests of the supplier state.  Importantly, security cooperation includes 
security assistance activities such as Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs, which often 
dominate military (and arguably diplomatic) relations between countries.65  In the United States, 
FMS, which is administered by the U.S. Defense Department, normally refers to the transfer of 
defence articles between governments in supplier and recipient states.  Separately, Direct 
Commercial Sales (DCS) includes agreements between a defence company in (rather than the 
government of) a supplier state, and the government of the recipient state.  Unlike FMS, DCS 
licenses must be approved by the U.S. Department of State.  Furthermore, dual-list items (i.e. 
items which could be used for both civil and military purposes) must also receive a license by the 
U.S. Commerce Department.66  The distinction between the various types of exports is 
important: in the period under study (especially during the 1980s) foreign companies often sold 
directly dual-list items to the Iraqi government; different U.S. government departments objected 
to exporting weapons technologies to Iraq, while others support them.67 
Measured in total monetary value, security assistance forms the largest fraction of 
security cooperation, the financial burden of which can be shared by the recipient and supplier 
states in varying degrees.  According to the Defense Institute of Security Assistance 
Management (DISAM)68, “the purchasing government pays all costs associated with a [foreign 
                                                 
65 In official U.S. terminology, the term security assistance (previously military assistance) was introduced by the 
U.S. Congress in 1976 “to include the political and economic aspects, as well as the military aspects, of arms 
transfers.”  William Mott, United States Military Assistance: an Empirical Perspective (Westport, CT: Praeger, 
2002), 5. 
66 DISAM, Green Book, 3-8. 
67 In particular, in the United States there was a conflict between the U.S. Department of Commerce (which was 
more lenient about exporting items to Iraq) and the U.S. Department of Defense (which objected to exporting dual-
items to Iraq.) 
68 DISAM is a U.S. military institution which “provides professional education, research, and support to advance 
U.S. foreign policy through security assistance and cooperation.”  See DISAM’s website: www.disam.dsca.mil . 
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military] sale.”69  Nevertheless, a number of security assistance programs – primarily the Foreign 
Military Financing Program (FMFP), the Military Assistance Program, and the Economic 
Support Fund – have either existed in the past or are currently available to provide loans, grants, 
and other types of economic aid to countries interested in purchasing U.S. defence articles and 
services.70  Two examples of recipient states that financed external security assistance programs 
with their own government funds were Iran during the 1960s and 1970s71 and Saudi Arabia from 
the late 1970s onwards.72  The increase in oil prices following the 1973 OPEC oil-embargo 
enabled both countries to increase their military imports.   
In other cases, the supplier has borne the burden. Since the late 1970s, Israel and Egypt 
have received an annual average of $3 billion in security assistance paid for by the United 
States.73  Both countries received yearly grants through the FMFP.74  Such programs were driven 
both by American geopolitical interests in the Middle East and by the security concerns of its 
local allies.  In general, financing of security cooperation-related programs is negotiated on a 
case-by-case basis and determined by the interests of the countries involved, arguably more so 
by the interests of the supplier states.  In American official terminology, academic journals, 
                                                 
69 DISAM, Green Book, 1-1 – 1-2. 
70 DISAM, Green Book, 1-1 – 1-27. 
71 Under the Shah, Iran paid for the majority of the military assistance program.  See U.S. Department of State, 
“Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXII, Iran,” Office of the Historian, Docs. 94-95, 98-
100, 108-111, 114, 122, 126, 124, 129. 
72 The U.S. Military Training Mission - Saudi Arabia (USMTM) conducts “advise, train, and equip” missions with 
the Saudi Ministries of Interior, Defence and Aviation, and National Guard.  The FMS cases that fall under 
USTMSM’s mission are funded by the Saudi government. 
73 In recent years, U.S. military aid to Egypt averaged roughly $1.3 billion (between Fiscal Years 2007 and 2009.)  
Military aid to Israel during that period averaged roughly $2.5 billion.  See Jeremy Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Assistance 
to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2011 Request,” Congressional Research 
Service (June 15, 2010) <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32260.pdf>, and U.S. State Department, “Egypt: 
Security Assistance,” Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (2008)  <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/64694.htm.> 
74 Between 1979 and 2006, Egypt received roughly $34 billion in foreign military financing “to purchase U.S.-
manufactured military goods and services.”  See: “Security Assistance: State and DOD Need to Assess How the 
Foreign Military Financing Program for Egypt achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Security Goals,” Government 
Accountability Office (May 12, 2006) < www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-437. > 
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newspaper articles, and other literature on the subject, security cooperation may alternatively be 
referred to by different names, sometimes varying slightly in meaning: defence cooperation, 
military cooperation, military aid, military assistance, arms transfers, or arms trade.75  Other 
countries use different terminology for the same concept.76  In addition, within the field of 
military aid there is covert assistance, which is normally led by the intelligence apparatus of the 
supplier state, for example the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the United States.  
Historically, the CIA has played a greater role in secretly propping up Arab regimes than other 
U.S. agencies which are involved in security cooperation, and more than most other countries in 
the Middle East.77  In this research, the various terms that are associated with military aid will be 
used to highlight a particular element in the transfer of defence articles and services, such as 
training, advising, maintenance, and other support services.  In terms of the expansion of Iraq’s 
armed forces, security cooperation and particularly security assistance -- that is, the import of 
military hardware, rather than military-military engagements, basing rights, or other forms of 
security cooperation -- dominated the development of the Iraqi armed forces in the period under 
study. 
                                                 
75 For example, offices dealing with foreign military assistance are called the U.S. Office of Security Cooperation in 
Iraq, the U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation in the UK, or the U.S. Office of Military Cooperation in Egypt.  See: 
<http://iraq.usembassy.gov/armsdealfeb18.html>; <http://london.usembassy.gov/odc/index.html>; 
<http://alexandria.usconsulate.gov/sections-offices/office-of-military-cooperation.html>.  
76 See Jennifer Moroney et al., Lessons from U.S. Allies in Security Cooperation with Third Countries: The Cases of 
Australia, France, and the United Kingdom (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011.) 
77 For example, see Hugh Wilford, America's Greatest Game: the CIA's Secret Arabists and the Shaping of the 
Modern Middle East (New York: Basic Books, 2013.) 
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SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
My research seeks to understand better the expansion of the Iraqi armed forces through security 
cooperation.  In particular, I look at Iraqi history between 1968, when the Baath party took over 
through a military coup, and 1990, just before Iraq invaded Kuwait.  I focus on the policies that 
Baathist leaders pursued throughout this period in order to establish and exercise sovereignty 
over Iraq and project Baghdad’s power in the region.  Furthermore, I look at some of the political 
and economic challenges that they faced in increasing Iraq’s military power through arms 
imports.  Although military power is a core issue of my research, I do not attempt to describe 
every battle that the Iraqi armed forces participated in.  Instead, I focus on the military 
campaigns or policies that directly relate to the subject of Iraqi military imports. 
My methodology involves examining a number of primary sources.  Prior to the 2003 
invasion, interviews with Baathist officials were limited.  Although the Baathist regime was not 
completely reclusive prior to 1990,78 information on Iraq’s national security strategy was kept as 
one of the highest state secrets by the Iraqi political leadership.  Most historic accounts of 
Baathist political-military decision-making, therefore, rely mostly on either official Iraqi 
government propaganda or secondary sources which do not reveal the internal deliberations of 
Iraqi policymakers during this period.  For example, utilizing discourse analysis, Ofra Bengio 
has looked at Baathist propaganda sources, such as the daily periodical Al-Thawra, in order to 
“follow the political processes” in Iraq.79  Other authors, as discussed in greater detail in the 
                                                 
78 A limited number of Western journalists were able to conduct interviews with Iraq’s top leadership in the period 
under study.  For example, see Christine Moss Helms and Saddam Hussein, President Hussein Interviewed by 
American Researcher (Dar al-Mamun: Baghdad, 1983) 
<http://archive.org/details/PresidentHusseinInterviewedByAmericanResearcher > and Helms, Iraq. 
79 Ofra Bengio, Saddam’s Word: the Political Discourse in Iraq (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1998.) 
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literature review above, have relied on official government sources to understand Baghdad’s 
perspectives on issues of war, diplomacy, and economics.80   
Following the 2003 Gulf War, Baathist-era Iraqi government documents were captured 
by the U.S. military and transferred to the CRRC.81  Today, the CRRC’s Saddam Hussein 
Collection houses nearly 60,000 pages of Iraqi government files (close to 1,000 Iraqi state 
records), all of which are dated before April 9, 2003, less than one month into the invasion of 
Iraq.82  The archive provides an invaluable, first-hand look into how Baathist leaders made 
national security decisions, including with regard to foreign military aid.  It includes audio 
recordings of high-level meetings of Iraqi political and military officials, official security 
cooperation agreements for the import of military equipment and cooperation in military 
production, and intelligence reports detailing the military strength of Iraq’s adversaries.  It also 
houses letters sent to foreign leaders (including on issues related to security cooperation), inter-
ministerial correspondences, presidential records, personal correspondences, speeches by senior 
Baathist officials, policy memos, and Iraqi military journals.  Although several of the documents 
from the archive are available online, and a number of reports on Iraqi political-military 
perspectives prior to 2003 based on the archive have been published,83 most of the captured Iraqi 
official documents are only accessible by going to the actual archive in Washington, DC.  
Between 2012 and 2013, I was granted access to the archive, which I used to answer the key 
                                                 
80 For example, see Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked’s Middle East Contemporary Survey, 1984-1985, Volume 
9; Volumes 1984-1995 (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Centre, 1987), 460 - 486.  As with other analysts of Iraq during the 
1970s and 1980s, their analysis was based primarily on Iraqi media sources, which were often propaganda outlets 
for the Baathist regime. 
81 Michael Gordon, “Papers from Iraqi Archive Reveal Conspiratorial Mind-Set of Hussein,” New York Times.  
(October 25, 2011), A12. 
82 For the official website of the archive, see “Saddam Hussein Collection,” Conflict Records Research Centre, 
National Defence University (NDU), Washington, D.C.  < http://crrc.dodlive.mil/collections/sh/.> 
83 For examples, see abovementioned publications by Woods et al., including The Iraqi Perspectives Project, 
Saddam’s Generals, Saddam Hussein and Terrorism, and The Saddam Tapes.  
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questions posed above.  Collectively, the documents allowed me to gain a profound 
understanding of the Baathist vision for the Iraqi military power, the challenges that Iraqi leaders 
faced in procuring conventional and unconventional weapons from abroad, and the strategies that 
they employed in dealing with their military suppliers.  As I found out, some of the documents at 
the archive, which heretofore have been examined by only a limited number of researchers, call 
for a modification of some of the previous narratives on Iraqi history. 
The archive does, however, have a number of limitations.  Given that the documents were 
seized amidst wide-scale looting and destruction in Iraq following the fall of the Baathist regime 
in 2003, the archive does not contain all of the official records from the Baathist-era.84  
Furthermore, the objectivity of documents in the archive is variable.  Some of the Iraqi 
government documents that were meant for public consumption exhibit systemic bias.  For 
example, a pamphlet entitled Cultural Program for Political Guidance, which was published by 
the “Department of Political Guidance” within the Ministry of Defence in the late 1980s, calls 
the outcome of the Iran-Iraq war a “great victory” for the Iraqi armed forces in which the Iraqi 
military “destroyed the Persian enemy.”85  As will be seen, although the Iran-Iraq War ended in 
1988 after five successful Iraqi military operations, the outcome of the war can hardly be 
described as a “great victory.”  On the other hand, many internal Iraqi government 
correspondences and strategy and policy documents are quite realistic and pragmatic.  For 
example, while Baathist officials publicly claimed that the Arab side won the 1973 Arab-Israeli 
                                                 
84 For example, Iraq’s National Library and Archives, a facility which was located directly across the Ministry of 
Defence in Baghdad, was initially reported to have been completely burned and looted.  Other facilities that housed 
Iraqi government manuscripts were similarly looted in the post-2003 chaos.  For a discussion of the impact of 
looting on Iraqi archives, see Nabil Al-Tikriti, “‘Stuff Happens’: A Brief Overview of the 2003 Destruction of Iraqi 
Manuscript Collections, Archives, and Libraries,” Library Trends, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Winter 2007), 730–745. 
85 SH‐MODX‐D‐000‐582, “Document, entitled 'Cultural Program for Political Guidance: Part 3,' regarding Iraqi 
military strategy and the Baathist regime,” 1989. 
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war, in private they recognised that the Arab forces were in fact roundly defeated by Israel.86  
Additionally, during the late 1970s Baathist leaders were quite realistic about how far behind 
they were in terms of their indigenous military industry.87   
Given the potential for inherent bias in some of the archival documents, all Iraqi 
government documents, whether offering an objective description or exhibiting systematic bias, 
were cross-referenced against other available evidence, such as previous non-Iraqi research 
conducted on Iraqi history, journal articles from the time period, and quantitative data on 
Baghdad’s military expenditures, its conventional military balance, and its arms imports.88 
In addition, some of the CRRC archive’s unofficial translations of the Arabic text are either of 
sub-par quality or are incomplete because they are based on inadequate audio-recordings.  In 
such cases, I have used common sense and cross-referenced other works based on the archive 
(for example, Kevin Woods’ The Saddam Tapes) in order to better understand the essential 
meaning behind the discussions.  In cases where the meaning of the translation was unclear, I 
omitted citing the Iraqi government file.  Despite these limitations, the documents that are 
available at the CRRC provide an unprecedented inside look into Iraqi decision-making during 
the Baathist era and serve as a vital resource in answering the primary research questions posed 
above.89   
                                                 
86 For example, see discussion in SH‐PDWN‐D‐000‐341, “Saddam Hussein speech at al‐Bakr University, entitled 
‘The Role of the Iraqi Armed Forces in the Arabic‐Zionist Conflict,’” June 3, 1978.  As will be seen in later 
chapters, the Arab defeat in 1973 contributed to several changes in the logistical structures of the Iraqi armed forces 
which proved important during the Iran-Iraq War. 
87 SH‐RVCC‐D‐000‐805, "Saddam Hussein speeches regarding the importance of science, technology, and 
manufacturing, and the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict," April 1977 to March 1978. 
88 For quantitative data, the IISS series, The Military Balance, and SIPRI’s on-line arms import database were 
particularly important. 
89 For a discussion of the CRRC archive, see Lawrence Rubin, “Research Note: Documenting Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraq,” Contemporary Security Policy, Volume 32, Number 2 (August 2011), 458-466, and Sassoon, Saddam 
Hussein’s Ba’th Party, 1.  
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It is also worth noting that Stanford University’s Hoover Institution houses another set of 
Baath-era Iraqi government documents.90  However, there are a number of limitations to the 
Hoover archive in the context of my research.  First and foremost, my research is fundamentally 
focused on Iraqi foreign policy and national security decision-making, whereas the Hoover 
Institution’s provides a perspective into the internal affairs of the Baathist regime.  As Lawrence 
Rubin notes, “while most of the CRRC’s documents on Iraq are related to national security and 
diplomacy… the Hoover Institution [houses] Ba’ath Party records from 1968-2003 that detail 
how Saddam ran his dictatorship.”91  Secondly, in discussions with individuals who work at the 
archive, I was told out that all of the documents are solely available in Arabic and that no full 
English translations exist.  In order to benefit from the potential insights of the Hoover Institute, I 
carefully consulted the two leading texts based on this archive: Joseph Sassoon’s Saddam 
Hussein’s Ba’th Party and Dina Khoury’s Iraq in Wartime: Soldiering, Martyrdom, and 
Remembrance.92  
I also conducted interviews and background discussions with Iraqi political-military 
officials from the era and experts of Iraqi history.  In particular, I benefited from interviewing 
Falah Hassan, who attained the rank of Colonel in the Iraqi Air Force (IQAF) in the period under 
study and is currently the commanding general of Iraq’s nascent air force, and Major General 
Najim Abed Al-Jabouri, who served with the IQAF during the Iran-Iraq War.  Numerous 
scholars of Iraq and the Middle East, such as Professors Gawdat Bahgat and Amatzia Baram, as 
well as scholar-practitioners such as Mowaffak Al-Rubaie (a former Iraqi National Security 
                                                 
90 For a discussion of the Hoover Institution’s archive, see Hugh Eakin, “Iraqi Files in U.S.: Plunder or Rescue?” 
New York Times (July 1, 2008) <www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/books/01hoov.html?_r=0 >, accessed: April 2, 
2015. 
91 Rubin, “Research Note,” 459. 
92 Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party, and Dina Khoury, Iraq in Wartime: Soldiering, Martyrdom, and 
Remembrance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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Adviser) and Sterling Jensen (General David Petraeus’ Arabic interpreter during the 2003 Gulf 
War), also shared their observations of Iraqi history and Baathist-era national security decision-
making in the period under study.  Their insights were invaluable in framing my understanding 
of Iraqi government policies in the period under study. 
In addition, I consulted open-source transcripts of post-2003 interviews with former Iraqi 
political-military officials, such as a series of interviews of Saddam Hussein conducted by the 
FBI in 2004, a series of interviews with five retired senior Iraqi military officers conducted in 
2009 by Kevin Woods and his team at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), and an 
interview with Tariq Aziz conducted by Al-Arabiya in 2012.93  Although these transcripts added 
to my understanding of how the Iraqi government formulated its national security decisions 
during the period between 1968 and 1990, such interviews have a number of limitations.  For 
example, the FBI’s interviews with Hussein were conducted following the overthrow of the 
Baathist regime in 2003, only months before Hussein’s execution, and may have been conducted 
under duress.  Similarly, some of the recent interviews with Tariq Aziz, the former Iraqi deputy 
prime minister and foreign minister, were conducted while Aziz was still a prisoner, sentenced to 
death, in ill-health, and awaiting execution; it is possible that his answers were skewed in part by 
the pressure of his conditions.  Meanwhile, the IDA’s interviews with the five Iraqi generals 
were conducted several decades following the Iran-Iraq War and thus their recollection of events 
which happened in a seemingly distant past may have been incomplete. 
An important consideration that I have had to make in interpreting both the interviews 
which I conducted and transcripts of interviews conducted by outside sources was the impact of 
                                                 
93 Post-2003 interviews with senior Iraqi officials include U.S. Department of Justice, “FBI Interview with Saddam 
Hussein,” Baghdad Operations Centre, Federal Bureau of Investigations (February 15, 2004); “Interview with Tariq 
Aziz,” Al-Arabiya (April 21, 2012); and Kevin Woods et al, Saddam’s Generals, 2011. 
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time on the recollection of events by retired Iraqi politicians and military officers.  As mentioned 
above, many of the interviews cited in this research were conducted years or decades after 
certain decisions were made.  Unlike the policy papers or strategy documents found in the 
Saddam Hussein archive, the answers that Iraqi leaders gave after 2003 may have been skewed 
by a poor recollection of events that happened decades earlier.  On the other hand, the time that 
has passed has, to a certain extent, allowed former Iraqi officials to take a more objective 
viewpoint towards their understanding of Iraq during the time period.  For example, in a 2009 
interview retired Iraqi Major General Aladdin Hussein Makki Khammas noted that during the 
Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s “everyone loved [Saddam Hussein]”94 because “in a crisis, people 
rally around their commander.  At the time, everyone supported Saddam and thought of him as a 
national hero.”95  Without the presence of Baathist political officers standing behind their 
shoulders, Makki and other professional Iraqi military officers who were interviewed decades 
later have given more objective accounts of Iraqi political and military policies during the 1970s 
and 1980s.96  My research thus adds to our understanding of the subject raised above by 
combining archival research of the SHC and information garnered from more recent interviews 
with Iraqi political and military officials. 
STRUCTURE 
Chapter two discusses contending viewpoints on the political, economic, and military 
dimensions of security cooperation.  Although it does not propose a new theory on the 
international arms trade, it engages elements of the conventional wisdom on military aid which 
                                                 
94 Interview with Khammas in Saddam’s Generals, 149. 
95 Interview with Khammas in Saddam’s Generals, 118. 
96 See, for example, the various interviews in Woods et al., Saddam’s Generals. 
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later chapters address by looking at the expansion of Iraq’s armed forces between 1968 and 
1990.  Chapter three, “The Strategic Context,” looks at the various strategic challenges facing 
Iraqi and its military suppliers, including threat perceptions and the demand for military imports, 
the link between military aid and a foreign military presence, and the impact of arms transfers on 
regional arms races and the military balance of power.  The fourth chapter, “Supplier Influence,” 
looks at how Iraqi leaders went about procuring arms from abroad and how its suppliers looked 
to exercise leverage over three distinct areas, including Iraq’s foreign policy, security policy and 
internal affairs. 
Chapter five, “Recipient Counter-Dependence,” looks at how the Baathist leadership 
sought and was able to decrease supplier influence by employing a number of counter-
dependence strategies.  The chapter looks at Iraq’s military diversification with its military 
partners, its investment in indigenous production, its stockpiling of weapons, and other strategies 
that the Baathist leadership employed during this period to maintain political and military 
independence from its suppliers.  The next chapter, “The Economic Elements of Security 
Cooperation,” looks at a number of economic issues that were related to Iraqi military imports 
during this period.  As the chapter points out, although the transfer of arms is predominantly a 
political-military activity, it also has salient economic dimensions.  The sixth chapter therefore 
looks at how military imports impacted Iraq’s socio-economic development, at how suppliers’ 
defence industries were impacted by their export of arms to Iraq, and how military aid impacted 
Baghdad’s non-military trade relationships with its suppliers.   
Chapter seven, “The Military Impact of Arms Transfers,” looks at the impact of security 
cooperation on Iraq’s military doctrine, combat effectiveness, and civil-military relations, which 
more directly pertain to the impact of security assistance on Iraqi military capabilities.  All of the 
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chapters above are divided into three parts each.  The first two parts present empirical evidence 
from 1968-1980 and 1980-1990, respectively.  The third part within each chapter provides an 
overall assessment of the evidence from the entire period.  The concluding chapter provides a 
summary of the study’s findings and discusses its broader implications for historians of Iraq, 
arms transfer scholars, and policymakers in both supplier- and recipient-states. 
  










The concept of “power” holds a central place in international relations.1  Hans Morgenthau 
argues that “international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power.”2  Although the term 
can be interpreted in multiple ways, scholars generally agree that a state’s military capabilities 
are a critical element of its overall power.  John Mearsheimer, a contemporary international 
relations theorist who argues that “power lies at the heart of international politics,”3 provides the 
following definition: “A state’s effective power is ultimately a function of its military forces and 
how they compare with the military forces of rival states.”4  Most states in the international 
system lack an indigenous military-industrial capability to generate their own military power.  
                                                 
1 Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz (editors), The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics (Lanham, 
Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009.) 
2 Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace [Brief 
Edition] (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), 29. 
3 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), 12. 
4 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 55.  Emphasis added.   
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Consequently, in order to meet their demand for military power, they rely on importing arms and 
related services (training, maintenance, spare-parts, and so on) from abroad.  As Ian Anthony 
points out: 
With the exception of the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom and China, every country 
in the world depends on imported weapons to equip its armed forces.  Even this characterization may 
be insufficiently sweeping.  All countries import some weapon systems, subsystems and components, 
a loss of access to which would be disruptive.
5
 
Interestingly, whereas the trade in civilian goods and services has spawned numerous and 
contending theories and areas of study,6 the trade in international arms has only produced one 
comprehensive school of thought: defence dependence theory.7  In essence, the theory argues 
that arms transfers “carry the potential for creating, or increasing, dependence on its suppliers of 
arms.”8  Because of the recipient’s dependence on military imports from the supplier, the theory 
predicts that weak recipient states are likely to become “clients” or “satellites” of their “patrons,” 
serving the interests of their dominant military suppliers.9  Scholars often define dependence in 
terms of “vulnerability.”10  As Klaus Knorr notes, “dependence on [military] imports constitutes 
a vulnerability, because supplies can be disrupted in various contingencies.”11  Erik Pages 
explains the link between dependence and vulnerability in greater detail: 
[Defence dependence] refers to a situation where reliance on a foreign source raises the potential 
that one’s ability to produce critical weapon systems and/or secure the most advanced technology 
for the development of a future weapons system could be compromised... In this sense, dependence 
                                                 
5 Ian Anthony, “The Conventional Arms Trade,” in Pierre (editor), Cascade of Arms, 17.  Emphasis added. 
6 Some of the disciplines in general economics include international trade theory, international monetary theory, and 
numerous schools of thought in international development.  For a discussion of economic dependence theory, which 
is linked to defence dependence theory, see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Penguin 
Books, London, UK: 1992), 99-103. 
7 For the most detailed analysis of defence dependence theory, see Christian Catrina, Arms Transfers and 
Dependence (Geneva: UNIDIR; New York: Taylor & Francis, 1988.) 
8 Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence, 1. 
9 Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence, 295-296. 
10 For example, see Lisa Niesz, Defense Dependence on Foreign High Technology: An Assessment of U.S. 
Vulnerability (Arlington, VA: Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1990.) 
11 Klaus Knorr, “Military Strength: Economic and Non-Economic Bases,” in Klaus Knorr and Frank Trager 
(editors), Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence, KS: National Security Education Program by the 
Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), 187. 
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becomes vulnerability and affects a relationship when the opportunity costs of foregoing the 
relationship are high or intolerable.12 
The basic premise of defence dependence theory has seeped into other areas of 
international relations, most prominently into the field of alliance politics.  In a seminal work on 
the subject, Glenn Snyder reduces his concept of “alliance dependence”13 to its military core: 
military dependence.14  According to Snyder, military dependence is a function of three factors: a 
recipient state’s demand for arms imports, the extent to which an ally can fill that need through 
arms transfers, and the alternative ways in which the recipient can meet that need (for example, 
by allying with and importing arms from another state).15  Snyder argues that “a state’s 
bargaining power will be greater, the lower its dependence, the looser its commitment, and the 
greater its interests at stake.”16  Snyder’s implicit conclusion is that a supplier state normally has 
greater bargaining power vis-a-vis a recipient state, given that the latter is dependent on arms 
from the former. 
Policymakers in both supplier and recipient states sometimes share the underlying 
assumptions of defence dependence theory.  For example, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, a former 
Foreign Minister of Singapore (primarily a recipient country), has argued that military imports 
create “a new form of dependence on the great powers, which can exploit the third world’s 
dependence on them for arms to manipulate them, to engineer conflicts between them, and to use 
them as their proxies in their competition for influence and dominance.”17  Cognizant of this 
                                                 
12 Erik Pages, Responding to Defense Dependence (Westport, Conn.:  Praeger, 1996), 8. 
13 Snyder defines “alliances dependence” as “a function of the net benefit [that a country is] receiving from [its 
alliance with one state], compared to the benefits available from alternative sources.  In these terms, states may be 
dependent on their allies for a wide range of values in addition to military security- for example, prestige, domestic 
stability, support for imperial ventures.”  Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1997), 166. 
14 For the purposes of this discussion, “military dependence” and “defence dependence” refer to the same concept. 
15 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 167. 
16 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 166. 
17 Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, “Speech at 10th Plenary Meeting,” United Nations General Assembly, Thirty-First 
Session, New York (September 29, 1976.) 
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reality, in May 1977 U.S. President Jimmy Carter issued a new policy of “arms restraint” which 
unilaterally committed the United States to a reduction in total foreign military sales; vowed that 
the United States “will not be the first supplier to introduce into a region newly developed, 
advanced weapon systems;” and promised “to promote and advance respect for human rights in 
recipient countries.”18  The Carter administration viewed arms exports as “an exceptional foreign 
policy implement, to be used only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the 
transfer contributes to our national security interests.” 19   
Other policymakers take a more pragmatic approach towards the subject: they view arms 
transfers as a necessary component of a state’s foreign policy.  For example, President Ronald 
Reagan adopted a more hawkish policy towards arms transfers than the Carter administration 
did, although the underlying assumptions regarding the impact of military exports did not 
change.  President Ronald Reagan’s 1981 directive on arms transfers argued that “the United 
States [views] the transfer of conventional arms and other defence articles and services as an 
essential element of its global defence posture and an indispensable component of its foreign 
policy.”20  In addition, instead of imposing a unilateral decision to exercise limits on U.S. arms 
exports as Carter did before him, Reagan’s directive stated that “there has been... little or no 
interest in arms transfer limitations manifested by the Soviet Union…  In the absence of such 
interest, the United States will not jeopardise its own security needs through a program of 
unilateral restraint.”21 
Although there is a general consensus that military cooperation plays a leading role in 
global affairs, there is disagreement over the impact that arms transfers have on international 
                                                 
18 Jimmy Carter, “Presidential Directive-NSC 13: Conventional Arms Transfer Policy,” 1977. 
19 Carter, “Presidential Directive-NSC 13,” 1977. 
20 Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, “President Reagan’s Directive on Arms Transfer Policy,” July 8, 1981. 
21 Reagan, “President Reagan’s Directive on Arms Transfer Policy,” 1981. 
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security.  Policymakers, analysts, historians, military officers, and even journalists who cover the 
“global arms market” differ in their views of why supplier states embark on security cooperation 
relationships, why recipient states spend a supposedly inordinate amount of their state budget on 
purchasing expensive arms, and whether the security which recipients were seeking to increase is 
actually achieved through the arms purchase or whether it has a differing effect.22  In particular, 
there are five areas in which there analysts disagree: (1) the strategic context in which arms 
transfers decisions are made; (2) the leverage or influence which a supplier can exercise over a 
recipient through military aid; (3) the ways in which a recipient can mitigate its dependence; (4) 
the effect of arms transfers on the socioeconomic development of a recipient state; and (5) the 
impact of security cooperation on the recipient state’s military effectiveness, doctrine, and civil-
military relations.  This chapter surveys these five topics by looking at the various perspectives 
offered in contemporary literature on security cooperation and the transfer of arms in particular.  
The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the limitations of currently-accepted ideas 
surrounding arms transfers.  Subsequent chapters attempt to answer the core question posed in 
the introductory chapter by looking at empirical evidence on Iraq through the lens of the five 
general topics which are discussed below. 
I. THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT 
According to SIPRI data, in the period between 1968 and 1990, the top twenty-five recipient 
states accounted for almost two-thirds (65.76%) of global arms imports.  Meanwhile, the top two 
                                                 
22 For example, whereas arms transfer policies by numerous presidential administrations (including Carter and 
Reagan) guaranteed that Washington would only send arms to those countries which asked it for aid, Andrew 
Feinstein points out that during the 1970s and 1980s large defence companies in Western countries (including the 
United States) placed “agents” in recipients states who bribed local officials so that the local government would 
request expensive weapons and weapon systems from suppliers.  See Feinstein, The Shadow World.  
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recipients during that time – India (6.03%) and Iraq (5.00%) – accounted for over one-tenth of 
the total.  If one looks at the 1980s, both India and Iraq were the highest arms importers: each 
country accounted for slightly over 7% of global arms imports.23  The share of Iraqi military 
imports is staggering given its size.  For example, during the 1980s Iraq’s population was 
between 13 and 18 million, and its GDP was about $48 billion.  By comparison, during the same 
period India had a population of about 850 million and a GDP of $326 billion.24  On the supplier 
side, during the same time period, China, France, Russia, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom accounted for 86% of global conventional weapons exports.25 
Analysts often point out three areas that contribute to the strategic context of arms 
transfers, that is, the complex set of reasons for why recipients and suppliers are interested in 
importing or exporting arms to begin with.  The first factor is threat perception, which Catrina 
defines as the “extent to which a government perceives a military threat to [its] national 
security.”26  Threat perception is a particularly important factor in determining the demand of 
recipient states for foreign military aid.27  In a sense, suppliers also have their own threat 
perception calculations, although their calculations are more closely based around geo-strategic 
competition.  This leads to the second issue.  Supplier states often justify military aid as a way 
through which they can “project power.”28  This is because transfer of weapons is often tied to a 
supplier staging a foreign military presence on a recipient’s territory.  A supplier may pressure 
the recipient to acquiesce to the staging of a foreign military presence, or a recipient government 
which believes that it does not have the capability to deal with regional threats on its own may 
                                                 
23 SIPRI, Global Arms Importers, 1968 – 1990.  Accessed: November 7, 2013. 
24 World Bank, Iraq and India Population and GDP Numbers, 2014. 
25 SIPRI, Global Arms Exporters, 1968 – 1990.  Accessed: November 7, 2013. 
26 Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence, 176. 
27 Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence, 176-179. 
28 Reagan, “President Reagan’s Directive on Arms Transfer Policy,” 1981. 
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itself ask for the supplier to provide it with “external protection.”  The transfers of sophisticated 
weapon systems may lead to the third factor which arms transfers literature often describes: arms 
races.  By altering the military balance of power, arms transfers may create an ever-increasing 




Threat perception – the degree to which a state perceives security dilemmas as posing a direct or 
indirect challenge to its interests – plays a key role in determining supplier and recipient states’ 
decisions to export or import arms.  Three main factors contribute to a recipient state’s threat 
perception: (1) a recipient’s perception regarding the political intent of adversaries, (2) the 
military capacity of its adversaries, and (3) the imminence of the threat, i.e. the time pressure 
created by the geographic or temporal proximity of a threat.29  The recipient country’s political 
leaders are usually responsible for determining the first factor (e.g. through diplomatic 
engagements, by looking at the official policy statements and behaviours of neighbouring 
countries, and so on), while its military leadership is charged with determining the latter by 
looking at the conventional military balance, in a process often referred to as “capability 
analysis.”30   Julian Schofield notes that whereas political elites are interested more in defining 
‘threats’ based on the intentions of other states, military institutions are biased at using 
“capability analysis [i.e. measuring the coercive capability of a neighbouring country] rather than 
intentions in defining [another country] as a threat.”31  Nevertheless, both sets of actors 
                                                 
29 Catrina identifies imminence as one of the variables contributing to threat perception and recipient defence 
dependence but defines it in slightly different terms.  See Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence, 176-178. 
30 Schofield, Militarization and War, 15-16. 
31 Schofield, Militarization and War, 16. 
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(politician and military leaders) are somewhat sensitive to both military capabilities and political 
intent. 
Supplier states’ policies are also impacted by threat perception, but the nature of the 
threats and the policy options available to deal with them are quite different from those of 
recipient states.  Since suppliers are normally great powers with international interests, threat 
perception is often determined by issues tied to international threats and global security interests.  
Suppliers may therefore view military assistance as a way to empower particular recipient states 
to counter mutual threats in a way that reduces the need for the direct involvement of the 
supplier’s military assets.  The Reagan arms transfer policy, for example, stated that in making 
arms transfer decisions, the United States will consider “the degree to which the transfer 
responds appropriately to the military threats confronting the recipient [and] whether the transfer 
will promote mutual interests in countering externally supported aggression.”32  One example of 
the role of mutual threat perceptions in security cooperation relationships was the Lend-Lease 
Program during World War II.  Through the program, the United States lent some $31 billion (in 
1940s dollars) worth of military and civilian supplies to the United Kingdom and $11 billion to 
the Soviet Union, with the goal of defeating a common threat: Nazi Germany and the Axis 
powers.33 
Defence dependence theory argues that, given the ambiguous nature of threat perception 
(i.e. an adversary’s political intent may be hard to observe or measure), weak recipient states are 
manipulated into believing that the suppliers’ threat perceptions are their own.  In the defence 
dependence view, over the long-run recipients are said to become proxies of their suppliers.  
                                                 
32 Reagan, “President Reagan’s Directive on Arms Transfer Policy,” 1981. 
33 Robert Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance,” Foreign Affairs 
(May/June 2010), 2.  Most of that amount was not repaid.  See DISAM, Green Book, A2-4. 
Page 46 of 355 
 
According to Catrina, “dependent arms recipients [may] feel that their decisions regarding a 
possible security threat are linked to the relationship to their main supplier(s).”34  Wulf writes 
that “the unprecedented accumulation of sophisticated weapon systems in the periphery [i.e. 
amongst developing countries] is of direct interest to arms producers.”35  The notion of suppliers 
“exporting” their security threats onto recipients is partially supported by empirical data.  As 
Ernie Regehr points out, 
The hundred or more wars since 1945 have been fought almost exclusively in the Third World with 
weapons built in the industrialised world...  The destructiveness and longevity of those wars [in the 
developing world] has been directly affected by the availability of imported weapons.36 
 
Foreign Military Presence / External Protection 
Arms transfer scholars often argue that the increase in military imports by a recipient state allows 
the predominant state to establish a foreign military presence (FMP) on its territory.  An FMP 
may include foreign-operated airfields, naval ports, army bases, missile sites, or intelligence and 
command structures located within a recipient country.37  Some suppliers may be motivated to 
establish FMPs as a way to project power.  For example, the 2002 U.S. National Security 
Strategy noted that to meet “the many security challenges we face, the United States will require 
bases and stations… as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment 
of U.S. forces.”38  The U.S. Defense Department notes that security cooperation includes all 
military interactions with foreign security establishments which, promoting other interests, also 
“provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.”39  Such “access” 
                                                 
34 Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence, 297. 
35 Wulf, “Dependent Militarism,” in Harkavy and Neuman (editors), Arms Transfers in Modern World, 253. 
36 Ernie Regehr, Arms Canada: The Deadly Business of Military Exports (James Lorimer & Company: Toronto, 
Ontario, 1987), xvii. 
37 Harkavy, Bases Abroad, 17. 
38 George W. Bush White House Archives, “President Bush’s National Security Strategy,” September 2002. 
39 DISAM, Green Book, AB-34. 
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often means an FMP.  For example, during the Cold War, the United States sometimes provided 
military aid to countries “which permitted... access to support or basing facilities in the interest 
of mutual defence.”40  Robert Harkavy, a noted author on arms transfers who has examined the 
subject in depth,41 points out that the countries which provided Moscow with significant military 
basing access during the Cold War were also major purchasers of Soviet arms; the same 
correlation between arms transfers and basing was true, albeit to a smaller degree, with U.S. 
allies.42 
Not surprisingly, Cold War competition caused American policymakers to perceive any 
Soviet attempts to acquire basing rights with suspicion.  This point was articulated most clearly 
by Dennis Ross, who during the early 1980s served as the Director of Near East and South Asian 
affairs in the U.S. National Security Council.  In 1981, Ross argued that Soviet arms transfers 
have “provided the Soviets access to the [Persian Gulf], allowed them to build a military 
presence in key places in the region, and may in the future offer them a relatively low-cost way 
to acquire local oil.”43  Ross went on to argue: 
Should the Soviet Union appear to be able to offer ‘Mafia-style protection’ – assuring a regime, for 
instance, that it need not worry about an internal insurgency or a neighbouring threat so long as it 
remains responsive to the Soviets’ “legitimate” needs – Gulf regimes may be prepared to cut the 
appropriate deals with the Soviets.44 
Decisions involving linkage between arms transfers and foreign military basing are 
normally raised to a higher (i.e. more political) consideration than more purely commercial arms 
transfers.  According to the DISAM, complex foreign military sales “involving political issues, 
                                                 
40 DISAM, Green Book, A2-13. 
41 For example see Robert Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access 
Diplomacy (Elsevier Science and Technology Books, 1982); Bases Abroad: the Global Foreign Military Presence 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Strategic Basing and the Great Powers, 1200-2000 (Taylor & Francis, 
2007.) 
42 Harkavy, Bases Abroad, 340-346. 
43 Dennis Ross, “Soviet Threats to the Persian Gulf,” International Security, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1981), 174. 
44 Ross, “Soviet Threats to the Persian Gulf,” 174. 
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such as basing rights,” require participation by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Geographic Combatant Command, and the 
Department of State.45  The flip-side of basing rights is “external protection”: some recipient 
states may also be interested in linking arms imports from suppliers as a way to get a great power 
to guarantee their security.46  As Harkavy notes, in a security cooperation relationship, 
There is usually a security commitment provided by the major-power arms supplier, and where the 
security interests of supplier and recipient are more or less convergent, [a foreign military presence] 
is very often involved.  The big power [i.e. the supplier state] is welcome, or at least accepted, and 
its protection desired [by the recipient]; hence, the strength of its overall power is deemed to be in 
the interest of the smaller, dependent power.47 
 
Military Balance of Power / Arms Races 
A third issue ascribed to arms transfers is the potential impact which arms transfers may have on 
creating an imbalance of power in a particular region, which could spark a regional arms race.  
This subject is of particular concern to arms control experts.48   Analysts often point out that in 
the short term, the transfer of military equipment, technologies, and training in the international 
system provides recipient states with the opportunity to increase their military power in order to 
achieve parity with their adversaries.  As Catrina points out, arms transfers are “a way for 
governments of states not producing the whole range of armaments to acquire the means they 
consider necessary for self-defence.  From this perspective, arms transfers can be seen as 
contributing to greater equality among states.”49  Reagan’s military aid policy noted that 
                                                 
45 DISAM, Green Book, 5-10. 
46 For example, see America’s 2014 military pact with the Philippines.  “Philippines, US sign defence pact,” Agence 
France Presse (April 28, 2014.) 
47 Harkavy, Bases Abroad, 327. 
48 For example, see Geoffrey Kemp, The Control of the Middle East Arms Race (Washington: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 1991.) 
49 Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence, 1. 
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American arms transfers are designed to demonstrate that the United States “will not allow 
[allies] to be at a military disadvantage.”50  Knorr makes a similar point regarding arms transfers: 
Because complex modern weapons systems are and can be produced only in a small number of 
states, the military potential of all other countries would be hopelessly outclassed were it not for the 
international transfer of arms.51 
Although tilting the regional military balance in favour of a recipient state may be a 
shared objective of both the supplier and recipient, some scholars argue that in the long term 
such a policy may inadvertently result in an arms race that harms the recipient state.  For 
example, during the Cold War, the introduction of a new weapon system by one of the 
superpowers often galvanised the other superpower to take action to arm a neighbouring 
recipient state.  In this way, a recipient’s initial attempt to catch up with the military capability of 
another state often sparked an arms race and perhaps even a war.  Schofield has pointed out that 
Israel’s decision to purchase more weapons from France during the 1950s “was stimulated 
exclusively by the Czech arms deal” between Egypt and the Soviet Union in 1955.52   Prior to the 
Soviet armament, Israel and Egypt both had a roughly equal conventional weapons balance: 200 
tanks and 50 aircraft each.  After the Soviet arms deal with Egypt (which brought roughly 200 
Soviet T-34/85 tanks and 80 Soviet MiG fighters), Israel increased its military imports from 
France, buying an additional 200 AMX-13 and Sherman tanks and 72 French aircraft which were 
obtained “to defeat the Egyptian MiG-15s.”53  From an Egyptian perspective, initially Soviet 
military aid tilted the military balance in its favour.  However, it also sparked an arms race with 
Israel, in which over time the initial gap in military power widened, putting Egypt in a worse 
                                                 
50 Reagan, “President Reagan’s Directive on Arms Transfer Policy,” 1981. 
51 Knorr, “Military Strength,” in Knorr and Trager (editors), Economic Issues and National Security, 186. 
52 Schofield, Militarization and War, 71. 
53 Schofield, Militarization and War, 72 and Jon Glassman, Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the 
Middle East (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London, 1975), 10-12. 
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position than that from which it had begun, and ultimately resulted in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-
Israeli wars in which Egypt was defeated.  Cognizant of the potential of arms transfers in 
creating an arms race amongst recipient states, the Clinton administration’s post-Cold War 
military-aid policy noted that U.S. arms transfer decisions will take into account whether the 
“introduction of a [weapons] system… foster increased tension or contribute to an arms race.”54   
 
II. SUPPLIER INFLUENCE 
Possibly the most important area of scholarly debate is over the extent to which suppliers can 
expect to wield “influence” through military assistance.55  According to William Mott, during the 
Cold War the primary criteria by which supplier states measured the success or failure of 
military aid was by the extent to which arms transfers enhanced their “influence [or ability] to 
elicit a recipient’s cooperative action, supportive policy, and conformity with rules of behaviour 
established by the donor.”56  Authors often point out that supplier influence is closely related to 
the degree to which a recipient is dependent on arms from that state.57  Recipient dependence 
itself arises because, as Knorr points out, from the vantage point of a recipient state “it is not 
easy, for political [and] technical reasons, to switch to an alternative import source.” 58  Firstly, a 
weapons-producer may force a recipient state to enter into an exclusive deal to avoid side deals 
                                                 
54 William Clinton, “White House Fact Sheet on Criteria for Decision-Making on Unites States Arms Exports,” 
February 17, 1994. 
55 Defining a broad concept such as “influence” is beyond the scope of this research. For a broad discussion of the 
nature of influence, and the role that arms transfers play in recipient-recipient relations, see Smolansky, The USSR 
and Iraq, 1-9. 
56 Mott, Soviet Military Assistance, 43. 
57 Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence, 155-159. 
58 Knorr, “Military Strength,” in Knorr and Trager (editors), Economic Issues and National Security, 187. 
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with the supplier’s political adversaries or competitors.  This continues to be true in the post-
Cold War era, when the world’s major military suppliers (the United States, Russia, and China) 
continue to be competitors.  Consequently, it is in the interest of these suppliers to make sure that 
the recipient maintains a relationship of exclusivity with them.  Secondly, the export of whole 
weapons systems can create a relationship in which recipient states must continually return to the 
original supplier for follow-on maintenance, spare parts, and additional training, as alternative 
suppliers may not have the technologies necessary to provide the required military aid; weapons 
systems can be quite proprietary.  The table below provides William Mott’s model for 
understanding the link between recipient dependence and the potential for supplier influence. 
Supplier Influence Model59 
 
 
Policymakers and some academics are generally biased towards believing that military 
aid is an effective instrument by which a supplier may exercise influence over a recipient’s 
foreign policy, security policy, and internal affairs.  However, many academics who have tested 
out empirically whether this is the case have found this to be untrue.  Consequently, there is still 
                                                 
59 Adapted from William Mott, United States Military Assistance, 79-80. 
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much controversy over the extent to which arms transfers actually allow a supplier to exercise 
influence.  This section looks at some of the primary debates about the subject. 
 
Foreign Policy 
According to Walter Barrows, a recipient state’s dependence on a supplier’s weapons, 
maintenance services, and training “elicits at least a caution if not outright realignment in the 
recipient’s foreign policy dealings with its military patron.”60  For example, analysing U.S.-
Pakistani security cooperation, Thazha Varkey Paul writes that because Washington provided 
military aid to Islamabad during the 1970s and 1980s on a consistent basis, Pakistan invariably 
took a position in alignment with the United States when issues of high importance to U.S. 
interests rose up.61  During the 1980s Pakistan supported American efforts to undermine the 
Soviet military campaign in Afghanistan, which contributed to the ‘bleeding out’ of the Soviet 
Union.  Paul also argues that arms transfers to Pakistan allowed the United States to gain a 
strategic foothold in South Asia, especially since India (the other major power in the region) was 
primarily dependent on arms from the Soviet Union.62  Policymakers who promote security 
cooperation are biased towards believing that foreign military aid will allow the supplier to 
increase its influence vis-à-vis a particular country or region.  In addition, some analysts argue 
that arms transfers lead recipient states to become embroiled in unwanted military conflicts that 
are indirectly tied to the interests of their suppliers.63 
                                                 
60 Walter Barrows quoted in Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence, 297. 
61 Thazha Varkey Paul, “Influence through Arms Transfers: Lessons from the US-Pakistani Relationship,” Asia 
Survey, Vol. 32, No. 12 (December 1992.) 
62 Roughly three-quarters of India’s arms imports between during the 1970s and 1980s came from the Soviet Union.  
SIPRI, Indian Military Imports, 1968-1990. 
63 For example, see David Kinsella, “Arms Transfer Dependence and Foreign Policy Conflict,” Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1998), 7-23. 
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Nevertheless, other authors argue that the opposite is the case: that, counter-intuitively, a 
recipient is able to exercise influence over the supplier through arms transfers.  For example, 
Efraim Karsh argues that the inherent power asymmetry in the arms-transfer relationship “does 
not necessarily work to the advantage of the arms donor, as is commonly assumed, but rather to 
the benefit of the arms recipient.”64  Examining U.S. security cooperation relations with small 
allies during the Cold War, Robert Keohane came up with the concept of the “big influence of 
small allies.”65  According to Keohane, small U.S. partners “have not only been able to act 
independently; they have also been able to use alliances to influence American policy and to 
alter American policy perspectives.  Even some of America's most dependent and weakest allies 
have been able to achieve significant changes in United States policy.”66  As Keohane explains, 
Allied influence on the United States is… particularly high where the United States maintains large-
scale military installations and conducts substantial aid programs, for in such situations American 
agencies become dependent on the small ally's consent to their continued presence within its 
boundaries.67 
A number of authors have conducted comparative studies to test whether military and 
economic aid results in supplier-recipient foreign policy convergence in both peace-time and 
war-time.  Most of these did not yield conclusive evidence that supplier states wield influence 
over recipients’ foreign policy.68  Similarly, looking at Soviet arms transfers to Iraq, Syria, and 
other Arab countries prior to and during various armed conflicts, Karsh found that Moscow was 
unable to prevent recipient states from going to war or significantly impact their decision-making 
despite the large magnitude of Soviet military aid.69  Karsh concludes that “if a state perceives 
                                                 
64 Efraim Karsh, “Influence Through Arms Supplies: The Soviet Experience in the Middle East,” Conflict Quarterly 
(Winter 1986), 53. 
65 Robert Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” Foreign Policy, No. 2 (Spring 1971.) 
66 Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” 162. 
67 Keohane, “The Big Influence of Small Allies,” 165. 
68 For example, see include Bruce Moon, “The Foreign Policy of the Dependent State,” International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 3 (September 1983), 315-340. 
69 Karsh, “Influence Through Arms Supplies,” 48-53. 
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certain interests as vital, it will be most unwilling to compromise them and will tend to reject any 
pressures designed to prevent it from carrying out its course of action.”70 
 
Security Policy 
Unlike the debate over foreign policy (which looks at broader areas such as diplomacy and trade 
relations), the debate over security policy concerns a supplier’s ability to influence a recipient’s 
military decisions: for example, how it sets up its Ministry of Defence, how it decides to train its 
military forces, and how it formulates its decisions to go to war.  Certainly, supplier states try to 
influence a recipient’s security policy.  For example, under the 1972 Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of 
Friendship and Cooperation, Moscow promised to provide greater amounts of weapons and 
training to Iraq, while Baghdad promised to consult the Kremlin before going to war.71  In 
addition, analysts often point out that a supplier may exercise greater amount of influence over a 
recipient’s security policy when the latter is engaged in war.  This happens because, as Mott 
explains, “when a recipient is in conflict, the urgent demands for continuing flows of 
ammunition, parts, and replacement for battle losses intensify its dependence [on its military 
suppliers.]”72  Catrina explains the subject in the following terms: 
Evidently one dimension of foreign affairs – security policy – is directly influenced by recipient 
dependence.  Dependent arms recipients will feel that their decisions regarding a possible security 
threat are linked to the relationship to their main supplier(s). Recipients’ need for arms supplies, 
training, and support may in some situations provide the major suppliers with something like a veto 
over the continuation of war even if they may have found themselves unable to prevent its outbreak.  
Viewed from the powerful states, this may be a tool for crisis control and containment.  From the 
recipient’s view it is a limit to its autonomy.73 
                                                 
70 Karsh, “Influence Through Arms Supplies,” 54. 
71 As will be seen in later chapters, Iraq broke this promise when it invaded Iran in 1980 without consulting Moscow 
first. 
72 Mott, United States Military Assistance, 8. 
73 Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence, 297. 
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In peacetime, a supplier state may influence a recipient’s security policy through military 
engagements: i.e. contacts between the military elites of a supplier state and political and military 
officials, defence industry representatives, and civilians within a recipient state.74  According to 
policymakers in supplier states, intelligence sharing between the national security apparatuses of 
both the supplier and the recipient, foreign military and civilian advisors working on security 
cooperation within a recipient state allow a supplier to have an impact over political-military 
decision-making of the recipient state.  For example, Andrew Michta writes that during the Cold 
War “the Soviet military stationed in Eastern Europe [served] as the locus of Soviet power in 
relation to satellite military establishments, as well as the direct conduit of Soviet influence in the 
region.”75  More recently, the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, meanwhile, stated that “the 
presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. 
commitment to allies and friends.”76  Some academics agree that the presence of supplier troops 
and advisors in recipient states enhance supplier influence over a recipient’s security policies.  
For example, Mott writes that during the Cold War,  
Large, sophisticated missions of military advisors and technicians in the recipient country were both 
instruments of influence and operational commitments to achieve the aims of a donor-recipient 
relationship…  All major donors also trained recipient military personnel in donor military schools 
to develop influence on recipient policy and strategy.77 
On the other hand, some scholars contend that in the long-run, the presence of foreign 
military trainers could surprisingly have the opposite effect, actually limiting the control the 
supplier may exert over the recipient. As Catrina writes, a large influx of a supplier’s military 
and civilian personnel “for military construction, training, management, and technical support… 
                                                 
74 Derek Reveron, Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of 
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76 Bush, “National Security Strategy of the United States,” 2002. 
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may antagonise the population and thus cause problems for the recipient government.”78  This 
was arguably the case with Iranian-American security cooperation during the 1970s.   Between 
1972 and 1978, Iranian investment in conventional arms imports from the United States 
amounted to an estimated $19.5 billion.79  This required the stationing of an estimated 20,000 
American military personnel in Iran; furthermore, roughly 150,000 American contractors 
supported these contracts from abroad, at times coming into Iran to work on maintenance and 
training.80  Because many of the arms deals during that period were agreed upon as a result of 
personal relationships rather than strategic interests,81 the military build-up created internal 
discontent within Iran at the perceived corruption of the Shah’s regime, while other segments of 
Iranian society were also angry with the idea that Iran was becoming completely dependent on 
another country for its arms and training.82  These societal perceptions contributed, at least in 
part, to the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, which resulted in the expulsion of American military 
advisors and curtailed U.S. efforts to influence Iran through security cooperation.  Therefore, the 
presence of military advisers can be a double-edged sword: it can offer greater leverage to the 
supplier, but it can also run the risk of too heavily trespassing upon the sentiments of the local 
population and leadership, paving the way for a future severance of ties. 
 
Internal Affairs 
According to some arms transfer scholars, supplier states normally try to influence at least two 
areas of a recipient state’s internal affairs: its domestic politics and its treatment of specific 
                                                 
78 Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence, 75. 
79 The figures are 1990 prices.  See Sanford Gottlieb, Defense Addiction: Can America Kick the Habit? (Boulder; 
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factions (often ethnic or religious groups) within the recipient state.  With regard to the former, a 
supplier may use military aid to pressure a regime in a recipient state to allow a certain political 
party that has a similar ideological outlook to participate in the recipient’s governing structure.  
As Catrina writes, 
Political parties with particularly close links to a foreign country may perhaps expect to have their 
role enhanced if their home country is dependent on that foreign country.  For example, Communist 
parties in arms recipient countries might expect some benefits from the dependence of their home 
country on Socialist arms suppliers, even if their home state is and remains nonaligned.83 
A supplier may also utilise arms transfers to promote human rights, either in general 
(for ideological reasons) or for particular minority groups which are supported by the 
supplier (for pragmatic reasons).  During the late 1970s, Carter’s arms transfer policy stated 
that “the United States will give continued emphasis to formulating and conducting our 
security assistance programs in a manner which will promote and advance respect for human 
rights in recipient countries.”84  Similarly, the Soviet Union justified its arms transfers to 
Egypt during the Cold War by stating that “millions of simple Egyptians are eager to defend 
the freedom… of Arab countries.”85  The linkage between military aid and human rights (or 
“freedom,” as the issue was framed by Soviet commentators) was reiterated after the end of 
the Cold War by the United States, when the Clinton White House decided that all arms 
transfers’ decisions will take into account “the human rights... record of the recipient.”86 
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III. RECIPIENT COUNTER-DEPENDENCE 
Recipient states which are sensitive to attempts by the supplier to influence their foreign or 
internal affairs may undertake several counter-dependence strategies designed to mitigate their 
dependence.   Firstly, they may diversify their military suppliers.  This may be a difficult policy 
to pursue due to the paucity of supplier countries and the technical difficulties of operating 
weapon systems from different countries.  A second, more long-term policy includes investing in 
the recipient’s defence-industry to allow it to generate its own military powers.  Such a policy 
may be costly because it requires the import of heavy-industry products from abroad and the 
incorporation of technological knowledge from advanced, industrialised states.  This section 
discusses these and other recipient counter-dependence strategies. 
 
Diversification of Military Suppliers 
Diversification of military suppliers can benefit the recipient in two different ways: (1) it can 
allow for the continued flow of arms and training, which is crucial if one of the suppliers 
decides, for political, military, or economic reasons, to cut off military aid to the recipient state; 
(2) it can create competition amongst military suppliers and thereby improve a recipient’s 
bargaining power, thereby potentially leading to lower costs of weapons systems, more generous 
loan terms, and better-quality arms.  The first point is important for governments who are 
interested in greater independence in their decision-making, in particular those involved in an 
ongoing dispute or armed conflict.  According to Edward Kolodziej, during the 1970s a number 
of recipient states began to “diversify their supply source to maximise their strategic and 
diplomatic independence.”87   Their decision to diversify was caused in part by the fact that their 
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predominant military suppliers proved to be unreliable: they were either too slow to deliver 
promised military supplies; they delivered the weapons but they were of inferior quality; or the 
suppliers imposed an arms embargo.  Having numerous military suppliers allowed recipient 
states to exercise greater independence in their decision-making, in particular with regards to 
their security policies.   
The second benefit of military diversification -- supplier competition -- can often be just 
as important as the first to a recipient state.  It does not necessarily matter whether the recipient 
actually finds another major alternative donor: just by creating a credible threat it might, the 
recipient can gain leverage.  A supplier which is afraid of losing a recipient to another supplier 
may be more willing to deliver better-quality arms, to speed up the delivery of weapons, or to 
lower the costs of arms transfers in order to entice the recipient to stay in the security 
cooperation relationship.88  Mott argues that by the late 1970s many recipient states had become 
proficient in playing suppliers against one-another: “Diversification across alternative suppliers 
became a common recipient strategy for avoiding dependence and bloc alignments, and for 
converting supplier influence into recipient leverage [during the Cold War.]”89  More recently, in 
2014 Egypt’s interim President, Field Marshal al-Sisi, travelled to Russia to negotiate a $2 
billion arms deal soon after Washington (which was Egypt’s primary military supplier for nearly 
three decades leading up to that point) threatened to cut off military aid to Cairo.90  Despite the 
political benefits of military diversification, there are numerous potential downsides.  The first 
issue is that it is much easier, in terms of logistics and maintenance, to create a military force that 
consists of inventory from one country.  According to Kemp, “the costs [of diversification] can 
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be measured in terms of inefficiency since the multiplication of different systems increases 
logistical-support requirement.”91  Furthermore, suppliers often speed up deliveries of weapons 
and training to loyal recipient states (i.e. those that have only one predominant military supplier), 




Literature on arms transfers often argues that only way in which states can ensure their survival 
in the international system is to develop an indigenous military-industry.  Ethan Kapstein points 
out that “all other things being equal, states would prefer to be autarkic in the production and 
deployment of advanced weaponry.”92  Michael Moodie explains why most recipient countries 
seek to develop an indigenous military-industry in the following terms: 
The incentives generating the drive toward increased domestic defence production in the Third 
World include security and economic and political concerns.  Underlying all other motives, 
however, is the desire to eliminate, or at least greatly reduce, dependence on industrial countries for 
arms deemed vital for national security.  Indigenous defence production is an expression of self-
reliance, and thus, it is a means of reducing a state’s vulnerability to military and political pressures 
during times of crisis.93 
Despite the challenges inherent in building and sustaining a robust military industry, 
during the latter part of the Cold War there were an estimated 28 countries that produced major 
weapon systems, and somewhat more countries that created small arms and ammunition.94  
However, even recipients developing indigenous military production are often still dependent in 
part on outside support.  Moodie describes the seven broad stages by which a recipient state 
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could theoretically build an indigenous military industry, all of which are costly in terms of 
actual labour and the amount of economic investment.95  The early stages are normally the most 
arduous, often requiring negotiation with outside suppliers for licenses to establish the domestic 
assembly of the sought-after weapon systems.  Such licenses are normally required by both 
governments and defence companies in supplier states for strategic reasons (to make sure that 
advanced weapons technologies do not get into the wrong hands) and technological reasons (to 
make sure that defence companies from other countries do not acquire sensitive industrial secrets 
held by the supplier).  Nevertheless, if a recipient state is able to obtain a blue-print for 
manufacturing weapons and weapon systems, it can benefit considerably over the long-run by 
possibly being able to manufacture such a weapon on its own.96   
Ironically, countries wishing to establish an autarkic defence industry (i.e. one 
independent of foreign aid), often must – at least in the beginning – continue to import military 
aid, albeit in the form of technological know-how rather fully-formed weapon systems. 
Consequently, some authors contend that licensed co-production does not completely mitigate a 
recipient’s defence dependence.  According to Wulf, in the long run, “the independent decision-
making in the military sector which is hoped for, and expected through indigenous arms 
production, cannot be attained since local production is crucially reliant on the delivery of 
technology and personnel from abroad.”97  Furthermore, according to Kemp, “as a country 
reaches the point of becoming relatively self-sufficient in operating a given weapon system, a 
more modern weapon [may be] procured [by its adversary or the original supplier state], which 
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requires a new series of dependencies upon the supplier.”98  Creating an indigenous military 
industry is a counter-dependency strategy that some recipients have used to some extent, but 
there are very few examples of recipient states that have been able to develop an indigenous 
military industry that satisfies all the needs of their armed forces. 
 
Other: Less-Costly Weapons, Diplomacy, and Stockpiling 
Recipients hoping to mitigate defence dependence may embark on a number of other counter-
dependence strategies.  The first is “down-shifting”: placing a greater emphasis on cruder but 
indigenous arms to allow eschewing more advanced weapon systems.  As Catrina points out, one 
important strategy in mitigating recipient dependence is “the adaptation of military planning, 
tactics, doctrine, and strategy to relatively less-costly weapons which could more easily be 
produced domestically.”99  It may seem counter-intuitive that a state would seemingly 
downgrade its military capabilities in an effort to augment its chances of survival.  Nevertheless, 
this is what a number of recipient states have done, especially during war-time, in order to forego 
accepting advanced military equipment which would create a greater need for foreign military 
advisors.  For example, Kemp points out that during the Vietnam War, North Vietnam forewent 
accepting more sophisticated Soviet surface-to-air missiles, which would have given them a 
military advantage, because doing so would have left it more “dependent upon the Soviet Union 
to control the operation.”100  Kemp argues that, 
The trade-off [between better imported arms and greater dependency] is a difficult one for a small 
country at war to make; the introduction of new weapons may make all the difference between 
victory and defeat, yet the price of dependency may be to compromise sovereignty during and after 
conflict.101 
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A second strategy involves building up loyal domestic constituencies within the supplier 
state.  Within some of the major arms suppliers (such as the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and France), a supplier’s arms transfer policies are often determined by internal political 
considerations.  Since public opinion has an impact on a recipient state’s political decision-
making, some recipient states may aim to try to build constituency groups within the supplier 
state.  Looking at American relationships with small allies, Keohane writes that a recipient state 
can mitigate supplier influence when it can “count on organised group support in the United 
States…  The key to this strategy is that demands for aid to small allies are filtered through 
domestic groups.”102  For example, Keohane points out that Israel has been able to do this vis-à-
vis the United States; in essence, by building a strong constituency group in the United States 
that sympathises with it, Israel has been able to receive more American military aid than other 
recipients of U.S. arms and thereby maintain a “qualitative military edge” over its adversaries.103  
A recipient may build political sympathy within a supplier state by making an argument in terms 
of shared values between the supplier and the recipient, by building close personal relationships 
with officials in supplier states, or by emphasizing the positive impacts on the supplier’s defence 
industry which an arms sale may present. 104 
A third policy aimed at mitigating dependence, which can be more costly in economic 
terms, is the stockpiling of arms imports.  As was mentioned earlier, dependence is often seen as 
a problem during war-time, when a recipient has a greater demand for foreign military aid.  A 
recipient may embark on a policy of stockpiling weapons over time, especially spare parts, in 
order to prevent the potentially disastrous impact of an arms embargo.  As will be discussed in 
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further detail below, during the late 1970s Iraq stockpiled much of its Soviet weaponry.  
Consequently, for over a year at the start of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq was able to continue fighting 
despite the Soviet arms embargo.  Nevertheless, few recipient states are said to have the financial 
capacity to stockpile vast amounts of weapons efficiently.  As Catrina points out, while 
stockpiling may reduce “short-term dependence,” in the long-term it is a “costly option” and 
works “only if foreign involvement in logistics is kept low [and] large stocks of spare parts are 
managed with computerised retrieval systems.”105 
IV. ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF ARMS TRANSFERS 
Another area of debate within literature on security cooperation is the economic dimension of 
arms transfers.  To begin with, there is some conflict in current literature as to whether the sale of 
arms can be compared to the sale of other goods.  On the one hand, arms transfers may be 
viewed as “something special, apart from all other trade [because they are] designed ultimately 
to kill people and destroy property (even if it happens in self-defence).”106  On the other hand, 
some authors contend that arms transfers are subject to the same market forces as other 
commodities.  For example, looking at U.S. arms-transfer policies during the 1990s, Kapstein 
argued that “economic forces will be the main policy driver when it comes to arms trade.”107   
This section does not resolve the issue of whether arms transfers are primarily an economic or 
political activity.  However, it raises three economic areas that are frequently highlighted in 
current scholarship.  The first and possibly most important area is the impact of arms transfers on 
a recipient’s socio-economic development.  Many academics, journalist, and some policymakers 
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have a strong gut-reaction against arms transfers because of the perceived negative costs of arms 
imports on the socio-economic development of poorer countries.  For example, in The Shadow 
World, Feinstein relates how during the mid-1990s South Africa, a relatively poor, developing 
country, purchased over $3 billion in arms from BAE, the majority of which went towards 
buying expensive jet-fighters; his account seriously questions whether recipient states can or 
should divert state funds that could be used on socio-economic development towards financing 
expensive arms.108  On the other hand, as the section below shows, the numerous comparative 
studies that have been conducted to measure the impact of arms imports on a recipient’s 
economic growth have not yielded a decisive conclusion.  In fact, some studies have suggested 
that arms imports actually lead to higher economic output in a recipient state because they 
generate greater activity in the industrial sectors of the recipient’s economy.   
A second economic area which has generated much interest in present scholarship 
focuses on the impact of arms transfers on the defence industries in supplier states.  For some 
suppliers the export of arms plays a very important role in keeping the domestic industry alive; 
ironically, recipient states which recognise such a supplier’s “export dependence” may use it to 
seek strong relationships (e.g. to seek better quality arms or defer payment on arms-related 
loans).  A third area which is the subject of some debate within present literature is whether a 
country’s position as a predominant military supplier also allows it a more privileged position as 
an economic partner with the recipient state.  Supplier governments may at times use their 
position vis-à-vis a recipient state to promote a domestic company bidding for a civilian contract 
within a recipient state. 
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Recipients’ Socio-Economic Development 
Policymakers who subscribe to the defence dependence view argue that arms transfers are “a 
drain on the economies of third-world countries.”109  In addition, Stephanie Neuman, a noted 
academic in the field, argues that military imports may adversely affect a recipient state’s 
balance-of-payments, increase its debt burden, and crowd out public and private investment – in 
all potentially leading to detrimental effects on a developing country’s economic growth.110  
Furthermore, Neuman points out that, 
Resources used for military purposes compete for resources that otherwise could have been available 
for socioeconomic development.  The escalating demand for ever-more sophisticated weapons and 
the rising price of these imported weapons put pressure on central budgetary expenditures, leaving 
fewer resources for other purposes.111 
Defence dependence is related to dependencia (“dependence”) theory, which can be 
traced to Leninism and later to the various schools of economic dependence theory that emerged 
during the 1950s and 1960s.112  Unlike classical liberal trade theorists, who argued that 
participation in a global free-market system furthers the economic positions of all states in the 
system, economic dependence theorists argue that developing countries that enter the open 
economy are “doomed to perpetual backwardness.”113  According to this theory, industrialised 
states control the terms of trade, manufacturing sophisticated goods like automobiles and 
airplanes while forcing poorer countries to simply export raw materials and low processing 
commodities.    
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Defence dependence theory, meanwhile, predicts that arms imports crowd out investment 
in other areas which are crucial to a developing country’s socio-economic development.  Nicole 
Ball notes that “the countries that spent most on their armed forces during the 1980s generally 
ranked the lowest in the United Nations Development Program Human Development Index at 
the beginning of the 1990s.”114  Similarly, Miroslay Nincic found that the average percentage 
GNP growth of developing countries is slightly negatively correlated with military imports: 
higher military imports (as a proportion of GNP) were correlated with lower economic growth.115  
Arms imports and economic growth data for the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) from the past two decades lends some credence to Nincic’s observation that higher arms 
imports lead to lower economic growth.  In the period between 1988 and 2012 Saudi Arabia had 
the highest level of arms imports amongst the GCC countries, followed by the UAE, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain.116  During the same period, the countries that imported less arms 
generally enjoyed higher economic growth than those which imported more: Qatar (13.1%), 
Kuwait (6.46%), Bahrain (5.53%), UAE (5.14%), Oman (4.89%), and Saudi Arabia (3.51%).117   
The above data may be explained by Wulf, a defence dependence theorist, in the following 
terms: 
The allotment of resources for the military and arms [in recipient states] restricts the proportion of 
GNP available for public consumption and national development (social surplus); in a number of 
peripheral societies… military activities and the resources allocated for this purpose are so 
voluminous that the social surplus is totally wasted.  The long-term development of these societies 
is therefore in danger.118 
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Emile Benoit’s findings, however, present a different side of the argument.  Examining 
the “defence burden” (that is, defence spending as a percent of national economic product) of 44 
developing countries between 1950 and 1965, Benoit found that defence expenditures were 
positively correlated with growth rates over the time period: countries that spent more on their 
military (as a proportion of their economy) grew faster than those that spent less; the opposite 
was also true.119  Similarly, although Neuman points out that there are “opportunity costs” to 
arms imports, she also argues that whereas foreign economic aid and development programs only 
perpetuate existing technical levels in developing countries, defence technology transfers require 
developing countries to raise their technological proficiency in order to operate advanced 
technologies.  By introducing advanced industrial technologies into a developing country, 
Neuman argues that such transfers may help in the recipient state’s long-run economic 
development.120  In a number of recipient states, the import of defence technologies may in fact 
become part of the country’s overall industrial and technology production strategy.121 
Furthermore, a recipient state’s ability to completely defend itself against foreign threats 
– a stage that can often be reached only through foreign aid – may be vital to securing its 
national economic interests.  For example, Neuman argues that in some recipient states, 
“expenditures on armaments and expenditures for economic development are not seen as 
mutually exclusive policy alternatives, but as mutually complementary political necessities.”122   
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Neuman observes that Shah-era Iran used military spending to guard sea-lanes in the Persian 
Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, and parts of the Indian Ocean in order to protect the 
flow of oil, the revenues of which were vital for the country’s economy.  Iran's GDP rose from 
nearly $11 billion in 1970 to $86 billion in 1979 and its per capita include rose from $370 to 
$3,000 in the same period despite the fact that Tehran was one of the largest arms importers in 
the world under the Shah.123  Because arms import-levels may be positively or negatively 
correlated GDP growth depending on the country and the time-period, the impact of arms 
imports on economic growth in recipient states is subject to continuing academic debate. 
Policymakers in some supplier states have erred on the side of caution and assumed that 
that their sale of arms imports may have a detrimental effect on the recipient’s economic growth.  
For example, Carter’s arms transfer policy directive noted that “in formulating security 
assistance programs… we will assess the economic impact of arms transfers to those less-
developed countries.”124  Similarly, Reagan’s more hawkish arms transfer policy noted that in 
deciding where to send military aid, the United States will take into account, “whether the 
proposed equipment transfer can be absorbed by the recipient without overburdening its military 
support system or financial resources.”125  The impact of arms imports on a recipient’s economy 
is a subject of major interest amongst policymakers, scholars, and arms transfer journalists, 
although whether arms imports have a negative impact on a recipient state’s economy is a 
subject of some contention. 
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Suppliers’ Defence-Industrial Aspects 
Amongst the major supplier states, the defence industry plays a key role in the overall economy.  
For example, in the United States, the production of military aircraft alone was responsible for 
the employment of over 400,000 workers annually in the mid-1980s and about 235,000 in 1994 
(the decline resulted from the end of the Cold War).126  In 2010, Lockheed Martin, one of the 
largest U.S. defence companies and manufacturers of military aircraft, employed about 132,000 
workers.127  In the same year, BAE Systems, a UK-based defence company with a large U.S.-
based subsidiary, employed 98,200 British workers and 46,900 American workers.128  In some 
supplier states, arms exports make up an important part of the overall military industry.  For 
example, various governmental and non-governmental studies of U.S. defence-industry 
employment conducted during the mid-1970s found that every $1 billion in FMS accounted for 
an average of 40,000 American jobs.129   
In addition, Harkavy notes that for medium-sized suppliers such as France and the United 
Kingdom the “arms trade [was] primarily…an economic matter” during the Cold War.130  Data 
on the total number of jobs in the defence industry in France during the late 1970s and 1980s 
shows that the number of defence industry-related jobs ranged from a low of 280,000 employees 
to a high of 436,000; during those decades, arms exports accounted for anywhere between 
98,000 and 151,000 jobs (or about one-third of all defence industry jobs) per year in France.131  
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While the majority of arms exports are conducted by great powers, some smaller countries that 
have a military industry, such as Belgium (a small industrialised country), export the majority of 
its defence production.132  Additionally, some industrialising countries may also become 
exporters of arms.  For example, in the period between 2008 and 2012, countries as diverse as 
Brazil, Belarus, Israel, South Korea, South Africa, and Ukraine were all arms exporters.133  
Regardless of the size of the supplier, the export of arms may “stimulate demand”134 for 
suppliers’ national military industries.  
The economic dimension of security cooperation has a domestic political element as well.  
In the United States, for example, the production of advanced weapons such as jet fighters, tanks, 
and aircraft carriers, is usually spread across many Congressional districts.  Even if U.S. military 
personnel announce they do not have a need for a particular weapon system, Congressional 
leaders have an incentive to continue funding military production programs in order to keep 
production lines open in order to win the votes of their constituents.135  When defence spending 
is cut, military exports may offer an important external source of demand for the suppliers’ 
military production.136  Consequently, Reagan’s arms transfer policy pointed out that “applied 
judiciously, arms transfers can… help to enhance United States defence production capabilities 
and efficiency,”137 while the Clinton White House stated that in making decisions on whether to 
export a weapon or not, Washington will take into account a foreign military sale’s “impact on 
U.S. industry and the defence industrial base.”138  In theory, arms exports may also generate 
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dependence from a supplier’s side.  For example, a supplier may become dependent on the 
revenue generated by selling weapons overseas in support of its domestic defence industry, 
creating what may be referred to as “export dependence.”139 
Most scholars do not go as far as to argue that a large supplier state’s defence industrial 
base can ever be completely dependent on orders from abroad, but they do agree that foreign 
military sales can keep a “warm” defence industrial base in times of decreased spending.  During 
the Cold War, the viability of the Soviet Union’s and the United States’ defence industries were 
dependent on domestic demand.  Following the end of the Cold War, Michael Beard writes that 
due to declining defence budgets, the U.S. Department of Defense was “unable to fully support 
its military-industrial complex…  [Consequently,] Foreign Military Sales procurements [became] 
the only purchases keeping many U.S. weapons production facilities open.”140  Similarly, in the 
late 1990s, Kapstein wrote “with the decline in domestic defence budgets, most [U.S. defence] 
firms will have no choice but to increase exports if they are to survive and prosper.”141  
Therefore, suppliers’ defence companies have a strong interest in exporting arms, although the 
degree to which they do is in large part determined by how big a budget the government within 
the supplier state devotes to defence spending. 
 
Supplier-Recipient Trade Relations 
A third economic dimension of arms transfers that is often raised by scholars is whether a 
country’s position as a primary supplier to a recipient state gives it a privileged status as a trade 
partner in civilian goods.  Some scholarship points out that “cooperative government-to-
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government relations established by arms transfers may lead the recipient to place an additional 
part of its non-military orders with the same supplier.”142  Furthermore, Catrina argues that 
military aid may help a supplier state secure important supplies of natural resources and raw 
materials from a recipient state.143  Similarly, Mott points out that arms exports may allow a 
supplier “to gain access to critical strategic minerals and materials” and “to obtain convertible 
currency to pay for imports and balance trade accounts.”144 
The promise of improving economic ties between two countries through military aid has 
often been controversial.  For example, over the past half-century, various Arab Gulf states have 
signed some of the largest “arms-for-oil” deals.  During the 1970s, over half of all international 
arms imports were conducted by regimes in the Middle East, particularly by the “highly affluent 
oil-exporting countries.”145  According to Sampson, during the 1970s “economic pressures... 
dictated the rush of American weapons into the Middle East.”146  This oil-for-arms policy in the 
Gulf continued after the end of the Cold War.  For example, according to Michael Klare, 
between 1990 and 1997 the United States provided the Gulf countries arms and ammunition 
“worth over $42 billion – the largest and most costly transfer of military equipment to any region 
in the world by any single supplier in recent history.”147  While the transfer of arms is normally 
motivated by political or strategic considerations, in some cases it may also involve salient 
economic elements.  Unlike the previous two areas of economics raised above, there seems to be 
a general consensus that a country’s position as a primary military supplier to a certain recipient 
gives it a privileged position vis-à-vis that recipient state. 
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V. MILITARY IMPACT OF ARMS TRANSFERS 
The military impact of arms transfers is an important topic, given that it is in part the original 
reason why a recipient state wanted to import arms to begin with.  The arguments concerning the 
military impact of arms transfers are often very simple: over time a recipient state begins to 
resemble its primary military supplier in terms of its military doctrine, how it plans and executes 
its military operations, and how it sets up its civil-military relations.  The reasons behind the idea 
that a recipient becomes a “protégé” of its supplier are usually made simple by scholars.  
Suppliers want the recipients’ militaries to look like their own (a concept known as 
“interoperability,” discussed below) so that, in case of war, both sides could easily fight 
alongside one another to defeat a common threat.  Recipients, meanwhile, are said to take the 
seemingly common route of becoming “protégés” of their military suppliers.  These two areas 
form a major part of the current scholarship on the topic and are discussed below. 
 
Recipient’s Military Effectiveness / Interoperability 
Foreign military aid is said to directly impact the military effectiveness of a recipient state.  
Supplier states often refer to this as “interoperability.”  Interoperability refers to the idea that 
security cooperation transforms the recipient’s military power in both a quantitative and a 
qualitative sense in such a way that a recipient’s military begins to resemble that of its primary 
military supplier.  For example, the Clinton administration stated that Washington takes into 
account “the degree to which [an arms] transfer supports U.S. strategic and foreign policy 
interests through increased access and influence, allied burden sharing, and interoperability.”148  
Consequently, foreign military aid should, over time, impact the recipient’s military doctrine and 
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training, and its ability to handle sophisticated weapon systems, so that it begins to resemble that 
of its primary military supplier.   The strategic importance of interoperability to a supplier state is 
explained by DISAM in the following terms: 
The sharing of defence technology, properly controlled, is a valuable way to ensure our allies 
participate with the U.S. in future military operations.  In applying export and technology security 




From a recipient state’s perspective, interoperability with a supplier can raise the 
qualitative power of its armed forces to the level of its military supplier.  Most supplier states are 
not only stronger in terms of the number of weapons that they possess, but also because of their 
doctrine and training; security cooperation with a stronger military power should therefore 
improve a recipient state’s military effectiveness.  As Knorr points out, some recipient states 
“that are incapable of producing modern arms can learn to employ them with considerable 
effectiveness.”150  In other words, the fact that a state does not produce advanced weapons does 
not preclude it from using them effectively in the battlefield.  Clearly, security cooperation has 
an important impact on the quality of a recipient state’s armed forces.  Nevertheless, there is 
some contention whether a recipient’s armed forces actually benefit from becoming 
interoperable with their primary military supplier.  In particular, defence dependence theorists 
argue that, despite the potential military benefits of security cooperation (in terms of raising the 
qualitative level of the recipient), the notion of interoperability is simply another instrument by 
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which strong powers seek to exercise dominance over, and espouse a dependency-type 
relationship, with weaker, developing countries.  As Wulf explains: 
The term ‘arms transfer’ is usually associated with the export of tanks, fighter planes, missiles, ships, 
and other military equipment.  But … ‘software,’ including military doctrines and ideologies, are 
also exported to influence the armed forces of the periphery…  The demand for arms and the 
requirement for foreign collaboration reinforce each other; by importing military doctrines and 
military technology, not only is the mode of production of the supplying country imported [but] the 




Recipient’s Civil-Military Relations 
According to some authors, security cooperation aid has “an inevitable, diverse, and largely 
unintended influence on domestic political development.”152  Therefore, a second area in which 
arms imports are said to have a military impact is by modifying the civil-military relations within 
a state.  Lefever argues that the political impact of military aid is “inevitable because the 
program is addressed to the military establishment which plays a significant political role in the 
great majority of [recipient states.]”153  Usually scholars see the impact of military aid on civil-
military relations as linear: during the Cold War recipients of Soviet military aid adopted the 
Soviet civil-military relations model, while recipients of Western arms adopted the Western 
model.  For example, examining the impact of Soviet military aid on civil-military relations in 
recipient states, Andrew Michta writes that “Moscow's policy objectives [were] a major 
determinant of civil-military relations in Eastern Europe, and changes in Soviet policy [had] a 
discernible impact upon them.”154  Michta points out that amongst Moscow-backed communist 
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recipients, civil-military relations resembled the Soviet model: i.e. the Communist Party 
controlled the political activities of the military, which Michta described as “a political 
institution whose behaviour [was] bureaucratic in character.”155  Meanwhile, the impact of 
Western military aid on recipients is a subject of some controversy.  Western countries have a 
system whereby a popularly-elected political leadership is in charge of a professional military.  
Consequently, on a policy level, current U.S. legislation explicitly prohibits military aid from 
going to recipients “whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d’état or 
decree”156 or to a recipient which engages “in a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
internationally recognised human rights.”157  Furthermore, according to DISAM’s Green Book, 
security cooperation may be seen as a way to promote American ideals: 
Long after a country purchases, utilises, and disposes of US military equipment, what remains are 
the experiences the international military student (IMS) had during training. Through exposure to 
the American way of life and direct observation of US commitment to universal human rights 
concerns, the IMS comes to understand and appreciate American democratic ideals.
158
 
Nevertheless, numerous authors have pointed out that U.S. foreign policy has often fallen 
short of its commitment not to give military aid to recipients where the civilian leadership is not 
popularly elected.  For example, some scholars have pointed out that Arab Gulf Monarchies, 
which are ruled by non-elected regimes, nevertheless continue to receive significant U.S. 
military and economic aid.159  Similarly, Washington continued to give security assistance to 
Egypt between the early 1980s and 2010 despite the fact the Egyptian government was ruled by a 
former air force general, Hosni Mubarak, who stayed in power through largely unfair elections.  
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A similar case can be made regarding Chile during the 1970s, where General Pinochet received 
both covert and overt military aid despite gross violations of human rights and despite having a 
military-controlled government.   
LIMITATIONS TO CURRENT LITERATURE: RECIPIENT PERSPECTIVES 
In the sections above I presented some of the key assumptions, findings, and debates in the 
current literature on arms transfers.   I also described the basic elements of defence dependence 
theory.  Interestingly, the basic tenets of this theory are often similar to policymakers’ 
assumptions regarding military aid.160  Despite the existence of alternative concepts, defence 
dependence remains the most comprehensive school of thought on the subject.  Nevertheless, 
this theory, as well as much of the present understanding of the impact of military aid amongst 
academics and policymakers, misses a crucial piece of the puzzle: the recipient state’s 
perspective on arms transfers.   In arguably the most comprehensive work on defence 
dependence, Arms Transfers and Dependence, Catrina writes that, although his study provides 
theoretical predictions on how a recipient should behave in a security cooperation relationship, 
his analysis is not based on actual evidence of the arms-imports policies of the recipient states.  
As he explains: 
A discussion of arms import policies is not possible in this report.  Not only would too many states’ 
arms imports have to be discussed, but no evidence exists that there are arms import policies 
comparable to the arms exports policies of the main suppliers.  This is not to deny that many 
recipient governments devote close attention to aspects like reliability of the supply relationship, 
diversification, and acquisition of technology… but rarely are these considerations formulated in a 
consistent and comprehensive policy.161 
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Part of the problem of incorporating recipient perspectives into studies of security 
cooperation is that, unlike governments in supplier states, which issue public policy documents 
regarding how they will pursue military aid, the arms import policies of recipient states are not as 
widely available outside of their boundaries.  Thus, although defence dependence theorists 
provide a good starting point for understanding a recipient’s demand for foreign military aid, hey 
do not properly incorporate empirical evidence of recipient policies on arms imports.  As Phebe 
Marr points out, “although there is undeniable truth in dependency analysis, it has limitations 
[and] must be modified to take account of [the recipient’s] national leadership, the ability to use 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT 
 
 
Conventional wisdom argues that the strategic context in which recipient states make arms 
imports decisions puts them at a disadvantage as they can be manipulated into believing that 
their suppliers’ threats are their own.  Furthermore, recipients may allow foreign military powers 
to base their troops on their territory, which erodes their sovereignty over the long-run.  Finally, 
importing sophisticated foreign arms may spark a regional arms race that could work against the 
recipient state’s original interest in increasing its relative military power.1  This chapter aims to 
answer three questions:  1. Threat Perception:  Did Iraqi leaders generate their own threat 
perceptions, or were they “tricked” into purchasing arms which were then used to tackle their 
suppliers’ security needs?  2.  Foreign Military Presence/External Protection:  To what extent 
did Baghdad seek “external protection” and to what extent were its military suppliers able to 
establish a foreign military on Iraqi territory?  3.  Military Balance of Power/Arms Race:  Did 
Iraqi military imports hurt or aid Iraq’s relative military balance of power?   This chapter argues 
that, rather than being tricked by its suppliers, it was the Iraqi government’s own, internally-
generated threat perceptions which served as the basis for arms imports decisions.  Secondly, 
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despite being one of the largest military importers in the world, the Baathist regime was 
explicitly against permitting a foreign military presence on its soil.  Thirdly, although throughout 
the 1970s the military balance of power was tilted against Iraq, during the 1980s it imported 
roughly three times as much in arms as its primary enemy, Iran, and emerged as the strongest 
military force in the region.   
PART I: 1968-1980 
1. Threat Perceptions 
Internal Threats: Political Opponents 
To understand how Iraqi leaders conceptualised threats to their survival between 1968 and 1990 
one must examine the origins of the Baathist Party, which was formed in 1944 by a cross-
sectarian group of expatriate Arab intellectuals living in France.2  These early Baathists sought to 
promote a “pan-Arab” national liberation movement in opposition to the French mandate in 
places like Syria and Lebanon; after the Second World War, they opposed the older generation of 
Arab politicians, whom Baathists regarded as inadequate to pan-Arab needs.3  With its emphasis 
on pan-Arabism, freedom, and socialism, the Baath party slowly gained appeal across the Middle 
East, opening branches in Iraq and Jordan in the early 1950s.4  Over the ensuing years members 
of the Iraqi Baath Party remained largely underground.5  On July 16, 1968, Baathist military 
                                                 
2 Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party, 16-22; Helms, Iraq, 65. 
3 For a history of the Baathist Party from the Baathist perspective, see the Arab Baath Socialist Party, “A Survey of 
the Baath Party’s Struggle, 1947-1974,” 1974. 
4 Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958 (London: Tauris, 2001), 88.  The Baathist ideology 
spread, in varying degrees to Sudan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Libya.  See Helms, Iraq, 64. 
5 See Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 12-30.  The Iraqi Baath Party was briefly in power in 1963 but was 
ultimately overthrown after a backlash caused by its bloody repression of internal political opponents. 
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officers and civilians took over through a largely bloodless coup.6  The Baathists quickly 
established the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), a non-elected body which became 
Iraq’s highest decision-making structure.  Membership of the RCC was dominated by Baathist 
loyalists or family members of Baathist leaders; for example, the new Iraqi President and RCC 
Chairman Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr appointed his nephew, Saddam Hussein al-Takriti, as Iraq’s 
President and Vice Chairman of the RCC.7  Although the RCC resolved the political instability 
which dominated Baghdad in the preceding decade,8 the seven-person RCC – which had the 
power to declare war, implement budgets, overrule judicial decisions, and write its own 
legislation – ultimately became a form a form of “collegiate dictatorship” that had “absolute 
monopoly of all judicial, legislative and executive authority.”9   
While the Baath Party’s takeover in 1968 was led by the Party’s military-wing 
(specifically Major General Hasan Al-Bakr),10 gradually the civilian branch of the party (which 
had little to no military experience) came to dominate Iraqi decision-making by the mid-1970s.11  
One of the first programs that the RCC embarked on was a Baathification campaign of the Iraqi 
armed forces,12 which was historically responsible for many of the coups in Baghdad.  In 
December 1968, many of Iraq’s top military officers were arrested and eight divisional 
commanders were jailed.  Al-Bakr proceeded to promote around 100 Baathist officers to key 
positions in the Republican Guard (a military institution meant to protect the regime) and other 
                                                 
6 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 113. 
7 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 108. 
8 Between 1958 and 1968, three-quarters of Iraqi ministers that were in the cabinet served for a year or less.  See 
Phebe Marr, “Iraq’s Leadership Dilemma: A Study in Leadership Trends, 1948-1968,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 
24, No. 3 (Summer 1970), 297-298. 
9 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 118.  
10 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 31-32. 
11 Schofield, Militarization and War, 132-133. 
12 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 40-42. 
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units of the Iraqi military.13  By 1970, 3,000 Baathist loyalists were given commissions within 
the Iraqi military.14  By 1973 the Iraqi armed forces were brought thoroughly under Baathist 
control.15 
Internal Threats: the Kurdish Insurgency 
Early in its reign the Iraqi Baath Party recognised “the question of the nationalist ambitions of 
the Kurds of Iraq comes in the forefront of the problems facing the Arab revolutionary 
movement.”16  Upon taking over, therefore, President al-Bakr announced the government’s intent 
to “achieve national unity [and] end the problems in the North [i.e. Kurdish areas.]”17  
Nevertheless, the Kurdish leadership’s scepticism about the Baathist regime’s ultimate goals vis-
a-vis Kurdish rights led to a devolution of central authority in northern Iraq and the 
intensification of violence in Kurdish areas between 1968 and 1969.  In April 1969, Baghdad 
called out garrison troops and the then-diminutive Iraqi air force to confront the Soviet-backed 
Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq.  Although Moscow provided some military aid to Baghdad after 
the 1968 coup,18 once the Baathist regime began its counterinsurgency campaign against the 
Kurds Moscow stopped supporting the Iraqi central government and began supplying covert 
assistance to Barzani, the leader of the Kurdish resistance in northern Iraq.  According to 
Timmerman, “When [the Soviets] wanted something from [Iraq], such as an exclusive oil 
concession, they stepped up aid to the Kurdish leader.  When [the Baathists] became more pliant, 
                                                 
13 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 116. 
14 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 120. 
15 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 54 
16 Iraqi Government, March Manifesto on the Peaceful Settlement of the Kurdish Issue in Iraq, 1970. 
17 Quoted in Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, 66. 
18 In the decades leading up to the 1968 Baathist coup, Soviet foreign policy oscillated between supporting foreign 
Communist parties and fostering local nationalism (even at the expense of the power of Communist parties) in the 
belief that “nationalism would result in the forced retreat of imperialism and thus in the eventual downfall of 
capitalism.”  See Geoffrey Wheeler, “Soviet Interests in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey,” The World Today, Vol. 24, No. 5 
(May, 1968), 198. 
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they slacked off… The idea was to remind the [Baathist regime] that [it] owed [its] survival to 
Moscow.”19   
In January 1970, as the Iraqi military was about to be defeated by the Kurdish rebels, 
Hussein flew to Moscow in order to negotiate a deal with the Chairman of the USSR Council of 
Ministers, Alexei Kosygin, in which Moscow would withdraw its support for the Kurds.  
Kosygin demanded a stop to the massacre of Iraqi Kurds and pressured Baathist leaders to 
include members of the Iraqi Communist Party in Iraq’s decision-making process.  Agreeing to 
Moscow’s demands, in March 1970 the RCC issued the March Manifesto, which accepted the 
principle of Kurdish autonomy “within the framework” of the Iraqi state and recognised greater 
rights for the Kurds.20  Following the declaration the Soviet Union withdrew its military aid to 
Kurdish rebels.  Over the next four years both Communist and Kurdish parties worked alongside 
the Baath Party, until the conflict erupted again in 1974-1975. 
During the Baathist regime’s second counter-insurgency campaign against the Kurds, 
Iraqi forces numbered roughly 90,000 men, 1,200 tanks and armoured cars, and 200 aircraft, 
facing tens of thousands of Kurdish peshmerga with military assistance provided by the United 
States and Iran.21  Despite being better-equipped, with tanks, artillery, helicopters, fighters, and 
fighter-bombers, Iraqi military forces were unable to defeat the peshmerga or disrupt the Kurdish 
supply lines with Iran and Syria.22  A number of miscalculations, such as failing to predict the 
extent of external covert support of Kurdish rebels, ultimately bogged down six Iraqi Army 
divisions (over half of the Iraqi Army) to fight the Kurdish insurgency.23  By March 1975, 
                                                 
19 Timmerman, The Death Lobby, 34-35. 
20 Iraqi Government, March Manifesto, 1970. 
21 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 169; Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 122. 
22 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 81. 
23 Hoyt, Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy, 118. 
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Barzani’s peshmerga forces (equipped with heavy artillery and SAMs) killed 1,640 Iraqi soldiers 
and wounded another 7,903 and controlled roughly one-third of Iraqi territory.24  According to 
Baathist official accounts, Iraq lost 16,000 army personnel and suffered over 60,000 civilian and 
military casualties.25  The conflict also cost the Baathist regime an estimated $4 billion and 
threatened to bring the country “to the brink of economic disaster.”26   
During an OPEC meeting in Algiers on March 6, 1975, Hussein and the Shah of Iran 
signed the Algiers Agreement, a bilateral arrangement which aimed to restore the “security and 
mutual confidence [of Iran and Iraq] all along their joint borders.”27  The declaration ended the 
Iranian-Iraqi conflict over the Shatt al-Arab waterway in terms that were favourable to Iran 
(described in greater detail in the next section) and discontinued Iran’s support of Kurdish 
rebels.28  Following the signing of the Algiers Agreement, Tehran terminated its military aid to 
the Kurdish in the north and Iraqi forces defeated the Kurdish insurgents soon thereafter, while 
the remaining Kurdish rebels fled to Iran.29  The CIA terminated its covert “Kurdish Assistance 
Program” the following year.30 
Iraq’s External Threats: Iranian-Iraqi Competition 
The most immediate external threat to Iraq was Iran.  During the late 1960s the Shah of Iran 
claimed that a series of predominantly Arab islands and peninsulas in the Gulf, including 
Bahrain, belonged to Iran.  In 1970, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain rejected Iran’s 
claims to islands in the Gulf.  Although Bahrain’s status as an Arab state was confirmed via a 
                                                 
24 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 169. 
25 Iraqi Government, “Baath Party Regional Congress,” 1983. 
26 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 81.  See also Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 169. 
27 FBIS-MEA-75-046, “Joint Statement Issued in Algiers,” Baghdad INA (March 6, 1975.) 
28 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 82. 
29 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 170;  Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 84 
30 U.S. State Department Document 289, “Memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence Colby to the 
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),” June 4, 1976. 
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referendum the following year, Baathist leaders perceived Iran as a threat to Iraqi and “pan-
Arab” security in the Gulf.  In November 1970 the Shah of Iran threatened to use military force 
to lay claims to Abu Musa and the Tunbs, two islands in the Gulf.  In June 1971, Baghdad called 
on the Arab states to reject the Shah’s claims.  Five months later, Tehran and the ruler of Sharjah 
Island reached an agreement to permit the landing of Iranian troops in Abu Musa; Iranian forces 
reached Sharjah and the Tunb Island the following day.31  After Iran annexed the three 
aforementioned Gulf islands in 1971,32 most Arab states officially condemned Tehran’s actions; 
soon thereafter Baghdad broke diplomatic relations with Tehran.33 
Iraqi-Iranian competition also increased over Iraq’s Shatt al-Arab waterway.  On April 
16, 1969, Tehran announced the unilateral abrogation of the 1937 Boundary Treaty,34 an Iraqi-
Iranian agreement meant to resolve disputes arising along the shared border and agree on the 
rights of navigation in and the payments of levies to the Iraqi government for the maintenance of 
the Shatt-al-Arab.35  On April 24, Tehran sent Iranian naval forces to the Shatt to escort an 
Iranian merchant ship which refused to pay a toll to Iraq authorities, thereby breaking the 
Treaty’s stipulations.36  Iraqi leaders, meanwhile, began to claim that Khuzestan, a 
predominantly Arab, oil-rich province in Iran, actually belongs to the “Arab nation.”37  Later in 
1969 both Iran and Iraq deployed military forces to the Shatt al-Arab.38  At the same time, under 
the pretext of countering the Iranian threat to the region, Kuwait invited Iraq to station Iraqi 
                                                 
31 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 67. 
32 Helms, Iraq, 145. 
33 Helms, Iraq, 145. 
34 See Iranian Government, “Iranian Statement Concerning Abrogation of 1937 Treaty Between Iraq and Iran,” 
April 16, 1969. 
35 See Boundary Treaty and Protocol Concerning the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway.  Signed in Tehran, July 4, 1937.  The 
Shatt-al-Arab is a river that runs through southern Iraq, near its border with Iran, and ends at the Persian Gulf. 
36 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 58. 
37 Iraqi Government, History of Arabistan and the Status Quo in Iran (Baghdad: Al-Jamhurriya Press, 1969). 
38 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 58. 
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troops on its territory.39  The deterioration in Iraqi-Iranian relations resulted in major clashes 
along the Iran-Iraq border in December 1972, January 1973, and February and March 1974.  
Although the UN arranged a ceasefire between the two states on March 17, 1974, tensions flared 
again in August 1974.  In part Iraqi-Iranian competition was driven by Iraq’s belief that it was 
representing the pan-Arab side in a historic Arab-Persian rivalry: 
If Iraq remained silent vis-a-vis the abolishment of the 1937 [Frontier] Treaty, it would throw the 
torn Arabian Gulf Emirates in the laps of Iran, because Iraq is the most powerful Arab state in the 
area…  Iraq's compliance with the Iranian decision means the complete absence of the Arab 
opponent in the conflict on the Gulf. 40 
The competition for influence and dominance in the Gulf between Baghdad and Tehran 
reached a peak in the period between 1974 and 1975, when Iran served as the conduit for 
American weapons reaching the Kurdish insurgency.  Iranian military forces themselves were 
also engaged in indirect fighting with the Iraqi military during that period.  For example, in 
December 1974, U.S.-made Hawk SAMs were fired from the Iranian side of the border and shot 
down two IQAF airplanes flying in northern Iraq.  Baghdad accused Tehran of acting 
belligerently, while the latter accused the IQAF of flying its planes over Iranian air space.  
Ultimately, the Iraqi political leadership resolved the issue of the Iranian threat by signing the 
Algiers Agreement of March 1975.41  The agreement allowed the Baathist regime to survive 
another day by defeating the Kurdish insurgency.  Furthermore, after the signing of the Algiers 
Agreement, Iranian-Iraqi relations gradually improved: in January 1976 RCC Vice Chairman 
Hussein met with Iranian Prime Minister Amir Abas Hoyeyda in Baghdad to discuss “areas of 
mutual concern,”42 and in June of the same year Iraq's foreign minister Sadun Hammadi led an 
                                                 
39 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 65-66.  Despite the fact that the Iranian threat to Kuwait never materialised, 
Iraq agreed to withdraw its troops only in July 1977. 
40 Iraqi Government, History of Arabistan. 
41 Long, Saddam’s War of Words, 190 
42 FBIS-MEA-76-003, “Saddam Husayn Meets Iranian Prime Minister,” Baghdad INA (January 5, 1976.) 
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Iraqi delegation to Iran, which included discussion of political and strategic importance with the 
Shah.43  In 1977 the two countries signed a trade agreement and in 1978 the Baathist government 
expelled Ayatollah Khomeini, an anti-Shah activist, from Iraq at the request of the Iranian 
government.44 
 
Supplier Threat Perceptions 
The Soviet Union entered the Middle East during the mid-1950s with the “Czech Arms Deal,” 
which provided the most significant amount of Soviet military aid to any Arab country (in this 
case Egypt) up until that point.45  Following the overthrow of Iraq’s Hashemite Monarchy and 
the declaration of the Iraqi Republic in 1958, Moscow signed its first military and economic 
cooperation agreement with Baghdad.  Soviet military aid to Iraq increased in 1970, following 
the Baath Party’s agreement to end the counter-insurgency campaign against the Kurds.  In 1972 
Iraq and the Soviet Union signed a 15-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.  Although the 
treaty did not contain any guarantees by Moscow to come to Iraq’s aid in the event of war,46 
articles 8 and 9 of the treaty pledged enhanced security cooperation between the two countries.47  
Over the next several years, Iraqi military imports from the Soviet Union tripled, in large part 
financed through the sale of oil.  Between 1973 and 1975, Soviet transfers of conventional 
weapons amounted to $4.3 billion (1990 prices), nearly three times as much as in the period 
between 1968 and 1972.48 
                                                 
43 FBIS-MEA-76-123, “Foreign Minister Comments on Visit to Iran, Middle East, and North Africa,” Baghdad INA 
(June 24, 1976.) 
44 Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, 189-190. 
45 Up until then, the Middle East was a Western sphere, largely carved up between France and Great Britain since 
the end of the First World War.  Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 11. 
46 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 77. 
47 Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, 15-18. 
48 SIPRI, Soviet Military Aid to Iraq, 1968-1975. 
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Moscow’s threat perception in the Middle East was driven by Soviet-American (and to a 
lesser degree Sino-Soviet) rivalry.  In particular, Soviet policymakers focused on exposing the 
“imperialist threat” to the Middle East and on convincing local Arab regimes that the Kremlin 
would provide them with the military and economic aid that was needed to defeat ‘imperialism.’  
For example, a supplement published in Moscow about the 1973 non-aligned conference taking 
place in Algiers stated that “all [Arab countries] admit that the major threat to their independence 
and the source hindering their progress is one, namely, imperialism.”49  The supplement further 
noted that the Soviet Union “is persistently and firmly pursuing a course aimed at supporting the 
anti-imperialist trend.”50   
Another “threat” that Moscow tried to convince local Arab governments that it was 
aimed at containing was Israel.  A 1973 opinion-editorial in Pravda, the official Soviet 
government newspaper, noted that Soviet leaders “condemned the aggressive actions of Israel, 
which pursues a policy of territorial seizures with respect to the Arab countries.”51  In rhetoric, 
Baathist leaders shared the Soviet belief that Israel posed a threat to the stability of the Middle 
East.  For example, in 1973 the Baathist regime published the “National Action Charter,” which 
set out its strategic vision and affirmed Iraq’s “struggle” against Israel through the Palestinian 
cause: “The Palestinian resistance is one of the main instruments of our people's (i.e. Arabs’) 
armed struggle [in the] confrontation [with] the Zionist enemy (i.e. Israel.)”52  The Iraqi armed 
forces also participated in direct confrontation with the Israeli military during the 1973 Arab-
Israeli War,53 although the Baathist regime did not have prior knowledge of the Egyptian and 
                                                 
49 FBIS-MEA-73-186-S, “Arab Common Interests,” Moscow Pravda (September 2, 1973.)  Supplement: Materials 
on Fourth Non-Aligned Conference in Algiers, Part II. 
50 FBIS-MEA-73-186-S, 1973.  Supplement: Materials on Fourth Non-Aligned Conference in Algiers, Part II. 
51 FBIS-MEA-73-186-S, “Orestov in Pravda,” Moscow Pravda (September 1, 1973.) 
52 FBIS-MEA-73-172-S, "Text of Iraqi National Action Charter," Baghdad Domestic Service (August 1973.) 
53 Pollack, Arabs at War, 167-176. 
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Syrian attack on Israel.54  (Iraq’s role in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War is also discussed in chapter 
seven.)  During the latter part of the 1970s, especially after the end of the 1974-1975 campaign, 
the Iraqi military remained primarily focused on fighting the Israeli armed forces.55 
Despite superficially being committed to the same policies as Arab countries, the Soviet 
Union differed with many Arab states on the solution to these threats.  Unlike many of the Arab 
states, which refused to recognise Israel’s right to exist, the Kremlin “remained committed to the 
concept of Israel’s existence.”56   Furthermore, while some Arab regimes seemed intent on 
provoking a conflict with Israel or attacking Western interests in the Middle East, Moscow 
wanted to avoid direct confrontation with the West in the region.57  During the early 1970s, the 
Soviets increased their amount of military aid to Arab governments and encouraged them to 
engage in regional security frameworks, believing that “increased unity [amongst Arab states] 
would allow them to confront external enemies more strongly.”58  Despite discouragement by the 
Kremlin, Arab countries engaged in outright conflicts with Israel between the late 1960s and 
mid-1970s, including during the 1967 and 1973 wars.  Their losses reflected poorly on the Soviet 
Union, since Arab losses were due in part to poorer Soviet weapons.59 
Meanwhile, most of Iraq’s non-Soviet military imports came from France.  In January 
1975, while Iraq’s counter-insurgency campaign was still raging, Baghdad concluded its “biggest 
arms deal ever” with both Paris and Moscow.60  The roots of French support of Arab regimes in 
                                                 
54 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 120. 
55 This can be seen by an extensive intelligence report on the “Israeli threat” published by the Iraqi air force in 1979.   
See SH‐AADF‐D‐001‐001, “Annual Intelligence Report for 1979 on Israel, including a snapshot of Israeli air 
defense capabilities and a summary of movements within Israeli leadership,” November 1979 to 1980. 
56 Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, 27. 
57 Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, 62. 
58 Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, 62. 
59 Pollack argues that the key determinant of Arab loses was the “human factor,” not the quality of weapons.  See 
Pollack, Arabs at War. 
60 FBIS-MEA-75-013, “Arms Deal Concluded With Soviet Union, France,” Beirut An-Nahar (January 19, 1975.) 
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the Middle East can be traced to the Presidency of Charles de Gaulle (1959-1969),61 who viewed 
French foreign policy in the region as “a central element within a broader foreign policy vision 
aimed at restoring French prestige and autonomy on a global stage.”62  After De Gaulle, French 
leaders continued to promote relations with Arab countries but within a “more aggressively 
mercantilist framework.”63  Between 1975 and 1980, Paris’s conventional military exports to 
Iraq were worth five times as much as they were between 1968 and 1975.64  French motivations 
for exporting arms to Iraq during the mid-1970s were driven not so much by threat perception 
but rather by “the need to offset commercial deficits with Arab oil suppliers.”65   In addition 
France exported a number of civil engineering projects to and helped Iraq with nuclear 
research.66  When Baghdad concluded its biggest arms deal with Paris in January 1975, the latter 
offered “to deliver the [arms] Iraq wanted... without conditions.”67   Iraqi leaders pursued close 
security cooperation with France in large part because Paris did not try to modify Baghdad’s 
foreign policy.  (Iraq’s diversification program during the late 1970s is discussed in greater detail 
in chapter five.) 
2. Foreign Military Presence 
Western Military Bases in the Middle East 
Throughout the 1970s, three of Iraq’s neighbours – Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey – had 
Western military bases.  For example Turkey housed between 10,000 and 16,000 U.S. military 
personnel and their dependents at the Incirlik air base, which was built during the 1950s, 
                                                 
61 Prior to De Gaulle France was largely a supporter of Israel.  Glassman, Arms for the Arabs, 10-11. 
62 Styan, France and Iraq, 66. 
63 Styan, France and Iraq, 66-67. 
64 SIPRI, French Military Imports to Iraq, 1968-1975 and 1975-1980. 
65 Styan, France and Iraq, 196. 
66 FBIS-MEA-75-224, “Nuclear Energy Agreement Signed with France,” Baghdad INA (November 18, 1975.) 
67 FBIS-MEA-75-013, 1975. 
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primarily to counter the Soviet threat, and in later decades meant to operate within the NATO 
framework.68  In 1950 Riyadh signed an agreement for the U.S. Air Force to use the Dhahran 
airfield (renewed five years later); although the United States abandoned Dhahran airfield during 
the 1960s, U.S.-Saudi security cooperation continued to be a major element of Saudi foreign 
policy in the ensuing decades.69  In the mid-1970s, for example, Saudi Arabia signed arms deals 
with the United States for the delivery of M-60 tanks, armoured personnel carriers, Sidewinder 
air-to-air and Maverick air-to-surface missiles, and other weapons, in contracts worth over $7 
billion.  As part of these contracts, the United States also began the construction of naval bases in 
the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.  In 1977, at a cost of $16 billion, the United States began to 
“be engaged in the construction of a variety of ‘military installations’ in Saudi Arabia.”70 
Meanwhile, Washington considered Iran as “a major asset in the Cold War, and 
significant American intelligence facilities were located on its territory.”71  In addition to hosting 
during the mid-1970s some 20,000 U.S. military personnel that were charged with training the 
Iranian armed forces,72 the American presence in Iran during that period also allowed for “useful 
monitoring [of] Soviet missile tests in connection with verification of SALT I.”73  Furthermore, 
the United States maintained a significant naval presence in the Gulf region, particularly in 
Bahrain, which became a homeport for four destroyers, and Diego Garcia, which housed 
American naval support facilities.74  From the Shah’s perspective, the U.S. presence in Iran was 
partially a security guarantor, preventing a possible Soviet intervention from Iran’s north. 
 
                                                 
68 Selin Bölme, “The Politics of Incirlik Air Base,” Insight Turkey, Vol. 9, Number 3 (2007), 82-91. 
69 Hermann Eilts, “Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy,” in Brown (editor), Diplomacy in the Middle East, 236. 
70 Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, 210. 
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Soviet Military Bases in the Middle East 
Despite claims by the Kremlin that all foreign military bases in the Gulf region “should be 
eliminated,”75 Moscow itself wanted “Middle Eastern bases, political influence, and oil.”76  At 
various points during the late 1960s and 1970s, Moscow succeeded in establishing and 
maintaining foreign military bases in a number of Arab countries, including Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya, Syria, and South Yemen.77  By the early 1970s Damascus gave the Soviet Union limited 
access to Latakia, a Syrian port; allowed the stationing of “Soviet air defence troops, pilots, and 
other military advisers;” and by 1973 housed approximately 6,000 Soviet personnel in Syria.78  
Throughout the 1970s, the Kremlin also developed a close security cooperation relationship with 
the newly-formed South Yemen.  Moscow was given naval base privileges in Aden, which later 
became the main base for Soviet military operations in the Indian Ocean, and access to facilities 
in Socotra.79  Additionally, beginning in 1978, the Soviet Union was granted access to Aden 
International Airport and to a military airfield in Al-Anad airbase.80  Permission to use aerial 
bases in Yemen allowed the Soviet Union to fly Ilyushin-38 ASW reconnaissance patrol aircraft 
on intelligence missions and “expedited the Soviet intervention in the Horn [of Africa, during the 
late 1970s.]”81 
Moscow also maintained close security cooperation with Cairo in the late 1960s and early 
1970s.  During the Six Day War of 1967, Nasser asked the Kremlin “to base some 20,000 air and 
                                                 
75 George Lenczowski, “The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf: An Encircling Strategy,” International Journal, 
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80 Harkavy, Bases Abroad, 91. 
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naval personnel in Egypt,” effectively stopping the Israeli advance.82  Another sign of the Soviet 
Union providing external protection to Arab regimes in exchange for being allowed to maintain 
military bases came a few years later.  In 1970, following a series of Israeli deep penetration 
manoeuvres against Egypt, Nasser asked the Soviet Union to take complete control of defending 
Egyptian airspace; in March of that year Moscow sent personnel to Egypt to begin constructing 
an entirely Soviet-manned air defence system, which ultimately included an early warning and 
air-control radar system, dozens of batteries of SA-3 SAMS, and over 100 MiG-21 interceptors, 
reportedly flown by Russian pilots.83  Up until July 1972 the Soviet Union was able to maintain 
significant air and naval bases in Egypt.84 
 
Soviet Attempt to Establish a Foreign Military Presence in Iraq 
Following the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, Moscow hinted to local Arab regimes 
that the USSR might try to fill the “security vacuum” created by Britain’s withdrawal by 
stationing Soviet military forces in the Gulf region.85  The majority of the ruling monarchies – 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE – were Western-allied before Great Britain’s 
departure.  Western powers were not as concerned that the Kremlin would seek to establish a 
military presence in the Arab monarchies as they were about its attempt to do so in Iraq, which 
had expelled the Western-backed Monarchy in 1958.  Numerous Western reports in the early and 
mid-1970s argued that Iraq was slated to host a Soviet FMP.  For example, Kelly argued in an 
April 1973 that the Soviet naval visit to Umm Qasr was “more than a routine port visit,” hinting 
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that Moscow was trying to establish a military presence there.86  A few months later, in January 
1974 Thomas Marks of the U.S. Army reported that “a new Soviet base is under construction at 
Umm Qasr, on the Persian Gulf in Iraq.”87  Similarly, Bruce Porter listed Umm Qasr as a 
“military support facility” that was used by the USSR during the 1970s.88   
However, reports of a Soviet naval base being established in Iraq turned out to be largely 
incorrect.  The Soviet military was granted visitation rights to Iraqi naval ports and airfields in 
Iraq following the signing of the 1972 Treaty.89  However, besides the naval visit to the port in 
Umm Qasr in 1973, Smolansky found that Soviet visits to Iraqi naval ports and Moscow’s use of 
airfields in Iraq throughout the 1970s were very “limited [and] rare.”90  Similarly, Alvin 
Rubinstein concluded in 1979 that “Moscow's access [to Iraqi ports] has not been automatic or 
unimpeded… though the Soviet navy can show the flag regularly at Umm Qasr, it must request 
official permission for each visit.”91  The Baathist regime was not only resolved to reject foreign 
military bases on its territory, it also wanted this to be known publicly.  For example, when 
American officials publicly claimed that Iraq had allowed the Soviet Union to stage a naval 
military base at Umm Qasr, Iraqi officials felt obligated to respond to this accusation.  In 
September 1974, Iraq’s News Agency (INA), declared that: 
The statement by the U.S. President’s press secretary that the Soviet Union has three military bases 
in the Indian Ocean, and the reference by the U.S. Defense Department that one of these bases is in 
Umm Qasr in the Iraqi Republic, are pure fabrication...   
Iraq, a member of the nonaligned group… pursues an independent foreign policy [and] rejects 
foreign bases and military alliances…  In harmony with this policy… Iraq rejects the establishment 
of any foreign base on its territory.  This rejection is not contradictory to Iraq’s friendship with the 
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socialist states, led by the Soviet Union, to whom Iraq is bound with a friendship treaty [which] does 
not aim at the establishment of military bases.92 
Interestingly, the statement above came within only two years of Iraq signing the 1972 
Treaty.  Not only did Baghdad refuse to stage a foreign military presence on its territory during 
this time period, but it also did not want to be perceived by other states as a staging ground for 
foreign militaries.  Recently declassified American reports show that even though Washington 
publicly declared that Baghdad allowed for the stationing of Soviet military bases, privately U.S. 
policymakers were aware that no such bases existed in Iraq.  For example, a 1976 U.S. State 
Department telegram to the U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia stated that, 
As far as we know, there is no Soviet base or base-type facility in Iraq.  The most persistent claim 
in this regard is that there is a Soviet Naval base at Um Qasr.  Though the tiny Iraqi Navy is based 
there and Soviet vessels use the port for occasional refuelling, we have no evidence that the port is 
a Soviet base.  Our understanding of the Iraqi position is that they would resist any Soviet request 
to establish a Soviet base in Iraq.93 
 
3. Military Balance of Power 
Impact of Soviet Military Aid to Iraq vs. American Aid to Iraqi Kurds 
One of the key events in Iraqi military aid policy was the signing of the 1972 Iraqi-Soviet Treaty.  
While the treaty enhanced Baghdad’s relative military power in the short-term, by the mid-to-late 
1970s it had actually backfired because of the reaction that it caused amongst American 
policymakers.  Following Soviet premier Kosygin’s trip to Baghdad to sign the treaty, U.S. 
officials had come to believe that: 
One of [the U.S.-Soviet] competitions was taking place in Iraq, at the Shah's doorstep.  At issue was 
the future political orientation of a country second only to Saudi Arabia in its reserves of oil, hence 
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with resources to threaten the equilibrium in the Middle East and especially in the Gulf…  Iraq 
under Saddam Hussein was edging ever closer to the Soviet Union.94 
In 1969, Washington was asked by Iraqi Kurds for financial and arms support in their 
struggle against the new Baathist regime.95  Similarly, the Shah of Iran requested that 
Washington help Barzani and Kurdish rebels in 1971.  The United States turned away both 
requests.96  However, after the signing of the Soviet-Iraq treaty, Washington began providing 
assistance to Kurds in northern Iraq in late 1972.97  American aid was largely funnelled through 
the Shah, who continued to provide logistics and artillery support, including long-range artillery 
to Kurdish rebels.  In April 1974 Washington doubled its covert contribution to the Kurds, and 
publicly provided $1 million in refugee relief; the Shah more than doubled his financial support 
to the Kurds, while British and Israeli military and economic assistance to the Kurds also 
continued.98  As described above, this foreign covert military aid contributed to nearly toppling 
the Baathist regime during Baghdad’s 1974-1975 counterinsurgency.99 
 
External Balancing: U.S. Military Aid to Iran 
A second inadvertent effect of Baghdad’s 1972 pact with the Soviet Union was that it 
undermined Iraq’s military balance-of-power vis-à-vis Iran.  Fearful of a Moscow-backed proxy 
state in the strategically important-Gulf, the United States increased its military aid to the Shah 
of Iran. Nixon approved the sale of high-performance aircraft (such as the U.S. Air Force’s F-15 
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and the Navy’s F-14), both of which the Shah had requested, and other advanced military 
equipment to Iran in order to, as Kissinger described it, “counteract the Kosygin-Saddam arms 
deal” in 1972.100  In 1974 Tehran ordered from Washington six Spruance-class destroyers and a 
communications intelligence system at an estimated cost of $660 million and $500 million (1975 
figures), as well as 12 Boeing transportation aircraft.101  In 1976 Iran purchased 160 F-16 
fighters at a cost of $3.4 billion (1977 figures).102  In late 1977 it ordered seven E-3 Airborne 
Warning and Control System (AWACS) planes,103 as well as eight nuclear reactors worth an 
estimated $10 billion.104  Although it is difficult to put a final figure on all of the military orders 
under the Shah during the 1970s,105 the table below illustrates that average Iranian military 
imports between 1974 and 1978 (prior to the Iranian Revolution) were over three times that of 
the average between 1968 and 1973.106  The disparity between Iraqi and Iranian military imports 
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Arms Race in the Gulf 
The Iranian-Iraqi arms race spread to other countries in the Gulf, which by the second half of the 
1970s had become the largest arms-importing area in the world.  In particular, Saudi Arabia 
became a major purchaser of U.S. military equipment.  Riyadh’s weapons imports during this 
period included the purchase of 250 M-60 medium tanks, HAWK surface-to-air missiles, 400 
air-to-surface missiles, 2,000 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and 45 F-15 fighters.107  According 
to SIPRI figures, regional arms spending on military imports amongst the countries of the 
Persian Gulf – Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain – peaked in 1977, 
when total spending on military imports for these countries reached $8.2 billion.108   
To keep up with the arms race in the Gulf, the Baathist regime spent an enormous amount 
of the state budget on the military.109  Almost 40% of Iraqi oil revenues were spent on 
purchasing expensive military equipment from abroad, while 20% of the Iraqi labour force was 
employed by one of the Iraqi security services: the military, the popular army, the police.110  
Between 1978 and 1980, Iraq ordered $4 billion worth of arms from France alone.111  In late 
1979, Iraq also signed a contract for 24 additional Mirage fighter-bombers with Paris and MiG-
23, MiG-25, and MiG-27 fighter aircraft with Moscow.112  In early 1980, Iraq signed a $2.6 
billion contract with Italy to outfit the entire Iraqi Navy; transfers included four Lupo frigates, 
six 650-ton corvettes, and one Vesuvlo-class vessel, all at an estimated cost of $1.3 billion.113  
All of these purchases were in part necessitated by the American counter-reaction following the 
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1972 Iraqi-Soviet treaty, the result of which unwittingly caused Iraq to enter an arms race with 
its two neighbours in the Gulf: Iran and Saudi Arabia.  The expansion of the Iranian military far 
outpaced that of the Iraqi armed forces and, during the latter half of the 1970s, posed a challenge 
to Iraqi regional ambitions.  Even though the Iraqi government signed the 1975 Algiers 
Agreement with Iran, it was never fully comfortable with the concessions which it had to make 
during the negotiations.  These tensions played themselves out in the following decade.  
PART II: 1980-1990 
1. Threat Perceptions During the Iran-Iraq War 
Iraqi Perspectives on Revolutionary Iran 
Saddam Hussein became Iraq’s President in July 1979, just months after the toppling of the Shah 
of Iran.114  Although Iraq’s initial invasion has been has been a subject of much literature, few 
accounts have been able to capture how Iraqi leaders perceived the threat from post-
revolutionary Iran during the late 1970s and early 1980s.  For example, in an often-cited study, 
Iran and Iraq at War,115 Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp claim that “there is no indication 
that the Iraqi authorities showed any profound understanding of developments in Iranian politics.  
On the contrary, [Baathist leaders] persisted in seeing Khomeini as the ‘turbaned Shah,’ acting 
within the same guidelines and towards much the same end [as the Shah.]”116  Nevertheless, the 
authors concede that “a number of factors contributed to [Iraq’s decision to invade Iran], 
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although, given the closed and secretive system of Iraqi government, it would be difficult to 
describe with any accuracy the relative weight of each.”117  Julian Schofield’s study, 
Militarization and War, published in 2007, notes that Iraq invaded Iran in part because war 
between the two was essentially inevitable; therefore, it was better for Iraq to invade earlier 
rather than later, when Iran could exploit internal issues in Iraq (e.g. by giving military aid to 
Iraqi Kurds) in order to undermine the Baathist regime.118  While these accounts have some truth 
to them, archival evidence at the SHC shows that Iraqi leaders showed much more ambiguity 
towards the threat posed by post-Revolutionary Iran and that their decision to invade in 1980 was 
more calculated than it had been given credit by previous accounts. 
On February 13, 1979, Baghdad sent a letter to the new provisional government in 
Tehran that noted that Iraq “views with sympathy and support the struggle waged by the 
neighbouring and friendly people of Iran for freedom, justice and progress.”119  On February 20, 
1979, top Iraqi officials met to discuss the implications of the developments in Iran, where the 
Shah had fled just over a week earlier.120  Although Khomeini seemed to have the broadest base 
of popular support at the time, different Iranian political parties were fighting against each other 
in Tehran and it was difficult to tell which political faction would gain political power.  At the 
meeting, contrary to the narrative that Baathist leaders perceived post-Revolutionary Iran in the 
same light as Shah-era Iran, Hussein stated that post-Revolutionary turmoil “in Iran does not 
have only one possible outcome.”121  One of the potential outcomes was that Iran would emerge 
as a “friend of Iraq”: in Hussein’s estimates, Iran’s “stability and unity will be something 
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positive for us if Iran is not hostile to the Arab nation... [Therefore,] we are seeking an Iran that 
is united, developed, a good neighbour, and not hostile to the Arabs.”122   
While such an outcome was preferable, Iraqi leaders recognised that the emergence of a 
friendly Iran was not guaranteed.  In early 1979, therefore, Baathist leaders sought better 
relations with Tehran in general but did not attempt to support any Iranian faction vying for 
power should their side not come to power.  This policy was driven by the following 
calculations: if Iraq did not take any actions to destabilise Iran during this period and a friendly 
regime emerged, then Iraq would have a powerful ally; on the other hand, the longer the political 
infighting in Iran dragged on, the weaker Iran would become – which would be vital in case an 
antagonistic regime ultimately came to power.  This approach was explained by Hussein during 
the February 1979 meeting in the following terms: “We should not give... preference to any of 
the parties that we mentioned.  Let them fight one another.  We will deal with the one who 
achieves success [in Tehran]… Our patience is an ordeal to [Iran] in this situation.”123 
In April 1979 Khomeini emerged as the political victor in the fight for power in Tehran 
and declared Iran an “Islamic Republic.”  Iraq’s Baathist regime not only recognised the new 
government in Iran but also publicly embraced it.  In June 1979 the Baath Party’s official 
newspaper, Al-Thawra, argued that during the 1970s Iraq placed “all its resources at the service 
of the Iranian opposition, including Khomeini... who used Iraq as a centre for guidance and for 
ideological, political and organizational activities [and] was treated by the Iraqi state with 
respect.”124  In the same month, when Iraqi aircraft fighting Kurdish rebels in the north 
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mistakenly bombed the Iranian side of the border, Baghdad apologised to Tehran for the 
incident.125   
 
Escalation of Hostilities and Iraq’s Decision to Invade 
Despite Baghdad’s diplomatic outreach, Tehran accused Iraq and other Arab states of conspiring 
against it.  For example, Tehran International Service claimed that “some Arabic and Islamic 
regimes, particularly in Egypt, Morocco, Iraq, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia stand against Iran, 
denounce its revolution and its anti-imperialist measures and refuse to condemn the war... which 
the United States is trying to impose on the Iranian people.”126  In addition, Khomeini’s regime 
expressed expansionist ambitions.127  In an interview with Vienna Die Presse in March 1979, 
Khomeini recalled that the “most holy Ali, the first imam of the Shi'is, ruled a state which 
included the Arabian Peninsula, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, and other regions.”128  In addition, 
Tehran claimed that various territories in the Gulf, such as Bahrain, should be part of Iran.129  
The Baathist regime’s suspicion of the new Iranian regime were further heightened by 
Khomeini’s attempts to reach out to Iraq’s Shi’i community, which forms a majority of Iraq’s 
population but was under-represented in the Sunni-dominated political leadership and military 
officer corps.130 
In November 1979, Iraqi President Hussein held a meeting with his inner circle to discuss 
regional developments, at which Baathist leaders concluded that Khomeini’s policy was to 
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“isolate Iraq” and that Tehran wanted to play the role of regional policeman.131  Latif Jasim, 
Iraq’s Minister of Culture and Information, argued that “Gulf people must be warned” that the 
Iranian policy threatens the region’s stability.132  Hussein argued that “we have treated them [the 
Iranian leadership] more kindly than they deserve,”133 hinting that Iraq may soon move towards a 
military solution to the problem.  In October 1979, Iraq broke off official diplomatic relations 
with Iraq.134  In November Baghdad told Tehran that the Algiers Agreement would have to be 
revised and that Iran must give up its claims to the three Gulf islands and allow independence to 
its Arab, Kurdish, and Baluch populations.135   
Baathist leaders also began to provide covert military and economic assistance to Arab 
and Kurdish opposition groups within Iran in order to undermine Khomeini’s regime.  Archival 
evidence at the SHC indicates that the Iraqi General Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID) 
had begun drawing plans to secretly destabilise Khomeini’s regime as early as March 1979; in 
particular, the GMID’s plans centred on “creating an organised party in Ahwaz” that would 
protest against the Iranian regime and push to “restore the Arabic characteristics of the 
region.”136  During the same time period (early 1979), the GMID’s northern directorate was told 
to “watch the situation in [Iran’s] Kurdistan” in order to see whether there were groups there as 
well that were seeking independence from Iran which Iraq could give covert military aid to.137   
In the aforementioned Iraqi government meeting in November 1979, Hussein referenced an Iraqi 
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“plan [that] took place with the Ahwaz Arabs,” and told his cabinet that “if the Ahwaz Arabs 
need weapons, money, media propaganda, films, or politics, we are here to help.”138  Hussein 
also told his inner circle that, 
Now the Kurds fight in the north and the Arabs fight in the south [of Iran]… Regarding this issue, 
we will continue to support them until a self-governing body is achieved in Arabistan and in 
Kurdistan, Iran… Both the Arabs and the Kurds are revolting now and they must achieve self-
governance. It is in our planning that they achieve self-governance. 
139
 
The deterioration in diplomatic relations between Baghdad and Tehran led to a series of 
military hostilities along the Iraq-Iran border in January 1980 that included “cross-border raids, 
artillery duels, aerial dogfights, political subversions and assassinations,” including a failed Iraqi 
attempt to install Shapur Bakhtiar -- the last Iranian Prime Minister under the Shah -- into power 
in Tehran.140  On September 7, 1980, Baghdad accused Iran of shelling border towns which 
belong to Iraq according to the Algiers Agreement.141  Baathist policies were countered by 
Khomeini with calls on Iraq’s Shi’is to topple non-Islamic regimes across the Gulf.  After a 
failed assassination attempt (allegedly sponsored by Iran) on Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi government 
publicly pledged to take revenge on Iran.  On June 9, 1980, Sadegh Ghotzbadegh, the Iranian 
foreign minister, publicly stated that the Iranian government “had taken the decision to topple the 
Baathist regime in Iraq.”142  The following day, Sadun Hammadi, the Iraqi foreign minister, 
argued that Iranian troops were still occupying Iraqi territories, despite repeated demands that 
Iranians evacuate them.143 
A theory that is popular in some Iranian, pan-Arab, and Western literature on the Iran-
Iraq War is that the Carter administration gave the Iraqi government an implicit “green light” to 
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invade Iran.  For example, Dilip Hiro writes that “by supplying secret information, which 
exaggerated Iran's military weakness, to Saudi Arabia for onward transmission to Baghdad, 
Washington encouraged Iraq to attack Iran - seeing in the move the making of a solution to the 
hostage crisis on the eve of the presidential poll.”144  In his biography of Saddam Hussein, with 
whom he worked personally, Said Aburish writes that in July 1980 Saddam met with King 
Hussein of Jordan in Amman; on the same day, King Hussein met with three CIA operatives.  
According to Aburish, both Saddam and the CIA operatives “were preoccupied with the problem 
of Iran” and all either met together to discuss an Iraqi invasion of Iran or at the very least there 
was “an indirect meeting of minds through King Hussein,” in which American officials gave 
their implicit support for an Iraqi invasion of Iran.145  A number of other sources, including 
Western academics and Iranian officials, have made similar allegations regarding American 
involvement in the lead-up to the Iran-Iraq war.146   
More recent research casts serious doubt on this theory’s validity.  One of the key pieces 
of evidence used to substantiate this theory is an April 1981 memo written to President Reagan’s 
then-Secretary of State Alexander Haig which noted that “President Carter gave the Iraqis a 
green light to launch the war against Iran through Fahd.”147  Chris Emery questions the 
credibility of this document by pointing out that this memo was “written by an individual outside 
government in 1980 [when Carter would have made this decision] and the circumstances in 
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which he reached his interpretation remain unknown.”148  Emery concludes that American 
influence on Baghdad’s decision to invade Iran is “highly questionable.”149  Furthermore, an 
examination of the CRRC archive yields no evidence that Iraqi officials were directly or 
indirectly encouraged by Washington to invade Iran in 1980.  In fact, a number of Iraqi 
statements point in the opposite direction.  For example, in a September 16, 1980 discussion (just 
days prior to Iraq’s invasion of Iran), Baathist officials concluded that “the Americans are going 
to work hard against us [Iraqis]”150 in the upcoming intervention.  Examining Iraqi government 
documents from the period, Brands also concludes that “far from expecting American support, 
Saddam seems to have believed that the United States could not but oppose his invasion of 
Iran.”151  Saddam’s suspicions that Western nations may work to undermine Iraq during the war 
proved to be prophetic.  During the Iran-Iraq war national security officials in the Reagan and 
Bush administrations supported Iraq “not out of preference for one of two reprehensible regimes, 
but because [the United States] wanted neither to win the war and were worried that Iraq would 
prove to be the weaker [side].”152  As the Iran-Contra affair (discussed below) would later 
illustrate, American officials ultimately proved willing to provide arms to Iran, thereby “working 
against Iraq” as Saddam had predicted. 
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From Limited Intervention to Full-Scale Mobilization 
Although it is difficult to confirm the exact moment when the top Baathist leadership decided on 
the inevitability of a full-scale invasion of Iraq, this decision probably came in early or middle 
1980.153  Between January and June 1980, the GMID conducted a top secret study on the 
military, political, and economic state of Iran.154  The study, which was approved -- if not 
directed -- by the top political leadership in Baghdad, seems to be one of the first clear signs that 
the Iraqi government had begun to seriously consider using military force to defeat the Iranian 
threat.  Rather than analysing the intentions of the new Iranian government (something left for 
Iraq’s political leadership to carry out), the GMID report focused primarily on Iranian military 
capabilities -- including the strength and readiness of the Iranian air force, army, and navy -- and 
the state of the Iranian military command.  For example, the GMID report noted that: 
We expect more deterioration of the general situation of Iran’s fighting capability. It is probable it 
will send other troops to the Kurdish region to confront the armed Kurds. Moreover, the shortage of 
spare parts and the continuation of the disunity and general contradiction will lead to a greater 
decline of [Iran’s] combat capability. 
… At present, Iran has no power to launch wide offensive operations against Iraq, or to defend itself 
on a large scale. However, it is necessary to pay attention to taking protective measures, because it 
cannot be guaranteed that the Iranian enemy could not launch a special operation of a dangerous 
nature. For instance, it could execute an air strike at the front line of our airbases with a few Phantom 
airplanes, if their troops or interests encountered effective losses due to our activities, or when [our] 
operation of weakening the Khomeini regime reaches a more intensive stage.155 
In essence, the document provided one of the key elements of capability analysis which 
was important for Iraqi decision-makers in deciding whether to respond to Khomeini’s threats 
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with military force.  In a 2009 interview with American researchers, retired Iraqi General Ra'ad 
Majid Rashid Hamdani (who served in the Iraqi Army and later the Republican Guard between 
1970s and 2003) stated that “a gathering of senior [Iraqi] officers discussed the decision to 
invade [Iran] on July 6, 1980,” that is, over three months before the actual start of the war.156  
According to Hamdani, at the meeting, the Baathist leadership expressed its desire to have a 
“limited invasion” of Iran, which was based on the following calculation: 
If Iraqi troops could advance 15 to 20 kilometres inside Iran, the [Iranian] Revolutionary Army 
would have to advance from Tehran toward the border to confront us.  This would provide secular 
counter-revolutionary groups in the [Iranian] capital a chance to seize control and establish a secular 
government.157 
According to Hamdani, at the July 1980 meeting, senior Iraqi military officers told 
Hussein that it would be risky to send all of the country’s army brigades to the border since Iraq 
did not have enough reserves.  This led to the Iraqi government’s decision to accelerate its 
expansion of the Popular Army.158  In the year between Hussein’s ascents to power in 1979 and 
the invasion of Iran in September 1980, the size of the Iraqi Popular Army (or “People’s Army”) 
grew from 100,000 to 250,000 men.159  While not a professional force, the Popular Army 
bolstered the Baath Party’s belief that the “unannounced reserves [of the Iraqi military] are the 
Iraqi people.”160  In addition, Hamdani argues that the invasion was not a spontaneous attack and 
that “all senior commanders were notified of the decision [to invade Iran] on 7 July and were 
told to submit a report evaluating the readiness of their units within 72 hours.”161  By early 
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161 Interview with Hamdani in Saddam’s Generals, 57.  Hamdani’s account differs from that of former Iraqi Air 
Force Major General Abousi, who stated in a 2009 interview that the Iraqi Air Force was not notified of the decision 
to invade Iran until the last moment.  See interview with Al-Abousi in Saddam’s Generals, 190.   
Page 110 of 355 
 
September 1980, the senior levels of the Baathist leadership felt the Iraqi armed forces were 
adequately prepared for a limited invasion of Iran, and that they “could achieve victory in four to 
six weeks.”162  The limited nature of Iraq’s early assaults into Iran in late 1980 is reinforced in a 
2009 interview with retired Iraqi Major General Aladdin Hussein Makki Khammas, who served 
as the chief of staff of the Army’s III Corps between 1981 and 1984: 
The attack into Iran should have been a short one, like a blitzkrieg, because Iraq did not have the 
resources for a long campaign.  We knew that we were not prepared to fight a long war, and that 
Iran had a greater capacity in terms of human resources, wealth, and land mass.  Logically, if Iraq 
fought a war against Iran it needed to be short, such as when Israel fought the Six-Day War.  Judging 
from the pre-emptive strike and attack, this was the intention of Iraq’s [high] command.163 
On September 16, 1980, in a meeting with senior military officials, Hussein stated that, 
“we gave Iran all this time to return [Iraqi] land, but the Iranians did not return it according to the 
agreement.  We have to gain it back with the blood of our soldiers and by force.”164  On the 
following day, the Iraqi government abrogated the 1975 treaty with Iran and declared Iraqi 
sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab.  Less than a week later, the Iraqi air force initiated a series of 
strikes on Iran’s military airfields; these attacks were followed by a ground invasion.  Although 
Tripp argues that the Iraqi government believed that a show of force would compel Khomeini’s 
government to concede to Iraq’s territorial claims and acknowledging the latter’s military 
superiority,165 it seems from more recent evidence (presented above) that Baathist leaders wanted 
to draw Iranian military troops towards the Iraqi border to create a power vacuum in Tehran, 
which it believed would allow secular Iranian parties to topple the Khomeini regime.  In other 
words, top Baathist leaders saw the role of the Iraqi armed forces in 1980 as much of an 
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instrument by which they could bring about regime change in Iran as it could be used to compel 
or deter the Iranian regime from attacks.  
The Iraqi leadership understood that the transformation of a limited intervention into a 
full-scale war had dangerous implications.  In the aforementioned meeting on September 16, 
1980, an Iraqi military official spoke of the importance of calculating “the worst case scenario” 
in the upcoming war.  According to the military official, in the worst case, “Iran might escalate 
[from a limited intervention to a full-scale war]…  The Soviet Union might pressure us by 
[imposing an arms embargo]… we should [therefore] look for another source from which to 
import ammunition – [and other weapons.]”166  During the same meeting, an Iraqi military 
official named Abu-Bashar made the following prediction about whether Baghdad would be able 
to access external military assistance over the long-run in a protracted war: 
There is no doubt that the international circumstance, presently, is in our favour to get the land back 
[i.e. territory inside Iran which Iraqis viewed as their own] and to conduct operations internationally.  
In the future, the international circumstances might not stay as they are if [military operations] take a 
long time… taking a long time means that we will drain our resources.  There is a transit agreement 
between Iran and the Soviet Union. The Iranians will allow the Soviet goods to pass through their land, 
and the Soviets in return will allow the Iranian goods to pass through their land…  Also, [the United 
States] might find a solution for [the hostage crisis with Iran.] If these problems are solved, it is possible 




Although Hussein expressed his confidence that the Iraqi military would be able to 
accomplish a quick victory, other Iraqi officials present at the meeting, such as Abu Hasan, 
pushed back on his optimistic predictions and repeated the line of another participant in the 
discussion that the Iraqi military invasion of Iran “might lead to a full-scale war.”168  
Furthermore, Abu Hasan stated that the support of the Soviet Union could not be guaranteed: 
In my opinion, the Soviets are more lenient toward us than before.  However, I do not think they will 
provide good support to Iraq...  In my estimation, the Soviet Union will be tight regarding the supply 
of ammunition.  This is if the situation escalates.  If it is a few days of war, then we do not need them.  
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However, the Soviet Union will not supply [us] for a long period of time.  Please calculate this in the 
decision [to invade Iran.]
169
   
 
Iraqi-Supplier Mutual Threat Perception 
The Iran-Iraq War began on September 22, 1980 with the Iraqi invasion of Iran.  Chapter 7 
discusses in greater detail the various military phases of the war.  At this point it is worth 
examining the role and the extent to which suppliers’ threat perceptions played in Baghdad’s 
decision to go to war.  During the early-1980s, although the Soviet Union’s share of total Iraqi 
military imports was in decline, Moscow still provided roughly half of Baghdad’s military 
imports.170  In 1981, Dennis Ross wrote the following analysis of Moscow’s approach to threat 
perception: 
Along all their borders or nearby regions, the Soviets favour weak states with regimes that are 
friendly and responsive to Soviet concerns and needs.  In this way, the Soviets can minimise the 
threats they face and in real terms meet a fundamental Soviet objective: the pushing of threats farther 
and farther away from the Soviet homeland.
171
 
Given this perspective on Soviet threat perception, it would made have sense for Moscow 
to distance itself from Iraq, which is farther away from the Soviet border, and to create better 
relations with the new regime in Iran, a country which was situated directly on its southern 
border.  To an extent, this is what the Kremlin attempted to do at the start of the war.  When 
Tariq Aziz, a member of the RCC, arrived in Moscow on September 21, 1980 to seek Soviet 
material and ideological support, the Kremlin was angry at Baghdad’s decision to invade Iran 
and imposed an official arms embargo on Iraq.  Moscow also reached out more closely to the 
Iranian regime and officially praised the progress of the Iranian revolution.  As the table below 
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shows, despite the strains imposed on Baghdad by the Soviet arms embargo, Soviet military 
supplies continued to reach Iraq, albeit through intermediaries in Socialist bloc-nations 
(particularly Poland) and some Arab states.  Nevertheless, while Soviet arms continued to flow 
to Iraq, the Iraqi regime put an emphasis on getting military equipment from other countries, 
including France, Brazil, Yugoslavia, and various European countries.  Iraqi total military 
imports increased significantly during the war, more than doubling on a yearly average by 1984, 
while Soviet military aid of total Iraqi military imports declined.172 
 
The difference between total Iraqi military imports and those supplied by the Soviet 
Union were made up by Western arms, which Iraqi leaders viewed as superior.  Exemplifying 
the Iraqi attitude towards Soviet arms imports, in a meeting with senior political-military 
officials in the spring of 1980, Aziz pointed out that an Iraqi military unit which suffered defeat 
in a battle in an early part of the war “was hurt because the Soviet weapon is inexpensive,”173 i.e. 
Aziz recognised that although the Soviet arms that they were importing were cheaper relative to 
other available arms on the world market, their inferior quality put a strain on Iraqi military 
effectiveness.  At the same meeting, when one of the Iraqi military officials complained that 
Britain’s Chieftain tank which Iraq wanted to procure was “expensive,”174 Hussein responded 
that “I am not going to worry about the weapon’s price” and promised that “I will not leave any 
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advanced weapon in the world that we can reach either directly or by assigning someone to buy 
it for us.”175   
The countries that Iraq “assigned” to buy weapons for it were primarily Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia.  Both countries shared Iraq’s threat perception vis-à-vis Iran and were therefore willing 
to finance the Iraqi military.  These two countries, alongside Iraqi political-military officials, 
were able to fill the gap created by the Soviet arms embargo between 1980 and 1982 by 
procuring weapons from over a dozen different countries, including Argentina, Brazil, 
Czechoslovakia, France, and Yugoslavia, amongst others.  Nevertheless, it was Moscow’s and 
Washington’s support of the Iraqi war effort that was more important than any of the other 
military allies: the Kremlin still provided roughly half of Iraq’s military imports, while 
Washington’s approval sparked other Western states to increase military assistance to Iraq.   
Despite Baghdad’s rapprochement with Washington, which began in the early 1980s, and the 
improvement in relations with Moscow in 1982, Iraqi leaders continued to believe that “America 
is against us and so is the Soviet Union.”176  The dilemma of reaching out to countries which the 
Baathist leadership felt were potentially opposed to Iraqi interests was expressed by Hussein in a 
meeting with his military advisors just one year into the Iran-Iraq War: 
Siding with the Soviets [on foreign policy matters] is indicative of weakness.  At the same time, 
opposing the Soviets is completely unacceptable.  We don’t want to be seen as dependent or 
regarded as being in the Soviet camp.  And if we do not improve our relations with them it is as if 
we have severed our [security] agreement with them.177 
Ultimately, through diplomatic efforts on both sides, Iraqi-Soviet relations improved after 
Moscow realised that the other partner it was trying to court, the Khomeini government, was an 
intransigent actor.  The Kremlin resumed arms shipment to Iraq in mid-1981 through 
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intermediaries, and officially ended the arms embargo in 1982.178  Following Aziz’s visit to 
Moscow in June 1982, nearly 300 ICP members were released from Iraqi prisons.  At around the 
same time, the Soviet Union began supplying Iraq with T-54 tanks, MiGs, and anti-aircraft 
missiles.  In December 1985, Hussein, alongside Foreign Minister Aziz and the Minister of State 
for Military Affairs, Abd al-Jabbar Shenshall travelled to Moscow to help secure further 
supplies.179  In April 1986, Baghdad held the 16th session of the Permanent Soviet-Iraqi 
Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation held in Baghdad.  The 
Iraqi delegation was led by Iraq’s Minister of Industry and Mineral Resources.  The two sides 
signed a trade agreement and reached an informal contract for economic, scientific, and 
technological cooperation, much of which helped Iraq’s effort to build an indigenous military 
production capability.  On June 13, 1986, the USSR and Iraq signed a long-term trade agreement 
after a visit by a Baathist delegation to Moscow.  In February 19, 1987, Foreign Minister Aziz 
again came to Moscow to seek greater security cooperation and assistance.  Therefore, despite 
Moscow’s efforts to stop the Iran-Iraq war during the early 1980s, within a few years the Soviet 
Union had once again become a supporter of the Iraqi military.  Soviet actions and attitudes 
seemed to have a limited impact on Iraqi threat perceptions.  Furthermore, contrary to the defence 
dependence view, in the long-run it was the supplier (Moscow) that was brought over to sharing 
the threat perception of its military recipient (Baghdad), not the other way around. 
Much like Moscow’s position on the Iran-Iraq War, during the 1980s Washington also 
maintained a policy of neutrality but tilted more towards Iraq.  While the United States never 
directly sold any arms to Iraq during this decade,180 it undertook a number of policies meant to 
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enhance Iraqi military power.  Firstly, Washington sent a considerable amount of dual-purpose 
equipment to Baghdad -- including trucks and helicopters that were officially for civilian 
purposes but were used by the Iraqi military -- and shared important military intelligence with 
the Baathist leadership on Iranian troop movements.181  Secondly, Washington provided a vast 
amount of economic aid, including allocations from the U.S. Department of Commerce during 
the late 1980s that reached several billions of dollars per year by the late 1980s, thereby freeing 
up the Iraqi government’s budget for higher military spending.182  Thirdly, America’s diplomatic 
support played an important role in influencing Iraq’s other military suppliers (such as France, 
United Kingdom, West Germany, Canada, and other countries) to transfer arms to Iraq.183 
Bruce Jentleson, who conducted interviews with top U.S. officials and reviewed 
declassified documents pertaining to American policies towards Iraq during the 1980s, argues 
that America’s tilt towards Iraq was driven by a variety of interests, which included: (1) an 
American desire to counter-balance the Iranian and Soviet threats in the Gulf, (2) the belief that 
Washington could turn Iraq into “a force for regional stability and peace,” and (3) the perception 
that there were economic benefits to be gained from trade with Baghdad.184  Nevertheless, 
despite the American drive to strengthen Iraqi military capabilities during the 1980s, by 1990 
Iraq had come to pose as great a threat to international security as Iran and was still intent on 
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acquiring a nuclear weapon,185 continued to proliferate of chemical and biological weapons, and 
supported international terrorism despite pressures by Washington to stop.186 
2. Foreign Military Presence 
During the 1980s, various countries accused Baghdad of allowing a foreign military presence on 
Iraqi territory.  However, the nature of these accusations changed from the preceding decade.  
For example, on January 13, 1980 Tehran International Service, argued that “the Baathist regime 
has invited the United States to establish military bases in Iraq, using the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan as an excuse.”187  Meanwhile, American policymakers argued that Iraq was going to 
allow the Soviet Union to host an FMP on Iraqi territory in exchange for external protection.  For 
example, Dennis Ross hinted in 1981 that Moscow was trying to build a foreign military base in 
Iraq: 
A Soviet presence in Iraq or the Soviet ability to use Iraqi bases would greatly enhance the Soviet 
threat to the northern Gulf area and Saudi Arabia.  Iraqi bases would bring these targets within range 
of Soviet tactical aircraft.  They could be used to protect the forward deployed Soviet airborne 
divisions, cover the Soviet land-routes through Iran and air and land routes to Saudi Arabia, and, 
also bomb potential land and sea entry points for U.S. or other forces in the Gulf/Arabian 
peninsula.188 
Establishing a foreign military base on Iraqi territory during the 1980s could have made 
sense from an Iraqi strategic perspective.  Since the fundamental balance of power between Iran 
and Iraq was tilted towards Iran (a country that was between three and five times the latter’s size 
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in terms of population, territorial size, and economic output), hosting a superpower’s military on 
Iraqi territory could have provided Baghdad with an important external protector.  And, given the 
geostrategic importance of Iraq, had Baghdad asked for an external power to base its military on 
Iraqi soil, it possibly could have received it.  Nevertheless, throughout the 1980s, Baathist 
leaders repeatedly vowed not to accept any FMP on Iraqi territory.  Speaking at the Islamic 
Foreign Ministers Conferences in Islamabad on January 28, 1980, Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Sadun 
Hammadi, stated that, “We reject the great powers’ intervention in other states affairs, regardless 
of any justifications and circumstances…  This is the nonaligned principle that we take as the 
basis of our foreign policy.”189  On February 8, 1980, speaking at a rally in Baghdad, Iraq’s 
President Hussein proposed the Pan-Arab Charter.190  Signifying the degree to which Iraq was 
opposed to foreign military bases, the Charter’s first principle proposed: 
The rejection of the presence in the Arab homeland of any foreign armies and military forces, or 
any foreign forces and military bases, or any facilities in any form, or under any pretext or cover, or 
for any reason whatsoever.  Any Arab regime that fails to abide by this principle should be isolated 




In the short-run, Iraq’s pan-Arab Charter succeeded in rallying the Arab masses, and 
consequently some Arab governments, in rejecting foreign military bases on their territory.  For 
example, on February 10, 1980, an editorial in Jordan's Ad-Dustur journal stated that the Iraqi 
pan-Arab charter “proceeded from a mature political awareness” and “expressed a realistic and 
responsible outlook.”192  Bahrain signed the Charter on February 17, 1980.193  Meanwhile, on the 
following day, Tripoli stated that “the Libyan Foreign Secretariat has expressed Libya's 
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satisfaction at the pan-Arab charter announced by Iraq [which] rejects the presence of any 
foreign military forces or armies in the Arab homeland.”194  Another objective of the charter was 
to undercut two of Iraq’s then-arch enemies and contenders for pan-Arab leadership: Egypt and 
Syria.  In January 1980 Egyptian President Anwar as-Sadat agreed to provide facilities for an 
American military presence in Egypt.195  Syria, meanwhile, had already began hosting a Soviet 
military presence on its territory and in October 1980 Damascus signed a Treaty of Friendship 
and Cooperation with the Soviet Union.196  Over the next decade Syria came to host three 
important naval bases for the Soviet Union at Latakia, Tartus, and Ras Shamra.  Writing in 1989, 
Harkavy noted that Tartus became “the primary maintenance facility for Soviet submarines… 
and the base appears recently to have been upgraded, perhaps to become the home port for the 
Soviet Fifth Fleet.”197  Undeniably, the Baath Party’s rejection of foreign militaries on its 
territory buttressed the Iraqi Baath Party’s credibility in the Arab world and made it a unique 
contender for pan-Arab leadership during the 1980s. 
In the long-run, however, while Iraq did not allow a foreign military base to be 
established on its territory, Baghdad was not successful in dissuading other Arab governments 
from doing the opposite.  A number of the regimes that signed the pan-Arab charter broke its 
first principle within a matter of a few years.  Libya, for example, allowed the Soviets regular 
access to ports in Tripoli and Benghazi, and both ports had a Soviet Mediterranean squadron 
stationed there; Moscow was also reported to be constructing a naval base in Badria.198  
Meanwhile, by the late 1980s, the United States had come to station a homeport at Al Jufair in 
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Bahrain; this military installation consisted of four destroyers and provided the U.S. military 
personnel with “communications, storage, barracks, berth, hangars, [and] co-use of adjacent 
airfield [and] re-supply of Indian Ocean task force.”199  Additionally, at Riyadh’s request, from 
September 30, 1980 and until the end of the Iran-Iraq War, an estimated 300 U.S. military 
personnel manned an AWACS base at Dhahran Air Force Base in Saudi Arabia “to provide 
battle management for potential air combat in and around the Persian Gulf.”200  As Cordesman 
and Wagner note, the American military presence “allowed Saudi Arabia and the U.S. to obtain 
long-range air defence and maritime surveillance, and a major command and data display centre 
was set up in an underground bunker at Dhahran.  This deployment later became the nucleus of 
all the U.S. air surveillance capability in the region.”201   Thus, despite Baghdad’s attempt to 
convince regimes in the region to remove all foreign military presence in the Middle East, many 
Arab states (especially Iraq’s neighbours) opted to seek foreign external protection from either 
the United States or the Soviet Union.  Nevertheless, contrary to predictions by defence 
dependence theory, Iraq itself had remained free of FMPs despite being the largest importer of 
arms in the region during this decade. 
3. Military Balance of Power 
The role of the great powers during the Iran-Iraq War has been a subject of much academic 
literature.202  Part of the narrative that emerged was that the Iraqi political leadership was naïve 
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vis-à-vis its relationship with its military suppliers.  Numerous analysts of the Iran-Iraq War have 
posited that Baathist leaders were drawn into a quagmire by the great powers, who sought to 
create a rough equality in the military balance of power between Iraq and Iran as a way to extent 
the war and weaken both states.203  In particular, some sources claim that Kissinger’s alleged 
quote about the Iran-Iraq War - “It is a pity that both sides cannot lose” – encapsulated the 
policies of the United States and other great powers, which aimed to make sure neither side 
emerged as a clear winner from the war.204   
In fact, Iraqi leaders themselves openly stated during the Iran-Iraq War that they believed 
the great powers were interested in prolonging the war.205  For example, a 1984 report by the 
Iraqi Mission to the United Nations, circulated within the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited 
American participants in a conference in Washington DC as saying that “the outcome [of the 
war] must be ‘No one victorious, no one defeated.’”206   The Iraqi report also noted that one of 
the audience members reported that Washington must “stick to our previous position of not 
letting any of the [parties win in the conflict] because it is going to be a great danger to the 
countries of the region if […] one party ends up victorious.”207 
Despite remaining suspicious of American intentions, the Baath Party calculated that it 
had no better alternative than to continue to maintain diplomatic, economic, and (to a more 
limited extent) military ties with Washington, while pressuring American policymakers to stop 
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their support of Iran.208   During the mid-1980s, U.S.-Iraqi security cooperation allowed the Iraqi 
government to receive 60 Hughes helicopters, $4.7 billion in American commodity loans, and to 
purchase an estimated $500 million in radio, graphic terminals, machine tools, computer 
mapping, and other sensitive technologies that were ultimately used for military purposes.209  In 
addition, Hewlett-Packard sold advanced computers to Iraq; an Atlanta branch of Italian 
government-owned Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro (BCCI) provided $5 billion of loans and credits 
to the Iraqi government; and the U.S. Commerce Department provided $1 billion annually for 
food credit, which aided the Iraqi war effort.210  Finally, the United States provided important 
satellite imagery to Iraq’s intelligence services about Iranian troop movements during the war.211 
In addition to American support, Iraq also continued to import weapons and military-
related products from the Soviet Union, France, and Arab countries.  Notable arms treaties 
included a $4.5 billion (1990 figure) purchase of 200 T-55s, 300 T-62s, and 600 T-72s from the 
Soviet Union and $600 million in ammunition from Egypt in 1984, a $1.5 billion purchase from 
France of 24 Mirage F-1 EQ5/6 in 1985, and large scale purchases of MiG29s, Su-25 fighter 
aircraft, and numerous Mi-24 assault helicopters from Moscow in 1986, at a cost of 
approximately $5 billion.212  The table below illustrates the large scale growth in the inventory of 
the Iraqi armed forces between the late 1970s and mid-1980s. 
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On November 13, 1986, U.S. President Ronald Reagan publicly acknowledged that the 
United States had been secretly selling weapons to Iran during the preceding eighteen months.213  
Washington’s covert transfer of arms to Tehran in 1985 and 1986, which was referred to in the 
Western press as the “Iran-Contra affair”214 or “Irangate” -- Saddam referred to it as “Irangate” 
in numerous meetings215 -- involved the transfer of over two thousand TWO missiles and 200 
spare parts for Hawk missile batteries in exchange for freeing American hostages held in 
Lebanon by Hezbollah, a terrorist groups with ties to Tehran.216  In the years leading up to the 
incident U.S.-Iraqi relations had improved considerably.  By 1984, the United States was 
providing Iraq with financial assistance, tactical intelligence, and dual-use equipment.217  In 
meetings with U.S. officials, Iraqi leaders expressed satisfaction with Washington’s initiative to 
discourage its allies from selling arms to Iran, a State Department-led effort that begun in late 
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1983 and was known as “Operation Staunch.”218  In a December 1983 meeting with Iraqi Under 
Secretary Mohammed al-Sahhaf, U.S. Ambassador William Eagleton noted that Sahhaf was 
“pleased” with Washington’s renewed activism in the region, including its effort to stop arms 
sales to Iran.219   
Reagan’s admission in 1986 that the United States had at least from the start of 1985 
covertly sold arms to Iran contradicted these developments and fed into Iraq’s earlier suspicions 
that the United States was pursuing a strategy to make sure that “neither side should win.”220  In 
the ensuing months Baathist officials held at least six high-level meetings to discuss the 
implications of Irangate.221  Two sentiments were frequently repeated by Baathist officials 
during those discussions.  Firstly, Iraqi leaders maintained that American actions “[are] close to 
what we expected.”222  In a meeting two days after the revelations of the Iran-Contra affair, 
Saddam stated that the revelation of U.S. covert military aid to Iran “is no surprise to us”223 and 
that “I was not convinced, not for a single day, that America does not provide Iran with 
weapons.”224  In another meeting in the same month, Iraqi officials reiterated that “we were not 
surprised” by America’s actions.225  A second strain that is evident in post-Irangate Iraqi 
government meetings is the visceral anger which Baathist officials felt by Washington’s betrayal.  
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Saddam referred to Irangate as a “stab in the back” by the United States.226  In a meeting soon 
after the affair’s revelations, several RCC members - notably Saddam, Taha Yassin, and Hassan 
- called American policies “conspiratorial,” Iran-Contra a “conspiracy against Iraq,” and Irangate 
as “a form of terrorism.”227  While RCC members maintained that they were “not surprised by 
Irangate,” they also viewed Irangate as a new level of “depravity [and] moral decay” by the 
United States.228 
Regardless of how Baathist officials felt inside the halls of power in Baghdad, outwardly 
they made a strategic choice to portray Iraq as the more pragmatic and cool-headed actor in the 
Iran-Iraq war.  In a meeting on November 15, 1986, when an RCC member urged Saddam to 
develop “a clear action plan to expose the American scandal on the international level,” Saddam 
responded that “regardless of how enthusiastic we are, we have to deal with [Irangate] ultimately 
in a confident, calm manner,” and reiterated that “we have to be calm about [Irangate]... and take 
things within the proper perspective.”229  This sentiment was echoed by another RCC member, 
Taha Yassin Ramadan, who highlighted the importance of discussing Irangate amongst Baathist 
leaders in an objective manner “so that we may know how to behave calmly in front of our 
people, the U.S., the international community, Iran, and with regard to the war.”230  Ultimately, 
the Iraqis adopted a strategy aimed at undermining Iran, rather than the United States: “Our talk 
should be [aimed at] Iran's image… more than giving weight to the amount of American aid.” 231  
In addition, Baathist leaders sought to use Iran-Contra to brandish Iraq’s stance as an 
independent state.  RCC member Taha Yassin Ramadan argued that Iraq should “give a priority” 
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to highlighting the hypocrisy of Iran, which while “identifying itself by hatred for America” was 
covertly cooperating with the West.232  Taha argued that exposing Iran’s hypocrisy “improves the 
standing of our nation, asserts that it is on the right path, is independent, and deals with powerful 
nations with a high measure of equality which serves its own interests.”233 
In accordance with Ramadan’s suggestions, on November 15, 1986 the Iraqi government 
published a press-release which “strongly denounced” American-Iranian cooperation. 234  
Considering the sense of betrayal Iraqi leaders expressed in post-Irangate meetings, the tone of 
the statement was largely moderate.  It condemned not the United States as a whole, but only the 
“act” of transferring weapons to Iran: “Iraq has strongly denounced the U.S. administration's act 
of supplying the Iranian regime with quantities of military hardware.”235  Iraqi leaders reserved 
the stronger language for Tehran.  The Iraqi press-release stated that the Iran-Contra affair 
“demonstrates the lowliness of the Iranian regime, which is founded on charlatanism, shows 
[Iran’s] political and military bankruptcy, and confirms the strength of the Iraqi position in its 
political, ethical, and military aspects.”236  As Brands and Palkki write, in having such a 
“subdued diplomatic response” and “taking a moderate public line” towards Washington, Iraqi 
leaders hoped “to shore up U.S. backing for Baghdad.”237 
Although in public Baathist officials maintained a relatively “calm” posture, Irangate 
undoubtedly confirmed their conspiratorial mind-set and “severely eroded [Baghdad’s] minimal 
confidence [in Washington.]”238  In a July 1987 meeting, Iraqi officials stated that the 
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“superpowers” (primarily the United States) were out “to downsize this country [Iraq] or give it a 
lesson… or break it psychologically.”239  Similarly, in a May 1988 meeting at the end of the 
Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi leaders claimed that “America conspired with Britain against us in al-Faw.  
They cooperated with the Iranians in capturing al-Faw.”240  At the same meeting, Baathist 
officials stated that now that it had essentially emerged victorious from the war with Iran, Iraq 
has “to be aware of America and its satellites and tools more than the Iranians. Because they [the 
Americans] are now like a police force, protecting Iran, and anything they find out about Iraq 
will be delivered to Iran.”241  The 2004 Duelfer Report, which is based on interviews with Iraqi 
government officials and research of captured Baathist files, notes that “after Irangate, Saddam 
believed that Washington could not be trusted and that it was out to get him.”242 
Despite the lasting impression that Irangate left on the Iraqi regime, Baathist officials 
continued to cooperate with the United States for the remainder of the 1980s out of necessity.  
Baghdad’s pragmatic public stance paid important dividends over the next few years.  In 1987 
Washington lent Baghdad over $1 billion in Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) credits and 
loosened high-tech exports to Iraq.  In 1988 it placed 60 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency 
analysts in Iraq to provide Baghdad with targeting information on Iranian command-and-control 
facilities and logistical targets.243  In the first seven months of 1990 (just prior to the U.S. 
invasion of Kuwait), roughly 32.2 percent of Iraqi oil went to the United States, account for 
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nearly 9 percent of U.S. oil imports.244  Even up until July 1990 (just months before the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait), the U.S.-Iraqi Business Forum – which facilitated the transfer of high-tech 
American exports to Iraq – included well-known military, heavy-industry, and oil companies 
such as Bell Helicopter Textron, Lockheed, United Technologies Corporation, Exxon 
International, Bethlen, Brown & Root (later KBR), Catterpillar, and General Motors.  As the 
table below shows, by the end of the 1980s Iraq had about ten times as many main battle tanks, 
armoured infantry fighting vehicles, and armoured personnel carriers, and between four and five 
times as many towed field artillery pieces, self-propelled field artillery pieces, and combat 
aircraft as did Iran.  In all of the major categories of conventional weapons (i.e. main battle 
tanks, combat aircraft, and so on), Iraq also had a quantitative edge over Israel by 1990.245 
Iraq-Iran Military Balance, 1989-1990246 
 Iraq Iran 
Total Armed Forces 1,000,000 604,500 
Army 955,000 305,000* 
Main Battle Tanks 5,500 500 
















Combat aircraft 689 
 
185 (est. 72 
in service) 
*Estimated to include approximately 250,000 conscripts. 
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INTERPRETATION OF EVIDENCE, 1968-1990  
Threat Perceptions 
Mutual Threat Perceptions? 
This chapter argued that although some of Baghdad’s military supporters (primarily Moscow and 
Washington) tried to modify Iraqi threat perception, the Baathist leadership was ultimately the 
arbiter of which state and non-state actors posed the greatest threat to Iraq’s national security.  
The Iraqi approach to security cooperation was exemplified in a speech by Hussein during the 
late 1970s: “Even though the weapons' suppliers are friendly countries, we should not believe 
that they agree with all our objectives and ambitions… we must prepare ourselves [in ways 
suitable to our aims], which may not be suitable to the strategy of the weapons' exporting 
countries.”247  Although suppliers were not able to manipulate the Baathist leadership’s threat 
perceptions, they were able to have some impact on the circumstances in which Iraqi leaders 
made their decisions, e.g. by providing military aid to state and non-state actors which were 
already at war with the Iraqi government.  As Hussein noted during a conference in June 1975, 
the “Kurdish cause, while it is a local case as it looks [on the surface], it is international 
regarding its intentions and final planning.”248  The “international dimension” meant that 
Kurdish parties will not only seek Western support but “will [also] try to broaden their Arab 
alliances [and also gain] the support of the Soviet Union and socialist countries once more.”249  
Baathist leaders therefore had a very pragmatic understanding of their relationships with military 
suppliers.  Later, when Moscow reached out to Tehran at the start of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi 
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officials recognised that the Kremlin had its own legitimate interests in trying to improve 
relations with Iran; rather than breaking relations with the Soviet Union, Iraq adopted a policy of 
“quiet diplomacy” with Soviet leaders (i.e. not mentioning Moscow’s support of Iran in 
diplomatic discussions.)250 
Another misperception about Iraqi Baathist behaviour was that it acted rashly in the way 
it approached its threats.  For example, Karsh writes that in 1980 “the Iraqi leadership hurried to 
take advantage of [the political turmoil in Tehran] to pre-empt and frustrate the recovery of the 
Iranian armed forces from their post-revolutionary debacle.”251  As was illustrated above, 
however, the Iraqi leadership devoted about a year-and-a-half to carefully choosing the right 
course(s) of action to deal with Khomeini’s Iran.  It is also important to remember that during the 
late 1970s, the Iraqi military was primarily preparing for a potential conflict with Israel.252  
Therefore, preparing for a potential military conflict with Iran (which in 1980 had a population 
about ten times Israel’s size),253 required enhanced efforts at both internal planning and external 
outreach to neighbours and global powers which could supply Iraq with military and economic 
aid.254   
Baghdad’s military suppliers often tried to understand which countries Iraqi leaders 
perceived as threats.  While superficially the Baathist regime’s primary threats were Iran, Israel, 
and the United States,255  internal documents reveal that Iraqi threat perception was driven more 
by strategic consideration than ideological divides.  One key example is provided in a 1986 Iraqi 
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intelligence document (included in the Appendix) which is entitled, “On the Factors that 
Determine the Priorities of IIS [Iraqi Intelligence Services’] Work Outside Iraq.”256  The 
document classifies Iraq’s neighbours as Tier I countries, i.e. those that are the biggest potential 
threat and which deserve most of the IIS’s attention -- regardless of whether they are “Arab or 
foreign” -- because “their power is always a direct influence over Iraq’s national security, due to 
their conjoining geographical borders with the country, and because of their power over the 
control of Iraq’s international air, sea, and land gateways.”257  A second determinant for a 
country being classified as a Tier I Priority Country was if it had declared “outright hostility 
towards Iraq.”258  Despite the Iraqi government’s reputation for its “anti-imperialist” rhetoric and 
its attempts to frame Iraq as the leader of “pan-Arabism,” most of the countries that the Baathist 
regime classified as Tier 1 were Arab states and the Palestinian territories.  Arab countries were 
most proximate to Iraq, and many of them were either overtly against Iraq (e.g. Syria and Libya 
during the 1980s) or in competition with it (e.g. Saudi Arabia and Egypt.)  Baghdad’s threat 
perceptions were therefore formed by practical realities (such as other states’ ability to attack 
Iraq’s sovereignty) rather than ideological considerations.   
Foreign Military Basing and External Protection 
Between 1968 and 1990, the Soviet Union provided 68.4% of Iraq’s $49.2 billion worth of 
military imports.259  Despite being Iraq’s dominant military supplier during both the 1970s and 
1980s, Baghdad did not allow Moscow to maintain a foreign military presence on its territory.  
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As Smolansky points out, in the period between 1968 and 1990, “the Moscow-Baghdad 
relationship failed to produce the sorts of tangible benefits (e.g., bases or dependable access to 
resupply or repair facilities) to which Soviet military planners no doubt originally aspired.”260  
Similarly, the Baathist leadership did not allow other important military supporters, such as 
France or the United States, to maintain a foreign military presence on its soil during this 
period.261  Many of the countries in the region followed a pattern of allowing military bases or 
naval ports to their primary military suppliers.  This was true in terms of American bases in 
Bahrain throughout the 1980s, when the United States was Manama’s primary military supplier 
during that decade;262 with Soviet bases in Egypt during the late 1960s and early 1970s and 
Soviet naval bases in Syria during the 1980s, when Moscow provided most of Syria’s $16 billion 
military imports;263 and in terms of Soviet signals intelligence and air facilities in Libya,264 three-
quarters of whose imports came from Moscow.265 
The key difference between Iraq and other recipient states that were willing to stage 
foreign military troops during those decades (such as Egypt pre-1972 and Syria during the 
1980s) was not the nature of the political regime itself266 or even its oil wealth,267 but rather the 
strategic choices and policies which the Iraqi government took.  According to the logic of Iraq’s 
Baathist leadership, seeking external protection would -- despite the short-term benefit of 
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providing external protection to Iraq -- in the long run result in the partition of Iraq by the great 
military powers.  At a meeting with Iraqi military officers discussing arms imports during the 
Iran-Iraq War, Hussein expressed this perception in the following terms: 
The great countries, because of their strategic competition, always favour partition [of countries] 
because each part does not guarantee at one point what each part guarantees when they are united…  
Frequently, the uncertainty over which direction the proposed new country will take tempts the 
superpowers to fight over it, each hoping it will fall under his sphere of influence.  As each camp 
tries to pull the proposed new country under its influence, the new country is pulled apart and the 
concept of unity usually dies in the process.
268
 
Perhaps unique to other Arab governments, the Iraqi Baathist regime believed that war 
could improve other spheres of a nation’s development, such as economic growth, political unity 
and independence, and scientific progress.  For example, in 1978 Hussein told Iraqi military 
officers that Israelis were “scientifically advanced” because they had skills and experience “in 
setting up the entire state for war purposes.”269  Similarly, Baathist leaders wanted Iraqis 
themselves to gain experience in “administrating the state for war purposes,” which they 
believed was vital to Iraq’s long-term development.  In 1983, Hussein described his 
understanding of the economic progress and scientific advancement that Western countries 
experienced following the Second World War, which helps shed light on the Iraqi Baathist view 
of the Iran-Iraq War: 
Hussein: ... War, in spite of its consequences, brings with it many scientific advances. 
Unidentified Iraqi Official:  A great economical and scientific boom took place in Japan, Germany, 
and Italy after the war.   
Hussein:  [In fact,] all scientific advances in the world occurred during and after World War I and 
World War II.270 
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Although the Baathist leadership did not provide concrete evidence of how going to war 
would “awaken” the Iraqi or Arab nation,271 the belief that the Iran-Iraq War would contribute to 
the “development of the Arab nation and its civilisation”272 remained a consistent theme in 
Baathist thinking throughout the 1980s.  For example, a few months into the start of the war 
Hussein told the Iraqi cabinet that Iraq had been “asleep for 712 years” but that “nowadays the 
Iraqi [citizen] has begun to awaken from this slumber and his true qualities are showing.”273  
Several years later Hussein told senior Baathist military officials that “historical events like war 
may have a good outcome in the long run [i.e. economic progress, scientific development, 
combat experience] even though present consequences are harmful.”274  In the same conversation 
Hussein added that “countries learn how to fight by fighting in actual wars” and that “experience 
we are gaining from the war will stay intact after the war.”275   
Baathist leaders were also flexible enough to modify their stance when doing so benefited 
them.  For example, when the great powers intervened in the Persian Gulf during the Tanker War 
phase of the Iran-Iraq War, the Baathist leadership mostly remained supportive of external 
involvement in the region.  Given the relative weakness of Iraq’s navy in comparison with the 
Iranian navy, the presence of foreign ships in the Gulf aided Baghdad’s war effort since the great 
powers were largely on Iraq’s side.  And, because it was not technically stationed on Iraq’s territory 
or its coastline, foreign naval forces allowed Baghdad to maintain enough distance to technically not 
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be associated with a foreign military presence.  As Hussein stated in a discussion with top Iraqi 
officials in the late 1980s, “we were not the ones who brought the American fleet. However, if 
either the Americans or the Soviets clash with the Iranians, this will be in our interest.”276   
Regional Military Balance of Power and Arms Races 
This chapter has argued that while the military balance was against Iraq during the 1970s, over 
the next decade the regional military balance had swung towards it and by the end of the 1980s it 
emerged as the largest military in the Middle East.  Following the 1972 Treaty, which initially 
equalised Iraqi and Iranian military imports, U.S. military aid to Iran and Saudi Arabia during the 
mid-and-late 1970s tilted the balance of power away from Iraq.277  During the late 1970s Tehran 
and Riyadh spent over five times as much on military expenditures per year as did Baghdad.278  
During the 1980s, however, the transfer of arms to the Gulf tilted the balance of power towards 
Iraq, as Baghdad imported over five times Tehran’s amount.279  The tilt in military imports 
towards Iraq occurred in large part as a result of Iraq’s enhanced diplomatic engagement with its 
neighbours and the great powers (described in further detail in the next two chapters), through 
which Baathist leaders were able to convince other states that Iran posed a greater geopolitical 
threat to the region.280  As the table below shows, while in each separate decade there was a large 
imbalance between Iran and Iraq in terms of military imports, over the entire period (1968-1990) 
both countries imported very similar amounts of military aid. 
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Although the Iraqi leadership could have broken diplomatic relations with the United 
States following the revelations of Iran-Contra, it continued to exercise as close a security, 
scientific, and technological cooperation as possible with Washington throughout the remainder 
of the decade.  It did so in the belief that Washington (as well as other suppliers) would 
ultimately prove more willing to support Iraq more than they would a revolutionary Iran, as 
encapsulated in the discussion below amongst RCC members on November 13, 1986, the day 
that the Iran-Contra affair was made public: 
Hussein: … Do you think that they, the Americans, will be closer to achieving their desired influence 
inside Iran if Iraq collapses?  You, as analysts or as outsiders, do you think a weaker Iraq will get 
the Americans closer [to their goals in the region]?  Or will that happen with a strong Iraq?  
Ramadan:  A strong Iraq, of course.  
Khairallah:  A strong Iraq, so that Iran is not able to take it over.  
Hussein: I say that [the United States] prefers a mildly strong Iraq to a weak Iraq… This is how I 
see things as an analyst: … an Iraq somewhat strong is better than a weak Iraq, and I say this from 
the perspective of the Americans.281 
 Ultimately, the Iraqi government’s analysis proved correct.  Despite the continuing covert 
transfer of arms and assistance to Iran during the 1980s by numerous powers, both the United 
States and the wider international community was more interested in seeing that Iraq not be 
defeated by Iran.  In a sense, some policymakers wanted “neither side to win,” which meant that 
                                                 
281 SH-SHTP-A-000-556, 1986. 
Page 137 of 355 
 
the Iran-Iraq War would continue and prove costly in human and economic terms.  However, in 
military terms, Iraqi leaders also understood that the longer the war lasted, the more their armed 
forces would benefit by the influx of weapons.  Baghdad’s patient and pragmatic approach 
towards its suppliers in times that it was spurned by them (e.g. the Soviets in the early 1980s, the 




Despite the conventional wisdom that the Iraqi Baathist regime was an ideological actor, internal 
Iraqi government documents revealed Baghdad’s threat perceptions were driven by the same 
considerations that any country’s political or military leadership would look at when deciding 
whether another country is a threat: political intent, military capability, and geographic proximity 
of the threat.282   Security cooperation allowed Iraqi leaders to defeat two threats, one internal 
(the Kurdish insurgency) and one external (Iran).  Furthermore, despite being one of the largest 
importers of arms during the entire period, Iraq did not allow foreign militaries to maintain 
airfields, ground forces, missile sites, intelligence and command sites, or any other bases that 
would constitute an FMP.  By the late 1980s the Iraqi military emerged as one of the largest and 
most effective fighting forces in the Middle East.  Ironically, Iraq’s unprecedented military 
position during the Iran-Iraq War made the conspiratorial Baathist regime more paranoid when 
the conflict was over: as Hussein told his military officers in 1988, “from now on, the 
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superpowers will conspire against us more and I am prepared for that… When Iran weakens and 
our army gets stronger [then] conspiracies by some countries against us will increase.”283  To an 
extent this statement proved to be a self-fulfilling prophecy over the next decade.  
                                                 
283 SH-PDWN-D-000-730, 1988. 





CHAPTER FOUR: SUPPLIER INFLUENCE 
 
 
In the period between 1968 and 1980, the Soviet Union provided 90% of Iraq’s conventional 
arms imports, and 59% of Iraq’s military imports between 1980 and 1990.284  During the 1980s, 
China and France were the second- and third-largest exporters of military aid to Iraq, providing 
16% and 15% of Iraq’s total military imports, respectively.285  Under Mott’s model of supplier 
influence (provided in chapter two), the Soviet Union would be classified as Iraq’s sole supplier 
for the majority of the period between 1968 and 1979; between 1980 and 1990, Moscow 
oscillated between being a predominant and a competitive supplier to Iraq.  According to Mott, 
sole-supplier and predominant-supplier relationships provide “substantial and even decisive 
supplier influence through structural dependence that approximates... control [over a recipient’s 
internal and foreign affairs.]”286  Therefore, one would expect that Moscow exercised a strong 
level of influence over Baghdad in the period under study, while China and France, as alternative 
suppliers, would have had limited influence.   
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This chapter examines empirical evidence from the SHC to test whether these predictions 
held up in the case of Iraqi military imports between 1968 and 1990.  It argues that during most 
of the period under study (1975-1990), Iraq’s primary and secondary suppliers were able to 
exercise only limited influence over Iraq’s foreign, security, and internal policies.  The few 
concessions that the Baathist regime made early on to satisfy suppliers (for example, allowing 
Soviet-backed Kurdish and Communist parties into the Iraqi government during the early 1970s), 
were turned around by the late 1970s.  Given that Iraq was such a high importer of arms, the 
findings of this chapter (namely, that supplier influence on Baghdad’s policies was low) stand in 
marked contrast to current literature on arms transfers (particularly defence dependence theory) 
and policymakers’ expectations regarding recipient behaviour. 
PART I: 1968 - 1980 
1. Foreign Policy 
In the period between 1968 and 1980, Moscow and Baghdad were often depicted in official press 
as close friends and partners.  For example, in April 1976, following a visit by the Soviet 
leadership to Baghdad, the Iraqi central government released an official press statement thanking 
Moscow for its military, economic, and diplomatic support of the Baathist regime.  The 
following is an excerpt of the official Iraqi statement, which was addressed to the Soviet 
leadership and published in the official Iraqi press: 
The Iraqi-Soviet friendship and cooperation treaty [of 1972] has played an important role in lifting 
the relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union to a higher level in the political, economic, cultural 
and social fields.  This has been of the utmost effect for the mutual benefit of the Iraqi and Soviet 
peoples and the further developing of their joint military relations. 
Iraqi-Soviet cooperation, which is governed by the basic principles and ideas of respect for national 
sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs and joint struggle against imperialism, Zionism 
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and colonialism, has given the treaty signed between the two anti-imperialist countries an important 
pillar in the area of their joint relations. 
The Baath Party constantly stresses the need of [protecting] the national and pan-Arab stand and of 
preserving the principles and policy of nonalignment in which the party and its revolution in Iraq 
believe.  In doing so, the party shoulders a great national burden for the sake of safeguarding Arab-
Soviet relations… 
[Signed] Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, secretary of the Baath Party Regional Command and president of 
the Iraqi Republic.287 
To Western audiences, the press release may have seemed like a vindication of the 
suspicion that Baghdad was firmly in Moscow’s sphere of influence.288  However, part of Iraqi 
foreign policy during the formative years of the Baathist regime was communicating the message 
publicly that Iraq and the Soviet Union had close relations.  By the time that the Baathist regime 
came to power in 1968, diplomatic relations with one superpower, the United States, were 
already broken.289  In the formative years of the early-and mid-1970s, therefore, part of the Iraqi 
government’s strategy was to make Western powers think that Iraq had the protection of another 
superpower: the Soviet Union.  The Baathist regime needed Moscow’s support in this period for 
two fundamental reasons.  The first instance came with the nationalisation of Iraq’s oil industry 
(at the time managed by Western countries) in 1972, an act undertaken by the nascent Baath 
Party only four years into its rule.  From a Baathist perspective, had the Iraqi strategy towards 
nationalisation been undertaken incorrectly, it could have sparked Western military intervention, 
similar to the one that followed Egypt’s nationalisation of the Suez in 1956, or covert programs 
aimed at removing government officials in charge, as was the case in Tehran with the overthrow 
of Mohammad Mosaddegh, whose removal from power was caused at least in part by his support 
for the nationalisation of Iranian oil.  The Baathist leadership issued a nationalisation decree in 
                                                 
287 FBIS-MEA-76-071, “Al-Bakr, Soviet Leaders Mark Treaty Anniversary,” Baghdad Domestic Service (April 12, 
1976.) 
288 See, for example, Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 579-580. 
289 In 1967 the Iraqi government broke diplomatic relations with the United States following American support of 
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May 1972 (which was finalised a few months later on June 1), just over one month after signing 
the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty.290  The move was essential to sending a signal to Western policymakers 
that Iraq had an external backer, thus pre-empting a potential foreign intervention.  Secondly, 
Iraq also needed to have a large-scale manufacturer of weapons which could fulfil its growing 
demand for arms.  Only two countries had the potential of playing that role: the Soviet Union and 
the United States.  Given the break in Baghdad’s relationship with Washington in 1967 (prior to 
the Baathist coup), the Iraqi leadership only had one alternative left: to seek Moscow’s support. 
Nevertheless, despite the public rhetoric of close Iraqi-Soviet relations, documents at the 
SHC also illustrate that, privately, the Baathist regime’s unofficial attitude towards Moscow was 
very different from the press statements it released.  During the same time period in April 1976 
(described above), Hasan al-Bakr, Iraq’s President, wrote a letter to Hussein, Iraq’s then-Vice 
President, relaying to him that he had chastised the Soviet Ambassador in Baghdad for 
Moscow’s inability to deliver the weapons and spare parts that it had promised to Iraq.  
According to his account, al-Bakr bluntly told the Soviet Ambassador: “You have not been 
receptive to supplying us with the few tanks that we have asked for despite our repeated requests 
on different levels.  However, we received solid information that you generously offer various 
advanced weapons to Kuwait.”291  Al-Bakr’s account of his message to the Soviets continued: 
We have chosen your [i.e. Moscow’s] friendship by our own free will as we feel that certain goals 
unite us in the long term. You have accepted that by signing the treaty of friendship between us. 
Therefore, it is the duty of each side to identify the characteristics of their friend, and you must get 
to know who we are.  We do not compromise nor can we be subject to any compromise.  We do not 
relent to any pressure whatsoever regardless of its shape and source. 
 
We had an arms deal with you - which we thank you for - but what is your excuse for not securing 
the spare parts?  Furthermore, the military equipment that you provided has been inoperative for 
nearly three years.  We did not believe Sadat when he referred to the same experience that Egypt 
had when dealing with Soviet arms deal until we experienced the same thing.  I personally being in 
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charge of administering the Ministry of Defence was presented a few weeks ago with a report 
indicating the delays by the Soviets, which are both amazing and unfortunate….  [Why would you] 
withhold weapons from Iraq and supply Kuwait and Libya with the latest weapons?  What is the 
strategic intention of this policy?  Is it intended to offend Iraq?292 
 
The language above highlights that private Iraqi-Soviet diplomacy was very different 
from the public image that Soviet and Iraqi leaders worked on creating.  In fact, the letter above 
portrays not only the strains in the Iraqi-Soviet relationship during the 1970s, but also a 
willingness on the part of the Iraqis to be assertive with its military suppliers.  It is important to 
point out, however, that there is no evidence that al-Bakr was actually aggressive in his private 
discussions with Soviet leaders.  The aforementioned note between al-Bakr and Hussein was a 
private correspondence, and it is possible that he was simply trying to brandish himself as a 
tough leader.  The SHC also contains a private communication from April 1976 between Iraqi 
and Soviet leaders which illustrate how strained the relationship in private.  In particular, what 
stands out is the fact that it was the issue of military aid – particularly the slow delivery of spare 
parts and equipment – that caused tensions in Iraqi-Soviet relations.  The following is an excerpt 
of a letter from al-Bakr to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, sent in April 1976: 
 
[To] The Honourable Comrade Leonid Brezhnev 
 
I received with great gratitude your letter dated 4 APR 1976. …We recognise substantively that 
wide-ranging [Iraqi-Soviet] relations will experience problems and obstacles. We have always 
looked at these problems and obstacles objectively, and tried always to resolve them within the 
framework of mutual understanding, which is based on the lasting principles of friendship and 
alliance.  However, we have been and continue to insist that constant and productive efforts be made 
to solve the [following] problems and obstacles…  
 
Among the critical points in the bilateral relations is the issue of armament… We have explained to 
you a certain aspect of these problems when we dispatched an envoy to you in October 1975, who 
explained to you the types of weapons we need… A vital aspect in our armament remains: the 
acquisition of main battle tanks...  There is also another issue we have explained to your ambassador, 
and it has become an unusual problem for us, which is the issue of weapons spare parts. We hope 
you would take prompt and successful measures in this regard.  We would be very pleased [to] 
receive tangible answers [from Soviet officials] to these questions [regarding armament.] 
 
                                                 
292 SH-SPPC-D-000-705, 1976. 




The language in the letter above exemplifies the proactive and assertive approach that the 
Baathist regime undertook in securing what it viewed were its vital interests.  In this private 
correspondence to the Soviets, al-Bakr’s language is much more moderate in its tone than the 
one that al-Bakr told Hussein he had used with the Soviets.  Nevertheless, the message was still 
essentially the same: military aid (particularly the slow delivery of promised military supplies) 
was a key issue causing a strain between the Kremlin and Iraq’s Baath Party.  By the mid-1970s, 
therefore, the once auspicious Iraqi-Soviet relationship did not deliver on its promises.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Moscow failed to get any tangible strategic benefits from its 
security cooperation with Baghdad (e.g. the Soviet air force and navy had only limited access to 
Iraqi military facilities.)294  Furthermore, during the mid-1970s Iraq embarked on an extensive 
military diversification program, as discussed in further detail in the next chapter. 
During the early 1970s the Baathist regime also tried to portray itself as the leader of the 
pan-Arab cause; most notoriously, it supported various Palestinian terrorist groups.295  Over the 
long-run, however, the Baathist leadership was always committed to maintaining and promoting 
uniquely Iraqi interests, which included reaching out to “imperialist” countries.  By the mid-to-
late 1970s, some American policymakers had begun to recognise this fact.  For example, in 
November 6, 1976, the U.S. Interests Section in Baghdad sent a telegram to the State Department 
and the American Embassy in Iran which highlighted the divergence in Iraqi and Soviet foreign 
                                                 
293 SH‐SPPC‐D‐000‐705, 1976.  Emphasis added. 
294 Timmerman, The Death Lobby, 74. 
295 For example, the "political committee" of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a terrorist 
group, was based in Iraq during.  See FBIS-MEA-74-041, “Habbash, PFLP Determined to Fight Kissinger Plans,” 
Baghdad INA (February 17, 1974.)  For example, archival evidence of Iraq’s support of Palestinian terrorist groups 
during the early 1970s, see SH‐GMID‐D‐000‐231, “Letter from the GMID to the General Staff Department 
containing a report on the Functional Committee for the Liberation of Palestine,” August 1970 to November 1970; 
SH‐BATH‐D‐000‐219, “Letter from the State Secretariat Director to Director of General Security regarding 
organizations formed to back up the Palestinian Liberation Organization,” August 1973 
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policy and argued that the “Iraqi regime consists of a group of prickly and hardened 
revolutionaries who accept socialist principles but act very much on the basis of their own 
perceptions of Iraq’s national interests.”296  Consequently, in a separate memorandum, the U.S. 
Interests Section argued that the divergence in Soviet-Iraqi relations has “certain implications for 
U.S. policy”: 
We could encourage the British and French to sell arms to Iraq and thereby reduce Iraq’s dependence 
on the Soviet Union. We could ourselves be more forthcoming on supplying non-lethal military 
items to the Iraqi armed forces and security services. We could find new ways to support U.S. 
commercial interests in Iraq.297 
As will be pointed out in a later chapter (Chapter 6: Economic Implications), U.S. and 
Western commercial trade with Iraq increased considerably during the mid-1970s.  In fact, the 
Soviet Union remained Iraq’s dominant supplier in only one field during this period: military 
equipment.  Meanwhile, French military aid increased considerably during that time period as 
well, so much so that the Soviet share of Iraqi military imports declined from over ninety percent 
to about two-thirds by the end of the decade.  All of these factors meant that by the end of the 
decade, the Baathist leadership had much greater leeway in exercising an independent foreign 
policy than it did in the immediate years after signing the Iraqi-Soviet treaty.  Consequently, by 
the late 1970s, Baghdad had begun to openly differ with Moscow on policies affecting Arab or 
Muslim countries, including Afghanistan, Eritrea, Somalia, and Yemen.  For example, Iraq gave 
“weapons, money, and support”298 to Eritrean rebels who were fighting Soviet-backed Ethiopian 
forces.  In addition, the Iraqi government took a different stance than Moscow regarding the 
political situation in North and South Yemen, where Iraqi officials were covertly promoting 
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Baathism.299  In sum, despite remaining Baghdad’s primary military supplier, Moscow was 
unable to exercise significant influence over Iraqi foreign policy.  The divergence in Iraqi-Soviet 
views on foreign policy was heightened during the mid-to-late 1970s in large part due to Iraq’s 
military diversification program, which is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.   
2. Security Policy 
In the first years of the Iraqi Baath Party’s reign the role of the Iraqi armed forces was geared 
towards internal security, particularly focused on quelling the Kurdish insurgency in the north.300  
In the late 1960s, nearly 60,000 Iraqi soldiers were sent to the north by the Baathist regime to 
quell the Kurdish insurgency, which at the time was supported by Moscow.301  Despite Iraq’s 
outwardly anti-Israeli and anti-Western rhetoric, its participation in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War 
was limited and Baathist leaders did not have prior knowledge of Egypt’s and Syria’s decision to 
attack Israel.302  Contemporary wisdom holds that a dominant supplier, especially one that has a 
significant presence of military trainers in a recipient state, would have considerable input in the 
recipient’s military operations, policymaking, and strategic planning.303  During the 1970s, 
Baghdad’s large-scale weapons purchases brought about the presence of a significant number of 
Soviet military advisers in Iraq.  Given the secrecy of the Baathist regime, figures vary on how 
many Soviet military personnel were actually stationed in Iraq during this period.  Although 
Soviet estimates on this subject are difficult to come by and no records of the total Soviet 
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advisers are available in the SHC, a 1973 telegram from the U.S. Embassy in Iran to the U.S. 
Department of State provided some evidence that the “Soviets have 1,000 technicians and 
advisors in Iraq.”304  The telegram also noted that “Iraqi government has asked the Soviets to 
send experts to help reorganise the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and to overhaul governmental 
administrative systems.”305   
It is important to note that U.S. diplomats got the information above from the Shah of 
Iran, who may have had his own interests in portraying Iraq as a “Soviet satellite country” in 
order to gain more weapons from Washington.306  Furthermore, the Iraqi Ministry of Interior 
dealt primarily with ensuring the survival of the Baathist regime; there is little evidence to 
suggest that during the 1970s Soviet advisors worked on reorganising the Iraqi Ministry of 
Defence, which at the time was focused primarily on the fight against the Kurdish insurgency in 
the north.307  Nevertheless, the evidence above does suggest that in the immediate years 
following the 1972 Treaty, there was a sizable presence of Soviet advisors in Iraq and that they 
did try to impact, to an extent, Iraq’s internal security structure. 
A U.S. State Department memorandum from 1976 estimated the “Soviet presence in Iraq 
includes approximately 1,000 military advisors, primarily in training and maintenance areas, and 
approximately 2,000 civilians and technicians in such areas as oil development and exploration, 
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irrigation projects, and power projects.”308  Similarly, Roger Pajak, who served as a National 
Security Adviser to the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury during the early 1980s, stated that there 
were over 1,000 Soviet technicians and military personnel working in Iraq on defence contracts 
during the late 1970s.309  In addition, Iraqi students formed one of the largest contingents of 
foreign students that were trained in Soviet military academies during the 1970s.310  As will 
discussed in chapter seven, during the 1970s Baghdad did adopt the Soviet model of having 
“political commissars” running a parallel chain of command in the Iraqi military to ensure 
soldiers’ loyalty to the Baath Party.  However, there is no evidence to suggest that ICP members, 
much less Soviet advisors, were part of that parallel structure. 
In addition to Soviet military advisors in Iraq, the second largest contingent of foreign 
military trainers during the 1970s came from India.  In the early 1970s, India signed a secret 
agreement to provide military training to Iraq.311  Between 1968 and 1979, most of India’s 
military inventory came from the Soviet Union, while the United States provided no military aid 
to New Delhi.312  Consequently, much of India’s military assistance focused on training Iraqis to 
use Soviet or Socialist-bloc weapons.  According to Iraqi Major General Falah Hassan, who 
entered the Iraqi Air Force during the early-to-mid-1970s, 
Most of our training came from Indian and Russian military personnel.  The training was conducted 
in a mix of languages, including Russian, English, and even some Hindi.  The Indian contingent 
taught us how to fly Czech L-29 and L-39 in our advanced training courses.  The Russian training 
depended a lot more on safety, on following the basic rules and keeping people alive.  The Indian 
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training was more aggressive; after we received advanced training from Indian personnel, we 
became more confident in our abilities, as they encouraged us to be more creative and courageous.313 
During the 1970s, therefore, Iraq was primarily trained by Soviet military personnel or 
advisors from other countries to use Soviet or Socialist-bloc weapons.  Nevertheless, Soviet 
military trainers were unable to impact Baghdad’s security policy, that is, the ends towards 
which the Iraqi government was willing and interested in using its military power.  Despite the 
Kremlin’s attempts to stop Iraq from fighting the Kurds, the role of the Iraqi armed forces 
remained focused on internal security, particularly on quelling the Kurdish insurgency in the 
north.314  Furthermore, Soviet attempts to integrate Iraq into a regional security framework 
composed of “anti-imperialist” Arab states (described in more detail in the previous chapter) also 
failed.315  Even though both Iraq and the Soviet Union being openly supportive of the Palestinian 
cause, the Iraqi Armed Forces did not come to the aid of Palestinians during Black September, 
the period between September 1970 and July 1971 when thousands of Palestinians were killed by 
the Jordanian military.316  Here it is important to note that the Iraqi military was stronger than the 
Jordanian armed forces, and maintained a large contingent in Jordan.  Given that Jordan received 
most of its limited foreign military assistance during the 1970s from either the United Kingdom 
or the United States,317 an attack with Soviet weapons on the diminutive Jordanian armed forces 
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could have led to a quick and decisive Iraqi victory, thereby boosting Moscow’s image as a 
powerful supporter of the Palestinian and “pan-Arab cause.” 
Arguably the only time that the Kremlin was able to influence Iraq’s security policy was 
in the period between 1968 and 1970, two years after the Baathist takeover.  In 1969 the Iraqi 
Baath government abandoned the fight against the Kurds and in the following year signed the 
March Agreement.  In retrospect, however, the March Agreement was intended not to so much to 
satisfy the demands of its primary military supplier as it was to buy time for the Baathist regime 
to expand the Iraqi armed forces to such a degree that they could defeat the Kurdish insurgency.  
When the Iraqi government launched its second counterinsurgency campaign four years after the 
agreement was signed, the Kremlin officially maintained a neutral position on the Iraqi military’s 
campaign and continued to supply Baghdad with military aid, including Scud surface-to-surface 
missiles and MiG-23s.318  During the mid-1970s, no Iraqi pilots were qualified to operate the 
Tupolev-22 medium-range bombers and the MiG-21s and 23s, which were used extensively 
during the mid-1970s against the Kurds.  Consequently, some reports suggested that Soviet pilots 
flew advanced aircraft in northern Iraq during this time period and that Soviet military 
technicians were in charge of surface-to-surface missiles.319  During the late 1970s, when Soviet 
support was no longer needed as much in quelling the largely defeated Kurdish insurgency, the 
Baathist regime increased its purging of Communist and Soviet-backed military officers.  In 
1978, following an alleged coup, Iraqi authorities reportedly arrested 1,000 officers (40 of which 
were ultimately executed) who were deemed to be members of the communist party or “protégés 
of Moscow.”320  Through the repressive Baathification program, the RCC sent a powerful 
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message to internal (i.e. Iraqi civilians and military officers) and external (i.e. the Soviet Union 
and other suppliers) audiences: the Baathist leadership was alone in charge of Iraq’s security 
policy. 
3. Internal Affairs 
Given that the Kremlin often pressured recipient states to give greater freedom to Communist or 
socialist parties in recipient states,321 one may expect the Soviet-backed Iraqi Communist Party 
(ICP) to have been given greater freedom to play a role in the Baathist-led government.  Initially, 
this was the case in Iraq: the Baathist regime legalised the ICP in 1973 following the signing of 
the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty in the year before and formed the National Progressive Front, which 
integrated the Soviet-backed ICP and the Kurdish Democratic Party into Iraq’s government.322  
In order to continue receiving military aid from the Soviet Union, the Baathist regime even 
allowed several members of the ICP to become members of the Presidential cabinet, albeit in 
non-influential posts.323  In the period between 1968 and 1975, therefore, Soviet military aid did 
have an impact on Iraqi internal affairs, as Baathist officials aimed to appease Soviet demands in 
exchange for security assistance.   
Nevertheless, following the end of the aforementioned 1974-1975 military campaign in 
northern Iraq, the Baathist leadership quickly turned back to repressing the ICP since Soviet 
military aid was no longer needed as much to defeat the Kurdish insurgency.  In 1976 the Baath 
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Party launched a drive led by the security services against the ICP.  In March 1977, the ICP 
delivered a scathing report to the Baathist leadership which criticised the Baath Party.  In April 
1977, the Baath Party arrested suspected communists and communist sympathisers in the 
military and sentenced them to death.  Although the Soviet Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev 
asked the Baathist leadership to commute the sentences, they were executed on May 19, 1977.324  
In May 1978, an additional twenty-one Iraqi communist party members were executed.  A few 
months later, Baghdad enacted a law whereby any non-Baathist political activities exercised by 
military officers since 1968 were punishable by the death penalty, even if the military personnel 
had retired since and even if that individual no longer subscribed to non-Baathist (i.e. 
Communist) political ideologies.325 
Additionally, Moscow’s attempt to use military aid to allow for greater freedom of Iraq’s 
Kurdish minority only worked in the period between 1968 and 1972, during which the Kurdish 
movement had close relations with the Soviet Union.  One instance when tying military aid to 
Kurdish rights succeeded was when Moscow gave military support to both the Kurds and the 
Iraqi central government in the late 1960s, while putting pressure on Baghdad to cease fighting 
against the Kurds.  Because the Baath Party had just come to power in 1968 and the Iraqi 
military was weak, the Baathists had to quickly cease their military campaign by 1969.  In 1970, 
the Baath Party signed the March Manifesto with the Kurds, which brought about greater 
autonomy to the Kurdish region and greater respect for Kurdish rights.326  In March 1974, just a 
month before Baghdad launched its second counterinsurgency campaign, the Kurdistan 
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Democratic Party (KDP), led by Mustafa Barzani, sent a telegram to the Baathist leadership 
which noted that: 
The implementation of [Kurdish] self-rule and its practical application is considered a sacred trust 
for all of us.  This calls on our Kurdish people, their vanguard [Kurdistan Democratic Party], all the 
national forces and the best of our struggling Iraqi people to mobilise their resources and to provide 
their potentials in order to implement the law and to protect it from the plots of imperialism and 
suspicious elements.327 
In private, however, the KDP and Barzani were well-aware that the Iraqi government was 
building up its armed forces and were planning to attack Kurdish targets in the north.  
Consequently, in 1973 Masoud Barzani (Mustafa Barzani’s son) met secretly with U.S. officials 
to request American military aid.  In these discussions KDP leaders emphasised to American 
policymakers the “strong Soviet support” of the Iraqi leadership.328  Kurdish fears about the 
Baath Party’s intentions turned out to be well-founded.  Between 1970 and 1974 the Iraqi 
government used better relations with Moscow to ask for larger amounts of military aid, and 
began to stockpile weapons in preparation for a fight against the Kurds.  As the four-year period 
expired, Iraqi forces began to attack the KDP troops in 1974, only a short time after the Kurdish-
Baathist announcement above was made.  Soviet support of the Iraqi military campaign in 1974-
1975 was important to the survival of the Baathist regime and marked a significant shift in the 
Kremlin’s attempt to influence Iraqi internal affairs compared to the period when the Baath Party 
came to power: by the mid-1970s, Moscow was visibly on the side of the Baathist regime, 
regardless of whether it oppressed or supported the Kurds. 
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PART II: 1980-1990 
1. Foreign Policy 
During the 1980s, the Iraqi Baath Party adopted a more stridently independent foreign policy 
than it did during the previous decade.  The RCC alone made the decision to invade Iran, and 
contrary to the spirit of the 1972 treaty Baathist leaders did not give a real warning to Soviet 
leaders that they were about to attack Iran in September 1980.  Iraq’s failure to consult the 
Kremlin prior to the invasion angered Soviet decision-makers, who promptly imposed an arms 
embargo on Iraq that lasted for over a year.  The embargo ended by mid-1982.  In a meeting with 
Baathist Cabinet Ministers in July 1982, Adnan Khairallah, the Iraqi Minister of Defence, read 
the contents of an Iraqi government letter that was delivered to the Soviets at an earlier date: 
The Iraqi government sees that it is important to inform the Soviet government:  [In accordance 
with] Article 8 of the [1972] treaty between Iraq and the Soviet Union - [which] demands holding a 
consultation between the two countries if a danger appears to threaten any of them – Iraq wants to 
deliberate with the Soviet Union to take the necessary measures [for enhanced military 
cooperation.]329 
The irony of Iraqi leaders citing Article 8 of the 1972 Treaty in order to gain more Soviet 
military supplies could not have been lost on the Kremlin, since Baathist leaders failed to hold 
the consultative talks which were stipulated by the treaty before invading Iran.  The Kremlin’s 
response to the Iraqis’ request for military aid in 1982 was that the “Soviet Union will continue 
offering support and aid to all who did not kneel to the imperialist aggression in the Lebanon 
case [and] those who seek peace in the region.”330  While angered at first by Iraq’s decision to 
invade Iran, the Kremlin ultimately told the Baathist regime that they were willing to provide 
military and economic aid to Baghdad as long as Iraq continued to maintain an openly “anti-
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imperialist” stance.  The Iraqi government continued to do so while covertly courting 
Washington, with which it restored diplomatic relations in 1984. 
An area where one would expect greater foreign policy convergence between a supplier 
and its recipient would be over non-essential areas of foreign policy.  Here too the Soviets had a 
somewhat limited impact.  One example was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a country 
which borders Iran (not Iraq).  Even though at the start of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan 
Moscow was still Iraq’s primary military supplier, Baghdad quickly came out against the Soviet 
invasion in Afghanistan.  In January and February 1980, just weeks into the Soviet invasion, 
Iraqi officials, including Hussein, publicly denounced Soviet actions.331   Speaking at the Islamic 
Foreign Ministers Conference in Islamabad on January 28, 1980, Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Sadun 
Hammadi, stated that, “We, in the clearest sense of the word, condemn the Soviet military 
intervention in Afghanistan…  We also voted for the UN resolution… calling for the total and 
unconditional withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan.”332  In addition, two months 
later Iraq signed an anti-Soviet pact with Saudi Arabia which condemned the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan.333   
After the start of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi government softened its position vis-à-vis 
the Soviet Union, calculating that Baghdad will need Moscow’s military support.  An Iraqi book 
about the Baath government’s official policy about the Soviet invasion, released late in 1980, 
condemned the United States, Israel, “colonialism,” and “imperialism” for exploiting the 
international system.  Meanwhile, the official Iraqi book referred to the Soviet Union as an 
“inescapable friend” that made sure that “the Arabs would receive the necessary arms to confront 
                                                 
331 Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, 217-218. 
332 FBIS-MEA-80-021, 1980. 
333 Timmerman, The Death Lobby, 110. 
Page 156 of 355 
 
their... enemy.”334  Therefore, on matters that were non-essential to Iraqi interests Baghdad 
adopted a flexible position, averting any breaks in its relationship with Moscow.  When it came 
to essential matters, particularly the Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad maintained stridently independent 
policies. 
2. Security Policy 
During the 1980s, there were between 2,000 – 5,000 Soviet military and civilian advisors based 
in Iraq.335  That number decreased considerably after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, but was still a 
considerable amount.  In 1990, during the months leading up to the invasion of Kuwait, about 
1,000 Soviet military advisers were still based in Iraq.336  Given the size of the Soviet presence 
earlier in the 1980s, one would expect to find strong supplier influence over Iraqi political-
military decision-making.  However, this was not the case.  In essence, Baathist leaders believed 
that the Iraqi government must provide “immunity to [Iraqi] people” against foreign threats.337  
Because previous coups in Iraq were historically led by the military, the Baath Party extended 
the idea of “ideological immunity” to the military services as well.  Consequently, Soviet foreign 
military advisers for the most part were either isolated from Iraqi military officers or were kept 
under surveillance by the GMID.  One of the most detailed intelligence files in the SHC is a 
collection of internal exchanges within Iraq’s intelligence agencies from the period between 
1980 and 1984 which reveal the extent to which Soviet military advisors were under Iraqi 
surveillance and were required to request permission from the Iraqi government for even 
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seemingly inconsequential movements around Iraq.338  Requests by the Soviet Military Attaché’s 
office to the GMID during this period include: a 1982 request by Colonel Fasili Birlijin, the 
Soviet Military Attaché in Baghdad, to travel to Jordan in order to conclude his tour of duty; a 
1983 request by Colonel Anatoli Yurshinku, the new Soviet Military Attaché in Baghdad, to 
travel to Takrit in order to visit the Tanks Training Centre; a 1983 request by Colonel Yurshinku 
to travel to Amman, accompanied by the assistant military attaché and his secretary, to collect 
the Soviet Military Attaché’s family; a 1984 letter from the Assistant Soviet Military Attaché, a 
Major Vladimir Starajuk, requesting the GMID’s approval to travel to Kuwait in order to 
purchase a new vehicle for the Soviet Military Attaché’s office; a 1984 request by Soviet Naval 
Lieutenant Colonel Buns Saldatuf, and the secretary to the Military Attaché, Captain Valiri 
Izutuf, to travel to the al-Muthanna Complex for the purpose of purchasing spare tools for a 
vehicle.339 
In all of the Soviet communiqués to Iraqi intelligence, the Soviet Military Attaché’s 
office include the individuals seeking to travel, the exact departure and return dates and times, 
and details and a description of the car, along with license plate numbers.  To each one of the 
requests in the archive the GMID responded in the affirmative and forwarded the information to 
the local Iraqi intelligence branch, asking them to keep the Soviet military advisors under 
surveillance during their movements around Iraq.   Greater military cooperation, therefore, did 
not result in the military-military engagements one would expect; in fact, Iraqi-Soviet military 
interactions were plagued with suspicion.  For example, in an internal Iraqi military intelligence 
correspondence reviewing a Soviet Military Attache’s request to travel to al-Nasiriya to deliver a 
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lecture to Soviet experts at the al-Nasiriya power station, Iraqi intelligence concludes:  “Certainly 
the objective of his [the Soviet Military Attaché’s] travel is to give certain instructions and 
receive information from them [Soviet advisors] and at the same time conducting a 
reconnaissance of the military convoy’s area.”340  Given the level of suspicion of external 
military advisors, at the end of intelligence reviews of Soviet requests, the GMID told the local 
or regional Iraqi security outpost:  “Please put him [the Soviet military advisor] under strict 
surveillance and provide us with a detailed report of his movements.”341   Normally Iraqi 
surveillance of Soviet military advisors did not find anything of significance, with the GMID 
reporting that “no movement or activity was noted by the person in question [i.e. the Soviet 
military advisor] during surveillance.”342  Nevertheless, the fact that significant Iraqi intelligence 
assets were placed to monitor foreign military advisors during the Iran-Iraq war highlights the 
lengths to which Baathist leaders sought to minimise supplier influence over Iraqi security 
policy. 
3. Iraqi Internal Affairs 
In the short-run, Moscow’s attempt to pressure Baghdad into treating the Kurds better in the late 
1960s and early 1970s worked.  In the long-run, however, the attempt to promote Kurdish rights 
only turned the issue into the same one as with Iraq’s Communist Party: it heightened Iraq’s 
suspicion that the Kurdish issue was a means for foreign intervention in Iraq.  At a government 
meeting in 1981, a Baathist advisor told Hussein that Moscow “deals with Iraq taking into 
consideration that there is a Kurdish movement in Iraq possessing seventy thousand fighting men 
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and is looking for a chance to form a government on a real basis.”343  Implicit in this message 
was that the Iraqi government would have to be prepared to counteract any attempts by the 
Soviet Union, which remained Iraq’s primary military supplier during the decade, to try to use 
the Kurdish issue for its own gains.   
During the Iran-Iraq War, a similar scenario had begun to develop in terms of Baghdad’s 
relationship with Washington, which was providing Iraq with a modicum of direct and indirect 
financial, military, and intelligence aid.344  At various points during that period U.S. officials 
tried to exert pressure on Baath Party officials to stop its mistreatment of Iraqi Kurds and 
Shi’i.345  The promotion of human rights vis-à-vis military aid did not work.  Archival evidence 
at the SHC confirms that the Baathist leadership actually increased its suppression of both groups 
after U.S.-Iraqi diplomatic relations were restored in 1984.  During the mid-to-late 1980s, the 
Iraqi government allowed – and sometimes ordered - its armed forces to annihilate entire villages 
that had predominantly Shi’i Arab.  For example, in 1985 Hussein approved a directive which 
gave permission for the Iraqi military to level civilian population areas in Basra, a primary Shi’i 
city in southern Iraq.  A high-level Iraqi military telegram from that period notes that the 
“President and Commander of the Armed Forces [i.e. Hussein] has approved the... levelling of 
terrain east of the Tigris River [and] demolishing all homes and villages [in the aforementioned 
areas] and banning the return of their inhabitants indefinitely.”346  These and other documents 
available in the SHC show the culpability of the Baathist regime in willingly using harsher 
means to repress Iraq’s Shi’i community during the late 1980s. 
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Chemical warfare was used against the Kurdish minority and the Iranian military during 
the mid-to-late-1980s, despite the fact that Western leaders urged Iraq to stop from using 
weapons of mass destruction on innocent civilians.  At various points between 1984 and 1986, 
high-level U.S. officials publicly condemned Iraq for using chemical weapons in its war with 
Iran.347  (Washington also expressed as much if not more concern about Iran using chemical 
weapons, despite the fact that Iran used them at a much lower rate than did Iraq.)348  
Nevertheless, Washington’s criticism of Baghdad seem to have had little impact on Iraq’s use of 
chemical weapons.  Between 1986 and 1989, the Iraqi armed forces unleashed the “Anfal 
Campaign” against Kurdish fighters and civilians in northern Iraq, in which tens of thousands of 
Kurdish civilians were murdered on a systematic basis, often through the use of chemical 
weapons.  The SHC houses military memoranda from that time that clearly shows how the Iraqi 
military orchestrated mass murder on a systematic basis.349  For example, an Iraqi military unit 
sent to the north to quell a Kurdish uprising, reported the following on May 13, 1987:  “At 1630 
hrs, a force from the 8th National Defence Regiment set out to relocate and burn the villages of 
Kariza and Mashi... The [Iraqi] force was able to annihilate the village of Mashi.”350   
It is important to note that Shi’is and Kurds formed roughly 80 percent of the rank-and-
file of the Iraqi armed forces during the Iran-Iraq War.351  Former Iraqi General Hamdani points 
out that during the Iran-Iraq War “we [i.e. Iraqis] did not think about the Shi’i or Sunni. [...] The 
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[Ba'thist] Iraqi state was not built on divisions [...] We knew the percentage of Shi’is [in the 
military] was high.”352  Although both communities were often excluded from senior positions in 
the armed forces in the period under study,353 there were some exceptions.  Top Shi’i military 
officers included Lieutenant General Abd Al-Sattar Ahmad Al-Muini who commanded the 
Second Army, Lieutenant General Saadi Tuma Abbas Al-Jaburi who commanded the First, 
Third, and Seventh Army at different time during the Iran-Iraq War, and Major General Nimat 
Faris Hussein Al-Mihyawi, who led the First Army; meanwhile, Husain Rashid al-Takriti, a 
Kurdish general, commanded the Republican Guard which protected Saddam Hussein.354  
During the Iran-Iraq War, Shi’i tribes were also used by the Iraqi government to defend regions 
near the Iraq-Iran border.355  Such policies were largely reversed by the late 1980s, when Shi’i 
soldiers were often excluded from the top ranks of Iraq’s political and military leadership.356  
Despite these changes, for the entirety of war the majority of Iraqi Shi’is retained their Arab and 
Iraqi identity and their loyalty to the Iraqi state and armed forces.357   
Despite the loyalty of participation of many Kurds as part of the Iraqi military during the 
war, an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 Kurds (mostly civilians) were killed by the Iraqi armed 
forces in 1988 alone.358  The Iraqi government also authorised using chemical weapons against 
Iranian troops in the belief that “if they [the Iranians] do not witness the deaths of many [people] 
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right in front of their own eyes, they will not surrender.”359  Internally, the U.S. State Department 
was aware as early as November 1983 that Iraq was using chemical weapons on almost a “daily 
basis.”360   In 1984, doctors in Belgium, Sweden, and West Germany “confirmed that the Iranian 
soldiers sent to them for treatment were victims of mustard gas.”361  On three separate occasions 
between 1985 and 1987, U.N. Missions sent to the region confirmed that Iraq was using 
chemical weapons.362  Despite mounting evidence that the Baathist regime was not committed to 
upholding international human rights norms inside and outside of Iraq, Western countries 
continued to support the regime in Baghdad up until Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait 1990.  In 1988 
and 1989, both private American banks and British companies provided financial loans and aid 
to Iraq’s military industry that amounted to several billion dollars in total.363 
During the 1980s, Moscow also continued to try to link military aid with greater 
integration of the ICP into Iraqi decision-making.  As was the case during the 1970s, however, 
such efforts proved largely counterproductive because Soviet attempts to use military aid to 
change the political system in Baghdad engendered a suspicion amongst Baathist leaders that 
Moscow was trying to overthrow the regime.  As an Iraqi presidential advisor told Hussein in 
1981, “the Soviet Union deals with Iraq, in my opinion, through the following outlook: Iraq has a 
communist party that is nominated to take over the power in governing Iraq [i.e. after the 
hypothetical overthrow of the Baath Party.]”364  Similarly, in an RCC meeting in 1986, Tariq 
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Aziz reflected that “in 1979-1980, the Soviets wanted to destroy the Iraqi regime by stimulating 
the socialists in Iraq to rise against us [i.e. the Baathist regime.]”365  The Baathists who ran the 
government during the entire period under study were therefore very sensitive to Soviet 
pressures to integrate Communists into Iraqi decision-making, which they viewed as a ploy to 
overthrow the Baathist regime.  A 1982 Baath Party report declared that by the late 1970s, 
“relations with the [Iraqi] Communist Party's leadership had come to an end.”366 
During the Iran-Iraq War, over half of Iraqi military imports came from the Soviet 
Union.367  The release of 200 Iraqi Communist prisoners in 1982, reportedly conducted in 
exchange for Soviet military aid, made little impact on the Baath Party’s hold on power.  In 
1985, Hussein, Aziz, and Taha Yasin Ramadan – three top members of the Baathist leadership – 
travelled to the Soviet Union to ask the Kremlin for greater amount of military aid.  Following 
the visit, Iraq’s General Security Intelligence Directorate (GSID), located within the Ministry of 
Interior, compiled a report on Communist and Kurdish opposition views and activities in 
response to the trip.368  The GSID collected information from local security directorates located 
in the majority of Iraq’s eighteen provinces.369  Specifically, the Iraqi government was looking to 
find out a number of key sources of information: the degree to which the ICP and other political 
opposition groups still had links with the Soviet Union (which would be revealed by the amount 
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of details they had about the secretive trip) and whether they believed that Moscow had influence 
over the Baathist regime. 
Iraq’s internal intelligence discovered a mixed reaction in different regions.  In some 
provinces, such as Ninewa, the local security directorate reported that, “We do not see any 
reaction from communist elements, domestically, in regards to visit of President [Hussein] to the 
Soviet Union.”370  The Diyalah security directorate found that “the Communist elements were 
amazed by the sudden trip.”371  Most communist and Kurdish in Diyalah elements speculated 
that the secret trip was undertaken to obtain weapons from Moscow.  In Basrah province, Iraqi 
communists criticised Moscow for receiving the Iraqi President even though “the blood of 
[Communists] has not dried yet” off the hands of Hussein and other Baathist members.372  Other 
communists in Basrah were “optimistic that this visit may result in the releasing of communists” 
from Iraqi jails, in exchange for Soviet military support.373    
Given the secrecy of the negotiations on the trip, most Iraqis did not know what was 
actually discussed with the Soviet Union, and what Moscow agreed to.  In the Qadisiyah 
province, the security directorate reported that Abu Jawad, a member of “the [local] communist 
leadership ranks” in the region, told an Iraqi government intelligence source that, “Baath Party 
members imagine that the Soviet Union sponsors the Iraqi Communist Party, when in fact, the 
Soviets do not interfere in the internal issues of the [ICP].” 374  Regarding the Iraqi government’s 
strategy of maintaing domestic politcial control while receving foreign military assistance, Abu 
Jawad described how he viewed the Iraqi visit to the Soviet Union: 
                                                 
370 Ninewa Security Directorate file in SH-IDGS-D-000-792, 1986. 
371 Diyalah Security Directorate file in SH-IDGS-D-000-792, 1986. 
372 Basrah Security Directorate file in SH-IDGS-D-000-792, 1986. 
373 Basrah Security Directorate file in SH-IDGS-D-000-792, 1986. 
374 Qadisiyah Security Directorate file in SH-IDGS-D-000-792, 1986. 
Page 165 of 355 
 
[President Hussein] took Tariq Aziz and Taha Yasin Ramadan with him, who are the two candidates 
for the presidency, [to the Soviet Union]… and he left Azah al-Dawni to preside, a man who does 
not have any military authority.  As for the visit [itself], it was nothing but an excuse to buy 
sophistcated weaponary. 375 
 In Tamim Province, the security directorate reported that “communist elements” and the 
wider Kurdish public believed that Iraq “is currently undertaking negotiations with [the] 
Communist Party, and [the] Democratic Party of Kurdistan, in the wake of the visit of the 
President-commander [to the Soviet Union.]”376  Implicitly, the report noted that a number of 
Iraqi communists believed that an improvement with the ICP would come about as a result of the 
visit to the Soviet Union, which would pressure the central government to improve its 
relationship with Iraqi communists.  Other internal security directorates reported that some ICP 
members believed that the Iraqi government was willing to let Iraqi communists out of jail in 
return for Soviet military support.  For example, 
In Dahuk Province [a Kurdish region in Iraq], [opposition] elements circulated that throughout the 
visit of the President-commander… to the Soviet Union, the [Baath Party] Leadership raised the 
issue of the Iraqi [Communist] Party’s return to the national ranks [and] the National Front, and that 
His Excellency [Hussein] agreed to that… In the autonomous [Kurdish] region, those elements 
circulated that after President [Hussein] returned, he ordered the release of Communist elements 
which had previously been detained.377 
The expectation that Iraq will release members of the ICP in return for Soviet military aid 
was not unfounded.  Throughout the 1980s, as described in greater detail above, improvements 
in Soviet-Iraqi security cooperation sometimes did result in the release of a number of ICP 
prisoners.378  In other provinces of Iraq, communists were not as optimistic about Moscow’s 
influence over Baghdad.  The Iraqi government’s security directorate in Muthana province 
reported that “secret information issued within the [Iraqi] Communist Party [confirms their 
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belief] that the Soviet Union [views] Iraq as a [sovereign] country, [as evidenced in the Kremlin] 
not undertaking to interfere in internal affairs.”379  In addition, Joseph Sassoon, who has 
conducted archival research of both Iraqi and East German archives, has concluded the Baathist 
regime’s persecution of ICP members also caused the German Democratic Republic, which up 
until the mid-1970s enjoyed relatively close cooperation with Iraq, to revaluate its understanding 
of the Baathist regime during the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s.380 
INTERPRETATION OF EVIDENCE, 1968-1990 
Iraqi Foreign Policy 
While in the early period of the Baathist reign Iraq took generally similar lines to Soviet policies, 
by the mid-to-late 1970s Baghdad had begun to differ significantly from its primary military 
supplier on foreign policy issues in the Arab and Muslim worlds, including vis-à-vis 
Afghanistan, Eritrea Somalia, and Yemen.  Baghdad’s willingness to pursue a more independent 
foreign policy during that period could be explained in part by the success of its military and 
economic diversification policies of the late 1970s, which are discussed in greater detail in 
chapter five.  When Iraq invaded Iran in late September 1980, it did not inform the Kremlin of 
this decision, in contravention of the 1972 Iraqi-Soviet Treaty, which called for mutual 
consultation in the event of war.  Angered by the Baathist regime’s actions, Moscow imposed an 
arms embargo on Baghdad almost immediately after the war started.  It was only around June 
1981 that Iraqi-Soviet relations warmed again, and a secret agreement was made to begin 
deliveries one month later (the embargo officially ended in 1982).  In October 1981, in a meeting 
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a few months after the Soviets started to resupply the Iraqi armed forces top Baathist 
policymakers met to discuss Baghdad’s foreign policy.  In an audio transcript of that meeting, 
Baathist officials tried to figure out whether Moscow’s resumption of arms necessitates a change 
in Iraqi policies, including in the key issue of Iraq’s stance on Afghanistan: 
Siding with the Soviets [in order to continue Soviet military transfers] is indicative of weakness.  At 
the same time, opposing the Soviets is completely unacceptable.  We don’t want to be seen as 
dependent or regarded as being in the Soviet camp.  And if we do not improve our relations with 
them it is as if we have severed our agreement with them.381 
 
In the statement above, Hussein frames Iraqi policy not in ideological terms, but rather in 
how Iraq would appear if it sided with the Soviets.  In essence, Hussein framed the issue of 
siding with an arms supplier in the following way: if a recipient state blindly supports the 
policies of its primary supplier, it appears as its “client” or “satellite”; however, if it does not 
support the foreign policy of its military supplier, it risks antagonizing relations with it.  The first 
part is interesting because Moscow had no inherent interest in making sure Iraq won the war.  
Soviet military supplies were much more important to Iraq, which by then was one year in to the 
Iran-Iraq War.  Yet even here Baghdad did not want to be viewed by other states as a supplicant 
of its military supplier.  At the aforementioned meeting in October 1981, an unnamed Baathist 
official suggested that Iraq adopt the following general approach towards its primary military 
supplier: 
[Socialist] countries from Romania to East Germany and other countries whose political decisions 
are controlled by the Kremlin… all… sell guns and ammunitions to Iraq.  They also sell 
ammunitions to Iran at the same time, because they know that we are an independent country. They 
know that neither the leadership of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party and neither the government of 
Iraq will accept being on the band-wagon of the Soviets to declare support for the invasion of 
Afghanistan. When Gromyko meets with [Iraq’s foreign minister] Sa'adoon Hammadi and blames 
him for not supporting the invasion, Sa'adoon will answer and tell him that Iraq can give support of 
the propaganda campaign in Afghanistan to try and smooth the atmosphere.  However, Sa'adoon 
can say that Iraq will not give the support that the Syrians gave when they declared that they 
supported the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.382 
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Even though Moscow continued to support Iraq militarily throughout most of the Iran-
Iraq war, this seemed to have made little impact on Baghdad’s foreign policy beyond a change in 
rhetoric.  As with the Kremlin’s attempts to influence domestic politics in Baghdad, the Iraqi 
government did everything it could to limit Soviet leverage over Baghdad’s foreign policy.  
Baathist leaders believed that “superpowers do not like independent states [which they cannot] 
annex or directly influence”383 and recognised that their stubbornness could lead to worse-off 
relations with their military suppliers.  For most of the period under study, the Soviet Union had 
negligible influence over Iraqi foreign affairs despite remaining Iraq’s primary supplier.   
Iraqi Security Policy 
The Soviet Union also had much less impact over Iraqi security policy than one would expect.  
During the entire period under study, there were only two true instances where Moscow 
successfully exercised influence over Iraqi security policy: when Moscow was able to stop the 
Baathist regime’s counterinsurgency campaign against the Kurds in 1969 and when the Kremlin 
persuaded Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait in 1973.  Nevertheless, following the Arab 
loss in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Baghdad believed that Soviet military doctrine had failed to 
raise the proficiency of the Iraqi armed forces, and as a result abandoned much of the Soviet 
military that it had tried to learn in during the early 1970s.  As Pollack notes,  
Baghdad never had Soviet advisers attached to its operational units in the manner of Egypt and 
Syria, but there were instructors who trained Iraqi personnel in certain operations.  These men were 
sent home, and only those Soviets needed to teach weapons instruction and technical subjects were 
retained.384 
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During the 1980s, contrary to predictions by the defence dependence theory, overall Iraqi 
dependence on its predominant military supplier, the Soviet Union, actually decreased during the 
war as more military partners became willing to supply Baghdad with weapons.  Furthermore, 
even though Moscow placed an official arms embargo on Baghdad at the start of the Iran-Iraq 
War, Baghdad continued to receive Soviet military supplies and spare-parts primarily through 
intermediaries such as Poland, which transferred them first to countries like Saudi Arabia, and 
then to Iraq.385  Although there were several thousand Soviet military advisers in Iraq during the 
war, the Kremlin was unable to influence Iraq’s security policy during the war.  The files at the 
SHC confirm what a Soviet diplomat told Timmerman in the late 1980s: 
We [Soviet military advisors] never succeeded in penetrating the Iraqi high command, or the centres 
of decision-making within the Baath party [during the 1980s.]  It is incorrect to speak of Soviet 
military personnel in Iraq as ‘advisors’ as you normally understand the term.  They were more like 
contract employees working for an authoritarian employer.386 
Moscow was unable to persuade Baghdad to end the Iran-Iraq War during the early 1980s 
and had to concede to Baghdad’s requests for military aid while Iraqi military power continued 
to expand at unprecedentedly rates.  Iraq’s political-military decision-makers, who were largely 
insulated from the immediate effects of the war, had the following exchange in January 1981: 
Head of the Intelligence Service:  On the 5th or 10th of February next month, the big arms deal, 
which consists of 300 tanks, will begin. 
Chief of Army Staff:  Yes. This transaction will improve our situation much. 
President: What's bad with our situation?  (Laughter). 
Chief of Army Staff:  Then we will have a total of 500 additional tanks that are good and 200 tanks 
(interfered talk). 
President: Then the number of tanks that you will have will be more than what you had before 
the start of the war.387 
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The same sentiment was expressed later in the war.  In a meeting with senior military 
officials during the mid-1980s, two unidentified military officers conveyed how the conventional 
military balance of the Iraqi armed forces was improving: 
Male 1: Many [countries] were making fun of the [Iraqi] army shortly before the war started, saying 
it had only as few as 2,400 or 2,500 tanks.  [However, now the situation is different.] 
Male 2: Nobody can purchase as much as you did [speaking of Hussein.].388 
While in large part the conversations above were driven by the dynamics of Iraqi political 
and military institutions (in particular Hussein’s authoritarian nature),389 the content was also in 
large part true.  For example, by 1984 Iraq’s inventory of tanks had roughly doubled to roughly 
4,920 since the start of the war.390  Therefore, from the perspective of the Baathist leadership the 
war – which was originally meant to simply deter a threat – ultimately came to represent an 
opportunity to expand the country’s armed forces, something which the Baathist leadership was 
looking to do in the previous decade.  Hussein’s prediction that his generals will emerge with a 
larger military force turned out to be true: between 1980 and 1988, Iraq’s supply of tanks, 
combat aircraft, and major artillery pieces more than tripled and its reserves of helicopters and 
armoured fighting vehicles both doubled.391   
Moscow’s inability to influence Iraq’s security policy was not necessarily a structural one 
(i.e. one that is inherent to all security cooperation relationships), but rather a direct result of the 
Baathist regime’s strategic choices.  During the late 1960s and early 1970s, for example, the 
Kremlin was able to influence Egypt’s security policy.  In that period there were over 10,000 
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389 Sassoon notes that Saddam “had a habit of micromanaging,” although during the Iran-Iraq War he “allowed the 
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Ba'th Party, 138. 
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Soviet personnel stationed in various military bases around Egypt.  Soviet advisers in Egypt did 
not just provide technical instruction, but worked to reshape the Egyptian officer corps and 
improve the Egyptian military command structure.  According to Glassman, in the period 
between 1967 and 1972 Soviet military advisors were instrumental in transforming the Egyptian 
officer corps, which they worked in close tandem with.392  Nothing of this sort happened in terms 
of foreign military advising in Iraq under the Baathist regime, which remained suspicious of 
foreign influence and believed that they must pursue an independent course since “the states that 
supply us [with arms] do not necessarily agree with us in all our aims.”393 
Iraqi Internal Affairs 
Between 1968 and 1975, the Soviet Union exercised a modicum of influence vis-à-vis Iraq and 
the ICP, the latter being allied with Moscow.  Following the increase of Soviet military aid to 
Baghdad in 1972 and the incorporation of Communist party members into Iraqi decision-making, 
U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger told President Richard Nixon that Iraq had 
become “the principal Soviet client in the Middle East.”394  For the majority of the period under 
study (1975-1990), however, Moscow’s attempt to use military aid in exchange for greater 
integration of Communist parties into Iraqi decision-making was counterproductive due to Iraqi 
suspicions of Soviet motives.  Baathist leaders viewed Soviet attempts to alter the Iraqi political 
system as ultimately aimed at overthrowing the Baathist regime and replacing it with Iraq’s 
Communist Party.  From 1975 onwards the Baathists had come to dominate Iraqi politics.  
During the late 1970s, Soviet attempts to prevent the Baathist regime from executing ICP 
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members and communist sympathisers in the Iraqi military backfired.  As Tareq Ismael correctly 
observes, the Baath Party “identified the Brezhnev pleas [to give clemency to the communist 
party] as a communist gambit that represented an act of overt Soviet interference in Iraq's 
internal political affairs.”395  When Moscow again called for the crackdown of ICP members to 
end, the Baath Party proceeded to execute more communist party members. 
 As the evidence above shows, during the 1980s ICP members was again excluded from 
participating in Iraqi politics, had little contact with Soviet officials, and were unaware of 
Baathist-led Iraqi-Soviet negotiations.  While defence dependence theory predicts that political 
parties in recipient states may benefit from increased military cooperation between the recipient 
state’s government and a supplier state has links to that political party, the empirical evidence in 
the case of Iraq showed that the opposite was true.  Importantly, the few academics who have 
studied Iraqi-Soviet relations during this period closely, such as Oles Smolansky, had come to a 
conclusion that was closer to reality, and therefore very different from the predictions that the 
simple ‘strong donor-weak client’ framework that defence dependence offers.  His study of the 
Iraqi-Soviet relationship concluded that Soviet attempts to exercise influence over Iraq ended in 
“a crushing failure”: 
The equilibrium in Soviet-Iraqi relations had apparently shifted by 1975, so that the extent of the 
USSR’s investment in the relationship, ironically, had become a source of leverage for Iraq.  In the 
case of the ICP, the Kremlin had to acquiesce to Baghdad’s decision [to jail Iraqi communists] or 
sever the relationship, which it was unwilling to do.  The entire episode demonstrated… the limits 
of great power influence, especially with respect to the internal affairs of putative clients.396 
During the 1980s, there were some attempts by Washington to improve Iraq’s human 
rights records.  For the most part, however, despite condemnations, the United States did not 
impose economic or military sanctions on Iraq until after the war had ended.  In fact, American 
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officials often expressed more concern about Iranian use of chemical weapons, even though the 
latter had shown less propensity to use such weapons in battle than did Iraq.  Despite the rhetoric 
of Western powers linking military aid to human rights, Baghdad continued to receive military 
aid even though it had used over one hundred thousand chemical munitions against the Kurds 
and the Iranian military during the Iran-Iraq War.397 
CONCLUSIONS 
In 1981 Pajak predicted that Moscow “will continue to use arms transfers as a primary foreign 
policy instrument for maintaining and expanding Soviet influence in the Third World [which will 
accentuate recipients’ defence] dependence.”398  Contrary to expectations, during most of the 
period (1975-1990) Moscow was able to exercise only a limited amount of influence over Iraq’s 
foreign, security, and internal policies.  The Iraqi government minimised supplier influence by 
insulating foreign military advisors which were in the country and observing their movement 
within Iraq; by purging elements of the Iraqi armed forces which the Baathist regime deemed 
were “Soviet-backed”; and by eliminating any internal political parties which had external 
support.  In 1981, a Baathist official expressed Iraq’s outlook on Moscow’s relationship with 
Baghdad: 
[Over the past few years, Moscow has] come to understand that [the Baathist] leadership will not 
allow the Communist Party to be an active participant in the government… When [the Soviets] 
realised that this regime and this leadership are truly independent and are enemies of the imperialists 
[the Soviets were] very happy to find a country that is an enemy of the imperialists on the condition 
that it does not curtail [Soviet] influence in the region.399 
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Here an important caveat must be made about the case of “alternative suppliers,” the term 
that Mott uses to describe military suppliers that form between 10% and 49% of a recipient’s 
military imports.  China and France each fall under that category, as they respectively provided 
16% and 15% of Iraq’s military aid during the 1980s.400  As Mott would predict, both countries 
had negligible influence over the supplier.  But the key point here was that neither of these 
suppliers sought to gain any structural influence over Iraqi political-military decision-making.  In 
large part, for these suppliers as well as for some suppliers that formed a smaller percentage of 
Iraq’s military imports, arms were transferred to Iraq to sustain or strengthen the domestic 
industrial base alive,401 to gain greater access to oil resources,402 or both.  (The economic aspects 
of Iraq’s military imports will be discussed in greater detail in chapter six.)  From an Iraqi 
government perspective, the decision to enhance its security cooperation relationship with 
financially-motivated suppliers was a strategically correct one: arms imports from China, France, 
and other countries increased Iraqi military power while allowing Baathist leaders greater 
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hardware to keep its own domestic defence industrial base alive.  Other countries also supported Iraq purely for 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RECIPIENT COUNTER-DEPENDENCE 
 
 
As chapter two pointed out, a number of scholars have argued that although military 
diversification may be used to mitigate defence dependence, in practice most recipient states find 
it difficult to do so for a variety of reasons (political, economic, military or technological.)1  In 
addition, suppliers are often said to have such coercive power over recipients that they can easily 
manipulate security cooperation relationships to increase the recipient’s dependence on them.2  
This chapter argues that, contrary to predictions in current literature on arms imports, the Iraqi 
government adopted a number of strategies that mitigated its defence dependence.  Firstly, it 
diversified its sources of military suppliers.  While during the late 1960s Iraq had about three 
suppliers, by the 1980s it had over twenty suppliers across numerous political blocs and from all 
continents; meanwhile, the share of Soviet arms as part of total Iraqi imports fell from over 95% 
during the mid-1970s to about one-half during much of the 1980s.  Secondly, the Iraqi 
government invested a lot in the creation of an indigenous military industry.  By the end of the 
late-1980s, over 100,000 Iraqis were working on projects related to Iraq’s military industry, 
                                                 
1 Knorr, Economic Issues and National Security, 187.  See chapter two for a wider discussion. 
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which emerged as the most robust one in the Arab world.  Thirdly, the Baathist regime adopted a 
number of other strategies that included placing greater emphasis on building constituency 
groups within supplier states; investing in the production of less-costly weapons which it could 
produce indigenously and which would have a greater psychological impact on its enemies; and 
improving its ability to stockpile weapons and war materiel.  
 
PART I: 1968 – 1980 
1. Military Diversification 
When the Baath Party took over in the late 1960s, Iraq’s predominant supplier of conventional 
weapons was the Soviet Union.3  In the period between 1968 and 1975, Moscow accounted for 
some 96% of all conventional military transfers to Baghdad.4  Nevertheless, following Moscow’s 
imposition of an arms embargo on Iraq between 1968 and 1969, the Baathist leadership realised 
early in its reign that it would have to diversify its military suppliers if it wanted to ensure its 
survival.  In April 1974, Iraqi Vice President Hussein set up a tight-knit Strategic Planning 
Committee (SPC) which was charged with the long-term could of making sure that the Iraqi 
military would never be dependent on a single supplier as it had been during the Soviet arms 
embargo in the late 1960s.  Three people made up the SPC:  Hussein himself, General Adnan 
Khairallah (Hussein’s cousin and brother-in-law who later became Iraq’s Minister of Defence 
                                                 
3 Up until the overthrow of the Hashemite Kingdom in 1958, Iraq’s main military suppliers were Western countries, 
including the United Kingdom and the United States.  During the 1960s Iraq gradually shifted its military suppliers 
to the east.  For a fairly comprehensive account of the Iraqi military before 1968, including its relationships with 
outside suppliers, see Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq's Armed Forces, 11-104. 
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during the 1980s), and Adnan Hamdani (Iraq’s first deputy prime minister and a lawyer.)  
General Khairallah was in charge of the military side of the Committee (i.e. testing the military 
capability of weapons), while Hamdani served as the chief negotiator with foreign government 
officials and defence industry representatives.5  In November and December 1974, the three SPC 
members met with French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac to discuss the future of French civilian 
and military exports to Iraq.6  During negotiations in Paris and Baghdad later in the same year, 
the Iraqis requested from the French side two important sources of armaments that the Baathist 
leadership deemed crucial to Iraqi military power: Mirage fighters and nuclear technology.  
On December 2, 1974, following three days of talks in Baghdad, Chirac announced that 
“the Iraqi and French sides have agreed to develop joint cooperation in the field of electronic, 
petroleum industry and nuclear energy.”7  Later on the same day, both sides issued a joint 
statement which “asserted the desire of France to cooperate with each other in all fields.”8  The 
Iraqi and French announcements left out a critical part of the outcome of negotiations, in which 
Baghdad committed to buying billions of dollars’ in military equipment from Paris.  Later, in 
March and September 1975, Hussein, Hamdani, and Iraqi military officers met with the French 
President, Prime Minister, Defence Minister, and a number of French defence industry 
representatives from companies such as Dassault and Snecma to look at purchasing Mirage F-1 
fighters, Jaguar fighter-bombers, and Alpha jet trainers.9  In the discussions, Hussein insisted that 
Dassault provide some of the most advanced weapon systems used by the French Air Force.  
                                                 
5 Timmerman, The Death Lobby, 44. 
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Furthermore, the Baathist delegation told French political-military decision-makers that they 
wanted Dassault to build an aircraft assembly line in Iraq and train thousands of Iraqi workers.10  
The delivery of French military equipment to Iraq was slow, but gradually a variety of arms – 
including Alouette helicopters11 – began to filter into an Iraqi military that between 1968 and 
1975 was primarily reliant on Soviet weapons. 
At this early stage of Iraqi military diversification, the Baath Party’s key ambition was 
not necessarily to start the deliveries of Western military equipment as soon as possible but to 
convince the Kremlin that Baghdad was looking to other viable military partnerships.  In fact, 
although the specific details of the French arms deals often remained secret at first, the general 
expansion of Franco-Iraqi military, industrial, and nuclear cooperation became well-publicised in 
the press in 1975.12  The strategy of making the Kremlin afraid of losing Baghdad as a partner 
worked: Moscow continued to provide military aid during the 1974-1975 campaign.  Although 
some authors suggest that there was a “Soviet arms embargo” during this period,13 Moscow 
actually increased its military aid to Baghdad during this period, particularly starting in the latter 
half of 1974.14  Furthermore, evidence in the SHC suggests that Iraq did receive military aid 
during this period, although not as much as the Baathist leadership had wanted.  For example, at 
a 1980 Iraqi government meeting Hussein refers to sending an Iraqi “staff commander to the 
Soviet Union [in early 1975] where he signed an [arms] agreement.  They told him they had only 
1,200 artillery rounds,”15 an amount that was smaller than the Iraqi government was hoping for 
                                                 
10 The deal was rejected by the French, who feared that the Iraqi project would undermine French defence industry.  
Timmerman, The Death Lobby, 96. 
11 IISS, Military Balance 1975, 90. 
12 For example, see FBIS-MEA-75-013, 1975; FBIS-MEA-75-223, “French Industry Minister Arrives on 3-Day 
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relative to the high-demand for arms during the counterinsurgency campaign.  Nevertheless, the 
continuation of any modicum of Soviet military aid to Iraq during the second Baathist 
counterinsurgency campaign was a significant shift from Moscow’s use of military aid to 
Baghdad during the late 1960s.  The shift in Soviet military aid policies vis-à-vis Iraq seems to 
have been caused, at least in part, by Baghdad’s military diversification program.   
The Baath Party’s commitment to diversification continued after the end of the 
counterinsurgency campaign and seems to have had the same effect on Soviet decision-making.  
For example, following the delivery of French arms to the Iraqi military in 1975, Tariq Aziz 
travelled to Moscow in July 1976 and concluded the largest Soviet-Iraqi arms deal up to that 
time.  Worth over a billion dollars, the package included the delivery of the MiG-23 (then the 
latest Soviet fighter), advanced air combat missiles, and an accelerated training program for 
IQAF officers and mechanics.  Meanwhile, in June 1977 Paris signed a $1.8 billion deal with 
Iraq, which included the delivery of 72 Mirage F-1 aircraft, four twin-seat trainers, advanced 
missiles to go under the Mirage fighters, training programs for Iraqi pilots and maintenance 
personnel by French contractors, and modifications to Iraqi hangars and other ground 
installations to accommodate non-Soviet aircraft.  According to the French press, Iraqi imports 
of French arms during the late 1970s included “Panhard armoured cars equipped with antitank 
missiles, mortars and laser equipment, as well as Alouette helicopters armed with guns [and the 
expected delivery of] Mirage 2000 [aircraft.]”16  In total, between 1978 and 1980, Iraq ordered 
an estimated $4-billion worth of French arms alone.  In addition to purchasing conventional arms 
from France, Baghdad was also investing in greater nuclear cooperation with Paris; by 1977, 
nearly 500 French technicians were building a “nuclear research centre” in Iraq.17   
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Of greatest concern to Moscow was the fact that the contract included the French 
providing maintenance services to Soviet military equipment.18  Soviet authorities were in fact 
infuriated by Iraq’s military diversification program and attempted to dissuade the Baathist 
leadership from signing these arms deals.19  According to the French newspaper Le Monde, 
“military deals between Iraq and France have taken place despite strong commercial and political 
pressures on the part of the Soviet Union on the Baghdad authorities.”20  To counteract the 
increased penetration of French arms into Iraq, Moscow first offered Baghdad more MiG-23s at 
concessionary prices, then threatened to call Iraq’s debt, and finally threatened to cut off Soviet 
military exports completely if Baghdad continued to purchase French weapons.  Ultimately, 
however, Moscow did not follow up on its threats, as it seemed to make almost no impact on the 
Baathist leadership.  Instead, in 1978, the Kremlin signed a $3-billion arms package for 138 
MiG-23/27 fighter bombers; half-dozen SCUD-B missile launchers; up to 16 of the Soviet airlift 
command’s largest troop and equipment transport; and large quantities of Mi-8 troops transport 
helicopters.  In the next year, Baghdad ordered SA-6 anti-aircraft missile batteries, MiG-25 
reconnaissance planes, and ordnance for MiG-23s.21   
In addition to increasing its inventory of both Soviet and French weapons, Baghdad also 
reached out to other countries for arms during the late 1970s, including Great Britain, West 
Germany, Brazil, and other non-Soviet bloc states.22  In 1976 and 1977, Iraq signed a number of 
economic and trade agreements with Brazil, which paved the way for Baghdad to start importing 
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arms in later years.23  In 1978, Iraq bought 200 Cascavel armoured personnel carriers from Great 
Britain, ten frigates and corvettes from Italy, and a number of armoured fighting vehicles from 
Brazil.24  By the end of the decade, Iraq’s diverse list of military suppliers included the USSR, 
France, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Brazil.25 
2. Indigenous Production 
One of the core assertions of defence dependence theory is that military imports create “new 
forms of dominance and dependence” on the supplier state.26  To mitigate the potential of long-
run dependence, a second option that is available to recipient states – in addition to military 
diversification – is investing in indigenous military production.  While the majority of the growth 
of the Iraqi armed forces during the 1970s came through foreign military aid, the Baathist 
leadership gradually began to invest in the long-term development of an indigenous defence 
industry, especially after the founding of the aforementioned SPC in 1974.  In developing an 
indigenous military industry, the planning council recognised two realities: (1) Iraq would not be 
able to develop an indigenous military industry overnight; (2) it would have to continue 
importing arms from foreign suppliers for a considerable time before Iraq had its own capability.  
Hussein expressed these points in a meeting of the SPC in 1977: 
At this time... we are not capable of manufacturing all the needs of our army, and we cannot do so 
without signing armament agreements with [other] countries that are the source of the weapons we 
require for our army… However, does this mean we stand with our hands tied behind our backs 
because of the lost investments or other expenses in the field of military manufacturing?  The answer 
is no, because this would mean that we will forever have to accept the present circumstances… We 
                                                 
23 FBIS-MEA-76-143, "Iraq, Brazil Adopt Measures to Increase Cooperation,” Baghdad INA (July 22, 1976); FBIS-
MEA-77-090, "Brazilian Industry Minister Arrives in Baghdad," Baghdad Domestic Service (May 8, 1977); FBIS-
MEA-77-093, "Cooperation With Brazil," Baghdad INA (May 12, 1977); FBIS-MEA-79-094, "Vice President 
Leaves on Latin American Tour," Baghdad INA (May 13, 1979.) 
24 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 123. 
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26 Wulf, "Dependent Militarism in the Periphery," in Neuman and Harkavy (editors), Arms Transfers in the Modern 
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must therefore [invest] in the field of weapons' manufacturing in a way that is suitable to [Iraqi] 
aims.27 
As can be seen by the quote above, the Baathist leadership’s long-term vision was very 
ambitious, if not completely unrealistic.  In essence, over the long term, the Baath Party set the 
bar for Iraq’s defence industry to reach the same level as the U.S. military industry or its allies; it 
is unclear whether Hussein or other Iraqi political leaders actually believed that this was feasible, 
or simply thought that Iraq’s military industry would benefit from setting the bar very high.28  
However, the rationale for building an indigenous military industry was explained later in the 
meeting in the following terms: 
Based on my understanding, as time goes on, there will be some sort of agreement between the 
largest industrial nations, to monopolise certain types of industries, to remain in control and keep 
other countries as recipients, if not slaves, for a long period of time.29 
To an extent, the quote above reflects an Iraqi “defence dependence” view of the 
international arms market.  While realising the military imports were still necessary, Baathist 
leaders wanted to minimise their dependence on external sources in order to avoid becoming 
“slaves” to – or dependent on– the “monopolistic” defence companies of the industrialised 
world; they could avoid becoming dependent on military suppliers if they invested in building an 
indigenous military within Iraq.  The approach to military imports displayed in these statements 
illustrates that the Baathist leadership was cognizant that the building of long-term Iraqi military 
power would need to come from both internal and external sources.  The military, technological, 
and even societal transformation that the Baathist leadership sought over the long-term was 
encapsulated in the aforementioned meeting of the SPC: 
1 — We [Iraq] must prepare ourselves to deal with and understand technology and science well. 
Therefore we must give importance to the research centres and to the preparation of personnel. We 
                                                 
27 SH-RVCC-D-000-805, 1977. 
28 In a sense, Hussein’s full-quote above turned out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy when Iraq, by then truly one of 
the largest militaries in the world, faced the U.S. military in 1990. 
29 SH-RVCC-D-000-805, 1977. 
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must also pay attention to and study the latest science and technology developments...  In order for 
us to become an industrial, developed country in a way that is suitable with our objectives, we must 
master a way to deal with science and technology as invented by others, in the first phase of our 
work. 
2 — The second point is to adjust [foreign] technology to our way of life and also adjust the 
directions of using science. We must not adopt all the [foreign] innovations of science and 
technology and apply them as is, but rather adjust them or some of them to comply with our political, 
social, economic and other objectives. 
3 — The third point is manufacturing: we must manufacture in our special ways that are suitable to 
our national objectives and ambitions. We will not shy away from manufacturing what we can buy 
and will not manufacture all we can manufacture… We must prepare ourselves in the field of 





In contrast to other countries in the Arab Gulf which looked for outside powers to 
guarantee their security, the Baathist government linked Iraq’s indigenous military production 
capability directly to its national security.  Non-Soviet sources often proved more important in 
acquiring technology transfers necessary for the development of an Iraqi military industry.  In 
fact, during the 1970s the Kremlin normally refused to share with Iraqis any information on how 
to manufacture advanced arms indigenously or conduct maintenance on sophisticated weaponry.  
For example, Soviet aircraft engines had to be shipped back to the USSR for repair rather than be 
fixed in Iraq, because Moscow was worried that Baghdad might secretly gain information on 
how to manufacture them.  In addition, when Baathist leaders approached the Soviet Union on 
acquiring advanced nuclear technology, they were rejected by the Kremlin.  The French defence 
industry, meanwhile, offered Baghdad a different arrangement: as long as Iraq paid, the French 
were willing to sell them not just the equipment, but the expertise to manufacture it.  In March 
1975, representatives of the three most important French defence companies travelled to Iraq; 
during discussions in Baghdad, Baathist officials expressed an interest not only to purchase 
advanced French fighters, but to set up “an engine overhaul facility in Iraq for the Mirage F1.”31  
After a two-day visit to Baghdad in June 1975, French Prime Minister Barre affirmed Paris’ 
                                                 
30 SH-RVCC-D-000-805, 1977.  Emphasis added. 
31 Timmerman, The Death Lobby, 53. 
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commitment to assist Iraq in the fields of “industrialisation, technology, and finance,” and noted 
that France is 
Considering the expansion of cooperation in the training of cadres and technicians needed by Iraq...  
I hope that by doing so, we will be serving economic and manpower development in Iraq... [France] 
fully realises the desire of a country like Iraq to protect its independence by every means available 
to it.32 
On November 18, 1975, Baghdad signed a multi-billion dollar cooperation agreement 
with Paris “in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy”33 which stipulated that France 
would train up to 600 Iraqi nuclear scientists.  In a $2 billion arms deal which was signed later in 
the decade, France agreed to an “Iraqi share in the production of the Mirage 2000.”34  
Furthermore, over the following years an estimated 3,000-4,000 Iraqis went to France to receive 
basic training courses in electronics and specialised courses in particular branches of production 
technologies.  Some Iraqi students were sent to Thomson training centres across France to learn 
the secrets of the latest combat radar then being supplied to Iraq for its Mirage fighter-bombers 
and “master the art of fooling… electronic countermeasures, designed to protect NATO aircraft 
from attack by enemy missiles and planes.”35  Furthermore, during the mid-1970s, a Palestinian 
consulting group named Arab Projects and Development (APD) was contracted by the Baathist 
government to reorganise Iraq’s higher education system; through APD’s efforts, the number of 
Iraqi students in technical fields grew to roughly 120,000 students.  As part of its efforts, APD 
itself also hired about 4,000 scientists and researchers to work in Iraq on industrial projects, 
including some that were then tied to Iraq’s nascent but growing military industry.36 
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During the late 1970s, Iraq signed technical, scientific, nuclear, and military cooperation 
agreements – focused on the imports of goods as well as technology transfers- with countries as 
diverse as Belgium, Brazil, Jordan, Finland, France, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, and West Germany, 
amongst others.37  Iraq was slowly beginning to extricate itself from its reliance on Soviet-bloc 
states (which not only had inferior weapons but also often refused to transfer requisite 
technologies), and opening up to imports of technological knowledge from Western countries.  
Additionally, the Baathist regime was interested not so much in importing industrial capabilities, 
but in transforming Iraqi society and economy so that it could take become a regional leader in 
economic, technological, and scientific terms.  As Christopher Lucas writes, “Virtually alone 
among the Arab oil-producing states, Iraq was determined not to depend upon outside foreign 
(i.e., non-Arab) labour, but to generate the technological expertise demanded by its national 
development scheme almost entirely from within the indigenous population.”38  (The next 
chapter discusses in greater detail the Iraqi government’s socio-economic plans during this 
period.) 
3. Diplomacy, Less-Costly Weapons, and Stockpiling 
The most important efforts that helped the Iraqi military grow during the 1970s was the Iraqi 
government’s diplomatic outreach, not so much to the Baath Party’s natural allies (the USSR and 
other Socialist bloc states), but to Western countries, in particular France and the United States.  
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Importantly, the Baathist regime tailored its messaging to each one of its primary military 
suppliers.  With regard to Moscow, Iraqi officials recognised that in order to continue getting 
military aid from Moscow they needed to do two things: (1) not to aggravate the Kremlin 
unnecessarily, which meant in part voicing their concerns privately rather than publicly; and (2) 
to make Soviet officials believe that the Baath Party was committed to “anti-imperialism.”39  The 
latter was done largely by conveying to Soviet diplomats that the Iraqi regime stood with the 
Kremlin in the “international struggle against imperialism.”  For example, when a Soviet 
“friendship delegation” attended a celebration in Iraq as part of the “Iraqi-Soviet friendship 
week” in January 1974, “representatives of the [Baath] party... welcomed the Soviet friends and 
lauded the Iraqi-Soviet treaty which has changed the relations between the two countries into 
strategic stands against the imperialist forces in the world.”40  Following a visit in 1975 by Iraqi 
Vice President Hussein to East Germany (which was then a Soviet bloc state), a joint statement 
was issued in Baghdad and Berlin which highlighted “the successes [that the Baathists] achieved 
in the struggle to eliminate imperialism” and “announced [Baghdad’s and Berlin’s] continued 
support in all domains for the people who are still enduring the yoke of imperialism.”41 
At the same time Iraqi leaders were also pursuing an opening with both Paris and 
Washington.  With regard to the former, Baathist officials convinced French diplomats that the 
Iraqi government had legitimate political aspirations: i.e. that the ruling Baath Party was 
pursuing goals and policies which were ones that any “normal” state would pursue.  For 
example, following a two-day visit by French Prime Minister Raymond Barre to Baghdad in 
1977, France and Iraq issued a joint statement which read: 
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The two sides [France and Iraq] agreed to assert the commitments of their two governments to the 
principles of national independence, non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, and 
cooperation…  The two sides affirmed the need to tackle international problems through peaceful 
means in accordance with the UN Charter and international law and treaties…  The two sides also 
asserted the significance of the dialogue between the industrialised and developing countries to 
resolve the problems of inflation, energy, raw materials, and development.42 
The joint statement with France left out any discussions about “anti-imperialism” and 
instead stressed issues such as national independence, international law, and non-interference, 
which policymakers in Paris were comfortable with supporting.  Iraqi officials also reached out 
directly to influential French defence companies, such as Dassault and Aerospatiale, which had 
close links to politicians in Paris and which wanted to export French arms abroad.43  During the 
1970s, Iraqi leaders, including Hussein and the other two members of the SPC, visited France on 
numerous occasions to meet with French officials while French defence industry representatives 
frequently visited Iraq to discuss potential arms sales.  By highlighting the commercial benefits 
that the French defence industry could derive from close security cooperation, Iraqi leaders 
ensured that they had a powerful ally in Paris. 
Perhaps the most unexpected element of the Baath Party’s program was its diplomatic 
outreach to Washington.  In July 1973, Vice President Hussein received journalists from three 
key American, French, and British newspapers: New York Times, Le Monde, and the London 
Observer, respectively.  The New York Times reported on July 15, 1973 that “in an interview 
with three Western correspondents, Mr. Hussein said Iraq would welcome moves by the United 
States and Britain that would lead to normalization of relations with Iraq.”44  A telegram from 
the U.S. Interests Section in Baghdad on the same day noted that “at the end of the interview, 
[Hussein] spent an hour asking journalists questions on such topics as Iraq’s image in the 
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West.”45  Meanwhile, in January 1974 Iraq’s President al-Bakr sent a letter to U.S. President 
Nixon in January 1974 in response to an American effort to hold a conference for the world’s 
major energy consumers and producers in the wake of the October 1973 OPEC oil embargo, 
which read: 
His Excellency Richard Nixon, president of the United States of America:   
I have received your message in which you suggest the holding of a meeting between the major 
energy-consuming and energy-producing states for the purpose of organising affairs concerning 
imports and prices. 
At a time when I full realise the great importance of this matter, I wish to express the Iraqi 
government’s view…  We feel that there is a tendency to define the states that consume energy as a 
certain number of major, advanced industrial states, while in fact all the states of the world consumer 
energy at some rate.  If the question of energy is of great importance to a number of major industrial 
states because these states have colossal industrial and military machines, a high standard of living, 
and extensive information and political potentials, the other states that consume energy, particularly 
the poorer ones, are also suffering greatly in this regard to the extent that it gravely affects the 
securing of the basic requirements for their livelihood and their dire need for development... 
Therefore, we believe that the entire world community, for the sake of its own welfare and 
prosperity, should participate in any organization on energy imports and prices. 
Signed, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, president of the Iraqi Republic.46 
While Al-Bakr’s letter to Nixon was portrayed by the Baath Party’s daily newspaper, al-
Thawra, as taking a stridently “anti-imperialist” stance,47 in reality the majority of the letter to 
Nixon was couched in non-ideological terms.  For example, Al-Bakr’s message noted that “we 
[the Iraqi government] consider the United Nations and its specialised organizations to be the 
best framework for discussing this issue and other vital matters we have referred to in this 
message.”48  American officials were surprised at the pragmatic tone of the Baathist regime.  In a 
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memorandum sent to U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger a few days after Al-Bakr’s letter was 
received by Nixon, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance William Donaldson wrote, 
President Bakr’s reply to President Nixon’s energy letter seems remarkable for its moderation and 
absence of polemic…  With the exception of certain references to “imperialism” and “monopolies,” 
there is no direct attack against the United States and no mention of the Arab-Israeli conflict…. 
Bakr’s reply… is not merely an exercise in propaganda, but is meant to be constructive.49 
Some American diplomats recognised the elements of pragmatism in the Iraqi 
government while others continued to believe that the “Soviets remain a major factor in Iraq and 
that Iraqi policies remain far from amenable to Iranian and U.S. interests.”50  Consequently, 
Washington continued to provide aid to the Kurds during the period between 1974 and 1975 in 
order to undermine the “Soviet-client state of Iraq.”51  Nevertheless, even during the Iraqi central 
government’s fighting against the Kurdish insurgency in the north (when Baghdad was aware of 
covert U.S. and Iranian aid to the Kurds), Baathist officials continued to reach out to American 
diplomats in order to improve bilateral relations.52 
While not necessarily ground-breaking, the Baath Party’s initial diplomatic outreach to 
Washington in the early-to-mid 1970s ultimately did over time persuade some U.S. officials that 
Iraq was a country that it could find some common ground with.  When Boeing representatives 
contacted the U.S. government in December 1974 to get approval for selling aircraft to Iraq, 
David Korn, a senior State Department official, recommended that “the [State] Department 
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[should] raise no objection to the propose sale of [Boeing] 727, 737, and 747C.”53  The telegram 
also recommended that the State Department should reject “further inquiries by [U.S. defence 
company] Lockheed” to sell the L100-30 aircraft since “a joint State-DOD [Department of 
Defence] study has confirmed… the adaptability [of the aircraft] for military use.”54  Although in 
1974 U.S. officials were still reticent about selling military aid to Iraq, by the following year they 
had begun viewing the Baathist regime as a more pragmatic actor that was interested in 
procuring military aid in order to resolve mainly internal challenges, rather than using it for 
expansionist purposes.  According to U.S. State Department notes from 1975, 
Iraq has a strong interest in procuring American military technology and armaments.  We know this 
from repeated reports from the British Military Attaché in Baghdad as well as from a number of 
private sector Iraqis who have clearly been authorised by [Iraq’s Minister of Defence] to extend 
feelers… 
Iraq is already buying roughly as much Western military technology… as it is from [Socialist 
countries, excluding the Soviet Union], an amazing rapid turnabout.  This is clearly part of Iraq’s 
emerging posture of non-alignment and of the leadership’s resolve to be dependent on no one source 
of supply.  GOI’S military goals are internal security, border and mountain region surveillance and 
a credible defensive deterrent against Syria and Iran.55 
Ultimately, Washington did not sell any weapons equipment directly to Iraq during the 
1970s.  Nevertheless, Baghdad’s diplomatic outreach effort did over time change the perceptions 
that American diplomats had of the Baathist regime and ultimately bore fruit when Washington 
acquiesced to the building up of the Iraqi armed forces.  For example, during the late 1970s, Iraq 
begun negotiating with the Italian government “to buy a turnkey navy” for $2.6 billion, which 
would include “four 2,500 ton Lupo-class frigates, six 650-ton Assad-class corvettes, an 8,700-
ton supply ship, and a 6,000-ton floating deck.”56  As part of the deal, the Iraqi Ministry of 
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Defence wanted the frigates to be equipped with American-made General Electric gas turbine 
engines.  Although the U.S. Senate first blocked the sale (since Iraq was still on the U.S. 
government’s list of terrorism-sponsoring states), the State Department overturned the ruling and 
allowed for the GE engines to be exported to Italy to be included in the final sale to Iraq.  
Despite the often-circuitous road that the Baathist leadership had to take to import Western 
military equipment, improving Iraq’s image amongst policymakers in Washington helped in 
procuring equipment from the United States and its allies which could be used, directly or 
indirectly, for military purposes. 
Baathist plans for mitigating Iraq’s dependence on foreign military suppliers also centred 
on the development of an unconventional arms program, which required less-costly technologies, 
including chemical, radiological, biological, and bacteriological sources.  In the period between 
1976 and 1980, Iraq pursued a “Five Year Plan” aimed at developing an indigenous chemical 
weapons production capability.57  In addition to creating government agencies directly 
responsible for procuring agents needed to produce unconventional weapons, such as the State 
Establishment for the Production of Pesticides, the Five-Year Plan also led to the opening of the 
Samarra Complex, which became the principal establishment for the manufacture of chemical 
weapons;58 the construction of the Salman Pak facility, which was involved in the production of 
biological weapons;59 and the Nassr State Establishment for Mechanical Industries (NASSR) 
which played an important role in the development of Iraq’s ballistic weapons program.60   
Importantly, buying the chemical or biological ingredients needed to produce 
unconventional weapons, required relatively cheaper investments than purchasing and 
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maintaining advanced aircraft or tanks.  Furthermore, relative to the length of time that it 
sometimes took some weapons to actually reach Iraq and to train Iraqis to use them, the 
development of unconventional weapons took roughly the same amount of time.  For example, 
Iraq ordered Mirage fighters from France in the late 1970s but only received them in 1982 and 
began to use them effectively several years after that; by comparison, Baghdad started its 
chemical weapons program in the late 1970s and used chemical weapons for the first time 
against Iranian troops in 1983. 
Finally, a third strategy that Iraqi leaders used to mitigate dependence was stockpiling.  
To an extent, this is what the Iraqi government did in the period between March 1970, when 
Baghdad signed the agreement with the Kurdish factions that stopped the Kurdish insurgency, 
and March 1974, when the four-year agreement expired and the Iraqi armed forces launched 
another attack on Kurdish rebels.  While stockpiling worked early in the campaign, the Baathist 
regime fundamentally miscalculated how much weaponry they would need to defeat the Iranian 
and American-backed Kurdish resistance.  Iraq’s unsuccessful stockpiling of arms was related by 
Hussein in an internal Iraqi government meeting in 1979, when he mentioned that during the 
1974-1975 campaign the Iraqi military’s munitions had run out, that Iraq had no heavy artillery 
shells, and that the “air force had only three bombs left.”61 
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PART II: 1980 – 1990 
1. Military Diversification 
The Baath Party’s military diversification program was accelerated as a result of realities of the 
Iran-Iraq War.  When Iraq first invaded in September 1980, the Kremlin quickly imposed an 
arms embargo on Baghdad for its failure to consult Moscow.  Baghdad was able to get Egypt to 
supply the Iraqi army with spare parts for Soviet equipment, while Jordan served as a vital route 
for supplying those weapons in the early part of the war.  In addition, one of the most crucial 
military suppliers to Iraq during the war was France, which provided $5.6 billion in arms to Iraq 
in the first two years of the war alone.62  As Iraq gradually became the world’s leading weapons 
importer, new military suppliers became more willing to embark on closer security cooperation-
type relationships with Baghdad, delivering capabilities to the Iraqi military which it did not 
have in decades prior.  For example, beginning in 1982, British, French, German, Italian, Swiss, 
and Yugoslavian companies all worked on constructing different parts of Iraq’s strategic shelter 
program designed to protect the IQAF’s assets.  By around 1986, Iraq had built 300 hardened 
aircraft shelters and 300 “dummy shelters” designed to fool enemy planes.  To create this 
system, Iraqi military officials visited NATO air bases in Belgium and West Germany.  As 
Timmerman notes, “The whole project, including the use of dummies, was based on NATO 
doctrine and built by NATO suppliers.”63  Although not on a par with that of the U.S. Air Force, 
as the 1990-1991 Gulf War illustrated,64 by the late 1980s Iraq’s air defence system was one of 
the strongest ones in the region.  Its establishment through cooperation with foreign suppliers 
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was the result of Iraq’s military diversification policies.  The Baath Party argued that Iraq’s 
military diversification program  
has paid off remarkably well during the battle with the Iranian enemy… After we were forced to 
decisively and comprehensively confront the Iranian enemy, the Soviet Union has totally stopped 
all military supplies to Iraq [in the 1980-1982 period.] However, it has been possible to meet the 
needs of the battle [through the] policy of constantly maintaining a large reserve of military 




As in the preceding decade, the Baath leadership believed it was key for a new state like 
Iraq to maintain a distance from the great powers in order to achieve true political independence.  
Baathist officials wanted “not only the absence of foreign troops, but also the freedom of choice, 
movement, and relations with big powers.”66  Diversification of military suppliers was one way 
of mitigating Iraq’s dependence and increasing its freedom of movement.  The chart below 
illustrates the impact of Baghdad’s diversification program on the number of its total military 
suppliers over four periods between 1968 and 1990. 
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2. Indigenous Production 
In addition to military diversification, throughout the 1980s the Baath Party continued to invest 
in the development of an indigenous defence industry that would have a capability to build 
conventional and unconventional weapons.  As the 1982 Baathist Congress report noted, the 
build-up of Iraq’s military industry is “a necessary prerequisite for consolidating national 
independence and free national will… It is quite possible, even necessary, to provide as much as 
possible of [Iraq’s military] needs through national industry.”67  Two key government 
organisations were in charge of developing Iraq’s military industry: the Military Industrialisation 
Commission (MIC) and the State Organisation for Technical Industries (SOTI).68  During the 
early 1980s, SOTI used existing Iraqi intelligence outposts in order to establish a covert network 
aimed at acquiring foreign military technologies in support of Iraq’s military-industrial base.  
SOTI officials took charge of engineering project and licensed military production projects with 
France and supervised Saad General Establishments, which built factories for the production of 
conventional and unconventional weapons.  Iraq worked on purchasing missile technology and 
other military equipment through the NASSR State Establishment for Mechanical Industries.  In 
1988, SOTI, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Heavy Industry, and the Military 
Production Authority (all disparate Iraqi government agencies that worked on developing an 
indigenous military production capability) merged into one new organisation: the Ministry of 
Industry and Military Industrialisation (MIMI).  Run by Hussein Kamil (Saddam Hussein’s son-
in-law), MIMI was charged with, amongst other functions, creating an independent nuclear 
program in Iraq.69  Its power within Iraqi government decision-making was symbolised by the 
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fact that it was the only governmental office that could “finance projects independently of the 
Office of the President.”70  With the assistance of foreign engineers, MIMI developed a long-
range multi-rocket launch system, adapted French in-flight refuelling equipment to fit it to Iraqi 
MiG-23s, and bought a license to manufacture T-72 tanks.71 
The Iraqi government’s investment in military projects placed a significant burden on its 
economy.  Iraq’s defence expenditures as a percentage of gross national product amounted to 
25.4% in 1981, rose to 44.7% in 1982, and peaked in 1986 at 47.4%.72  Meanwhile, arms imports 
accounted for anywhere between two-fifths and two-thirds of total Iraqi defence spending,73 and 
for over four-fifths of all Iraqi imports in 1984.74  Hoyt’s and Alnasrawi’s calculations are derive 
from the data provided by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), an independent 
arms control agency within the U.S. government.  ACDA data has not always been historically 
reliable.  Catrina points out that the ACDA has often underestimated the arms exports of Western 
European and Third World countries.75  Nevertheless, Iraqi government documents at the SHC 
lends credence to the belief of just how high a burden arms imports were during the Iran-Iraq 
War.  For example, at a senior Iraqi government meeting in 1982, the Iraqi Minister of Finance 
noted that the Defence Ministry’s planned expenditures for the year were 3,600 Iraqi Dinars (ID) 
million out of a total of 8,713 ID for the entire budget, thus accounting for approximately 41.3% of 
Iraq’s budget for 1982.76  (The next chapter will discuss the economic aspects of this in greater 
detail.) 
                                                 
70 Hoyt, Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy, 124. 
71 Timmerman, The Death Lobby, 370. 
72 Hoyt, Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy, 130. 
73 Hoyt, Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy, 130, and author’s calculations. 
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(New York: Routledge, 2012), 61. 
75 For a wider discussion of the reliability of ACDA data, see Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence, 363-377. 
76 SHTP-A-000-635, “Saddam meeting with his cabinet to discuss the 1982 budget,” 1982. 
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Despite these costs, high state investment in Iraq’s military industry gradually began to 
pay off.  By the late 1980s, Iraq had at least 19 state-run military production facilities that were 
producing ordnance and artillery, with products that included variants of the RPI-7 anti-tank 
grenade launcher and anti-personnel and anti-tank mines.  At a military exhibition in Cairo in 
1987, Iraqi military officials showed indigenously produced aerial bombs, sniper rifles, 
Kalashnikovs, and other locally-produced light arms and munitions.  In addition, Iraq’s military 
industry modified major weapons platforms such as tanks, armoured vehicles, and aircraft to 
alter them to fit the Iraqi military’s needs during the war.77  According to Pelletiere, during the 
late 1980s Baathist officials in charge of Iraq’s military industrialisation 
Made grandiose boasts, promising to make Iraq self-sufficient in arms within the decade.  To 
buttress its claims, [it] put on an arms show just after the war, and a number of products – which the 
Iraqis claimed were natively produced – were displayed, some of which were quite impressive.  For 
example, they showed off an Iraqi AWACS, actually a Soviet plane that they refitted.  They also 
had on display modified MiG-23 fighters (equipped for in-flight refuelling) and naval mines.78 
By the late 1980s, Iraq was reportedly self-sufficient in the production of ammunition, 
artillery, aircraft bombs, mortar bombs, RPGs, rockets, tube-launched rockets, mortars, shells, 
propellant, fuses, explosives, and replacement barrels, and was experimenting with uranium to 
create armour-piercing projectiles.79  Through indigenous production, by 1988 Iraq was able to 
produce three Al-Husyan missiles per day (which had a range of 600km) as well as Al-Abbas 
missiles (which had a range of 800-900km.)80  According to Pollack, although Iraqi-made (or 
modified) long-range missiles were “inelegant,” they “got the job done and solved an important 
                                                 
77 Hoyt, Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy, 132-138. 
78 Stephen Pelletiere, Douglas Johnson, and Leif Rosenberger, Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East 
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79 Hoyt, Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy, 132-133. 
80 Hoyt, Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy, 144-145. 
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military problem for Baghdad – its inability to strike Tehran and other distant Iranian cities on a 
sustained basis.”81   
Iraq’s indigenous military production programs continued after the Iran-Iraq War ended 
in 1988.  In May 1989, Hussein Kamil, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law who was put in charge of 
MIMI announced that Iraq was founding a defence industrial program that was intended to 
provide “all of Iraq’s basic industrial supplies from indigenous sources.”82  Although such 
statements were often Baathist propaganda, archival evidence indicates that Iraq was in fact 
proceeding with its program of creating an indigenous military industry.  For example, in June 
1989 Iraq signed a protocol for the expansion of cooperation between Iraq and the USSR for the 
production of armoured vehicles in Iraq,83 while in the following year the MIC was working on 
the production of new types of missiles.84  The high-levels of debt that Iraq had at the end of the 
war (described in the next chapter) had limited impact on the Baathist military spending during 
the late 1980s. 
3. Diplomacy, Less-Costly Weapons, and Stockpiling 
The ability to access foreign military aid (i.e. both arms and technology transfers) was only made 
possible through an expanded diplomatic outreach program, which was directed by the senior 
levels of the Baathist government, specifically by Iraqi President Hussein himself, and supported 
by Iraq’s security and intelligence apparatus.85  During the 1980s, the majority of RCC members 
                                                 
81 Pollack, Arabs at War, 234. 
82 Hoyt, Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy, 132. 
83 SH-MICN-D-000-413, “Correspondence Issued by the MIC Legal Department to Special Projects Technical 
Committee Concerning Protocol-Approving Law,” July 29, 1989. 
84 42. SH‐MICN‐D‐000‐945, “Correspondence from the Military Industrialisation Commission regarding the 
production of the R400 bomb,” January 1, 1990 to December 31, 1995. 
85 The role of Iraq’s intelligence and security apparatus was crucial in the area of “covert technology acquisition.”  
See Hoyt, Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy, 131. 
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were made up of civilian technocrats who did not have military experience.  Not only did the 
Iraqi government’s close-hold on the armed forces have a negative impact on the military 
operations in the early years of the war,86 as will be discussed in further detail in chapter seven, 
but it also had a negative impact on the choice of weapons that the Iraqi government chose to 
import.  Numerous files in the SHC show that at the start of the Iran-Iraq War Hussein (who had 
a very limited background in military affairs)87 made decisions regarding the types of weapons 
that Iraq would import even though he did not understand the differences between weapon 
types.88  Nevertheless, as Schofield writes, during the 1980s Hussein’s “[military] strategy was 
not altogether effective because of his unfamiliarity with the use of military force [but his] 
diplomatic strategy… helped sustain Iraq for eight years of war.”89  The key piece of Iraq’s 
diplomatic outreach was the expansion of diplomatic relations with Washington.   
Although the United States restored full diplomatic relations with Baghdad only in 
November 1984 (which were broken since October 1967),90 Iraqi-American negotiations on 
military aid took place as early as 1981, when Baathist officials pressed Washington to stop its 
covert arms supplies to Iran.91  In April 1981 Iraqi Foreign Minister Sadun Hammadi told a 
senior U.S. official that “while Iraq was not communist, it could hardly be surprising that the 
                                                 
86 Helms, Iraq, 169. 
87 Karsh and Rautsi point out that in his youth Hussein failed his entrance examination to the Baghdad Military 
Academy.  See Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 35.  Various Iraqi Generals have pointed out that during the 
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89 Schofield, Militarization and War, 140. 
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Soviets continue to exploit the original opportunity they gained from the Czech arms deal with 
Egypt through an indifferent U.S. policy.”92  Implicit in Hammadi’s message was that if 
Washington proved unwilling to provide military aid to the Iraqi war effort against Iran, 
Baghdad’s geopolitical orientation would have to move closer to the Soviets.  
 Iraqi-American dialogue in the early 1980s paved the way for other openings in the 
diplomatic relationship.  In a meeting with William Eagleton, the head of the U.S. Interests 
Section in May 1981, RCC member Tariq Aziz stated that Iraq “wished to increase its trade with 
the U.S.” and that “Iraq… sought a wider understanding based on increased contact.”93  The 
message that Baathist officials sought to send was that Iraq was a country which Washington 
could do business with.  In 1982, Iraq was removed from a U.S. State Department list of 
terrorism-sponsoring states.  Although initially this did not entail Washington sending more 
military equipment to Iraq,94 it paved the way for Baghdad to begin dual-use items from the 
United States.  Furthermore, in meetings with American diplomats during this period, Iraqi 
officials stressed the importance of gaining more access to military imports.  In May 1983 Aziz 
(who replaced Hammadi as Iraq’s Foreign Minister in that year) told U.S. Secretary of State 
Alexander Haig that “there can be no negotiation with the Iranians unless they are convinced that 
they cannot crush Iraq militarily,”95 implying that American military aid to Iraq could tip the 
                                                 
92 GWU Document 6, "United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department 
of State. 'Meetings in Baghdad with Foreign Minister Hammadi,'" April 12, 1981. 
93 GWU NSA Document 10, “United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to 
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military balance in Iraq’s favour, thereby bringing Iran to the negotiation table.  A few months 
later, in December 1983, then-Presidential Envoy Donald Rumsfeld travelled to Baghdad to meet 
with Hussein.  According to U.S. State Department meeting notes, Hussein told Rumsfeld that 
“Iraq was an independent and non-aligned country and it was incorrect and unbalanced to have 
relations with the Soviet Union and not with [the United States.]  Iraq [has] no ideological 
complexes on this score.”96  Furthermore, during the mid-1980s, American officials began to 
receive requests from Iraqi officials for dual-use items, the approval and transfer of which would 
prove controversial over the long-run.  For example, a June 1983 telegram from the U.S. 
Interests Section in Baghdad notes that:  
The Director of [Iraq’s] Agricultural Aviation has invited U.S. crop spraying aircraft manufacturers 
[to Iraq]]… The director has expressed an interest in purchasing multi-purpose crop-spraying 
aircraft from U.S. sources.  Six helicopters and six fixed-wing aircraft with one ton minimum load 
capacity are envisioned as the initial purchase.97 
 
The request for such aircraft came from Iraq’s Ministry of Agriculture, sections of which 
– such as the Iraqi State Ministry for Pesticide Production – served as fronts for programs that 
developed chemical and biological weapons.98  The transfer of crop spraying aircraft may not 
seem like much but it made a significant impact in Iraqi war efforts during the mid- and late-
1980s.  Such aircraft were linked to Iraq’s aerial use of chemical weapons against Iranian troops 
and Kurdish uprisings throughout that decade, which made a significant psychological impact on 
defeating threats from both.99  Additionally, in January 1984 Washington began to consider 
                                                 
96 Rumsfeld Papers, “Rumsfeld Mission: December 20 Meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein,” December 
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liberalizing export controls on Iraq: “We are considering revising present policy to permit 
virtually all sales of... dual-use equipment to Iraq.”100  In the next month, U.S. Secretary of State 
Shultz approved the export of 2,000 heavy trucks, worth $244 million, to Iraq, although the 
United States still remained cautious in exporting items that could be used directly for military 
purposes.101   
Prior to 1983, Washington covertly permitted Israel to supply billions of dollars’ worth of 
American weapons and spare parts to Iran through covert channels.102  However, in 1983, as 
U.S.-Iranian relations deteriorated, the U.S. State Department placed Iran on its list of terrorist-
sponsoring states (which would bar it from receiving overt military assistance) and launched 
“Operation Staunch,” an international effort to place an arms embargo against Iran.103   In 
November 1984, Baghdad and Washington re-established diplomatic relations.  Overt the 
ensuing years Washington transferred to Baghdad over $4 billion in Commodity Credit 
Corporation guarantees and Export-Import Bank credits, which allowed the Baathist regime to 
devote more on military spending.  In 1986, after Iraq suffered numerous defeats to Iran, the 
United States began to give Iraqi analysts access to American satellite reconnaissance and 
provided it with precise data on Iranian economic targets.104  While Washington was openly pro-
Iraq during the mid-1980s, in 1985 some U.S. officials – notably in the National Security 
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Council and the CIA – initiated a covert program that sold Iran arms and shared intelligence 
information with Tehran, in exchange for Iran’s support in releasing American hostages in 
Lebanon.  In 1986, the program was exposed and subsequently terminated.  Following the 
revelations of the Iran-Contra affair, Washington increased its support of Baghdad.  Agricultural 
credits increased from $536 million in 1986 to $1 billion in 1988; the U.S. Commerce 
Department approved roughly 97.5% of export license applications for dual-use items bound for 
Iraq; and the CIA also shared with Iraq intelligence pertaining to strategic targets in Iran.105   
 Baathist officials also attempted to impact, to the extent they could, the perceptions of the 
American public.  In 1983, for example, Hussein met with Christine Moss Helms, an American 
researcher, for an extensive interview which allowed the Iraqi President to present 
autobiographical details on his life, resulting in a positive portrait of a leader that would be seen 
as a dictator only a few years later.106  In 1984, Moss authored a book entitled, Iraq: Eastern 
Flank of the Arab World, which was published by the Brookings Institution and presented one of 
the most sympathetic accounts of the Baathist regime in the Western press.107  After Washington 
and Baghdad re-established diplomatic relations in 1984, the newly-appointed Iraqi Ambassador 
to the United States, Nizar Hamdun (previously head of the Iraqi Interests Section in 
Washington) embarked on an extensive media and public outreach campaign.108  In 1985, the 
Iraqi ambassador wrote a letter to the editor of the New York Times in which he highlighted Iran's 
efforts to “destabilise the Gulf” and argued that “stability in the area has rested for several years 
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on Iraq's firm stand in the face of Iranian expansionist attitudes.”109  The underlying message of 
Hamdun’s letters to American news outlets was two-fold: (1) Iran was the primary threat to 
stability in the Gulf and wider Middle East, and (2) Iraq was the only country in the region that 
could counter it.110   In 1987, a profile of Hamdun in the New York Times highlighted that as part 
of his diplomatic effort, “the Ambassador has made himself available to a wider range of 
Administration officials, academics, and business leaders, consistently portraying Iraq as a 
peace-loving country that... wants to bring the [Iran-Iraq] war [to an] end.”111  The profile 
provided a quote by Hamdun which perhaps best encapsulated the Iraqi government’s 
perspective on dealing with the United States, the centrepiece of which was making sure that 
Baghdad’s voice was representing in decision-making circles in Washington: 
I represent Iraq to the United States of America and not to the diplomatic corps or the Arab 
community here.  The terms ‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’ apply in the United States, and if you’re 
perceived as a good guy, the American people may disagree with you, but at least they will respect 
you.112 
Baathist leaders also built relations with U.S. businesses, including American defence 
companies.  In meetings during the early 1980s, Iraqi officials consistently expressed their desire 
to expand trade relations with the United States.113  In May 1985, the Baathist regime set up the 
Iraq-U.S. Business Forum in Washington, DC.114  Run by an American intermediary, this 
lobbying outfit became increasingly influential by the late 1980s.  Its membership list included 
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powerful American military, oil, and heavy-industry businesses.115  Although it would be 
incorrect to argue that Iraq was able to establish a “death lobby” in Washington (as Timmerman 
writes), collectively through efforts to reach out to American officials, business, and the U.S. 
public, Iraq established a powerful base of support in Washington which lobbied on behalf of 
Iraqi interests during the 1980s.  According to Eagleton’s notes of a 1981 meeting with Aziz, 
“Iraqis [are] aware that Western Europe and the United States were more technologically-
advanced and affluent [than Socialist countries.]  Since Iraq is paying the price [for military and 
civilian goods], they want the best product.  Thus, there is an objective ground for close relations 
with the U.S. and Europe.”116  Washington’s support of Iraq also served as an informal green-
light for European military suppliers, such as Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom, and various Arab states (most notably Egypt) to increase their military 
assistance to Iraq.117  Consequently, as the chart below shows, the share of Soviet military 
imports dropped from 77% in 1980 to as low as 45% in 1983 and stood at 57% by the end of the 
Iran-Iraq War. 
 
Part of Iraq’s diplomatic outreach program involved sharing intelligence with its 
suppliers about military equipment.  Although the Iraqi government directed military officials to 
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avoid providing information about the performance of Iraqi weapons,118 Baghdad was willing to 
share captured enemy weapons with its suppliers.  For example, in 1983, Iraq agreed to a request 
from the chief of the Soviet armed forces to provide Moscow with samples of the American-
made Phoenix, Sparrow, and Sidewinder missiles,119 and captured Iranian artillery “for the 
purpose of delivering it to the concerned parties in Russia to study it.”120  According to the Iraqi 
intelligence notes, Baghdad agreed to deliver these American-made weapons after the Soviets 
reassured them that they “will provide us with the study results so we can benefit from [the 
knowledge in the war.]”121  Iraq benefited from Soviet studies on American-made weapons 
because the Iraqi armed forces had to counter them on the battlefield during the 1980s.  For 
example, throughout the war the Iranian military used American-made TOW anti-tank missiles 
(which were purchased both under the Shah and, covertly, from the United States during the 
1980s) to halt attacks by Iraqi tanks.122  Archival evidence suggests that in 1981 the Soviet 
Union provided information to Iraq’s military intelligence on the development of second 
generation TOW missiles that were being used by Iran in the field.123   
Sharing their enemies’ military technologies with military suppliers was also part of 
Iraq’s attempt to receive foreign assistance in other fields as well.  For example, according to 
former Major General al-Tarfa al-Ubaydi, who served in the Iran section of the general 
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command intelligence cell between 1980 and 1987, during the war “the Soviets helped [the Iraqi 
military] by providing code-breaking experts in return for an Iranian F-4 aircraft that had crash-
landed [in Iraq] and was only slightly damaged.”124  Washington supposedly tried to work out 
similar deals with Baghdad: for example, American negotiators wanted to obtain a Soviet tank 
that was “protected by advanced armour potentially invulnerable to American firepower” and 
offered in exchange to deliver American-made howitzers to Iraq.125  During the war itself 
Baghdad was generally unwilling to give Washington information about Soviet military 
equipment,126 although an American “foreign liaison officer delegation” was allowed to visit Iraq 
after the Iran-Iraq War to inspect the weapons that were used during the war.127  
Another counter-dependence strategy which the Baathist government pursued was the 
development of less-costly (or unconventional) weapons.  In 1980 Iraq created the State 
Establishment for Pesticide Production (SEPP), a front for the production of chemical weapons 
which also acted as the contracting agency for the Samarra Chemical Weapons facility.  
According to Pelletiere and Johnson, who examined the military operations of the Iran-Iraq War, 
the Iraqi military was “motivated to find a solution to the impact of Iranian human wave infantry 
attacks.”128  As they point out, while chemical weapons have “a low kill ratio,” they also have a 
“great psychological potential.”129  In the case of the Iran-Iraq War, the use of chemical weapons 
lowered the morale of Iranian troops, who now faced the prospect not just of dying on the 
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battlefield, but suffering a slow and painful death.130  Over the 1980s, the Baathist regime 
became used chemical weapons on the Kurdish resistance and Iranian troops to deliver an impact 
that forced the latter to stop its assault on the Iraqi government.131   
During the mid-1980s, Baghdad also spent billions of dollars on contracts with 
Yugoslavian and West German firms to develop ballistic missiles and chemical, biological, and 
nuclear warheads.132  The development of Iraq’s ballistic missile program had its roots in the 
1970s, but was expanded significantly during the 1980s with support from countries as diverse as 
Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, the Soviet Union, and West Germany.133   Through Iraq’s various 
indigenous ballistic programs program, Iraq was able to develop SCUD missiles that had a range 
capable of hitting Tehran.134  In the final year of the war, Iraq fired almost twice as many SCUD 
missiles into Iran as the latter did into Iraq.135  The development of ballistic missiles allowed Iraq 
to offset the need for the IQAF to fly over vast territories in Iran and instead land missiles 
directly at the Iranian capital city, directly impacting the centre of the enemy’s political-military 
decision-making.136  Furthermore, because some of the missiles were primarily locally produced, 
the Baathist regime also had greater control over their supply than it did over the delivery of 
foreign manufactured weapons systems. 
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chemical-armed ballistic missiles, which caused several million people to leave Tehran.   For more on the use of 
Iraqi surface-to-surface weapons, most notably its SCUD missiles, see Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons of Modern 
War, 495-506. 
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Iraq was also much more successful in the field of stockpiling military equipment during 
the 1980s than it was in the previous decade.  The 1982 Baath Party report claimed that “it has 
been possible to meet the needs of the battle… thanks to the [Iraqi government’s] policy of 
constantly maintain a large reserve of military equipment.”137  This was not simple propaganda.  
As Cordesman and Wagner note, “unlike Iran, Iraq’s land forces… had massive modern support 
and training facilities [and were] able to set up vast supply dumps in virtually every part of the 
front.”138  Even though the shortage of some war materiel (in particular ammunition and 
artillery) was a consistent theme amongst discussions of Iraqi political and military officials 
during the 1980s,139 such shortages were more the result of an unprecedented expansion of the 
Iraqi armed forces (i.e. demand outstripped supply), not poor planning by Iraqi logisticians.  In 
fact, during the late 1970s, Iraq created an enormous stockpile of “ammunition, spare parts, and 
other military consumables” which meant that when the Soviet Union imposed an embargo on 
Iraq at the start of the Iran-Iraq war, it had little impact on troops on the front lines.140  
Furthermore, according to Pollack, after the Arab-Israeli 1973 War Iraq built a hybrid Soviet-
British logistics system which during the Iran-Iraq War proved efficient in maintaining the 
“movement of troops, weaponry and supplies… Iraq’s logistical system kept nine divisions plus 
support troops (a force of over 150,000 men) well-supplied for over a year in Iran without any 
glaring mistakes – a considerable achievement by any measure.”141  In addition to its diplomatic 
outreach effort and investment in less-costly weapons, the Iraqi military’s ability to stockpile 
weapons more efficiently also mitigated the country’s dependence. 
                                                 
137 Baath Party Report, 1982. 
138 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons of Modern War, 169. 
139 For example, see SH-SHTP-A-001-229, “Saddam and Military Officials Discussing the Iran-Iraq War and Iraqi 
Military Capabilities,” 1980; SH-SHTP-A-000-627, 1983-1984; SH‐SHTP‐D‐000‐572, 1981. 
140 Pollack, Arabs at War, 192. 
141 Pollack, Arabs at War, 192. 
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INTERPRETATION OF EVIDENCE, 1968-1990 
Military Diversification 
Although Baghdad’s policy of military diversification allowed the Baathist regime to insulate 
Iraqi foreign and domestic policy from Soviet influence and to obtain better quality weapons, on 
the downside it also prevented Iraq from developing close security cooperation relationships with 
its military suppliers.  In April 1978 the Baath Party publicly celebrated the sixth anniversary of 
the 1972 Iraqi-Soviet treaty and stated that “the Soviet Union has stood and always stands on the 
side of the Arab national liberation movement.”142  In private, however, Iraqi political-military 
officials were in fact concerned that the Soviet Union had begun giving military equipment to 
Baghdad’s enemies, particularly the Shah of Iran.  In January 1978, the General Staff of the Iraqi 
Military sent a telegram to the Iraqi Military Attaché “to confirm the accuracy” of information 
about Iran receiving “weapons, ammunition and military equipment through a swap for gas deal 
with the Soviet Union.”143 
Iraqi concerns about Moscow transferring military equipment to Iran were well-founded.  
In the period between 1977 and 1978, at the height of Iraqi military diversification programs in 
that decade, the Soviet Union transferred $1.5 billion in air defence systems and missiles to 
Iran.144  In the period between 1972, when Baghdad first signed the Iraqi-Soviet cooperation 
treaty, and 1976, when Iraq’s military diversification programs were just starting, according to 
SIPRI there are no Iranian-Soviet arms transfers.145  To an extent Baghdad’s military 
                                                 
142 FBIS-MEA-78-077, “Paper Hails Sixth Anniversary of Treaty with Soviets,” Tariq Ash-Sha'b, Baghdad (April 
20, 1978.) 
143 SH‐GMID‐D‐000‐845, “General Military Intelligence Directorate correspondence regarding weapons, 
ammunition, and military equipment from the Soviet Union and correspondence with the Iraqi military attaché in 
Tehran,” January 1978 to September 1979. 
144 SIPRI, Iranian-Soviet Military Transfers, 1977-1978. 
145 SIPRI, Iranian-Soviet Military Transfers, 1972-1976. 
Page 211 of 355 
 
diversification (particularly reaching out to Western countries) pushed the Kremlin to play the 
same game.  Similarly, Iraq’s non-Soviet military partners were also supporting Baghdad’s 
enemies during the 1970s; for example, while Paris was willing to sell nuclear technologies to 
Baghdad, it also signed nuclear cooperation contracts with Tehran in the same period.146 
During the 1980s Iraq’s military suppliers continued to provide aid to Iran.  The chart 
below is composed of over a dozen Iraqi intelligence reports from the 1980s.  The suppliers in 
the middle of the chart are those that gave arms to both Iran and Iraq during the war.  In essence, 
according to Iraqi intelligence, nearly every single military supplier that Baghdad had during the 
1980s was simultaneously providing military aid to Iran, albeit through intermediaries.  
American-made weapons made their way to Iran through countries as diverse as Israel, Taiwan, 
and Pakistan.  Chinese weapons were passed through North Korea and Pakistan.  Libya and 
Syria (which sided with Iran during the war) were together conduits for weapon transfers from 
Brazil, France, and the USSR, all of whom had important security cooperation agreements with 
and were providing military aid to Iraq during the same period. 
                                                 
146 For example, FBIS-MEA-76-106, "Le Monde Interview with Iranian Prime Minister Amir-Abas Hoveyda," Le 
Monde (June 1, 1976.) 






Throughout the 1980s, China was the third largest provider of arms to Iraq after the 
USSR and France.148  As the chart above shows, Iraq’s intelligence service confirmed that China 
– like the United States and the Soviet Union – was providing military aid to Iran through 
intermediaries.  This information was gathered through various channels, including Iraq’s 
diplomatic outposts.  For example, in 1985, the Yugoslavian Directorate of Military Intelligence 
supplied Iraq’s Military Attaché in Belgrade with information confirming that China was 
delivering to Iran roughly a hundred surface-to-surface missiles “with a range of two hundred 
                                                 
147 Various Iraqi intelligence reports, including: SH‐GMID‐D‐000‐524, “Correspondence between the General 
Military Intelligence Directorate and the Iraqi Intelligence Service regarding Iranian‐Libyan military cooperation” 
November 1981 to November 1985; SH‐GMID‐D‐000‐154, “Telegrams sent from the Iraqi military attaché in Delhi 
to the GMID regarding chemical and germ warfare equipment and previous mustard gas shipments from North 
Korea to Iran in 1984,” April 4, 1984; SH‐MISC‐D‐000‐449, "Report regarding the Iranian military presence along 
the Iraq‐Iran border, Iranian current affairs, reports on weapons sales, and analysis," October 29, 1986; SH‐GMID‐
D‐000‐265, "General Military Intelligence Directorate study on the Iran‐Iraq War, including causes, effects on the 
economy, and general security and relations in the Gulf region," May 12, 1987; SH‐GMID‐D‐001‐145, "Document 
regarding investigation reports regarding the relationship between Iran and Pakistan, including armament support 
from Pakistan to Iran, and food supplies," December 1987.  Note: The United States provided indirect military aid to 
Iraq as discussed in this chapter. 
148 SIPRI, Iraq’s Arms Imports, 1980-1988. 
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kilometres.”149  In 1986, Iraq’s General Directorate of Military Intelligence learned through its 
Military Attaché in London about the “arrival... of the improved type of S-S-12 surface-to-
surface missiles that are made in China and loaded on food transporting trucks to the Iranian 
enemy.  The trucks take the land route of Nepal-Pakistan-Iran.”150  Although the Iraqi 
government tried to stop its suppliers from providing military aid to Iran,151 such efforts were 
only moderately successful in part because Baghdad failed to develop more exclusive 
relationship with its suppliers. 
One example of a state in the region which placed a premium on maintaining a loyal 
security cooperation relationship was Israel vis-à-vis the United States.  In the period between 
1975 and 2010, roughly 93% of all Israeli military imports came from the United States.152  At 
no point during this time period did Israel actively pursue a military diversification program like 
Iraq: the six military suppliers that Israel had besides the United States at this time period (which 
together accounted for only six percent of all Israeli military imports) were all American 
allies.153  To an extent, Tel Aviv’s close security cooperation relationship with Washington 
meant that it was potentially vulnerable to American influence.  At the same time, however, 
Israel benefited from a more exclusive relationship because it knew that the United States would 
not give arms to countries that were seeking to destroy it.154  While military diversification 
                                                 
149 That is, with enough range to hit Baghdad.  See SH‐GMID‐D‐000‐295, “Correspondence between Iraqi Air 
Forces, Anti‐Aircraft Defense Command and the General Military Intelligence Directory regarding the 
bombardment of Army and oil locations and establishments by Iranian surface‐to‐surface missiles,” April 1985 to 
October 1986. 
150 SH-GMID-D-000-295, 1985-1986. 
151 For example, see GWU NSA Document 7 and 10, 1981. 
152 SIPRI, Israeli military imports, 1975-2010. 
153 SIPRI, Israeli military imports, 1975-2010. 
154 A full discussion of Israeli-U.S. security cooperation is outside the scope of this dissertation.  For more details on 
the subject, see Jeremy Sharp, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel," Congressional Research Service (December 4, 2009).   
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allowed Iraq to minimise supplier influence it may have also resulted in the fact that suppliers 
were more willing to support its enemies. 
Indigenous Production 
During both the 1970s and 1980s the Baathist leadership was adamant about pursuing an 
indigenous military production program.  The Baathist leadership’s long-term strategy for 
developing an indigenous military production facility began in earnest in 1974 with the setting-
up of the Strategic Planning Committee described above.  Although Baghdad’s unconventional 
weapons program was often shrouded in mystery, Baathist officials did not keep its ambitions for 
developing an indigenous Iraqi military industry a secret.  At a 1979 UN Conference on Science 
and Technology in Vienna, Iraqi representatives stated that an objective for the year 2000 was 
“the development of the armament industry in order to achieve self-reliance and national security 
for both Iraq and the Arab world.”155  By the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s Baghdad’s 
strategy shifted from importing whole weapons-systems to “technology transfers.”  For example, 
the SHC contains a military cooperation agreement signed in April 1983 between Baghdad and 
Moscow for the construction of an intermediate repair project for the R-13-M rockets to be built 
in Iraq with the help of Soviet advisors.156  Another similar agreement signed with Moscow 
focused on the “development of an airplane repair project in Iraq.”157  These agreements 
highlighted Iraq’s commitment to develop an indigenous military industry, the reasons for which 
were described in a 1982 Baath Party Report in the following terms: 
The building-up of [a] military industry… is a necessary prerequisite for consolidating national 
independence and free national will.  If it is not possible to manufacture all that our armed forces 
                                                 
155 Iraqi delegates quoted in Hoyt, Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy, 126. 
156 SH-PDWN-D-000-552, 1981-1989. 
157 SH-PDWN-D-000-552, 1981-1989. 
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The creation of an indigenous military industry proved to be a formidable task.  For most 
of the period up until the Baathist takeover in 1968, the majority of Iraq’s labour force was 
involved in agricultural projects.  Even during the early 1970s, 30-40% of Iraq’s labour force 
still worked in the agricultural sector.159  That began to change during the mid-1970s as oil 
revenues enabled the Iraqi government to spend more on state-funded enterprises.  By the late 
1970s, nearly one-half of the active labour force was employed by the Iraqi state.160  Significant 
portions of Iraqi government spending during the 1970s and 1980s were devoted to large-scale 
industrialisation projects.161  By 1984, Iraq had an estimated 170,000 industrial workers, an 
enormous expansion of Iraq’s industrial workforce over a relatively short period of time; 
furthermore, during the mid-1980s, roughly 40 percent of those working on industrial projects 
worked specifically on Iraq’s military industry.162  By 1990, the number of Iraqis working on 
developing the country’s military industry reached approximately 100,000.163   
The extent to which Iraq succeeded in building an indigenous military industry during the 
1970s and 1980s is a subject of some disagreement.  For example, Timmerman and Jentlesons’s 
accounts highlight the successes of Baghdad’s military industrialisation program; reading their 
works, the impression one gets is that generally the Iraqi defence production was very robust.164 
                                                 
158 Iraqi Government, “Baath Party Conference Report,” 1982. 
159 Most of Iraq’s GDP during that period came from oil revenues, but the oil industry employed only a small 
portion of the Iraqi labour force.  See Helms, Iraq, 12. 
160 Colgan, Petro-Aggression, 103. 
161 The fastest growing sector in which private and public investments were made was in Iraq's industry, which by 
the late 1970s accounted for an estimated half of all investments in Iraq.  Between the early 1970s and early 1980s, 
the number of employees working in large industrial establishments doubled and the value of the output of such 
establishments rose from 235 Mil ID in 1972 to 1,520 Mil ID in 1982.  See Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 
1958, 232-236. 
162 Hoyt, Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy, 123.   
163 Hoyt, Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy, 123. 
164 Timmerman, The Death Lobby; Jentleson, With Friends Like These. 
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On the other hand Pollack argues that “the Iraqi arms industry was never able to supply the 
armed forces with much more than ammunition and some small arms…  The vast majority of the 
weapons Iraq claimed to have developed were [often] foreign weapons systems that Iraq had 
poorly disguised and renamed.”165  The truth seems to be somewhere in the middle: while Iraq’s 
military industry never reached Western-levels, the advances made by Iraq over the following 
two decades were truly impressive, especially for an under-industrialised country with a labour 
force that was still largely agricultural at the start of the 1980s.  For example, analysing the 
growth of Iraq’s military industry during the 1980s, Hoyt writes that, “in just a decade, Iraq had 
created a significant and, in some fields, technologically-sophisticated military industrial-
base.”166  By the late 1980s, Iraq possessed one of the most robust military industries in the Arab 
world.167 
Diplomacy, Less-Costly Weapons, and Stockpiling 
The Baathist regime also undertook three policies aimed at decreasing its dependence on 
weapons from abroad.  The first and most effective policy was Baghdad’s flexible and active 
diplomacy with countries from different ideological blocs (i.e. the Western powers, the Socialist 
bloc states, members of the Non-Aligned Movement).  This policy was reflected in the 
aforementioned 1982 Baath Party report, which emphasised “the need to diversify Iraq's foreign 
relations [in order to] provide better chances for meeting [Iraq’s] needs at both local and Arab 
                                                 
165 Pollack, Arabs at War, 234-235. 
166 Hoyt, Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy, 124. 
167 Among Arab states, the only country that came close to Iraq’s military industry was Egypt.  However, with a 
population roughly one third the size of Egypt, Iraq’s military industrialisation relative to the size of its labour force 
was more impressive.  In the Gulf, the only rival was Iran (about three-to-four times the size of Iraq), although the 
lack of access to foreign military technologies seriously hampered Iran’s indigenous military industry during the 
1980s.  See Yazid Sayigh, Arab Military Industry: Capability, Performance, and Impact (London; Washington: 
Brassey’s, 1992.) 
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levels.”168   Baathist leaders varied the content of their rhetoric with each diplomatic partner.  
With the Soviet Union Baathist officials argued that Baghdad was a partner in the “struggle 
against imperialist forces” and highlighted that Iran was acting on behalf of “imperialist agents.”  
With France they stressed that Iraq was an unaligned country and highlighted the commercial 
elements of Iraqi-French security cooperation.  With the United States Baathist officials 
cultivated their relationships with Western journalists, politicians, military officials, and business 
leaders.  While this diversification strategy worked to some extent (i.e. it convinced those 
suppliers Iraq was a country that one could do business with), as described above diversification 
also precluded Iraq from achieving an exclusive relationship with any of its suppliers.  Not 
surprisingly, during the late 1980s, Barzan al-Takriti, Iraq’s then Ambassador to Geneva, wrote 
to Iraqi President Hussein that while “other nations [have] true allies fighting on their side in all 
fields… we have opportunist allies who crave after us and some of them sell us short... when the 
going gets tough.”169   
 Secondly, Iraq’s investment in developing less-costly (or unconventional) weapons also 
had both costs and benefits.  The “benefit” of these weapons was that they struck psychological 
fear in the various enemies that Baghdad faced: the development and use of Al-Husayn, Al-Abas, 
and other long-range ballistic missiles which could hit Tehran caused wide-spread paranoia in 
the capital and other cities in Iran, delivering a psychological impact comparable to Iraq had used 
aircraft to assault Tehran and at a lower price.170  On the cost-side, the use of unconventional 
weapons damaged the Baathist regime’s reputation in the international system: no matter how 
many letters-to-the editor Iraq’s Ambassador Hamdun wrote highlighting the “peaceful” nature 
                                                 
168 Baath Party Congress Report for 1982. 
169 SH‐PDWN‐D‐000‐469, “Response letter from Barzan al‐Tikriti to Saddam Hussein regarding assessment, 
comments, and suggestions on various issues in Iraq,” September 1989 to October 1989. 
170 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons of Modern War, 500. 
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of the Baathist regime, Baghdad’s use of chemical weapons, especially against civilians, was 
covered in the Western press.171  Furthermore, while the Executive branch of the U.S. 
government continued to authorise providing Iraq with further financial aid even after the 
Halabja massacre in March 1988,172 the U.S. Congress had formed a committee in August 1988 
to investigate Baghdad’s use of chemical weapons.173  At the same time a United Nations panel 
confirmed that Iraq had in fact used chemical against the Kurds.174  In September 1988, both the 
U.S. House and Senate passed legislation imposing economic sanctions on Iraq and a ban of 
selling dual-use equipment to Baghdad as a result of its use of chemical weapons.175  On April 3, 
1990, U.S. President George Bush, who had been largely supportive of the Baathist regime up 
until that point, issued a statement “strongly urge[d] Iraq to abandon the use of chemical 
weapons.”176  A few days later, on April 11, 1990, British Customs officials seized Iraq-bound 
cargo that contained crates for building Iraq’s “Super-Gun.”  On April 16, a delegation of U.S. 
Senators in Iraq delivered a letter to Hussein which expressed “deep concerns” about recent Iraqi 
policies and urged it to stop its “attempts to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological 
capabilities.”177  Over the long-run, the Baathist regime’s propensity to break international norms 
put pressure on Western policymakers to curb Iraq’s access to military equipment and dual-use 
items, thereby slowing down its military expansion. 
A third policy that the Baathist leadership undertook to mitigate its dependence was 
stockpiling.  During the 1970s, Iraq was largely unsuccessful in this realm.  During the 1974-
                                                 
171 For example, see Alan Cowell, “Iran Charges Iraq with Gas Attack,” New York Times (March 24, 1988), A11; 
"Poison Gas: Iraq's Crime," New York Times (March 26, 1988), 30. 
172 See Friedman, Spider’s Web, 107-164. 
173 Jentleson, With Friends Like These, 220. 
174 "U.N. Panel Says Iraq Used Gas on Civilians," New York Times (August 24, 1988), A11. 
175 Robert Pear, "House Approves Sanctions Against Iraq," New York Times (September 28, 1988), A8. 
176 FBIS-NES-90-072, "Saddam Reacts to Bush's 3 Apr Statements," Baghdad INA (April 1, 1990.) 
177 FBIS-NES-90-074, "Saddam Husayn Addresses Visiting U.S. Senators," Baghdad Domestic Service (April 16, 
1990.) 
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1975 campaign against Kurdish rebels Iraq had out of much of the ammunition and weapons that 
it had needed to sustain the fight.  It was only through a diplomatic manoeuvre (i.e. the Algiers 
Agreement brokered by Hussein and the Shah of Iran), that the flow of weapons to the Kurdish 
rebels ceased and the Iraqi government was finally able to defeat the insurgency.  By the late 
1970s, however, Iraq had begun to stockpile weapons and spare parts, which allowed the Iraqi 
forces to remain well-supplied during the eight months of the Soviet arms embargo at the start of 
the Iran-Iraq War.  Furthermore, according to Pollack (who is generally critical of the Iraqi 
military effectiveness), prior to and during the Iran-Iraq War “the logisticians... accomplished 
every task required of them… Supply and transport units kept the combat units well supplied 
throughout the invasion [and for over a year inside Iran.]”178 
CONCLUSIONS 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the Baathist regime undertook two major policies aimed at 
mitigating Iraq’s dependence on foreign military suppliers: military diversification and 
indigenous production.  Though both policies took time and had some costs, for the most part 
they enabled the regime to build Iraq’s military power while maintaining the political 
independence that the Baathist government believed was necessary for Iraq to become a major 
world power.  In addition, through diplomatic outreach, the Baathist regime was able to change 
the perceptions of its suppliers so that they were more amenable to provide Iraq with economic 
and military aid.  Iraq’s investment in less-costly weapons, meanwhile, provided the Iraqi 
military with considerable power, but the use of unconventional weapons against innocent 
                                                 
178 Pollack, Arabs at War, 192. 
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civilians gradually transformed the international community’s perceptions against the Baathist 
regime, which worked against Iraqi interests in the long run.  Finally, the Baathist regime was 
unable to use stockpiling in an effective manner during the mid-1970s, but its ability to stockpile 
weapons improved considerably during the Iran-Iraq War.  On the downside, these counter-
dependence strategies may have cost Iraq in another way, by preventing the development of a 
more exclusive security cooperation relationship, which resulted in Baghdad’s military suppliers 
being willing to provide weapons to its enemy during the Iran-Iraq War.  
  










The economic dimensions of Iraqi military imports between 1968 and 1990 do not seem to 
follow conventional thinking on recipient behaviour in three key areas.  Firstly, although Iraq 
was the second largest importer in the world during this period, spending on arms imports and 
the military in general did not seem to contribute negatively to Iraq’s socio-economic 
development.  Generally, Iraq experienced a relatively high period of growth over the entire time 
period, improvements in its living standards, and an increasingly robust and educated labour 
force.  Secondly, in relations with numerous suppliers, Iraq was successful in encouraging 
supplier-export dependence.  This was particularly the case with medium-sized suppliers, such as 
France and Brazil, where various large defence companies relied on exporting arms to Iraq, 
particularly during the 1980s.  Iraq’s ability to generate some level of supplier dependence 
allowed Baghdad to obtain better quality weapons, at better financial terms.  And thirdly, the 
Baathist regime was able to separate its military relations with suppliers from its overall trade 
policies.  This policy allowed Iraq to both obtain the best civilian and military imports that it had 
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access to and maintain greater political, economic, and military autonomy vis-à-vis its suppliers.  
This chapter explores these three issues. 
PART I: 1968-1980 
1. Recipient Socio-Economic Development 
Prior to 1968, Iraq had one of the most underdeveloped economies in the world.1  Since the 
Baath Party had no economic plan when it came to power in July 1968, it allowed the previous 
regime’s five-year plan (1966-1969) to “run its course while it attempted to consolidate its power 
and develop its plans for the future of Iraq.”2  By 1970, the Baathist regime had created its own 
five-year National Development Plan (NDP), which was due to run between the fiscal years 
1970/1971 and 1974/1975.3  The NDP set out a number of goals, which included: improving 
Iraq’s economic output labour productivity; modernising the country’s economy by bringing in 
new technologies from abroad; and strengthening Iraq’s private sector.  Furthermore, under the 
NDP, the Iraqi government undertook to invest in numerous development projects in four sectors 
of the country’s economy: agriculture, industry, transportation and communication, and building 
and services.4     
Baathist goals for strengthening Iraq’s economy were buttressed by the increase in oil 
revenues during the 1970s.  Beginning in 1973, Iraq experienced a boom to its economy that 
                                                 
1 For a detailed history of Iraq’s economy from its founding until 1968, see Abbas Alnasrawi, The Economy of Iraq: 
Oil, Wars, Destruction of Development and Prospects, 1950-2010 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994), in particular 
chapters one through four.  For a history of the role that oil revenues played in Iraq’s economy during that formative 
period, see Rafael Kandiyoti, Pipelines: Flowing Oil and Crude Politics (London, I.B. Tauris, 2008), 33-83. 
2 Alnasrawi, The Economy of Iraq, 55. 
3 Alnasrawi, The Economy of Iraq, 62. 
4 See FBIS-MEA-74-071, "Saddam Husayn Meeting with Arab Journalists," Baghdad INA (April 10, 1974); FBIS-
MEA-74-038, "Iraqi Transport Minister on Development Projects,” Baghdad Al-Jamhurriya (February 9, 1974.) 
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resulted from a combination of internally-generated policies and externally-imposed 
circumstance.  The internal factor contributing to the boom in Iraq’s economy during the mid-
1970s was the Baath Party’s decision to nationalise Iraq’s oil in 1972, which set up the Iraqi 
government to benefit from the rise in oil prices in the following year.   
In terms of external factors, the 1970s were marked by an increasing demand for Middle 
Eastern oil by countries in Western Europe.  For example, in 1973, two years after the military 
withdrawal from the Gulf, Great Britain was still importing three-fourths of its oil from the 
Middle East, a number that decreased after the discovery of North Sea oil.5  Throughout the rest 
of Europe, around three-quarters of all foreign oil continued to come from the Gulf.6  In October 
1973, during the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War, OPEC led a boycott against exports of oil to the 
West.  The result was a four-fold increase in the price of oil that not only shocked the world 
economy, but brought a dramatic increase in oil revenues to OPEC member states.  While the 
Iraqi government urged other Arab states to nationalise their oil as well, it was also pursuing its 
own, independent policy regarding oil production.  When it came to the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, 
the Iraqi government was the only Arab state that refused to reduce the country’s production 
quota by 5% (as all other OPEC countries agreed to) and did not prevent Iraqi oil from reaching 
Western Europe.7  In fact, during the embargo, Iraq increased its oil production and continued to 
sell oil to the European market, so that it benefited from both higher prices and increased 
exports.  To justify Iraq’s oil reaching Western Europe during the embargo, in an interview with 
the Baath Party’s daily newspaper al-Thawra in 1974, Hussein explained that: 
Western Europe is not the strongest authority that supports... aggression [against Arab states.]  The 
United States is the known authority for doing that through continued unconditional financial and 
                                                 
5 After the discovery of North Sea oil, Middle Eastern oil to Great Britain decreased to 14 percent in 1983.  See 
Louis, “Britain and the Middle East after 1945,” in Brown (editor), Diplomacy in the Middle East, 45. 
6 Louis, “Britain and the Middle East after 1945,” 45. 
7 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 94. 
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economic support of the enemy and supply of weapons. It is natural that we direct the oil weapon 
at the United States and whoever aligns with it and not to [European] countries.8 
From the perspective of the Baathist regime, Western Europe and the United States 
formed different parts of “Western imperialism.”  Some European countries, especially France, 
were amenable to Arab interests.  (French foreign policy in the Middle East is discussed in 
greater detail in chapter three.)  Consequently, Baathist leaders believed that they could better 
achieve its objectives on the world stage by driving a wedge between the two entities.  In a 1979 
meeting of top Baath Party decision-makers, Hussein described Iraq’s strategy in the following 
terms: 
We should not rule out the importance of our strategy of persistence, thorough patience, and 
seriousness in the pursuit of isolating the European policy from the American policy.  Strategically, 
this issue is linked to the unity of our nation [and] our vision of developing [Iraq’s] role [in the 
world.] It is in our interest that Europe… remains [powerful] and that this entity not be associated 
with the American one.9 
For a medium-sized power, using the oil weapon as a policy of trying to balance great 
powers against each other was an ambitious (if not unattainable) task.  While Iraq never fully 
succeeded in attaining this objective, having the ability to separate its relationship with Europe 
from the United States enabled Baghdad to pursue numerous bilateral relations with different 
states without being subsumed into any particular bloc.  Furthermore, Iraq’s use of the oil 
weapon exemplified the Baathist regime’s belief in the close link between politics and 
economics.  In an interview with Arab journalists in April 1974, Hussein stated that Iraq does not 
“separate politics from economics…  Consequently, our interest in foreign policy, Arab policy 
and the mobilization of the masses and the party is equal in importance to our interest in building 
the new economy [of Iraq.]”10  The nationalisation of Iraq’s oil was therefore driven by both 
                                                 
8 SH‐PDWN‐D‐000‐458, “Saddam Hussein interview regarding geopolitics related to the effects of oil and U.S. 
policy,” December 20, 1974. 
9 SH-SHTP-D-000-559, 1979. 
10 FBIS-MEA-74-071, 1974. 
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political considerations (especially by the Baath Party’s emphasis on attaining Iraq’s 
independence over its own resources) and economic interests. 
Between 1968 and 1979, the price of oil increased by over seventeen-times, from $1.80 
to $31.61 (in real terms.)11  Meanwhile, during that period, Iraq’s daily production of oil 
gradually increased as well, from 1.5 million barrels per day in 1968, to 2.0 million barrels per 
day in 1973, to 3.5 million barrels per day in 1979.12  After the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, oil 
revenues as a percentage of Iraq’s GNP jumped from 15% (in 1972) to 50% (1974), 57% (1976), 
51% (1978), and 56% (1980.)13  In the period between 1970 and 1980, Iraq’s GDP grew 12% on 
an annual basis, consumption grew by over 13%, and construction and gross fixed investment 
each grew annually by 28%, an impressive feat.14  Between 1970 and 1980, the construction and 
manufacturing sectors grew by over 250 percent each in real terms.15  Oil revenues allowed for a 
considerable increase in the wealth of income held by ordinary Iraqis: by 1979, Iraq’s GDP per 
capita reached roughly $4,219, one of the higher incomes in the region .16   
Much of the oil revenues were diverted to increased military spending.  According to 
Colgan, oil income increases “the state’s propensity for international conflict, principally by 
reducing the leader’s risk of domestic punishment for foreign policy adventurism [and in 
increasing] the state’s military capabilities.”17  This seems to be partly true in the case of Iraq 
during the 1970s.  In that period, Iraq’s defence burden (i.e. military spending as a percentage of 
                                                 
11 BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2013.  < http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/energy-
economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy-2013.html>  Accessed: April 30, 2014. 
12 BP, Statistical Review, 2013. 
13 Alnasrawi, The Economy of Iraq, 11-12. 
14 Abbas Alnasrawi, “Iraq’s Odious Debt: Where do we go from here?” Global Policy Forum (March 29, 2004) < 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168-general/37419-iraqs-odious-debt.html. > 
15 Yousif, Human Development in Iraq: 1950-1990, 61. 
16 Joseph Sassoon, “Management of Iraq’s Economy Pre and Post the 2003 War: An Assessment,” in Ronen Zeidel, 
Amatzia Baram, Achim Rohde, Iraq Between Occupations: Perspectives from 1920 to the Present (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 190. 
17 Colgan, Petro-Aggression, 119. 
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GNP) accounted for up to one-quarter of the country’s economic output, a high percentage; the 
defence burden during that time ranged from a low of 14.9% (in 1972 and 1979) to a high of 
25.5% (in 1973).18  Spending on the ministries of defence and interior accounted for roughly 40 
percent of the annual budget in 1978-1979.19  A large portion of military spending was spent on 
arms imports, which accounted for anywhere between 34.5% of the government’s defence 
expenditures in 1976 and 44.7% in 1979.20  An important aspect of Iraq’s oil-driven economic 
growth was the high-level of foreign exchange revenues that selling oil to world markets brought 
to the Baathist regime.  Iraq’s total reserves of foreign exchange increased from a yearly average 
of $500 million in 1968-1970, to an estimated $3 billion per year in the period between 1973 and 
1975.21  Just prior to the invasion of Iran in 1980, Iraq had an estimated $35 billion in foreign-
exchange reserves, which was key to its ability to continue importing increasing amounts of 
advanced, modern weapon systems during the following decade.22 
Despite the Baathist regime’s high military spending, it also spent a considerable amount 
of the state budget on long-term socio-economic development projects.  A centrepiece of the 
government’s socio-economic plans was the educational programs that it invested in, in 
particular improving Iraq’s literacy rate.  In 1974, roughly 49.9% of Iraq’s population between 
the ages of 15 and 44 (accounting for 2.2 million people) was illiterate; in the same year, the 
Baath Party called illiteracy a “dangerous evil” which was “thwarting political, economic, and 
social progress in the Arab world.”23  During the late 1970s, the RCC passed a law implementing 
                                                 
18 Hoyt, Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy, 126; author’s calculations. 
19 Achim Rohde, State-Society Relations in Ba'thist Iraq: Facing Dictatorship (New York: Routledge, 2010), 27. 
20 Hoyt, Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy, 126; author’s calculations. 
21 World Bank figures for Total reserves (including gold, in current US$) for the period 1968-1975.  Last updated: 
July 12, 2013.  Accessed: August 3, 2013. 
22 Mofid, Economic Consequences of the Gulf War, 35. 
23 Christopher Lucas, “Arab Illiteracy and the Mass Literacy Campaign in Iraq,” Comparative Education Review, 
Vol. 25, No. 1 (February 1981), 78-79. 
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a National Campaign for Literacy and mandated free, compulsory primary school education for 
all Iraqis between the ages of 6 and 15.24  In 1977, the Baathist regime increased government 
spending on education by 88%, a figure that “represented a greater percentage increase than for 
any other sector of the economy.”25  Whereas only 16% of Iraq’s population went to primary 
school and 6% to secondary school in 1950, respective figures for these increased to 69% and 
24% by 1970, and 100% and 57% by 1980.26  Some of the Baathist regime’s policies in the 
educational realm were arguably counterproductive.  In 1975, the Iraqi state also nationalised all 
private institutions, from primary schools to universities.27  For advanced studies, the Baathist 
regime began to send Iraqi professionals to foreign academic institutions.  Beginning in the mid-
1970s, many of the academics and intellectuals who went abroad never returned, “causing a 
never-ending brain drain.”28 
The Iraqi government’s development policies were also erratic during the mid-to-late 
1970s.  According to Alnasrawi, after the expiry of the first NDP, “the RCC decided to abandon 
the continuity and stability features of planning in favour of investment programs decreed 
annually.  The 1975 investment program was followed by [a yearly] investment program for 
1976 and another one for 1977.”29  The switch to setting yearly development goals (rather than 
five-year plans) can be explained by the fact that most of the Iraqi government budget was tied to 
the price of oil, the volatility of which made long-term development difficult. 
                                                 
24 Helms, Iraq, 96-97; Lucas, “Arab Illiteracy,” 79.   
25 Lucas, “Arab Illiteracy,” 79. 
26 Mufti, Sovereign Creations, 203. 
27 Yousif, Human Development in Iraq: 1950-1990, 80. 
28 Rohde, State-Society Relations in Ba'thist Iraq, 27. 
29 Alnasrawi, The Economy of Iraq, 73. 
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The Baath Party’s commitment to industrial development was one area that stayed 
consistent throughout the late 1970s.30   In 1976, the Iraqi under-Secretary of the Ministry of 
Industry and Mineral Subhi Yasin stressed that the “industrial sector was the leading factor in 
national development.”31  (Iraq’s industrialisation is discussed in greater detail in the previous 
chapter.)  Nevertheless, increasingly during the late 1970s, the Baathist regime was unable to 
create an overarching, long-term economic plan that provided a consistent economic plan for 
Iraq’s development; especially during the late 1970s, Iraq embarked on some large-scale 
infrastructure projects that, when oil revenues dropped in the early 1980s, had to be abandoned.  
Perhaps because it lacked a strategic picture of how it will transform the Iraqi economy, by the 
late 1970s, the Baathist government had stopped making government allocations public and 
ceased publishing information about Iraq’s overall economy.32 
2. Supplier Export Dependence 
As was noted in chapter two, although security cooperation is fundamentally a political-military 
relationship, suppliers or recipients may try to transform it into more of a commercial activity.  
In rare cases, depending on the size of its government revenues and the supplier state with which 
it is interacting, a recipient’s arms imports may contribute to the supplier’s dependence on 
selling its military equipment abroad.33  Although Baghdad was not able to create supplier 
dependence from the two major superpowers (i.e. the USSR or the United States), over time it 
                                                 
30 For example, see FBIS-MEA-77-190, "Progressive Front Discusses National Development Plan," Baghdad 
Domestic Service (September 29, 1977); FBIS-MEA-78-067, “Al-Bakr Speaks on Industrial Development,” 
Baghdad Voice of the Masses (April 5, 1978.) 
31 FBIS-MEA-76-241, “Iraqi 5-Year Plan,” Baghdad INA (December 14, 1976.) 
32 Alnasrawi, The Economy of Iraq, 73-74. 
33 Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence, 235-248. 
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was able to form a large-enough portion of French arms sales and use supplier dependence to ask 
Paris for more lenient financial terms on transfers of better military equipment.   
Following the nationalization of Iraq’s oil industry, Compagnie Francaise des Petroles, a 
French company that participated in the IPC, was offered “special treatment” by the Baathist 
regime.  Hussein (then the civilian leader of the Baath and vice-chairman of the RCC) visited 
France in 1972 and concluded a ten-year agreement under which Iraq sold Compagnie Francaise 
des Petroles a 23.75% stake of the oil produced by the Iraqi national oil company.34  Other 
Western powers were not offered the same treatment: after the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, 
the Dutch and American shares in the Basra Petroleum Company, or BPC (a former subsidiary of 
the IPC) were nationalised.35  In 1974, Hussein stated that the “nationalisation [of oil] will 
provide us with total economic independence, which will enable us to control our wealth and to 
freely deal with the countries of the world on an equal basis and mutual interests.”36  Ultimately, 
in December 1975 Compagnie Francaise des Petroles’ shares in the IPC were nationalised as 
well.37  Nevertheless, the Iraqi government was able to cultivate a close commercial and military 
relationship with Paris in which the Baathist regime was able to generate French export 
dependence. 
Historically, France was dependent on arms exports for the survival of its military 
industry.  During the mid-to-late 1970s, arms exports accounted for between 35% and 40% of all 
jobs in the French defence industry.38  Furthermore, at the start of the 1970s, arms exports 
contributed to 0.3% of France’s GNP; later in the decade, French military exports rose to 
                                                 
34 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 154.    
35 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 155. 
36 SH‐PDWN‐D‐000‐458, 1974. 
37 Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, 59-60. 
38 By comparison, arms exports in the United States (which has an internally larger demand, account for 20%-25% 
of all defence industry jobs.  Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence, 245.   
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between 0.7% and 0.8% of its GNP.39  Baathist leaders recognised the importance of exports to 
French industry and sought to become a major customer of French civilian and military goods.  
On the military side, Iraq bought from Paris some of France’s most advanced aircraft (Mirages), 
missiles (including the Exocet, Milan, HOT, Magic, Martel and Armat missiles), helicopters 
(Alouette IIIs, Gazelles), howitzers (AMX 30-GCT), and radars (Tiger-G).  French military 
industry was also involved in building defence electronic plants, a navy yard, and nuclear power 
programs in Iraq.  On the civilian side, French industry was involved in building in Iraq 
“petrochemical plans, desalination plants, gas liquefaction complexes, housing projects, 
telecommunications systems, broadcasting networks, fertiliser plants… car assembly plants, a 
new airport, [and] a subway system.”40  In the long-term, these large-scale military and civilian 
deals gradually created a French export reliance on selling goods and services to Iraq that 
worked to Baghdad’s advantage in the next decade.  By the 1980s, France supplied Iraq with 
more advanced military equipment, allowed it to purchase expensive weapons through more 
favourable financial terms, and provided aid to Iraq’s indigenous military industry to a greater 
extent than other countries. 
3. Recipient-Supplier Trade Relations 
In terms of Iraqi military imports between 1968 and 1980, defence dependence theory’s 
predictions that greater security cooperation between two states leads to enhanced economic 
relations turned out to be only partly true.  The only time that this was the case was in the period 
between 1968 and 1975, when the Kremlin was able to link economic trade with military aid.  
Trade between Iraq and the Soviet Union increased from 49.4 million roubles in 1968 to 596.2 
                                                 
39 Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence, 243. 
40 Timmerman, The Death Lobby, 60. 
Page 231 of 355 
 
million roubles in 1975.  The Iraqi National Oil Company also signed a number of contracts with 
Soviet firms to explore oil in Iraq,41 and Soviet technicians worked on a contract for the 
construction of a 585-km pipeline between Baghdad and Basra and an expansion of production at 
the North Rumaila field.42  Baghdad also developed closer economic ties with Socialist-bloc 
states, such as Czechoslovakia and Hungary.43  These ties led an under-secretary in Iraq’s 
Ministry of Economy to tell the International Herald Tribune in April 1975 that, 
We cannot sacrifice technology for ideology… Of course, we have to keep our friends happy and 
throw some business their way.  Thus we buy [American] Boeing aircraft and let [Americans] build 
our oil refineries.  But a less important project, like a brick factory, will go to Bulgaria, even though 
we know we can get a better one from France.44   
Rhetoric aside, however, Moscow’s willingness to provide military aid to Baghdad did 
not result in a long-term Iraqi preference for Soviet commercial goods.  In fact, in the period 
between 1971 and 1975, Western countries accounted for nearly eight times as much in civilian 
trade with Iraq as they did with the Soviet Union or Eastern European states, even though they 
provided little to no military aid to Iraq.45  Additionally, Iraqi trade with the United States grew 
from $32 million in 1971 to $284 million in 1974, even though the two countries did not have 
diplomatic relations and Washington was not a military supplier to the Iraqi armed forces.  Over 
time, even though Moscow and other socialist states continued to function as Baghdad’s primary 
military suppliers, trade with the socialist bloc countries as a share of Iraq’s total foreign 
exchange reserves declined from 13% in 1974 to just 2.6% in 1981.46  As Smolansky notes, 
                                                 
41 For example, see FBIS-MEA-74-038, "Iraq-USSR Sign Contract for Seismic Survey," Baghdad INA (February 
24, 1974.) 
42 Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, 22, 52.   
43 FBIS-MEA-74-087, "Iraqi-Hungarian Agreement," Baghdad INA (April 27, 1974); FBIS-MEA-74-092, 
"Hungarian Heavy Industry Minister Arrives [in Iraq,]" Baghdad Domestic Service (May 8, 1974); FBIS-EEU-74-
068, "[Czechoslovakia's] Metallurgy Minister Simon Begins Visit to Iraq," Prague CTK (April 6, 1974.) 
44 Iraqi Under-Secretary of Economy quoted in Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 180.   Jimmy Carter 
approved the sale of 5 Boeing airplanes to Iraq in 1980.  See Timmerman, The Death Lobby, 115. 
45 Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, 24. 
46 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 181. 
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Having used the Kremlin’s assistance to position itself for the nationalization of the IPC [Iraq 
Petroleum Company], Baghdad took advantage of the explosive increase in oil profits which 
resulted from the restructuring of the world petroleum market in the mid-1970s, and, in short order, 
proved itself to be an autonomous trading partner rather than a compliant state.47 
In August 1972, after governmental delegations and freelance oil salesmen arrived in 
Baghdad to make offers for Iraqi oil, the Baathist regime concluded a number of major oil deals 
with the energy ministries and other state oil organisations in Japan, India, Greece and Brazil.48  
Japan was an especially important partner with Iraq’s energy industry; in 1973, it gave Iraq a 
$500 million loan for oil exploration; in the following year, it provided Baghdad with a $1 
billion loan to finance industrial projects that included a refinery and a petrochemical complex; 
and in 1975, a Japanese consortium was awarded a contract for the building of a chemical 
fertiliser plant at Khor al-Zubair.49  Under an Iraqi-Japanese economic and scientific cooperation 
pact, signed in January 1974, Japan agreed to send technical experts to Iraq and to train Iraqi 
technicians in Japan and supply Iraq with raw materials and oil tankers, and Baghdad agreed to 
supply Japan with “crude oil, liquefied gas, petroleum products, and other commodities.”50  
Japan remained an important economic partner of Iraq during the 1970s even though it did not 
provide any military aid to Iraq. 
One of the main points of the Baath Party’s National Development Plan was to diversify 
Iraq’s economic trade partners.51  Following up on the plan’s goals during the late 1970s Iraq 
signed economic and technical cooperation pacts with a wide variety of countries outside of the 
Soviet bloc.52  The text of such agreements often noted that the other country (e.g. Egypt or 
                                                 
47 Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, 282. 
48 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 155. 
49 Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, 23. 
50 See FBIS-MEA-74-012, "Agreement on Economic Aid," Baghdad Domestic Service (January 17, 1974.) 
51 Alnasrawi, The Economy of Iraq, 63. 
52 FBIS-MEA-74-050, "France, Iraq Sign Economic Cooperation Agreement," Baghdad INA (March 12, 1974); 
FBIS-MEA-74-212, "Economic, Technical Cooperation Pact with Japan Ratified," Baghdad INA (November 1, 
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Ireland or some other trading partner) will provide Iraq goods and services which will contribute 
to the "national development plan.”53  Furthermore, local Iraqi media reported that foreign 
businesses that were interested in operating in Iraq were doing so as part of their desire to 
contribute to Iraq’s national development.  For example, an October 1977 news report by 
Baghdad INA noted that in a meeting with RCC member and Trade Minister Hasan Ali, Great 
Britain’s Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Frank Judd “pointed out the 
desire of British firms in participating in projects which would contribute to the national 
development plan in Iraq.”54 
Consequently, the diversified nature of contracts that Iraq pursued with foreign 
companies during the late 1970s reflected the NDP’s goal of economic diversification.  The 
American conglomerate Brown and Root received a contract to construct an oil terminal at al-
Faw to service the North Rumaila oilfield; the Soviet Union constructed the Tharthar canal in the 
Tigris and opened it in October 1976; Mannesmann (a German company) completed an oil 
pipeline between Kirkuk and Dörtyol (a port city in Turkey) in January 1977.55  Flushed with 
greater oil revenues, the Iraqis could now buy the best Western civilian imports.  As Jawad 
Hashim, director of the economic staff for then-Vice President and Vice Chairman of the RCC 
Saddam Hussein, told the New York Times in 1975, “What we want is the best technology and 
the fastest possible fulfilment of orders and contracts.  That is more important than the price.”56  
Although Moscow remained Baghdad’s primary military supplier throughout the 1970s, Iraq’s 
trade with the non-Soviet bloc in this decade highlighted the Baath Party’s commitment to 
                                                 
53 Examples include FBIS-MEA-74-226, "Protocol on Cooperation with Egypt Ratified," Baghdad Domestic Service 
(November 20, 1974); FBIS-MEA-76-013, "[Canadian] Secretary on Cooperation [with Iraq]," Baghdad INA 
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economic and trade diversification, as well as a preference for Western expertise and 
technology.57 
PART II: 1980-1990 
1. Recipient Socio-Economic Development 
From the perspective of the Baathist regime, the notion that war had an opportunity cost in terms 
of forgone investment in human and social capital was trumped by the belief that war actually 
led to economic progress and industrialisation.58  This idea was expressed by Hussein in the mid-
1980s: “All scientific advances in the world occurred during and after World War I and World 
War II.”59  While Iraq’s economy did in fact experience large-scale industrialisation by the end 
of the 1980s, the war initially presented the Baathist leaders with numerous challenges.  The 
most serious challenge was the closure of two of Iraq’s three major pipelines by Syria, which 
was allied with Iran, early in the war.60  Subsequently, Baghdad was able to export oil only 
through the pipeline going to Turkey, which amounted to one million barrels per day, or about 
one-third of the amount Iraq was able to export prior to 1980; oil revenues fell sharply, from an 
estimated $26.1 billion in 1980 to $10.4 billion in 1981.61 
To sustain the high costs of the Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad strengthened its regional 
diplomacy.  Throughout the 1980s, Iraqi officials increased their presence in and contacts with 
                                                 
57 Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, 20.  In 1977, American exports to Iraq reached some $211 million; the number of 
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Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Morocco, Jordan, the UAE, Oman, the Yemen Arab Republic, Sudan, and 
Bahrain, in the hope of gaining their military, diplomatic, and economic support.62  The most 
important economic support to Iraq in the region came from the Gulf States.   Early in the war, 
both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait agreed to sell some 300,000 barrels per day of their own oil on 
Iraq’s account, to be reciprocated later.63  By 1981, both countries’ contribution to Iraq stood at 
around $10 billion,64 and by 1982, the GCC contribution had increased up to a reported $25 
billion in interest-free loans and grants to Iraq.65  During that early period of the war, the United 
States also provided large-scale loans to Baghdad.66 
The financial contributions of the Gulf States enabled the Iraqi regime not only to 
continue its war with Iran, but to shield its population from the effects of the war.  Although 
more financially pressed than ever because of war spending, Iraqi public spending actually rose 
from $21 billion in 1980 to $29.5 billion in 1982.67  In order to prevent a shortage of 
commodities, much of this spending was devoted to importing civilian commodities.  
Furthermore, to appease the growing number of Iraqi soldiers in the military, the Iraqi 
government spent a considerable amount of government revenues on improving the standard of 
living of the officer corps.  “The outcome of this guns-and-butter policy,” writes Karsh, “was 
that the ferocious military offensive which raged on the battlefield was hardly felt on the Iraqi 
home front.”68 
Iraq’s high military spending is exemplified in archival notes from a 1982 Baathist 
cabinet meeting which discussed the yearly government budget.  According to the Iraqi Finance 
                                                 
62 Schofield, Militarization and War, 138; Helms, Iraq, 181. 
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Minister’s estimates, government spending on the Iraqi National Defence Sector would account 
for 3,600 million Iraqi dinars (ID) out of a total government budget of 8,713 ID, equivalent to 
41% of the total budget.69  The Finance Minister also pointed out that over 80% of the overall 
increase in the general Iraqi budget was devoted to “imports of the Ministry of Defence from 
abroad [i.e. arms imports.]”70  In addition, SIPRI data shows that Iraqi military imports increased 
every year in the period between 1980 and 1984, by which time the amount of conventional 
weapons imports had more than doubled over the pre-war figures.71  In every year between 1982 
and 1987, Iraq was the largest arms importer in the world.72  Furthermore, the chart below shows 
that at the height of the war, military expenditures amounted to an upwards of 47.4% of GNP (in 
1986), or roughly one-half of Iraq’s economy.  In other years during the war, arms imports 
accounted from a low of 39.3% of Baghdad’s military expenditures (1988), to a high of 63.4% 
(1981). 
 
The policy of maintaining or increasing public spending levels on civilian and military 
goods, both foreign and domestic, had significant costs: within two to three years of the Iran-Iraq 
War, Iraq had depleted its $35 billion in foreign exchange reserves it had before the war.73  
Furthermore, inflation began to increase drastically.74  As the Iraqi Finance Minister warned the 
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Baathist leadership in the aforementioned meeting in 1982, this increase in defence imports from 
abroad was contributing to the high inflation inside Iraq: 
Inflation still exists in the Iraqi market. Yes, it would be better if the import program [of civilian 
goods] expands; however, our external resources [i.e. foreign exchange reserves] do not enable us 
to expand the import program. So, we [have] no other choice but to reduce the import program, even 




With a depleting foreign exchange, Iraqi leaders began to gradually cut large-scale 
civilian programs in 1982.76  At the same time, Riyadh agreed to Baghdad’s request to build 
pipelines going through Saudi territory and to handle oil exports from Iraq’s south.  Additionally, 
Turkey allowed the Baathist government to build another pipeline in northern Iraq and to expand 
the capacity of the existing pipeline.  The result was that by the end of the decade, Iraq was once 
again exporting around 3.3 MBD, roughly equivalent to the amount that it was exporting before 
Syria’s closure of two key Iraqi pipelines going through its territory.77  Meanwhile, 
Washington’s resumption of diplomatic relations with Baghdad in 1984 also benefited Iraq’s 
economic situation. During the mid-1980s, Washington approved a number of financial aid 
packages that alleviated the war burden on Iraq, including a $484 million loan for Baghdad to 
construct an oil pipeline, a $200 million short-term credit line for Iraq to be able to buy U.S. 
goods, and several hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of agricultural loan guarantees.78   
Much of the government’s budget was devoted to the Iraqi military spending.  In 1983, 
military spending accounted for 59.5% of Iraq’s GDP; that number fell to 54.4% (1984) and 
38.4% (1985), but military spending still made up a large part of Iraq’s economy at the end of the 
war (23.1%.)79  Furthermore, during the mid-1980s, the Iraqi armed forces accounted for roughly 
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one-fifth of the overall labour force.80  The switch from a development-focused economy in the 
1970s to a war-time economy in the 1980s was reflected in the Iraqi government’s budgetary 
documents.  For example, in 1987, the Iraqi Finance Minister Hasan Tawfiq stated that the 
annual budget “will pay special attention to providing and facilitating all the necessary means to 
promote and reinforce the fighting capabilities of the Iraqi Armed Forces in order to ensure their 
readiness to crush any aggressive Iranian attempt.”81   As a secondary goal, the statement also 
noted that government funds will also be spent on “continuing the process of building a 
developed modern society.”82 
Despite efforts by Baghdad to insulate the population from the conflict, the war 
ultimately had negative long-term effects on the Iraqi economy.  Firstly, the impact on Iraq’s 
population was devastating: at least 100,000 Iraqis were killed during the war.83  Additionally, 
the cost of the reconstruction of Iraq as a result of the war was estimated to be between $230 
billion and $450 billion.84  The third and most detrimental long-term issue was Iraqi debt.  
Military expenditures averaged around $15 billion per year during the eight years of war.85  
Kuwaiti and Saudi support was not enough to sustain such high spending; the Iraqi government 
had to borrow from other sources.  By 1986, Baghdad’s debt to Moscow and European and 
Japanese banks reached the same level as was owed to the Arab Gulf states.  Before Iraq lost the 
Faw Peninsula to Iran in 1986 (described more in the next chapter), Iraq was able to reschedule 
its loans to these bankers, who had agreed to Baghdad’s requests for financial aid “on the 
assumption that Iraq would survive the war and would then become a lucrative market for 
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foreign investment—seemingly a safe bet since Iraq had the second highest proven reserves of 
oil in the world.”86  Partly, it was Iraq’s ability to roll over debt during the war that led Baghdad 
to “believe it could continue this practice in the war’s aftermath, relying on incoming oil 
revenues to cover expenses, and discounting future revenues in favour of loans.”87  By the end of 
the 1980s, debt to the Gulf countries was roughly $50 billion (primarily to Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait); it amounted to between $30 and $35 billion to European states by the end of the war.88  
Of Iraq’s primary military suppliers, Baghdad owed the USSR and France roughly $20 billion.89   
Interestingly, the high level of debt did little to influence the Baath Party’s decision-
making when the Iran-Iraq War ended.  In 1988, The Economist estimated that Iraq would have 
to provide around $7 billion in debt service payments to Western banks in that year alone.90  In 
1989, Iraq had $13 billion in oil revenues, while government expenditures stood at $23 billion.  
Consequently, Iraq’s already-high debt increased by an additional $10 billion after the end of the 
Iran-Iraq War.  Furthermore, between 1988 and 1990, Iraq’s defence burden (military spending 
as a proportion of GDP) stood at 23 percent.91  Military spending in 1988 and 1989 averaged $5 
billion per year, half of which went to “reconstruction projects,” which included victory 
monuments and a new presidential palace.92  There were some positive signs that the Iraqi 
government would be able to pay back the foreign debt.  For example, in 1989, Saudi Arabia 
signed a non-aggression and military assistance pact with Iraq, and later converted some of 
                                                 
86 Pelletiere, Johnson, and Rosenberger, Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East, 12. 
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Baghdad’s debts into gift.93  On the other hand, Kuwait did not follow in Saudi Arabia’s steps, 
and in fact Kuwait’s emir pushed Iraq to begin repaying its wartime debt.   
The Iraqi government tried to resolve some of the troubles in the economy through a 
significant privatisation reform program.94  Dozens of state-owned enterprises were privatised 
between 1987 and 1988.  Meanwhile, major reforms took place within state-owned factories, 
where production increased by 27 percent and labour productivity rose by 24 percent in the same 
period.95  While privatisation programs were no doubt significant, the state continued to 
dominate the Iraqi economy during the rest of the decade.  The firms that were privatised were 
usually bought by one of a handful of families with close ties to the Iraqi government; as Rohde 
notes, the Baath Party’s privatisation drive “turned the former public monopolies into private 
ones in the hands of [Saddam] Husayn's favourites.”96  Beyond a few initial successes, therefore, 
the Baath Party was unable to create a robust market economy.97   
In attempting to quickly develop heavy industries (e.g. machinery and petrochemicals), 
the Baathist regime also often preferred to hire foreign contractors who could complete projects 
quickly.  As Bassam Yousif points out, foreign-operated turn-key projects “involved minimal 
local technical input and hence constrained the development of local skills and technology.”98  
Iraq’s GDP per capita in 1989 was $4,400, down by almost a third since 1980.99  Following the 
                                                 
93 Kevin Woods, The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein’s strategic plan for the Persian Gulf War, (Annapolis, 
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end of the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi government also faced an enormous challenge in deciding 
whether to demobilise the Iraqi military, which had quadrupled in size since the start of the war 
and reached over one million soldiers.100  A large scale demobilisation would have had numerous 
negative implications, including an enormous rise in unemployment.  By 1990, only one-quarter 
of the Iraqi military was demobilised.  Some of the Iraqi soldiers who returned home became a 
domestic security threat as they often turned into criminals, selling their weapons on the black 
market in order to provide for their families.101  By the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq’s economy 
was in a much worse shape than at the start of the decade, and prospects for its recovery were 
made bleak by the high debt the Iraqi government it owed to external creditors.102 
2. Supplier Export Dependence 
During much of the 1980s Iraq was the top purchaser of foreign arms in the world.  In four out of 
the eight years of the Iran-Iraq War, arms imports accounted for over half of Iraqi total imports: 
1983 (57.3%), 1984 (82.9%), 1986 (65.6%), and 1987 (74.3%.)103  For much of the war Iraq was 
unable to export about two-thirds of its oil, especially after Syria shut down two of the three 
major oil pipelines running out of Iraq.  With oil revenues dwindling, Iraq’s foreign exchange 
reserves were depleted in about two years.  Consequently, although Baghdad continued its oil-
                                                 
100 Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party, 135. 
101 Rohde, State-Society Relations in Ba'thist Iraq, 46. 
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for-arms policy continued during the 1980s,104 throughout the war the Baathist regime often had 
to go through foreign intermediaries to get its weapons; in particular, Iraq’s Arab Gulf partners 
were key to financing Iraqi purchases of ammunition and artillery.105  Foreign economic aid, 
often in the form of loans, allowed Soviet, American, and European sources also allowed Iraq to 
sustain high military spending and to continue exporting foreign arms.  Military diversification 
also pushed different suppliers to export weapons to Iraq on more lenient terms.  For example, in 
the late 1980s Moscow offered to export MiG-29s (at the time the most advanced Soviet fighter 
plane) to Iraq through low-interest loans, successfully stopping the Iraqi government from 
purchasing the French Mirage 2000 aircraft that it was considering.106 
In some instances, Baghdad was able to generate a medium-to-high level of supplier 
dependence on exports to Iraq.  For example, between 1980 and 1990, Iraq was the biggest 
customer of French arms.107  According to several sources, Iraqi arms imports accounted for 40% 
of French arms exports in the early 1980s.108   Furthermore, Jentleson notes that “the Iraqi 
purchase of 130 Mirage fighters was said to have saved the French manufacturer Dassault from 
bankruptcy.”109  Meanwhile, Timmerman notes that in 1986, France delivered 270 Exocet 
missiles to Iraq, or about three-quarters of Aerospatiale’s production.110  The importance of Iraqi 
purchases of French military exports translated into tangible benefits for the Baathist regime.  
                                                 
104 The oil-for-arms nature of Iraqi military imports during the 1980s is expressed by the Iraqi Military Intelligence 
Chief in SH‐SHTP‐D‐000‐572, 1981. 
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For example, after the Iraqi nuclear facility at Osirak was destroyed by the Israeli Air Force in 
June 1981,111 Tariq Aziz flew to Paris to discuss arms sales and cooperation.  In an interview 
with Le Monde following talks with French defence officials, Aziz stated that Iraq and France 
reached a nuclear “agreement in principle” and that “France will supply Iraq, as in the past, with 
the means of developing its nuclear technology program.”112  In addition, in 1983, as Iraq was 
awaiting the delivery of Mirage F-1s that it ordered France agreed to lease five Super Etendards, 
an advanced fighter aircraft which had only entered service in the French military a few years 
earlier.113  France was also willing to train Iraqis to acquire the latest avionics and electronics 
knowledge, including the ability of “fooling… countermeasures [which] were designed to protect 
NATO aircraft from attack by enemy missiles and planes.”114  France also proved willing to 
provide military equipment to Iraq increasingly on a loan basis.115  As was explained in Le 
Monde in 1983, “At the political level, France does not want Baghdad to be defeated, since a 
victory for Tehran would considerably change the balance of forces in the Gulf and in the Near 
East as a whole.”116  The article went further to explain that were Iraq to be defeated, “Paris 
would lose its stake in Iraq.”117  France’s backing of the Iraqi war effort led Aziz, who was 
appointed Foreign Minister in January 1983, to state that, 
France is our main partner in the political, economic, commercial, and military spheres.  We have 
identical concepts on the ways of ensuring that countries in the Middle East have independence and 
stability.  French firms are contributing to the growth of all sectors of our economy.  Our arms 
                                                 
111 For more on the bombing of the Osirak reactor and its implications on Iraq’s nuclear weapons program, see 
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purchases account for around 40 percent of French exports.  The total value of our trade is several 
times greater than that of our trade with the USSR for instance to which we are, nonetheless, bound 
by a friendship treaty.118 
Another country which exhibited some elements of supplier dependence was Brazil.  
Between 1980 and 1990, Iraq was the biggest customer of Brazilian arms.119  Baghdad’s imports 
of weapons from Brazil had begun in the previous decade, but increased substantially during the 
1980s.  Given the smaller size of Brazil’s defence industry (compared to the Soviet Union, 
United States, and France), Iraqi imports were crucial to its growth during the decade.  In 1980, 
for example, Iraq and Brazil signed an agreement on cooperation in the field of the “peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy.”120  After the bombing of the French-built Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 
by the Israeli air force, Brazil continued to work on Iraq’s nuclear program, reportedly sending 
enriched uranium to Iraq in the early 1980s.121  In addition to security cooperation, the Iraqi 
government sought to expand commercial trade with Brazilian firms.122  While Brazil was not 
willing to provide everything that Baghdad requested,123 the Brazilian government was willing to 
provide much of the arms and military technologies that Iraq requested for the majority of the 
Iran-Iraq War. 
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3. Recipient-Supplier Trade Relations 
The diversification of Iraq’s economic partners continued to be a primary goal of the Iraqi 
government during the 1980s.  For example, the 1982 Baath Party Congress report stated that 
“the maintenance of all [of Iraq’s] political, economic, military and other requirements” requires 
fulfilling several “tasks,” the first among which was, 
Establishing balanced international relations with various forces in the world, which are closely 
linked to the national interests on local and Arab levels... [There is a] need to diversify Iraq's 
foreign relations [not only] with the power centres of the world [but also] with those growing ones 
[i.e. emerging economies.]124 
Consequently, even though Moscow continued to be Baghdad’s top military supplier 
during the 1980s (although its share of overall military imports declined), the majority of Iraqi 
non-military imports during the 1980s came from countries other than the Soviet Union.  Firstly, 
Iraq increased economic and trade relationships with Arab countries.125  Secondly, as the quote 
above indicates, Iraq sought to strengthen its relations with emerging economies as well.126  
Thirdly, Baghdad sought to improve its economic relationship with Western powers, including 
the United States, as well as Japan.   In the period between 1980 and 1985, the top supplier of 
Iraq’s non-military imports was a non-military supplier state: Japan, which accounted for 14% of 
total Iraqi civilian imports.  This was followed by Germany (9%), which did supply some arms 
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and weapons technologies to Iraq, and Turkey (8%), which did not.127  Some of the countries that 
did give military aid to Iraq also had important non-military trade with it, including Italy and 
France (7% for each) and the UK (6%).128 
Generally, however, a country’s position as Iraq’s military supplier was not correlated to 
its trade in non-military goods.  For example, in 1982, Iraq’s civilian trade with the Soviet Union 
(which was still Baghdad’s primary military supplier) accounted for less than one third of its 
trade with the United States (which did not give direct military aid to Iraq.)129  The fact that 
Soviet-Iraqi trade was so low (relative to Iraqi trade with other countries) was the result of both 
the Baathists’ policies of diversification as well as of Soviet attempts to improve its relationship 
with Iran.  As pointed out in earlier chapters, the Kremlin’s early diplomatic outreach to post-
revolutionary Iran was ultimately rebuffed by the theocratic regime in Tehran.  As Moscow 
began to come more firmly on the side of Iraq, trade relations between the two states did begin to 
increase, particularly after 1986.130  Meanwhile, in 1987, Washington “signed a five-year 
economic and technical agreement [with Iraq], accompanied by $1 billion worth of food aid.”131 
In 1988, Iraq began to sell oil to the United States at a discounted rate; between 1989 and 1990 it 
earned over $5.2 billion in oil sales to the United States.132  As in the previous decade, therefore, 
the Baathist leadership continued its policy of economic diversification during the Iran-Iraq War 
and succeeded in separating the sources of its military imports from civilian imports.  
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INTERPRETATION OF EVIDENCE, 1968-1990 
Recipient Socio-Economic Development 
During the late 1970s, almost 40% of Baghdad’s oil revenues were spent on purchasing 
expensive military equipment from abroad and 20% of the Iraqi labour force was employed by 
one of Iraq’s security services: the police, the military, and the popular army.133  By 1982, Iraq 
transformed from an economic development-focused economy to a war-time economy.  During 
the Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi military expenditures accounted for anywhere between one-quarter and 
upwards of nearly one half of the country’s GDP; meanwhile, arms imports amounted to roughly 
one half of Iraq’s defence spending during those years.134  The high levels of defence spending 
and military imports could not be directly correlated to negative economic growth in the case of 
Iraq.  During the 1970s, for example, Iraqi military imports rose in tandem with increasing oil 
revenues and, for the most part, did not interfere with Iraq’s economic development; arguably, 
by stimulating the growth of domestic heavy industries it contributed to economic growth.  In 
fact, through the numerous national development plans described above, the Iraqi government 
expanded considerable government resources on socio-economic development programs during 
the decade.  Undoubtedly, Iraq’s economy had significant structural problems during these years, 
which according to Alnasrawi included “labour shortages, stagnant agriculture, rising urban 
population, persistent inflation, rising dependence on foreign consumer goods (especially 
foodstuffs), and rising dependence on oil.”135  At the same time, Iraq also “witnessed an 
unprecedented high rate of growth in oil output, oil revenue, national income, per capita income, 
industrial growth, construction, and public and private consumption [and] the accumulation of 
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nearly $40 billion of foreign exchange [by 1980.]”136  These economic factors improved as a 
result of Baathist policies, which included the privatisation of some state-owned entities and 
investment in large-scale industrialisation programs.137 
While in public Baathist leaders often argued that the Iran-Iraq War was “imposed” on 
Iraq by outside forces who wanted “to halt the development process in Iraq,”138 in private 
Baathist leaders believed that the war could mobilise – or “awaken” as the Baathist regime often 
called it – the society and economy of Iraq and the entire Arab world.139  The Baathist vision for 
the growth of Iraq’s economy and society was not fully realised during the Iran-Iraq War.  
Unable to export as much of its oil in order to independently finance military imports as before, 
Iraq became reliant on loans from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the Soviet Union, as well as west 
European countries (most prominently France), and the United States.  External assistance during 
the 1980s was essential for Iraq being able to maintain the GDP growth that it had during the 
1970s. As the graph below shows, even though the GDP of Iraq, Syria, and Egypt (the three 
main contenders for pan-Arab leadership) started at relatively the same level in 1968, Iraq’s GDP 
increased at a much faster rate than Syria’s or Egypt’s, even though Iraq was a larger importer of 
foreign military aid than both countries.  This was true even during the 1980s when Iraq was 
unable to export most of its oil. 
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Source: World Bank, 2014. 
Undoubtedly, the Iran-Iraq War impeded some of the Baathist government’s more 
ambitious development programs.  By the early-to-mid-1980s, Iraqi leaders had halted numerous 
projects as a result of various factors, including the “exhaustion of Iraq’s owned foreign 
reserves… high inflation rates… labour shortages, curtailment of investment spending, rise in 
food dependency… [and] rise in foreign indebtedness.”140  Iraq’s indebtedness and inflation were 
particularly worrisome.  Colgan estimates that Iraq’s war debt amounted to at least $130 
billion141 and that the war represented a loss of an estimated 4.1 billion barrels of oil over the 
course of eight years of fighting, amounting to some $230 billion.142  Iraq’s GDP at the end of 
the war was slightly lower than it was at the start of the war; it rose in 1989, but declined again in 
1990.143  A key problem was high foreign debt: Iraq’s post-war oil revenues, $13 billion, were 
not enough to cover public expenditures: civilian imports stood at $12 billion; military imports 
amounted to over $5 billion; and debt repayments cost at least $5 billion per year.144  With 
international bankers less comfortable about providing Baghdad with more credit, Iraq’s 
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economy stagnated during the late 1980s, while inflation reached over 60 percent in late 1989 
and roughly 45% in 1990.145  By 2003, Iraq still owed around $60-65 billion to its Gulf 
neighbors and almost $40 billion to Western countries, with most of this debt coming from the 
expenditures incurred during the 1980s.146 
Nevertheless, during the Iran-Iraq War itself, while Iraqi per capita income decline after 
1980, it still remained higher than pre-1978 levels.147  Furthermore, by the late 1980s Iraq’s per 
capita income had begun to exceed Iran’s GDP per capita, as well as other Arab countries such 
as Egypt, Syria, and Morocco, as the chart below shows.148  In terms of economic output, it is 
worth noting that Iraq was not the only oil-exporting country in the Arab world to have endured 
relative economic stagnation during the decade.  Oil revenues for all Arab states in 1987 were 
$74.5 billion, or roughly a third of their 1980 level ($209.5 billion) due to declining oil prices 
and lower volumes of exports.149 
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Source: World Bank, 2014. 
An unforeseen positive side-effect of the war on Iraq’s economy was the expansion of the 
private sector.  In 1982, the Iraqi government passed Law 113, which provided “substantial 
investment incentives in the form of tax concessions and low interest loans to private and mixed 
industrial firms.”150  The involvement of the private sector in Iraq’s economy was a marked 
change in the historic role of the Iraqi government in driving growth.  According to Marion 
Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, “the encouragement of larger firms [in the 1980s] meant that 
private capital was able to move into relatively big business, formerly the sole preserve of the 
state sector.”151  Furthermore, during the Iran-Iraq War, the Baathist regime’s investment in 
building an indigenous military industry also filtered to the general state of industrialisation in 
Iraq, a subject discussed in greater detail in the previous chapter.  Finally, the Baathist regime 
also continued to invest significant resources in building the human capital of Iraqi society.  As 
Hoyt points out, by 1990 “Iraq had the most educated workforce in the Arab World” and its 
literacy rate was “unusually high for an Arab state.”152 
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Supplier Export Dependence 
During the period between 1968 and 1990, SIPRI ranks Iraq as the second-largest arms recipient 
in the world,153 with imports of conventional and unconventional weapons amounting to some 
$65 billion (2011 figures) in the 1980s alone.154  As Catrina points out, rarely can a recipient 
generate such supplier dependence whereby a recipient’s decision to stop military purchases 
would have ruinous impacts on the supplier’s defence industry.155  Nevertheless, although the 
Baathist leadership was unable to generate export dependence with large military suppliers (i.e. 
the superpowers), it was able to create some degree of dependence with medium and small-sized 
military supplier, such as France and Brazil.  Vis-à-vis France, during the 1970s and especially 
during the 1980s a number of key defence companies, such as Dassault and Aerospatiale, relied 
on Iraqi purchases to keep some segments of their production open.  In total, Iraq accounted for 
roughly 40% of all French arms exports during the early 1980s.156  Iraq was also the largest 
foreign customer of Brazilian arms during the 1980s.  For both countries, the export of arms was 
key to maintaining their domestic military industry alive.  By maintaining close relationships 
with those countries and purchasing arms on a consistent basis, over time Iraq was able to reap 
some rewards, which included a greater willingness by medium-sized powers to supply Baghdad 
with arms through loan programs, to provide better weapons, and to give aid (often covertly) to 
the Baathist regime’s unconventional weapons program. 
                                                 
153 SIPRI, “TIV of arms imports to the top 50 largest importers, 1968-1990,” (Data generated: 24 July 2013.) 
154 Feinstein, The Shadow World, 398. 
155 Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence, 248. 
156 Jentleson, With Friends Like These, 45. 
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Recipient-Supplier Trade Relations 
In the case of Iraq there is little empirical evidence to support conventional thinking that a 
supplier’s position as a dominant military supplier allows it to exert any type of influence over 
the recipient in the economic realm.  In fact, one of the key aspects of the aforementioned five-
year national development plan, which was adopted in 1970, was to expand and diversify Iraqi 
exports.157  As Smolansky writes, during the 1970s “one of the cardinal features of the Baath’s 
political and economic policies… was the determination to avoid too deep an entanglement with 
any one state or a group of states… by diversifying its markets as well as its sources of assistance 
and support.”158  Throughout most of the decade, while the Soviet Union and Socialist-bloc 
countries provided most of Baghdad’s military imports, the majority of Iraq’s non-military trade 
was with non-military supplier states, such as Japan and the United States.  Iraq’s economic 
diversification policy continued into the 1980s, as described above.  Writing about Baghdad’s 
relationship with the various trade partners it had during the Iran-Iraq War, Chubin and Tripp 
observe that: 
Paradoxically, although Iraq had become more dependent than ever before on outside [economic 
and military] assistance, it was dependent on such a range of powers for so many resources and its 
plight seemed so desperate, that Saddam Hussein had won considerable independence of action.  He 
could thus afford to play one anxious backer off against another, confident in the knowledge that 
they regarded his mere survival, rather than any particular policy he might pursue, as an asset in 
itself.159 
Archival evidence in the SHC suggests that the Baathist regime did not believe that it 
“owed” other countries special favours or loyalty for their military or economic aid.  For 
example, in an internal meeting with Hussein, Aziz, and other Iraqi officials in October 1981, a 
                                                 
157 Alnasrawi, The Economy of Iraq, 63. 
158 Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq, 49. 
159 Chubin and Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War, 194. 
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statement by a Baathist official symbolises how at least some Baath Party members viewed Iraqi-
Soviet relations: 
They [the Soviets] are giving us weapons and we pay them for it in cash and gold and projects…  
They are giving us weapons equivalent to what we give them as projects in Iraq. When [a Soviet 
military delegation] came to Iraq… they met with comrade Saddam, comrade Taha and comrade 
Al-Rifai and told them that this list of weapons is equivalent to this many [economic] projects.  He 
then went to Izzat Ibrahim and took with him a list of projects and a list of weapons and said this 
list of weapons is equivalent to this list of projects. This means that the economic relationship is 
well-balanced.160 
Of course, from a Soviet standpoint, this was not the case.  During the 1980s, Soviet 
military aid was much more important to the Iraqis than any “cash, gold, and economic projects” 
that Baghdad could offer the Kremlin, especially since Iraq was engaged in a full-scale war.  One 
would have expected that Iraqi leaders would recognise their dependence on Moscow.  As 
Catrina notes, “When the recipient gets more benefits out of arms transfers than the supplier, the 
latter can expect that the difference will partially or fully be compensated for by recipient 
concessions outside arms transfers.”161  However, Baathist leaders did not view their relationship 
on Soviet military aid as resulting in any kind of dependence; in fact, they thought that they had 
a “well-balanced” relationship with the Kremlin.  Consequently, Soviet military aid to Iraq 
during this period did not engender any particular kind of loyalty that resulted in trade or 
economic cooperation relations more than it did with Iraq’s non-military partners.  In fact, during 
most of the 1970s and 1980s, the United States and other European countries accounted for a 
larger share of Iraq’s trade than the Soviet Union or Socialist bloc states, even though the latter 
gave more military aid to Baghdad. 
                                                 
160 Al-Rifai was an Iraqi Minister for Oil, Planning, Housing, Communications and Transportation.  Izzat Ibrahim 
was an Iraqi military commander who later became Vice President and Deputy Chairman of the RCC.  SH‐SHTP‐A‐
000‐711, 1981.  Emphasis added. 
161 Catrina, Arms Transfers and Dependence, 165. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has argued that the economic dimension of Iraqi military aid policy during the 
1970s stands in contrast to three assumptions in current literature on arms transfers regarding 
recipient behaviour.  Although Iraq was the second largest importer of foreign arms in this period 
(and the highest arms importer during the 1980s), in both decades the Iraqi economy experienced 
substantial economic growth and socio-economic development.  Additionally, although defence 
dependence theory predicts a strong correlation between security cooperation and economic 
trade relations between a military supplier and a recipient, the majority of Iraq’s civilian imports 
and exports during these decades came from non-military supplier states.  Finally, although 
defence dependence argues that a recipient is very unlikely to generate supplier dependence, Iraq 
was able to engender some level of supplier dependence with a number of medium-sized military 
suppliers.  









A number of books and journal articles on Baathist-era Iraqi military decision-making, planning, 
operations, and effectiveness on the battlefield have been published in recent years based on new 
archival information from the SHC.1  Some of the findings contained in these publications stand 
in contrast to previous literature on the Iraqi armed forces, as pointed out in the introductory 
chapter.  This chapter focuses on the elements of Iraqi military power which directly pertain to 
security cooperation.   The first section within each part looks at the impact of arms imports on 
Iraqi military effectiveness and interoperability.  The second section looks at the impact of arms 
transfers on Iraqi civil-military relations.  The chapter argues that, although Baghdad’s primary 
supplier during this time period was the Soviet Union, the Iraqi armed forces adopted a diverse 
body of military literature and thought in terms of its doctrine, planning, and operations.  In 
particular, it relied on American, British, Egyptian, French, Indian, and Soviet sources to create 
its own uniquely Iraqi military doctrine.  In addition, while adopting a Soviet model of civil-
                                                 
1 Examples include Talmadge, “The Puzzle of Personalist Performance,” 180-221; Kevin Woods, Williamson 
Murray, and Thomas Holaday with Mounir Elkhamri, Saddam's War: an Iraqi Military Perspective of the Iran-Iraq 
War (National Defense University, Washington, DC: 2009); Woods, et al, Saddam’s Generals; and Brands, 
“Saddam Hussein, the United States, and the invasion of Iran.” 
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military relations during the 1970s (i.e. a loyalist military designed to protect “the Party”), by the 
late 1980s Baghdad largely dropped this model and allowed the Iraqi armed forces to develop 
into a professional fighting force. 
PART I: 1968-1980 
1. Military Effectiveness and Interoperability 
Up until the late 1960s, the Iraqi armed forces were primarily equipped and trained by and 
modelled after the British armed forces.2  Between 1958 and 1968, Baghdad begun to shift its 
external orientation gradually from the West to the East, but still relied on much of its military 
equipment and training from the British and American armed forces.  Former Iraqi Major 
General Khammas, who was the commander of the Iraqi Armour School in 1970 and later in the 
decade became the Vice President of Bakr University for Higher Military Studies, stated in a 
2009 interview that, 
When I was at military college [during the late 1950s], we studied how best to defend Iraq against 
aggression from the Soviet Union based on the Baghdad Pact plans signed in 1956 between Iraq, 
Iran, Pakistan, [Turkey], and the United Kingdom.  The pact represented a contingency plan in the 
event that Soviet forces came through Iran to attack Iraq’s oilfields.  It assumed the Soviets would 
pass through the Bytaq and Dezful Passes.  The plan called for closing these two passes to prevent 
hostile forces entering Iraq from the east.  This plan should have helped inform our plans, when the 
Iraqi Army attacked Iran [in 1980.]3 
During both the 1970s and 1980s, Khammas played a key role in developing Iraqi 
military doctrine.  When the Baath Party embarked on closer security cooperation with the 
Soviet Union in the early 1970s, Khammas and other Iraqi military officers objected to the 
attempt to switch from a Western military doctrine to a Soviet one.  For example, in an interview 
                                                 
2 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 13-76. 
3 Interview with Khammas in Saddam’s Generals, 128-129. 
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in November 2009, Raad Majid Rashid al-Hamdani, a former Iraqi Lieutenant General who 
served in the Iraqi Regular Army and Republic Guard between 1970 and 2003, stated that at the 
beginning of the early 1970s the primary “source of our [military] education was British.”4  By 
the mid-1970s, however, there was pressure from the Baathist leadership to change the Iraqi 
military structure.  According to Hamdani, “in 1976, the [Baathist] political command [i.e. the 
Baath Party] wanted the Iraqi military to reject British military culture and move closer to Soviet 
military culture; military commanders disagreed.”5 
Such disagreements arose because many of Iraq’s top military officers, who had received 
their military education in American or British academies during the 1950s and 1960s, found 
Western military thinking to be superior to Soviet doctrine.  This is reflected in the 
aforementioned 2009 interview with former General al-Hamdani, who graduated from the Iraqi 
Military College in Baghdad in 1970 with a BA in military science.  During the 1970s Hamdani 
served in a number of armour units, participated in the October 1973 War, and then served as an 
instructor at the Iraqi armour school and Iraqi tactical school between 1977 and 1980.6  Hamdani 
mentions that during the early 1970s, he attended a meeting to discuss foreign armies as part of 
his military training.  In his account, “there was a general feeling [amongst the Iraqi attendees] 
that the British Army was better than the US Army.”7  During the meeting, General Tariq 
Tawfiq, a commander of Iraq’s 8th Mechanised Brigade in the early 1970s who served as a role 
model to Hamdani, mentioned that “he had once attend a training course in the United States and 
was impressed by the discipline of American soldiers.  Because most of us followed the British 
                                                 
4 Interview with Hamdani in Saddam’s Generals, 45. 
5 Interview with Hamdani in Saddam’s Generals, 44-45. 
6 Woods et al, Saddam’s Generals, 29. 
7 Interview with Hamdani in Saddam’s Generals, 44. 
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military method, we quietly called him ‘General Tariq Tawfiq, the American.’”8  Hamdani 
mentions that he was reading Western military literature during that time, including the memoirs 
of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery.9  Similarly, in interviews with other officers who either 
entered the Iraqi armed forces during this period or served in senior ranks, the attitude was often 
the same: Western equipment, training, and military doctrine was superior to that of the Soviet 
Union, which was becoming Iraq’s military supplier during the 1970s.10  In addition to 
objections by Iraqi military commanders, the Baath Party’s initial aim of adopting Soviet 
military doctrine was also hampered by its own fears over foreign subversive activities.  As Al-
Marashi and Salama observe, at various points during the 1970s, 
The [Baath Party’s] paranoia became all pervasive where officers’ interaction with foreign contacts 
was severely circumscribed to the point where they were discouraged from studying in the USSR 
for fear they would become communist agitators upon their return.11 
Given the pushback by Iraqi officers against adopting Soviet military techniques as well 
as the Baath Party’s fear of Communist infiltration of the Iraqi armed forces, it seems that by the 
mid-to-late 1970s the Baath Party had begun to adopt a slightly different strategy than 
completely transforming Iraqi military doctrine.  During the latter half of the 1970s the Baathist 
leadership pressed Iraqi military officers to generate a uniquely Iraqi perspective on military 
doctrine.  This guidance was expressed at a 1977 meeting with Strategic Planning Committee, in 
which Hussein told political and military officials that Iraq “must plan to shy away from 
imitation methods” because copying the “policies, directions, [and] methods” of the great powers 
“would create or increase the gap between [Iraq] and those advanced countries.”12  As discussed 
                                                 
8 Interview with Hamdani in Saddam’s Generals, 44. 
9 Interview with Hamdani in Saddam’s Generals, 44. 
10 Author’s interview with former Iraqi Air Force Major General Falah Hassan (January 17, 2014).  See also 
interview with former Iraqi Major General ‘Alwan al-Abousi, Saddam’s Generals, 185-215. 
11 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 119. 
12 SH-RVCC-D-000-805, 1977. 
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below, during the 1980s Iraqi officers continued to study the military doctrine of all countries, 
including their enemies, and adapted them to fit their own particular circumstances and generate 
a uniquely Iraqi military doctrine. 
 
2. Civil-Military Relations 
One area in which Iraq did seem to follow in the footsteps of its primary military supplier (i.e. 
the USSR) during the late 1960s and early 1970s was in the area of civil-military relations.  
Following the 1968 coup, the Baath Party quickly embarked on a “Baathification” program of 
the Iraqi armed forces, which in the preceding years were often involved in the overthrow of 
political regimes.  The result was that an estimated 3,000 Baathists were given a military rank by 
the end of 1970 even though they had no previous military training or experience.13  Throughout 
the rest of the decade, such Baathist political officers formed an “informal parallel chain of 
command that led to the [Baath] Party [as] opposed to the formal military hierarchy.”14  As Al-
Marashi and Salama write, 
Baathist political officers, analogous to the Soviet commissars, were stationed anywhere from corps 
headquarters to detachments on the front line, ensuring that officers 'worked according to the 
principles' of the Baath Party... These Baathist minders, as an extension of the political centre, 
emanated tarhib, projected fear and served [as] a reminder that [the Baath Party] could watch the 
officers at all times.15 
The phenomenon of “Baathist commissars” acting within the structures of the Iraqi armed 
forces during the 1970s is confirmed by former Iraqi General al-Hamdani, who entered the 
military at that time.  According to Hamdani,   
                                                 
13 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 114. 
14 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 114. 
15 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 148. 
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[During the 1970s,] Saddam was strongly influenced by Soviet doctrine, which led to many of the 
changes instituted.  Baathist ideology is an Arabic version of Marxist ideology.  This is why Saddam 
thought that political leaders could run the military…  The idea of having [Baathist] political officers 
in our army was a Soviet phenomenon that Saddam introduced into the army.  Saddam also wanted 
to replicate Soviet political guidance.  These ideas all proved misguided and failed.16 
While al-Hamdani is incorrect in asserting that Baathism is simply the Arabic version of 
Marxism, the idea of having Baath Party political officers was in fact borrowed from the Soviet 
model of placing political “commissars” within the armed forces to ensure loyalty to the 
Communist party.  In addition, the Iraqi government also created the Military Bureaus, which 
existed in every military unit, were accountable to the Baath Party Secretariat, and operated in 
parallel to the professional military command structure.17  Similar to the Main Political 
Administration in the Soviet Armed Forces, the Baathist Military Bureau 
Scrutinised the armed forces in addition to developing strategies of ideological indoctrination.  
Political guidance commissars were delegated this responsibility, as well as serving as an internal 
source of surveillance for the Party.  These Party loyalists in the military would watch over 
ammunition storage facilities as well as monitor all air bases to prevent coup attempts... The Bureau 
watched over officers and suggested their promotion based on their political loyalty, and withheld 
advancement from other officers who failed to demonstrate the requisite fealty to the Baath.18 
Consequently, borrowing on the Soviet model, the Baathist regime during the 1970s 
added a layer of institutionalised political appointments which were based on affiliation with the 
Baath Party.  On the positive side, this system prevented the types of military coups that plagued 
nearly every Iraqi government in previous decades.19  On the negative side, it resulted in the 
creation of an armed forces based more on political loyalty than military professionalism.  
During the following decade, this system put Iraq in peril and was soon replaced by a more 
Western outlook on civil-military relations, as described in the next section. 
                                                 
16 Interview with Hamdani in Saddam’s Generals, 44-45. 
17 Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party, 130-131. 
18 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 114. 
19 Although the system survived, there were assassination plots on senior Baathist officials during this period.  See, 
for example, SH‐IDGS‐D‐000‐808, “Memorandum from the General Security Directorate to the Iraqi Intelligence 
Service regarding an attempt to assassinate Saddam Hussein and the vice president,” June 1977 to September 1977. 
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PART II: 1980-1990 
1. Military Effectiveness and Interoperability 
Supplier Influence on Iraqi Military Doctrine 
Defence dependence theory leads to two inter-related conclusions which are inadequate in 
explaining the impact of arms imports on the Iraqi armed forces during the 1980s.  The first idea 
is that a recipient state, by virtue of it being a developing country, does not generate its own 
independent military doctrine.  A corollary to that idea is that the recipient state simply copies 
the military thinking of its primary arms supplier, a notion which is expressed in some literature 
on the Iraqi armed forces.  For example, in The Longest War: the Iran-Iraq Military Conflict 
(one of the most often-cited books on the Iran-Iraq War), Dilip Hiro writes that “Iraq’s military, 
reared on the Soviet doctrine of massive [and] static defence, was ill-trained to mount combined 
arms offensives.”20  Similarly, examining the impact of Soviet security assistance on Iraqi Air 
Force’s organization during the Iran-Iraq War, Douglas Kupersmith writes that 
One prominent feature of the IQAF organization was its resemblance to the Soviet air force.  This 
should not be surprising, considering the close relationship between the two countries in the early 
1970s and Iraq’s reliance on the Soviet-client relationship.  The division of the country into military 
districts and the basic composition of individual units closely follow the model set forth by the 
sponsor country to its protege.
21
 
As this chapter shows, this narrative is only partially true.  For example, the IQAF’s 
strategic shelter program (described above), which was built by NATO-member countries, was 
based on NATO military doctrine.  Furthermore, a close examination of the SHC reveals that 
Soviet influence on Iraqi military doctrine and effectiveness was much less limited than one 
would expect given Moscow’s position as Iraq’s primary military supplier.  For example, one of 
                                                 
20 Hiro, The Longest War: the Iran-Iraq Military Conflict, 48. 
21 Douglas Kupersmith, The Failure of Third World Air Power: Iraq and the War with Iran (Air University Press, 
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: 1993), 3-4.  
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the documents that is available at the SHC is the Iraqi Military Journal, an Iraqi military 
publication which started in the early 1980s and which is described as a “quarterly military 
journal issued by the Iraqi Ministry of Defence – Training Bureau, Combat Development 
Directorate (CDD), which is dedicated to strategic, operational, and tactical military research and 
studies.”22  A number of aspects stand out about the journal.  If the Iraqi military simply 
borrowed Soviet techniques, this should be reflected in the journal.  However, references to 
Soviet military literature are very rare.  One of the only Iraqi articles which cites a Soviet 
military source is entitled “Accuracy in the Transmission of Information,” written by Iraqi Staff 
Brigadier General Ihsan Qasim, in which there is one footnote that cites a Soviet military 
publication.23  Besides this singular reference to a Soviet source, none of the remaining articles 
seem to cite Soviet military sources.  In fact, the majority of the articles cite American or British 
publications or Arab and Iraqi military literature.  For example, in an article entitled “About 
Military Leadership,” the article’s author, Iraqi Staff Major General Aladdin Hussein Makki 
Khammas (whose role in developing Iraqi military doctrine is described in further detail below), 
provides British Field Marshal Montgomery’s definition of “command” as the first possible 
explanation of military leadership; his article then provides an alternative definition of command, 
given by American General Maxwell Taylor; no Soviet views on military leadership are 
referenced.24 
Similarly, the first footnote in an article about military organisation by Staff Brigadier 
General Natiq Bahjat Namiq cites Makers of Modern Strategy, a compendium edited by Edward 
                                                 
22 SH‐MODX‐D‐000‐853, "A quarterly military journal by the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, Training Bureau, 
regarding strategic, operational, and tactical military research and studies," July 1984. 
23 This footnote cites a book entitled The Armed Forces in the Soviet States, written by Soviet General Greshko.  See 
Iraqi Staff Brigadier General Ihsan Qasim, “Accuracy in the Transmission of Information,” Iraqi Military Journal in 
SH‐MODX‐D‐000‐853, 1984. 
24 Iraqi Staff Major General Aladdin Hussein Makki Khamas, “Commanders Innovate and Leaders Memorize: 
Exercise of Command in the Field,” Iraqi Military Journal in SH-MODX-D-000-853, 1984. 
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Mead Earle, an American strategist and Princeton University Professor who served as a 
consultant to the U.S. government.25  One of the later articles in the aforementioned journal, 
written by Colonel Abd-al-Ilah Mustafa al-Khazraji, is dedicated to examining the use of 
propaganda and psychological warfare.   Here too the author cites almost entirely Western 
sources, including a U.S. Army Field Manual entitled Psychological Operations, an English-
language textbook by K. J. Holsti entitled International Politics: A Framework for Analysis that 
was published in London, and a number of other articles and books about propaganda, 
advertising, and the use of linguistics for persuasion that are all either of American or British 
origin.  In total, while Soviet sources do not appear in most of the articles in the Iraqi military 
journal, American and British authors (military and civilian) are frequently cited.26 
Additionally, the articles that are available at the archive indicate that Iraqi military 
officers looked at the experiences not only of the Soviet armed forces, but of other militaries as 
well -- including the French, Israeli, and American armed forces -- to draw lessons for its own 
military strategy.  For example, an article entitled “Defence in Strong Points” about the 
importance of military fortifications in combat, written by Staff Brigadier General Abd-al-
Zuhrah Shikarah al-Maliki, cites Jordanian and Pakistani military manuals, as well as an 
American article, about the subject.   Furthermore, in the same article the author examines the 
Bar-Lev Line built by Israel on the Suez Canal and military fortification built by the First 
Brigade of the Free French Army in North Africa during the Second World War.27  Even though 
the Iraqi government viewed Israel as an “enemy state,” the fact that Iraqi military officers 
                                                 
25 Staff Brigadier General Natiq Bahjat Namiq, “An Examination of the Principles and Fundamentals of 
Organization and Reorganization in the Armed Forces,” Iraqi Military Journal in SH-MODX-D-000-853, 1984. 
26 Colonel Abd-al-Ilah Mustafa al-Khazraji, “Propaganda: Its Concepts and Methods,” Iraqi Military Journal in SH-
MODX-D-000-853, 1984. 
27 Staff Brigadier General Abd-Al Zuhrah Shikarah al-Maliki, “Defence in Strong Points,” Iraqi Military Journal in 
SH-MODX-D-000-853, 1984. 
Page 265 of 355 
 
looked into the military experiences of the Israelis and the French in order to learn from them 
contradicts the notion that the Iraqi military was simply a protégé of the Soviet armed forces.  In 
fact, the diversity of sources used seems to suggest that Iraqi military officers were influenced 
more by American and British sources rather than by Baghdad’s primary military supplier, the 
Soviet Union. 
Furthermore, most of the Iraqi military journal articles available at the archive are written 
by professional military personnel who had direct experiences in Iraqi conventional and irregular 
warfare and who received their training in a variety of Iraqi and foreign military academies.  For 
example, one of the aforementioned authors, Major General Khammas, joined the Iraqi Army in 
1958 and received his training at the British School of Infantry, the British Armour School, and 
the U.S. Army’s Armour Centre.28  In a sense, the fact that Khammas cites British sources in his 
article reflects the training that he received during the 1950s and 1960s.29  Between 1981 and 
1984 Khammas served as the chief of staff to the III Corps and between 1984 and 1988 was the 
director of the CDD, in which capacity he shaped Iraqi military doctrine.  In a 2009 interview, 
Khammas states that, 
The CDD had many sections: one for education and military magazines, another for field manuals 
and pamphlets, another for translations, and another for doctrine development….  When I came to 
the directorate [in 1984], it was chaos.  I found formal military manuals from Russia, America, and 
Egypt.  There were contradictions among them.  The officers in the CDD could not reconcile the 
differences.  The first thing I did was publish a manual describing our military doctrine.  All other 
manuals were then written in harmony with this main pamphlet.  I collected concepts from many 
armies, but we leaned toward following American doctrine because we found it to be logical, 
detailed, and easy to apply.30 
                                                 
28 Woods et al, Saddam’s Generals, 111. 
29 During the mid-1950s, and even through the 1960s, both the United Kingdom and the United States had 
significant military training missions in Iraq, taught Iraqi military officers in their academies, and were important 
suppliers to the Iraqi armed forces. 
30 Interview with Khammas in Saddam’s Generals, 133-134.  Emphasis added. 
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In addition to writing articles for various Iraqi military journals, as the director of Iraqi 
combat development between 1984 and 1988 General Khammas sought to reform and re-
organise Iraqi military thought and strategy into a variety of categories:  “I emphasised the 
operational level of war as part of the curriculum.  Before my time in office, the army did not 
recognise the operational level of war.  Similar to the British, [during the 1970s] we recognised 
only the strategic and tactical level.”31  The adoption of the operational level of war by the Iraqi 
armed forces during the 1980s is explained by Khammas in the following terms: 
[During the mid-1980s] we… encouraged a return to foreign military education.  The Iraqi military 
sent a number of officers abroad to India, America, Russia, and so on, to take courses on the 
operational level of military thought.  We imported Russian and Egyptian books on the topic. 
Unofficially, we read histories on German operations during World War II….  The Germans had 
used the term ‘operational level’ during World War II…  However, the most important books were 
American and British [since] the British had adopted the operational level [during the 1980s.]32 
Khammas argues that his study of operational art had an impact on Iraqi military 
successes during the late 1980s.33  In particular, Khammas notes that General Nizar al-Khazraji, 
who served as the head of the Iraqi Army’s first corps (1984-1988) and the Army’s chief of staff 
in 1988, adopted Khammas’ concept of operational art and used it successfully during the final 
operations at the end of the Iran-Iraq War.  Khammas further argues that all of the branches of 
the armed forces successfully applied his concept of the operational level of war during the late 
1980s, although he notes that each branch of the service “planned for itself.  There was no joint 
planning.”34  (As will be seen further below, there was coordination between the different 
branches of the Iraqi military on the tactical and operational levels.) 
                                                 
31 Interview with Khammas in Saddam’s Generals, 135. 
32 Interview with Khammas in Saddam’s Generals, 136. 
33 The addition of the ‘operational level’ of warfare in Iraqi military doctrine during the 1980s can be seen in the 
tagline of the aforementioned Iraqi Military Journal, which notes that the magazine is “dedicated to strategic, 
operational, and tactical military research.”  
34 See interview with Khammas in Saddam’s Generals, 136. 
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Amongst the various publications of the CDD was the aforementioned Iraqi Military 
Journal.  Given the Baathist regime’s reputation for being a secretive and reclusive regime 
(especially during the 1990s), one would expect that the aforementioned Iraqi military journal 
would exhibit elements of “narrow-mindedness” or “lack of creativity.”  However, one aspect of 
Iraqi military thought during the 1980s is that, in addition to citing diverse foreign sources, Iraqi 
military journals often referenced internally-generated Iraqi military doctrine.  For example, in 
the aforementioned article, General Khammas cites a number of independent Iraqi military 
doctrine manuals: Manual of the Development of Innovation in the Army (written by Iraqi Staff 
Major General Abd-al-Rahim Taha al-Ahmad), Manual of Heart and Soul Command (written by 
Staff Lt. General Ismail Tayah al-Nuyami), and Manual of Command, Official Manual No. 322, 
a military manual issued Iraqi Ministry of Defence in 1973.35   
Furthermore, it is important to dispel the notion that Iraqi military leaders were simply 
protégés of the Soviets who “followed the model set forth by [their] sponsor.”36  The SHC 
contains a vast amount of independent Iraqi military literature on doctrine, strategy, warfare, and 
operational techniques.  Some of the Iraqi military manuals available at the SHC include: The Art 
of War: Manual on the Principles of the Use of Force,37 Manual on Counterinsurgency 
Warfare,38 Recovery and Repair [of Military Equipment] in Desert Areas,39 Manual regarding 
standard operating procedures for battalions and battle groups,40 General Administration 
                                                 
35 Iraqi Staff Major General Khammas.  SH-MODX-D-000-853. 
36 Kupersmith, The Failure of Third World Airpower, 4. 
37 SH‐IZAR‐D‐001‐414, 1987. 
38 SH‐IZAR‐D‐000‐296, 1983 
39 SH‐IZAR‐D‐000‐414, Undated Manual. 
40 SH‐IZAR‐D‐000‐480, 1986 
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Manual, Unit Administration Guide in Peacetime,41 Command of Troops: Manual of the General 
Principles of Military Command,42 and The Art of War, Manual: Training for War.43 
 
Supplier Influence on Iraqi Military Operations 
Although on a political level the Baathist leadership had prepared for a limited invasion of Iran 
over a period of months, the Iraqi armed forces themselves were not necessarily prepared for 
what ultimately became the longest conventional war of the twentieth century.   Consequently, 
the initial phase of the war proved to be a disaster for the Iraqi military, which up until that point 
had experience primarily in counterinsurgency operations.44  Although achieving the element of 
surprise, most of the Iraqi airstrikes on Iranian air bases which began in September 1980 failed to 
hit their targets or establish air superiority.  Furthermore, because the Iraqi military was pursuing 
limited objectives, in the initial campaign Iraqi forces attacked only military targets (i.e. major 
airbases in western Iran, airfields around Khuzestan in southern Iran),45 but avoided bombing 
strategic roads, supply depots, and troop reinforcements.46  The tepid Iraqi advance failed to deal 
the crippling blow that the Baathist political leadership was hoping for.  On September 23, 1980 
Iranian aircraft counterattacked, destroying dozens of Iraqi aircraft, damaging eight Iraqi 
airfields and oil installations, and establishing relative air superiority, all while losing only about 
20 fighters out of a total of about 200 Iranian aircraft.47 
                                                 
41 SH‐IZAR‐D‐000‐598, 1988. 
42 SH‐IZAR‐D‐001‐416, 1976. 
43 SH‐IZAR‐D‐001‐417, 1989. 
44 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 124. 
45 Pollack, Arabs at War, 185. 
46 Helms, Iraq, 166. 
47 Tom Cooper and Farzad Bishop, Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988 (Schiffer Military History, 2004), 78.  Air 
defence was not a focus of the IQAF until later in the war, which could explain why the Iranian air force was able to 
establish air superiority relatively quickly.  Author’s interview with now retired Iraqi Air Force Major General 
Najim Abed Al-Jabouri (who served in the IQAF during the 1980s), November 2012. 
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According to Khammas, Iraq’s surprise air strikes against Iran in September 1980 were 
meant to emulate Israel’s pre-emptive strikes against the Arab forces in 1967.48  In comparing 
the Israeli airstrikes against those of Iraq, Pollack states that Iraqi airstrikes in September 1980 
were “pitiful,” and points out that Israel was able to deliver several times the number of sorties in 
their attack.49  Although correct, Pollack fails to mention that the Israeli airstrikes were 
conducted with Mirage fighters, which the IQAF did not possess at the start of the war.  Retired 
IQAF Major General Abousi, who served as a commander of numerous squadrons, groups, and 
airbases during the 1980s, notes that after conducting tests comparing Sukhoi aircraft (the Soviet 
aircraft used by the Iraqis during the initial airstrikes) to Mirage fighters, “we [the IQAF] found 
that flying a Sukhoi for one sortie was equivalent to flying three Mirage sorties because the 
Sukhoi was so hard on your body.”50  Many Iraqi pilots who flew the Sukhoi complained about 
the heavy physical toll that each mission had.  This may help explain, at least in part, why the 
IQAF was limited in the amount of sorties it delivered in the initial attacks.  Partially as a result 
of these limitations, Iraqi forces were able to only penetrate at their deepest approximately 80 
kilometres inside the Iranian border between September 22 and 28, 1980.  Without sufficient 
reinforcements, they soon lost control of the towns they were told to occupy.51 
Although the Iraqi military failed to achieve its initial aims (including establishing air 
superiority), it was able to capture some cities within Iran.  Between 1980 and 1982, the Iranian 
armed forces mounted a counter-offensive aimed at recapturing these lost Iranian territories.52  In 
1981, after the Iranian military drove Iraqi troops from Abadan, Saddam Hussein called for a one 
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month cease-fire to coincide with Ramadan; Tehran rejected the deal.53  In March 1982, the 
Iranians launched a major offensive against Iraqi troops and in May regained Khorramshahr 
(held by Iraqis since October 1980).54  By the summer of 1982, Iranian troops had not only 
captured most of the territories previously held by Iraq, but had also penetrated the outskirts of 
the strategic port city of Basra located in southern Iraq along the Iran-Iraq border.55  According 
to some estimates, by the end of 1982 upwards of 100,000 Iraqi soldiers were left dead on the 
battlefield.56  Between 1982 and 1984, Iraqi military operations transformed from offensive to 
primarily defensive manoeuvres in the same year.57  Describing Iraq’s defensive operations 
during the early 1980s, William Staudenmeier writes that “the most professional military 
operations conducted during the [early part of] the war [were] Iraqi defensive operations, which 
[were] patterned after Soviet doctrine.”58  However, Iraqi military planners who participated in 
these defensive operations actually argue that their military operations borrowed from Western, 
not Soviet, doctrine.  Between 1981 and 1984, then Brigadier General Khammas served as the 
chief of staff of the III Corps, which was located in southern Iraq and participated in defensive 
operations against Iranian assaults on Basra.  According to Khammas, 
After my appointment [as chief of staff to the III Corps of the Iraqi Army in 1981], I employed all 
the military staff techniques that I had taught once upon a time.  The first thing I did was a plan of 
manoeuvre, which I learned in France (project de manoeuvre.)  I asked the G2 for intelligence.  
Then, I wrote the plan of manoeuvre [and gave it] to the corps commander, who approved it.  The 
next day I explained it to the divisional commanders and the staff officers.  Thus, we were prepared 
for defensive operations against an Iranian attack [in 1982.]59 
                                                 
53 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 259.  
54 For more on the fight in Abadan and Khorramshahr, see interview with Khammas in Saddam’s Generals, 130-
135. 
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56 Karsh and Rautsi, Saddam Hussein, 156 
57 Cordesman and Wagner, Lessons of Modern War, 146-189. 
58 William Staudenmeier, “Iran-Iraq (1980- ),” in Robert Harkavy and Stephanie Neuman (editors), The Lessons of 
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The quote above contradicts some of the previous accounts which argue that Iraqi 
defensive operations were modelled on Soviet doctrine.  Beyond conducting defensive 
operations within Iraq, in 1982 and early 1983 the Iraqi military did not bomb oil-related 
facilities, raising questions about “Iraq’s military objectives and its ability to achieve them.”60  
After two major Iranian offensives in mid-to-late 1983, some estimates had reported that the 
human cost of the Iran-Iraq war up to that point had risen to around 175,000 people dead, 
600,000 wounded, and more than $2 billion in material losses.  Despite losses on the battlefield, 
the Iraqi armed forces benefited from a general expansion of its size largely due to foreign 
military aid.  Between 1981 and 1982 Iraq was able to get over three times as many arms from 
abroad as Iran.61  By 1982, France was Iraq’s largest non-Soviet supplier of arms.62  One of the 
key pieces of support that Paris gave Baghdad was access to air power capabilities: fighter 
aircraft, helicopters, and some of the most advanced missiles in the French arsenal.  France 
delivered its first combat aircraft to Iraq in July 1981, and a few months later the first Iraqi 
Mirage squadron was formed.63  While Bergquist writes that “the Iraqi military had enough 
problems conducting a war without introducing new systems that would only further tax its 
logistics base,”64 retired Iraqi Air Force Major General Abousi notes that despite the new 
training that was needed, the introduction of French aircraft was a boon, not a burden, to the Iraqi 
air force: “Western aircraft are easier to fly…  Compared to Soviet aircraft, [Mirages] were easy 
to fly [although] the targeting and navigation systems took time to master.”65  In fact, as 
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Cordesman and Wagner note, the delivery of Mirage F-1s gave “Iraq increasing success in air-to-
air combat [and] provided far better avionics for air-to-ground missions” than Soviet aircraft.66   
After lifting the arms embargo in 1982, Moscow gave Iraq greater “access to Soviet T-72 
tanks, replacement fighters, new surface-to-air missiles, and more artillery.”67  It also started to 
supply the more advanced MiG-25s to Iraq.68  By 1982, therefore, the IQAF had a diversified list 
of capabilities in its inventory, including Mirage fighters (French), MiG-25s (Soviet), Sukhoi-25s 
(Soviet), B-6D aircraft (Chinese), and Silkworm missiles (Chinese.)  Iraq also acquired Super 
Frelon helicopters and AM-39 Exocet missiles from France.69  The delivery of modern airpower 
systems enhanced the Iraqi military’s overall position by allowing it to penetrate deeper into Iran 
and strike distant strategic targets, including oil tankers and installations.  In September 1983, 
France delivered the Super Etendard aircraft to Iraq, although these were not put to use until 
March 1984.  As Abousi notes, early in the war, Iraqi aircraft “did not have electronic equipment 
that could detect or deal with missiles.  Our mission success relied on visually identifying the 
target: a shelter, a runway, a taxiway, a tarmac.”70  However, as Abousi continues, “after 1982 
the air force was transformed by the introduction of Mirages, MiG-25s, Sukhoi-25s, Chinese B-
6Ds aircraft, and Silkworm anti-ship missiles.”71  Given that the Iranian strategic targets were 
normally located at a much greater distance from the Iraqi border than Iraqi strategic targets were 
from the Iranian border,72 the improvement in air power capabilities allowed Iraq to hit much 
more significant targets and shift the balance of power in its favour.  
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In addition, Washington began to increase military and intelligence support to Baghdad in 
1983, especially after pro-Iranian terrorist attacks targeted U.S. Marines stationed in Lebanon.73  
One area in which Washington struck a pro-Iraqi stance was in protecting oil tankers passing in 
the Gulf.  The “tanker war” began in January 1984, with Iraq attacking neutral ships close to the 
Kharg Island and Iran responding in kind a few months later.  The tanker war internationalised 
the conflict, which was what Iraqi government officials were hoping for from the start of the 
conflict.74  Although Moscow officially adopted a neutral policy toward the tanker war in 1984, 
the Kremlin sided with Iraq, which was the country attacking most of the tankers in the Gulf.  In 
addition, early in the same year, Iranian President Ali Khamenei warned that if the U.S. got 
involved in the war, Iran would cut off oil exports from the Gulf.   
After Iran successfully captured the Faw Peninsula in 1986, nearby Kuwait put its forces 
on full alert and requested naval protection from both the Soviet Union and the United States in 
November 1986.75  Moscow responded to Kuwait’s requests first, dispatching naval assets to the 
Gulf to reflag Kuwaiti tankers.76   In May 1987, Iranian gunboats attacked a Soviet cargo ship 
that was on its way to Kuwait; in the next month, a Soviet tanker hit a mine off Kuwait’s coast.  
Partly in competition with the USSR, Reagan ordered the U.S. Navy to the Gulf in the spring of 
1987 to provide protection to Kuwaiti tankers77 and imposed more stringent sanctions on Iranian 
imports and banned fourteen categories of dual-use items to Iran.78  In July 1987, the United 
States reflagged the first two Kuwaiti tankers under Operation Earnest Will.79  By 1988, there 
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were 32 U.S. Navy ships in the Gulf, in addition were seven British vessels, making sure that 
Kuwaiti oil tankers were protected.80  The presence of great powers (both Western and Soviet) in 
the Gulf, brought by the tanker war, helped Iraq’s military position since the international 
presence protected the assets of Kuwait, which was allied with Baghdad.81 
The Baathist regime also began to attack Iranian economic targets (including Iranian oil 
refineries, hydroelectric sites, and power stations) in retaliation for Tehran’s strategy of crippling 
Iraqi oil exports and its economy.  In the fall of 1986, the IQAF commenced attacks on Iranian 
refineries at Isfahan and oil loading terminals at the Sirri and Kharg Islands.  In September 1987, 
Iraq launched a sustained air attack against Iranian economic targets, beginning with its attacks 
of the Tabriz oil refinery, which “wiped out one-quarter of Iran’s internal oil supply in a single 
afternoon.”82  As the IQAF improved at mid-air refuelling, it was able to reach destinations 
considered previously too remote, such as the oil transfer facilities at Lavan and Larak islands.  
By the end of 1987, Iran’s oil exports fell from 1.3 million barrels a day to 0.8 million barrels a 
day.  In February 1988, Iraqi missiles hit an oil refinery in a Tehran suburb.  In response, Tehran 
fired missiles into Baghdad, causing Iraq to launch the aforementioned al-Husayn rockets against 
Iranian targets.  Iraqi scientists had modified the Scud-B missile, so that it had an effective range 
to reach Tehran, for the first time, by the last week of February 1988.  In the first week of the 
1988 “War of the Cities” (which lasted until April 20, 1988), 376 Iraqi missiles hit Tehran; only 
19 rockets hit Baghdad.  Targets reached by Iraqi missiles also included Isfahan and Qom, a holy 
city for Iraq’s Shi’i community.83  
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On April 17, 1988, Iraq launched Tawakalna ala Allah, a military campaign which lasted 
for four months and resulted in the “absolute destruction of Iran’s military machine.”84  The 
campaign included five major battles, in which Al-Faw, held by Iran since 1986, was recaptured.  
In the 1988 Al-Faw operation, the Iraqi force may have had upwards of 200,000 troops 
(primarily from the Iraqi Seventh Corps and the Republican Guard), with the IQAF and Iraqi 
Army helicopters providing air cover and support against an estimated 15,000 Iranian troops.  
Only a few hundred Iraqi troops were lost in the battle.  In a top-level Iraqi meeting on April 18, 
1988 (the day that Al-Faw was recaptured by Iraq), Aziz expressed hope that “if we [Iraqis] 
maintain our spirit of victory, it will bring in the Iranians acquiescing to a fair and clean 
peace.”85  In the next battle, Iraq was able to regain land around Basra, which Iran seized after a 
campaign that lasted took more than three weeks and caused 70,000 casualties; the Iraqi military 
recaptured it in seven hours.  Three more major battles followed, in which Iraq was able to 
recapture the oil-rich Majnoon Island in a few hours, remove any Iranian threats to Baghdad, and 
move Iraqi troops 40 miles into Iran to Qasr-e Shermin.  On July 18, 1988, Khomeini drank from 
the “poisoned chalice” and signed a truce with Baghdad that ended the war.86  Pollack writes that 
that Iraqi military operations at the end of the war “demonstrated a higher degree of effectiveness 
than the Iraqi military had ever hinted at previously.”87  
The improvement of the Iraqi military in the second half of the war has raised the 
following question in some of the literature on the Iran-Iraq War: to what extent did foreign 
soldiers participate in support of Iraqi operations?  The defence dependence view is that 
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developing countries are unable to handle sophisticated military equipment; consequently, 
dependence theorists would argue that the Iraqi military’s success in using advanced military 
equipment means that foreign military instructors supported Iraqi military operations in the mid-
and-late 1980s.  This view is reflected in some of the literature on the Iran-Iraq War.  For 
example, Cooper and Bishop argue that the IQAF’s combat effectiveness improved as a result of 
the presence of foreign pilots.  In their account, Egyptians reportedly flew MiG-21s and MiG-23s 
for the IQAF; Belgians, South Africans, Australians, and possibly one American flew Mirage F-
1EQs in 1985-86; Soviet and East German pilots participated in MiG-25 operations; and French 
and Jordanian pilots acted as instructors and sometimes participated in combat missions.88  
Nevertheless, in interviews, retired IQAF General Abousi rejects these claims.  Abousi does 
admit that “pilots from many countries participated in our training—India, Egypt, Pakistan, and 
Czechoslovakia.”89  Abousi stresses that foreign instructors did not participate in IQAF missions: 
When we received the Super Etendards aircraft, the French offered to fly with us in order to train 
our pilots, but we refused. Instead, we sent our pilots for one-month training in France.  No foreign 
pilots participated in our combat missions.
90
 
Abousi’s sentiment is echoed in interviews with former Lieutenant General Abid 
Mohammed al-Kabi of the Iraqi Navy.91  Al-Kabi graduated from the Iraqi military college in 
Baghdad in 1962 and joined the Iraqi Navy in 1964.  During the late 1960s and early 1970s his 
foreign military training included courses in Egypt and India.  Between 1982 and 1987 he served 
as the commander-in-chief of the Iraqi Navy.  According to Al-Kabi, beginning in the early 
1980s, the Iraqi Navy cooperated with the Iraqi Air Force in two important ones.  The first was 
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in providing targeting information to the IQAF in its operations against economic and strategic 
targets in Iran.92  According to Al-Kabi, 
During [the early 1980s], Iraq had received Mirage F-1 aircraft, which carried Exocet missiles.  They 
[the IQAF] participated in attacking tankers, but depended on our [i.e. the Iraqi Navy’s] detection 
systems.  When we detected a target, we developed the attack plan, which estimated the future 
position of [Iranian] ships.  Then the Mirage F-1 would attack it at its estimated position…. [We 
provided] targeting information [to the IQAF.]93 
Secondly, cooperation between the IQAF and the Iraqi Navy included the former 
providing air cover for some Iraqi naval operations.  For example, in 1984 the IQAF provided air 
cover to the Iraqi Navy when it conducted “missile boat operations against [the] Kharg 
[Island.]”94  When Al-Kabi was asked during an interview in 2009, “to what extent did the navy 
take advantage of non-Iraqi tactical advisors from other countries?” he replied that “no [foreign] 
advice was given to the navy during the war.”95  It is not unexpected that an Iraqi military officer 
would reject claims that foreign instructors participated in Iraqi operations.  Nevertheless, 
analysis by various non-Arab sources also concluded that there was either limited or no foreign 
instructors participating in Iraqi military operations.  For example, Pelletiere and Johnson write 
that “we have strong reasons for believing that [foreign military instructors’] advice was not 
critical or solicited [during the Iran-Iraq war]… [Furthermore,] we do not believe that any 
foreign mercenaries were employed by the Iraqis” in the final phase of the war.96   Similarly, 
Pollack does not cite the presence of foreign instructors as a factor in the improvement of Iraqi 
military effectiveness during the 1980s.97 
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2. Civil-Military Relations 
At the start of the Iran-Iraq War, Baathist political officers “were stationed anywhere from corps 
headquarters to detachments on the front line.”98  Nevertheless, this seems to have begun to 
change during the mid-1980s.  One of the first tasks that former General Khammas undertook as 
director of the Combat Development Directorate in 1984 was to create a strategic digest similar 
to the Military Review in the United States.  In the first edition of this journal Khammas himself 
published an article on civil-military relations.  Although the article itself is not available in the 
SHC, as Khammas relates in an interview in 2009, upon becoming the director of the CDD, 
I arranged to publish a strategic magazine.  For the first issue, I wrote an article on politics and the 
army: why the armed forces in the West are not allowed to mix in politics, as opposed to why armed 
forces in totalitarian regimes, communist regimes, and one-party states end up interfering in politics.  
After I published the article, Saddam read it, was impressed, and sent me a Mercedes.  I earned this 
because I had written something.99 
In explaining why he published the article, Khammas notes that the idea of the separation 
between the civilian leadership and a professional military “is an important concept for a 
growing nation [i.e. Iraq] to understand.  People must be educated to know this.”100  From 
Khammas’ account, it seems that the article was only meant to stimulate debate on the ways that 
other countries look at civil-military relations rather than criticise the present state of civil-
military relations in Iraq.  However, the fact that Iraqi military officers were beginning to explore 
the topic of civil-military relations (and that they were rewarded for doing so) marked an 
important shift in the development of the Iraqi armed forces, which only a few years earlier 
accepted the Baathist system of civil-military relations out of loyalty, fear, or both.  And the fact 
that such a debate was stimulated during the mid-1980s ultimately resulted in the Baathist 
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political leadership giving professional military officers more room for independent decision-
making.  For example, Khammas notes that during the 1980s Hussein “did not interfere much” in 
the work of the CDC, which developed Iraq’s military doctrine during the Iran-Iraq War.101   
The greater freedom that the Baathist civilian leadership allowed the Iraqi military to 
have during the 1980s is also reflected in the aforementioned military journal.  Under a section 
entitled “Directives of the Editorial Board Regarding Publication and Writing in Military 
Journals,” the editors note that “articles published in the journal reflect the opinion of their 
authors [and] do not reflect the official opinion [of the Ministry of Defence.]”102  Undoubtedly, 
Iraqi military officers who submitted their journal articles were still subject to political pressure 
(and censorship).  While Hussein may have not “interfered much,” many of the articles in the 
Iraqi Military Journal are preceded by the slogans and aphorisms of “Field Marshal” or 
“President Commander Saddam Hussein,” suggesting a possible indirect influence over the 
content of the journal by the Iraqi president.103  Nevertheless, the fact that the journal’s editorial 
board states that articles reflect only the opinion of the author and not an official position seems 
to suggest that there was more freedom for independent and original debate in Iraqi military 
thinking than has been suggested before.  Furthermore, although the journal does not express a 
critique of the Baathist civilian leadership, the articles in the journal seem to lack any kind of 
one-sided, ideological outlook, suggesting that the influence of the Baath Party over the Iraqi 
military had declined during the 1980s.   
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The influence of Baathist “political officers” on Iraqi military operations also diminished 
during this period.  One example is provided by Khammas, who related the following story about 
Iraqi General Al-Khazraji: 
Al-Khazraji kicked out [a] political officer out of a meeting [in around 1984], because he had spoken 
while Al-Khazraji was issuing orders.  Al-Khazraji had exploded and told him, ‘When I talk, you 
must stop and listen.’  Then he told his political officer to get out.  This action represented an insult 
to the [Baath] party.  The [political] officer wanted al-Khazraji to be demoted or retired.  Saddam 
had considered it, but had stopped short.  Instead, Saddam transferred him to the CDC [where 
Khammas worked] about a month or two after I arrived.  [Al-Khazraji] regained command of I 
Corps later [and ultimately] became chief of staff [of the Iraqi army.]104 
The story is indicative of the changes happening during the mid-1980s in Iraqi civil-
military relationships.  Firstly, it illustrates a greater willingness by Iraqi military officers to 
stand up against interference by Baathist political commissars in planning military operations.  
Secondly, it shows that, whereas during the 1970s the Baath Party may have executed Iraqi 
military officers who stood up against orders by a Baathist political officer, during the 1980s the 
Baathist civilian leadership would be more willing to overlook such transgressions.  As Al-
Marashi notes, during the mid-1980s, the Iraqi government “removed the political commissars 
who had been formerly assigned to all Iraqi units above battalion strength.  Initiative on the 
battlefield was rewarded over political loyalty or blood relations to Hussein, and incompetent 
officers who were friends or relatives were purged.”105  Despite these changes, some Ba’th Party 
policies continued to hamper the institutional quality of the Iraqi armed forces.  For example, 
candidates hoping to enter Iraq’s military colleges during the 1980s were required to fill out 
forms in which their (and their families’) political background were scrutinised by Iraq’s various 
security organisations, most importantly by the Special Security Organisation.  Joseph Sassoon 
points out that whereas applications to Iraqi military colleges was a generally “egalitarian” 
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process during the 1970s, in the subsequent decade any applicant who was not a “committed 
Baathist” was denied entrance to Iraq’s military colleges.106  Furthermore, all candidates at Iraqi 
military colleges had to go through Baathist “political guidance” sessions, while some officers 
continued to hide facts in military reports in order to placate the regime.107  In addition, while 
some senior officers were promoted based on merit (see above), others such as Izzat Ibrahim al-
Duri, who became the deputy commander in chief of the armed forces, and Taha Yasin Ramadan 
al-Jazrawi, who was in charge of the Popular Army, had previously never served in the Iraqi 
military.108 
Another area where changes in civil-military relations had an impact on Iraqi military 
power was in Iraq’s industrial-military complex.  Hoyt writes that during the 1980s, “the Baath 
Party’s firm control over the military severely limited the role of the armed forces in military-
industrial and security policy.”109  As evidence for the statement above, Hoyt notes that the top 
three figures in Iraqi military-industrial policy were all civilians; however, while hinting that this 
was the case during the entire 1980s, his evidence only comes from the early 1980s.110  
Undoubtedly, some promotions within Iraq’s military industry were loyalty rather than merit 
based.  The most prominent example is that of Hussein Kamil, Saddam's son-in-law who was 
appointed head of the Military Industrial Commission in 1987.111 
However, more recent evidence indicates that Baathist military professionals were in fact 
in top positions directing the development of Iraqi military industry.  For example, former Iraqi 
Air Force General Abousi describes the case of Mohammed Jassim al-Jibouri, who served as the 
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commander of the Iraqi air force between 1979 and 1984.  As Abousi notes, al-Jibouri “was a 
British Hunter pilot and trained in America.”112  While commenting that some top IQAF 
commanders were not professionals, Abousi specifically notes that al-Jibouri was a “competent” 
commander of the IQAF.113  Furthermore, according to Abousi, “In 1984, Saddam appointed [al-
Jibouri] to the Military Industrialisation Commission (MIC) [and] told him, ‘You need to make 
military industrialisation as good as the air force.’”114  Up until the late 1980s, the MIC was a 
separate Iraqi ministry that was “charged with procuring, developing, and fielding weapons, 
including long-range missiles, chemical weapons, and development of nuclear capabilities.”115  
Although Abousi’s claim that Al-Jibouri “completely developed [Iraq’s] military 
industrialisation”116 may be exaggerated, the presence of a career military officer in the MIC 
contradicts Hoyt’s assertions that there were no military inputs into Iraq’s military-industrial 
policy and highlights the increasing importance of the military in Iraqi policymaking during the 
1980s. 
INTERPRETATION OF EVIDENCE, 1968-1990 
Impact of Arms Imports on Military Effectiveness and Interoperability 
Both the Kurdish counterinsurgency campaigns and the Iran-Iraq War cost the lives of an 
enormous amount of Iraqi soldiers.  The number consistently given by official and unofficial 
Iraqi sources was that the amount of Iraqi soldiers who were “martyred, killed, or wounded” 
                                                 
112 Interview with Abousi in Saddam’s Generals, 189. 
113 Interview with Abousi in Saddam’s Generals, 207-208. 
114 Interview with Abousi in Saddam’s Generals, 208. 
115 Saddam’s Generals, 208.  At the end of the 1980s, the MIC was rolled under MIMI, described in more detail in 
chapter five. 
116 Interview with Abousi in Saddam’s Generals, 208. 
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during the 1974-1975 campaign was 60,000.117  The amount of Iraqi soldiers killed during the 
Iran-Iraq War varies according to different estimates.  In a 1997 interview with PBS Frontline, 
the former head of Iraq’s Military Intelligence, General Wafic al-Samarrai, estimated that 
roughly 180,000 Iraqis were killed during the war.118  More recently, in a 2009 interview former 
Iraqi General Hamdani estimated that about 250,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed, 750,000 injured, 
and 40,000 taken prisoner.119  As previous chapters have shown, despite these losses the Iraqi 
armed forces expanded at an unprecedented rate during this period.  Furthermore, this chapter 
illustrated that the development of the Iraqi armed forces between 1968 and 1990 seems to 
largely contradict the viewpoint of defence dependence theorists and some of the current 
literature on arms transfers.  The Baath Party’s early attempts to shift Iraqi military doctrine from 
a Western (primarily British)-oriented one to the doctrine of Baghdad’s primary military supplier 
(i.e. the Soviet Union) was ultimately met with resistance by Iraqi military officers who had 
originally trained in the United Kingdom, the United States, or France.  For example, former 
Iraqi General Khammas, who graduated from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1957 
and later received training at the British School of Infantry, the British Armour School, and the 
U.S. Army’s Armor Center,120 promoted the adoption of Western military doctrine in the Iraqi 
armed forces during the Iran-Iraq War.  Officers like Khammas often considered Western 
military doctrine superior to that of the Soviet Union.  In the long-run, even though Moscow was 
Iraq’s primary supplier of weapons during the 1970s and 1980s, the attempt to “Sovietise” Iraqi 
                                                 
117 Of that number, an estimated 16,000 soldiers were killed.  See 1982 Baath Party Congress Report and Amir 
Iskander, Saddam Hussein: the Fighter, the Thinker, and the Man (1980), Part II, Chapter 10. 
118 “The Gulf War: Oral History," PBS Frontline (January 28, 1997) < 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/oral/samarrai/1.html > 
119 Interview with Hamdani in Saddam’s Generals, 80. 
120 Woods et al., Saddam’s Generals, 111.  In a November 2009 interview, Khammas first response, when asked to 
provide his background: “I was trained in the West.”  He also mentions that his father was a minister of defence 
“during the old regime, the [Hashemite] monarchy,” which was supported by Western powers. 
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military doctrine generally did not work.  In a 2009 interview, Khammas, who between 1984 and 
1988 served as the director of combat development at the Iraqi Ministry of Defence, states that, 
[During the 1980s], there were two schools of thought regarding military doctrine: Eastern (Soviet) 
and Western.  The Eastern school argued that military doctrine was equivalent to strategy in that it 
should affect the entire state.  The Western school of thought argued that doctrine is not equal to 
strategy.  I myself supported the latter approach over the argument that military doctrine should 
encompass the whole state.  Officers who studied in Egypt leaned towards the Eastern school of 
military doctrine, because Egypt had adopted Soviet doctrine.  I adopted the other one [i.e. the 
Western school] because it was more logical.121 
As with the Soviet impact on Iraqi military doctrine, the impact of Baghdad’s primary 
supplier on Iraqi military planning during the Iran-Iraq War was much more limited than one 
would expect, as a result of the background of the Iraqi military officers who were in charge of 
planning operations.  For example, between 1979 and 1984 the commander of the Iraqi air force 
was the Western-trained General al-Jibouri.  In addition, according to Hamdani, in 1980 the 
“leader of the [military] planning directorate was a three-star general, Abdul al-Asadi [who] was 
a graduate of British schools.”122  Furthermore, at around 1986, former Major General Saladin 
Aziz, who is described by Khammas as “an officer from the old Iraqi Royal Army [who] studied 
in the United States,”123 was brought out of retirement and promoted to General and became the 
Iraqi Army Chief of Staff.124  These officers planned operations in accordance with what they 
studied in their initial training, not in accordance with who their military supplier was at the time.  
Thus, as pointed out above, during the defence of Basra in 1982 and 1984, Khammas devised 
plans for defensive operations based on what he had learned in the West, not the Soviet Union.125  
Although institutional memory may play an important role in allowing a foreign military supplier 
to impact the military doctrine of a recipient state over a long period of time, Moscow should 
                                                 
121 Interview with Khammas in Saddam’s Generals, 134. 
122 Interview with Hamdani in Saddam’s Generals, 55. 
123 Interview with Khammas in Saddam’s Generals, 143. 
124 Interview with Khammas in Saddam’s Generals, 143. 
125 Interview with Khammas in Saddam’s Generals, 124-125. 
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have achieved this by the late 1980s, which would have marked roughly three decades since the 
start of Iraqi-Soviet security cooperation in 1958.  Nevertheless, with time Iraqi officers actually 
turned more towards the military doctrine of Western countries, which were not as important to 
providing arms to Iraq as the Socialist-bloc countries but whose doctrine they found superior. 
Impact of Arms Imports on Civil-Military Relations 
One area in which Iraq seems to have been influenced by its primary supplier was the placement 
of Baathist “political officers” in high military ranks.  Such political officers were given only 
minimal military training and formed a parallel chain of command within the armed forces.  
Operating through the Baathist Military Bureau, their primary task was to ensure the military’s 
loyalty to the Baath Party.  This was a concept borrowed from the Soviet Union’s Main Political 
Administration in the Soviet Armed Forces, which employed “commissars” throughout the 
Soviet military that made sure that the military remained loyal to the Communist party.  It is 
important to note, however, that while the concept was borrowed from the Soviet Union, only 
Baathists were allowed to serve as political officers.  In fact, during the late 1970s, the Iraqi 
government arrested and often executed any non-Baathist Party members (primarily ICP 
members) who tried to “infiltrate the Iraqi Armed Forces.”126 
Gradually, during the Iran-Iraq War the role of these political officers was curtailed.  As 
mentioned in the interviews above, beginning in the early-to-mid 1980s, Iraqi military officers 
began to stand up to orders given by inexperienced political officers.  Rather than imprisoning, 
jailing, or executing military personnel who argued with Baathist political officers (as was the 
case during the 1970s), the Iraqi government gave a less severe punishment (such as re-assigning 
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military officers elsewhere within the military).  Furthermore, individuals such as Khammas 
advocated a system that promoted civilian control alongside military professionalism, which is 
more similar to the Western model in its emphasis on a professional military force rather than the 
Soviet model of a loyalist, party-led military.  By around 1986, most of the Baathist political 
officers were completely removed, as military professionalism had become more important to 
achieving a higher rank than loyalty to the Baathist cause.  Whereas at the start of the Iran-Iraq 
War Saddam micromanaged the military and was involved in the formulation of Iraqi military 
doctrine and strategy, after several battlefield losses Saddam allowed the armed forces more 
flexibility.127  By the second half of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi armed forces emerged as a more 
professional military force, still under the control of the Iraqi government but less of an 
instrument of the Baath Party.  This transition in civil-military relations is reflected in the SHC.  
For example, at the end of the war, the “Department of Political Guidance” within the Iraqi 
ministry of Defence released a propaganda book providing the Iraqi government’s analysis of the 
Iran-Iraq War.  While the Baath Party is mentioned on a number of occasions, the book 
emphasises the achievements of the Iraqi armed forces as an institution and portrays it as a 
fighting force for the entire Arab world: 
The military, political, and psychological victories achieved in the Arab eastern gate by the Iraqi 
[armed] forces were not used for the Iraqi’s own benefits only.  The result of the Iraq-Iran War did 
not stop the aggression against Iraq only, but it stopped it against the entire Arab world…  The Iraqi 
victory [provides] the Arab countries with the opportunity to maintain their internal and external 
security from the big Khomeini wave, which was prepared to invade all Arab countries without 
exception.128 
                                                 
127 Sassoon, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party, 137-139. 
128 SH‐MODX‐D‐000‐582, “Document, entitled 'Cultural Program for Political Guidance: Part 3,' regarding Iraqi 
military strategy and the Baathist regime,” 1980 to 1989.  The “Eastern gate” in the quote above references Iraq’s 
geographic position as the only Arab country bordering Iran, which on its east. 
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Two additional areas are worth highlighting in terms of civil-military relations in Iraq in 
the period under study: deserters and martyrs.  Few definitive numbers exist that account for the 
total number of Iraqi deserters during the Iran-Iraq war.129  A figure that is commonly cited is 
that of 48,000 primarily Kurdish soldiers who, by Saddam’s own admission, deserted the Iraqi 
military in 1983.130  Desertion seemed to have become more problematic as the Iran-Iraq War 
continued.  Between 1986 and August 1988 the Southern Bureau of the Baath Party’s General 
Secretariat reported catching 67,522 deserters in southern Iraq, where the military was engaged 
in major military operations; of that number, 58,943 surrendered, most likely after an RCC 
amnesty decree, and about 600 either died in the pursuit or were executed.  Between the summer 
of 1985 and March 1987 the Northern Bureau processed nearly 83,000 deserters and absentees, 
while the Euphrates and Baghdad Bureaus processed over 20,000 deserters and absentees during 
the last years of the war.131 
Desertion posed a problem to the Baathist regime for a number of reasons.  Kurdish 
deserters, who were previously part of Iraq’s National Defence Battalions, often joined the 
peshmerga and mounted attacks on the Iraqi military during the mid-1980s.132  Some deserters 
engaged in illicit trade, joined the underground economy, or fled the country.  The Baath Party 
treated desertion as the “gravest of political and social threats.”133  To tackle increased levels of 
desertion (particularly beginning in the mid-1980s), the Iraqi government oscillated between 
passing draconian measures (for example, making desertion punishable by death) and issuing 
amnesty directives.  Heavy-handed policies often proved to be an ineffective instrument in 
                                                 
129 See Dina Khoury, Iraq in Wartime: Soldiering, Martyrdom, and Remembrance (New York: Cambridge 
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tackling desertion as the number of deserters increased as the war continued.  The Baath Party 
therefore periodically passed directives that offered amnesty to deserters.  For example, on 
February 11, 1985 the Revolutionary Command Council passed order number 209, which 
pardoned all deserters who were willing to re-join their units within thirty days of the law.134  
Another strategy which the Iraqi government pursued to deal with desertion included greater 
spending on the armed forces, including increasing arms imports, a subject which is tackled in 
greater detail in chapter four.  The influx of modern military imports during the Iran-Iraq war – 
from sophisticated weapons to high-quality uniforms – was part of the regime’s strategy to 
enhance their soldiers’ morale and loyalty to the state.135 
The Iraqi government also sought to solidify the population’s support for the war by 
encouraging the concept of martyrdom.136  On January 16, 1982 the Baathist regime designated 
the first of December as the Day of the Martyr to commemorate December 1, 1981, when an 
untold number of Iraqi prisoners of war were executed by Iranian soldiers in Bostan, Iran.137  In 
addition, according to the 1982 Baath Party Ninth Regional Congress, the Iraqi government 
exempted the families of martyrs “from the bequest tax as well as the deeds of cession held by 
the legal heirs.”138  If the martyr was the owner of a house, then that house was exempt from the 
estate tax.139  In July 1983 the Iraqi government inaugurated the Martyr’s Monument, which was 
meant to commemorate Iraqi soldiers who had died during the Iran-Iraq war.140  Rituals, 
entitlements, and monuments devoted to martyrs and their families “unified Iraqis across the 
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religious, sectarian, and ethnic divide; their personal histories submerged in an epic fight against 
historic enemies.”141   
During the 1980s the Baathist regime defined that historic enemy as the “Persians.”142  
Martyrdom was portrayed by Iraqi officials as the ultimate sacrifice in the defence of the nation 
against the “Persian enemy” and the most virtuous act a citizen of Iraq could undertake.  Internal 
Iraqi intelligence documents from the mid-1980s are labelled with the quote that “Martyrs will 
always be the noblest amongst us.”143  The Baath Party’s promotion of martyrdom as the 
“noblest” deed continued into the late 1980s, even after the end of the Iran-Iraq War.144  The 
regime’s treatment of desertions and martyrdom were two important pieces of Iraqi civil-military 
relations during the period under study. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter looked at the military implications of security cooperation.  In particular, it analysed 
whether a country’s position as a predominant military supplier to a certain recipient increases 
the likelihood that the recipient will follow the modus operandi of the supplier (i.e. in terms of 
doctrine, strategy, tactics, planning, and civil-military relations.)  It argued that between 1968 
and 1990, the Soviet Union’s position as Iraq’s primary military supplier had a much more 
limited impact on the Iraqi armed forces than one would expect.  Many of the senior Iraqi 
military officers during the 1970s and 1980s were originally trained in Western countries (e.g. 
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the United States, the United Kingdom, and France) and resisted political pressures to drop 
Western doctrine in favour of Soviet doctrine.  In particular, during the 1980s, many of the 
senior Iraqi military officers charged with planning operations and developing Iraqi doctrine 
tried to emulate and borrow from Western militaries more than they did from the Soviet armed 
forces. 
 An area in which Iraq resembled its primary military supplier was in the area of civil-
military relations.  As was the case of the Communist party commissars in the Soviet armed 
forces, during the 1970s the Baathist regime inserted thousands of political officers within the 
Iraqi armed forces to ensure the military’s loyalty to the Baath Party.  These political officers had 
little training or experience in military affairs and their presence on the front-lines early the Iran-
Iraq War had disastrous consequences on early Iraqi military operations.  By the mid-1980s, 
however, most of these political commissars were removed by the Baathist regime after pressure 
from senior Iraqi military officers.  During the latter part of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq gradually 











CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS  
 
When the Baath Party came to power in 1968, few scholars or policymakers could have 
predicted that Iraq – which at that point had a population of only nine million and a gross 
national product amounting to $3 billion dollars – would develop into one of the largest military 
powers in the region, let alone in the world.  Yet, in the course of just over two decades, that is 
exactly what had happened: by 1990 Iraq had a larger arsenal of conventional weapons than each 
of its neighbours, regional adversaries and competitors, including Iran, Israel, Turkey, the Gulf 
countries, Syria, and Egypt, and possessed one of the largest arsenals of unconventional weapons 
in the world.  In addition, its performance on the battlefield by the late 1980s had improved 
considerably since the start of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980.  As Pollack points out, by the end of 
the war Iraqi military forces “penetrated Iranian defensive positions quickly and usually with a 
minimum of casualties…  The offensives were preceded by highly effective deception operations 
and benefited from excellent intelligence [and] moved crisply and efficiently, proceeding from 
one phase to the next with little delay and featuring relatively rapid movement throughout.”1   
Contrary to conventional thinking in arms transfer literature, much of which argues that foreign 
military assistance accentuates and prolongs the weakness of recipient states, this research 
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showed that Iraq was able to become much stronger militarily through security cooperation, to 
maintain an independent foreign and domestic policy despite the increase in its import of arms, 
and to grow its economy despite the high levels of military imports.  This chapter describes how 
Baghdad was able to do this.  It then explains the theoretical and policy implications of this 
work, and presents areas for further research. 
ASSESSING IRAQ’S MILITARY IMPORTS STRATEGY 
In the opening chapter of this research, I asked to what extent Iraq’s military suppliers had an 
impact on Baghdad’s political, economic, and military policies.  In particular, I wanted to find 
out if Baghdad’s primary military suppliers were able to wield significant influence over Iraqi 
internal, foreign, and security policies.  In the second chapter I presented the main assumptions 
and predictions of the current literature on arms transfers.  I focused on defence dependence 
theory, the predominant school of thought in the field.  In the ensuing chapters I tried to 
understand the extent to which Iraqi behaviour between 1968 and 1990 conformed to the 
expectations of scholars, analysts, and policymakers.  As this research showed, some 
assumptions regarding recipient behaviour were proven to be right; others were not.  While Iraqi 
behaviour followed some of defence dependence theory’s expectations vis-à-vis recipient 
behaviour (which were presented in chapter two), in many ways it did not.  To an extent, it was 
Baghdad’s unwillingness to conform to the unwritten norms of recipient behaviour that made it 
such a powerful independent military force by 1990, and which made studying its policies so 
interesting. 
Other countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt, also aspired to the 
same goals that the Baathist leadership in Iraq did, such as political independence vis-à-vis their 
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suppliers and greater access to the latest military hardware in their suppliers’ inventories.  
However, Baghdad pursued a much more activist strategy in terms of diversifying its arms 
suppliers, building an indigenous military industry, and constantly signalling to all of its partners 
its commitment to developing independent political, economic, and military policies.  Unlike 
Iraq, which engaged in security cooperation with the Western and Socialist blocs and non-
aligned countries, in the period between 1968 and 1990 Saudi Arabia imported arms almost 
exclusively from the West: primarily from the United States, but also from the United Kingdom 
and France.2  Riyadh did not pursue military cooperation with the Soviet Union or socialist bloc 
states in part because of America’s vast imports of Saudi oil (the dollars which Riyadh received 
from oil sales were later used to buy American military hardware) and the ideological 
incompatibility between the religiously conservative Saudi Arabia and the “godless” Soviet 
Union.3  Riyadh’s policies came at a cost.  During the 1970s it was essentially locked in a race 
“to purchase U.S. arms in order to match Iranian arms proliferation.”4  Whereas Baghdad had 
many suppliers from multiple political blocs from which it could choose from and play against 
each other, the reverse was true for Riyadh, whose primary military supplier (the United States) 
was simultaneously building-up the military of its primary regional rival (Iran). 
Similarly, between 1968 and 1990 Syria imported 96% of its arms from the Soviet Union 
with the remainder coming primarily from Socialist bloc states such as Czechoslovakia and 
Poland.5  Despite Syria’s reliance on Soviet weaponry, on some occasions Damascus was able to 
exercise influence over its supplier.  For example, after the Kremlin cut arms to Syria in 1976 to 
                                                 
2 According to SIPRI, roughly 94% of Saudi arms imports in the period between 1968 and 1990 came from the 
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was China, which accounted for 1.9% of Saudi imports.  See SIPRI, Saudi Arms Imports, 1968-1990. 
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protest the latter’s intervention in Lebanon, Damascus threatened to curtail Moscow’s access to 
the Tartus port.  The Soviet Union resumed its arms shipments to Syria during the following year 
and the relationship stabilised thereafter.6  Damascus also sought to play off the various blocs 
that financially supported Syria’s military expansion against one another, including the Soviet 
Union, the Gulf States, Iran, and the West.7  However, Damascus had much less leverage vis-à-
vis its suppliers relative to Iraq, which had over twice as many suppliers from the socialist, 
Western, and non-aligned blocs.8 
Contrary to Cairo’s wishes, Moscow refused to supply Egypt with offensive arms in the 
period under study.  As a way to open its relations to the United States as well as to bolster its 
image of independence, in July 1972 Sadat expelled 25,000 Soviet military advisors from 
Egypt.9  Only then was Cairo able to exercise more autonomy and achieve relative military 
success in the October War of 1973.  Furthermore, during the mid-1970s the Egyptian military 
gradually started to diversify its suppliers; the United States replaced the Soviet Union as 
Egypt’s main arms supplier, and Cairo secured France, the United Kingdom, and China as 
additional military partners.10  Military diversification created a more effective Egyptian military 
and bolstered the local arms industry during the 1980s.  The sections below highlight some of the 
other similarities and differences between Iraq and its neighbours in the period under study.  
Notably, Iraq stood out in comparison to other Arab recipients such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and 
Syria in that it imported more arms than all of the aforementioned states, had over twice as many 
                                                 
6 Karsh, “Influence Through Arms Supplies,” 6-7. 
7 From 1977 to 1988, Syria only financed 45% of its total imports, while the rest of the financing came primarily 
from Moscow and the Arab Gulf countries.  See Raymond Hinnebusch, “The Foreign Policy of Syria,” in Raymond 
Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (editors), The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2002), 151.  
8 SIPRI, Syrian and Iraqi Arms Imports, 1968-1990. 
9 Hinnebusch, “The Middle East Regional System,” in Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (editors), The Foreign Policies of 
Middle East States, 41.  
10 SIPRI, Egyptian Arms Imports, 1968-1990. 
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suppliers, built the strongest Arab armed forces and arguably the strongest military industry in 
the region, and successfully barred military suppliers from staging a foreign military presence on 
its territory. 
I. The Strategic Context 
Some scholars argue that the strategic context (i.e. the set of local, regional, and international 
circumstances) in which a recipient makes its arms imports decisions puts it at a disadvantage: a 
recipient may unwittingly fight on behalf of its suppliers; it may enter an arms race that is 
engineered by outside powers; and it may ultimately seek external protection (despite the loss of 
sovereignty which it entails) to guarantee its security.  Nevertheless, Baghdad was able to import 
vast amounts of arms without fundamentally modifying its threat perception to fit in with those 
of its military suppliers.  During the 1970s, Iraq’s primary military supplier was the USSR.  
While on the surface it seemed that both Moscow and Baghdad shared the same threat perception 
(i.e. the belief that the region was under attack by Western-led “imperialism”) in practice the 
Baathist regime was more concerned about internal security challenges.  Between the late 1960s 
and the mid-1970s the Baathist regime used military power to extend its coercive power 
throughout Iraq in particular in defeating the Kurdish insurgency in northern Iraq.  Defeating the 
Kurdish insurgency was certainly not an interest to Moscow, since during that era the Kremlin 
enjoyed close ties with Kurdish opposition groups.   
In one area in which the Kremlin did perceive a threat to the region, Iraq proved to a non-
compliant recipient: despite pressure by Moscow on Baghdad to join a pan-Arab regional 
security mechanism meant to defend against “imperialist forces” in the region, the Iraqi 
government failed to do so.  Additionally, compared to the other conflicts that it was involved in 
during that time period, including the Kurdish counterinsurgency campaign and border clashes 
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with Iran, Iraq’s participation in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War was very limited.  During the 1980s, 
Baghdad’s primary threat shifted to an external source: Iran.  At the start of the Iran-Iraq War, 
Iraq’s military suppliers had no intrinsic reason to view Iran as a greater threat than Iraq.  
However, by presenting Iraq as a more pragmatic and rational actor than Iran, Baghdad was able 
to alter the threat perceptions of the great powers in accordance with Iraqi interests.  By changing 
the threat perceptions of its suppliers (instead of the other way around), Baghdad opened almost 
a floodgate of foreign military assistance: Iraq became the largest arms importer in the world for 
much of the 1980s, and its armed forces grew at one of the fastest rates in the world.  For most of 
the period under study, therefore, Iraqi threat perceptions were essentially determined by the 
Baathist leadership, with suppliers having a minimal impact in its formulation.  To an extent, 
Iraq demonstrates an example of Keohane’s “big influence of small allies” rather than Catrina’s 
description of dependent states: Baghdad was able to change the threat perception of its military 
allies rather than the other way around.  
Between 1968 and 1990, most of Iraq’s neighbours (Turkey, Iran, and the Arab Gulf 
states) had at some point or during the entire period a foreign military presence on their territory.  
The pattern was often the same: a recipient state would allow its primary military supplier to 
maintain a military base on its soil.  This policy enabled supplier states to project their military 
power, and the recipient states to receive both arms and external protection.  This was true of the 
United States vis-à-vis Iran during the 1970s and vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia during the 1980s, 
NATO vis-a-vis Turkey during the entire period, the Soviet Union vis-à-vis Egypt during the late 
1960s and early 1970s and Libya and Syria during the 1980s, and Great Britain vis-à-vis the 
smaller Arab Gulf states prior to 1971.  In all of the cases above, the recipient state allowed its 
supplier to have a forward military presence on its territory in exchange for closer military ties 
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and arms imports.  In this context, Iraq proved to be the exception rather than the rule.  Despite 
granting the Soviet navy limited “visitation rights” to the Umm Qasr port during the early 1970s, 
the Baathist regime did not allow any foreign military power to maintain a permanent base 
during the period under study.  Stridently independent, the Baathist government insisted that it 
would counter internal and external threats on its own.  It viewed any external foreign military 
presence as an encroachment of Iraqi and pan-Arab sovereignty and also urged other Arab 
countries to adopt its Pan-Arab Charter, the first principle of which was the rejection of all 
foreign military bases in the region.  While accepting the Charter’s ideals in theory, most Arab 
states did not follow its principles, including those countries that had initially signed it.  
Nevertheless, in contrast to literature that links arms imports to foreign military bases, Iraq itself 
did stay committed to the principle of rejecting a foreign military presence on its territory. 
II. Supplier Influence 
Scholars and policymakers often argue that military assistance is an effective instrument of a 
supplier’s foreign policy.  However, this research showed that, although Iraqi foreign and 
domestic policies were impacted by the desires of its suppliers in the early years of the Baath 
Party’s reign, over the long-run Baghdad maintained an autonomous decision-making vis-à-vis 
its foreign, security, and internal policies.  During the 1970s Moscow sought to influence 
Baghdad’s foreign policy and was moderately successful for a number of years.  For example, 
Iraq withdrew from Kuwait in 1973 as a result of Soviet pressure.  Baghdad’s public rhetoric 
also suggested that it shared Moscow’s objective of expelling the “imperialist forces” from of the 
Middle East.  Nevertheless, private correspondence between Baghdad and Moscow, found in the 
SHC, illustrates that in private there were strong disagreements between the recipient and its 
primary supplier, often caused by the Soviet Union’s inability to delivery weapons and spare 
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parts on time.  Furthermore, despite the Iraqi government’s openly “anti-imperialist” stance, 
recently declassified U.S. documents from the early 1970s show Baghdad’s consistent attempts 
to improve its diplomatic ties with Washington (often through private channels.)   
In addition, after Baghdad began to diversify its military suppliers during the mid-1970s, 
the Baathist leadership began to criticise Soviet foreign policy, particularly when it concerned 
the Arab and Muslim worlds, including Afghanistan, Eritrea, Somalia, and Yemen.  Similarly, 
during the 1980s, despite the aid that it gave to Iraq during the war, Washington’s attempt to 
curtail Baghdad’s support of terrorist groups or to cease its weapons-of-mass destruction 
programs, the Baathist regime did not deviate from its policies.  During most of the period under 
study, besides changing some of its rhetoric in public (for example, during the 1980s the Iraqi 
government openly supported a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict), Iraq pursued an 
independent foreign policy that was largely unaffected by the pressures of its military suppliers. 
Contrary to expectations by policymakers and scholars, Baghdad’s suppliers were also 
generally unable to influence Iraqi security policy.  During the 1970s and 1980s, the large 
volume of Iraqi military imports necessitated the presence of foreign military personnel in its 
country: advisers, trainers, technicians, maintenance crews.  Several thousand foreign military 
personnel were present in Iraq during both decades.  Nevertheless, given the authoritarian nature 
of the Baathist regime, the movement of foreign military personnel around Iraq and their ability 
to interact with local military officers and civilians was restricted by Iraq’s internal intelligence 
and security services.  In particular, Soviet military personnel had limited access to or influence 
over political or military officials in the Iraqi high command; consequently, their ability to 
impact the work of Iraq’s Ministers of Interior and Defence was much more limited than one 
would expect given the size of the Kremlin’s arms exports.  In addition, foreign technicians 
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working on conventional and unconventional weapons programs in Iraq often were unaware of 
the Baathist government’s ultimate vision for its indigenous military production program.   
One of the elements that defence dependence theory misses is the role that the domestic 
political structure of the recipient state plays in how arms imports impact the security policy of 
the recipient state.  In particular, the authoritarian nature of the Baathist regime ensured that the 
increasing amount of military imports would not have a significant impact on Iraqi decision-
making.  Nowhere was this truer than when it came to Iraq’s internal affairs.  During the first few 
years at the start of the Baathist regime’s reign, Moscow was able to use arms transfers to 
pressure the Baathist regime to share power with the Iraqi Communist Party and the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party.  However, once the Baath Party felt comfortable that its power was 
consolidated in Baghdad, it launched a counterinsurgency campaign against the Kurds and 
moved to eliminate any participation by Soviet-backed ICP members in the Iraqi government 
and armed forces.  By the late 1970s, the Baath Party emerged as the undisputed decision-maker 
within the Iraqi government.  In the following decade, despite Soviet arms accounting for over 
half of all Iraqi military imports during the 1980s, with a few minor exceptions the Iraqi 
government largely refused to stop its persecution of ICP members.  Furthermore, despite the 
public commitment of Western states to link military aid to the human rights records of the 
recipient state, Iraq was able to continue receiving military aid from France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and other European countries for years even though there was mounting 
evidence that Baghdad was using it on a systematic basis against Kurdish targets and Iranian 
troops.  In large part, it was the nature of the Baathist regime, as described above, that 
determined the low-level of influence by Iraq’s military suppliers. 
Page 300 of 355 
 
III. Recipient Counter-Dependence 
One of the key strategies by which the Iraqi government mitigated supplier influence was 
through its military diversification program, which began in earnest during the mid-1970s.  By 
the late-1970s, Baghdad’s primary military supplier after the Soviet Union was France.  Iraq also 
had embarked on close security cooperation relationships with a number of Socialist bloc states, 
Arab countries, and numerous regimes in Africa and Latin America.  The number of military 
suppliers rose from three in the early 1970s to over 20 countries during the mid-1980s.  
Meanwhile, by the late 1970s and during the 1980s the share of Soviet military aid as a total of 
all Iraqi arms imports dropped, from over 90% to as low as one-half.  The Baath Party’s military 
diversification program was one of the primary reasons that Baghdad was able to maintain an 
independent political stance vis-à-vis Iraq’s internal and foreign policies, as described above. 
A second counter-dependence strategy that the Baathist regime adopted was the 
development of Iraq’s military industry, which was largely non-existent before the ascent of the 
Baath Party.  Indigenous military production programs had their roots in the mid-1970s, but 
reached a peak during the 1980s, when the Iraqi government focused more on technology 
transfers, i.e. importing the knowledge of how to build weapons rather than merely purchasing 
whole weapon systems themselves.  The expansion of Iraq’s indigenous military industry was 
impressive: at its height during the mid-to-late 1980s it employed over 100,000 workers and 
cooperated with thousands of scientists and technicians from around the world.  The results of 
these labours were mixed: Iraq was able to manufacture small arms, such as ammunition and 
light weapons, but it was unable to achieve other objectives that the Baath party was aiming for 
earlier in their reign (for example, the ability to build aircraft internally.)  Additionally, some of 
the arms that Baghdad exhibited during the late 1980s as “Iraqi-made” seem to have been 
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modified foreign weapons.  Despite these shortcomings, by the late 1980s Iraq had the most 
robust military industry in the Arab world and arguably one of the most ambitious programs for 
producing conventional and unconventional weapons. 
One of the key areas in which Iraq’s military industry was especially successful was in 
the development of unconventional weapons, which also contributed to its ability to mitigate 
dependence on foreign military suppliers.  During the 1980s, Baghdad was able to import the 
technologies and ingredients that were needed to develop and deploy chemical and biological 
weapons and launch ballistic missiles.  The use of chemical weapons against enemy targets and 
the employment of Iraqi long-range ballistic missiles on Tehran and other large Iranian cities had 
a direct psychological impact on Iranian decision-makers, troops, and citizens.  By lowering the 
morale of its adversary, the use of indigenously-produced cruder weapons reduced Iraq’s need 
for more advanced and expensive conventional arms.  In addition, the Baath Party implemented a 
wide-ranging diplomatic campaign during the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s with 
countries which it earlier branded as “imperialist powers,” such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom.  In particular, Iraq appealed to foreign political-military elites and defence 
industry representatives and reached out to the general public in military supplier states.  
Through these efforts, Iraq was able to build important and loyal constituencies in Brazil, France, 
the United States, and a host of other countries.  Relationships created between high-ranking 
Iraqi officials and policymakers in supplier states meant that the latter proved willing to support 
Iraq on a continued basis during the 1980s even when certain disagreements arose (e.g. over the 
use of chemical weapons against innocent civilians.)    Finally, although the Iraqi armed forces 
were not particularly adept at stockpiling weapons during the 1970s, by the 1980s Iraq adopted a 
number of logistics systems which enabled it to survive during the Soviet arms embargo between 
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1980 and 1982 and continue military operations deep in Iran throughout the war.  Collectively, 
these actions allowed the Iraqi government to maintain the distance that it had wanted to from its 
military suppliers. 
IV. Economic Elements of Arms Transfers 
Scholars often point out the negative impact of arms imports on a recipient’s socio-economic 
development.  Nevertheless, as was shown above, during both decades under study Iraq was able 
to sustain high levels of growth despite its weapons imports.  While heavily reliant on oil 
revenues, Iraq’s economy and living standards continued to improve during the 1980s despite the 
fact that it was able to export only a third of its previous level of oil.  The survival and growth of 
its economy during the Iran-Iraq War can in part be attributed to the external financial aid which 
Baghdad received from various Gulf countries, European countries, and the United States.  
However, Baathist socio-economic investments in the Iraqi workforce and general population 
(such as foreign training programs and the Baathist literacy campaign) and the privatisation of 
numerous state-run industries also contributed to the creation of a more vibrant economy that 
was slowly transitioning from an agrarian labour force to an industrialised one.  The major long-
term cost of Baghdad’s “guns-and-butter” policy was that Iraq accumulated a large foreign debt, 
which proved difficult to repay after the war. 
The Iraqi government’s imports of both military and civilian goods from abroad also 
generated a moderate level of supplier export dependence.  While such purchases theoretically 
could have made Iraq a more dependent country, its status as a large-scale weapons importer 
allowed Baghdad to emphasise the commercial incentives of security cooperation in discussions 
with officials in military supplier states.  This had an important consequence on its relationship 
with France, Iraq’s second-largest military supplier during the late 1970s and throughout the 
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1980s.  Baghdad embarked on large-scale military cooperation programs with Paris, and at the 
height of their relationship Iraq accounted for nearly half of all French arms exports.  Since one-
third of France’s defence industry relied on the export of arms, Baghdad’s vast arms imports put 
Iraq in an advantageous negotiating position, which it was able to use to gain better weapons, 
often at more lenient financial terms.  Furthermore, despite the massive accumulation of debt that 
Baghdad owed to Paris by the mid-1980s, France continued to send weapons to Iraq and support 
its military industry.  In a way, the debt which Baghdad generated vis-à-vis its suppliers 
contributed positively to its war effort, since its suppliers now had an interest in seeing Iraq win 
the war so that it could pay back the debt. 
V. Military Implications of Security Cooperation 
While foreign military training improved the effectiveness of Iraq’s armed forces, there was a 
more limited correlation between the source of weapons that Baghdad received and the source of 
Iraqi military doctrine, planning, and operations.  In fact, the Baathist political leadership’s 
attempt to introduce Soviet military doctrine to the Iraqi armed forces during the early 1970s was 
met with protest from senior military officers.  This was particularly true with the older 
generation of Iraqi military officers, many of whom were trained in Great Britain and the United 
States and considered Western military doctrine superior to Soviet doctrine.  Consequently, even 
though Moscow provided the majority of Iraq’s weapons in the period under study, the military 
doctrine, operations, and planning of the Iraqi armed forces often reflected ideas borrowed from 
American and British militaries.  One early exception was the doctrine of the Iraqi air force, 
which continued to rely on Soviet air doctrine until the early 1980s.  However, with the 
introduction of French fighter-aircraft into the Iraqi military at the start of the Iran-Iraq War, the 
IQAF began to integrate Western military training, which stressed more personal initiative and 
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creativity and improved the IQAF’s effectiveness in both air-to-air combat against the Iranian air 
force and missile strikes against Iranian targets.  Furthermore, as described above, Iraq’s air 
defence program during the mid-to-late 1980s was modelled after NATO military doctrine.  For 
other branches of the Iraqi armed forces, the Iraqi military during both decades resorted to using 
a combination of Western and Soviet doctrine.  The Baathist political leadership also directed 
military officers to develop an indigenous military doctrine, which they created by combining 
foreign military doctrines alongside their own experiences fighting their own adversaries (the 
Kurds, Israel, and Iran.) 
One area in which Iraq borrowed from its primary military supplier was in terms of civil-
military relations.  From the start of the early 1970s the Baath Party promoted several thousand 
Baathist “political officers” (equivalent to “political commissars” in the Soviet armed forces) to 
high-level posts within the Iraqi armed forces.  Since the Iraqi military was historically involved 
in numerous political coups in Baghdad, the primary job of these political officers was to ensure 
the loyalty of professional military officers to the Baath Party.  During the Iran-Iraq War, 
however, their presence on the front-lines of combat impeded military operations.  By the mid-
1980s, Iraqi political-military officials had begun a debate over the different types of civil-
military relations.  Ultimately, the Iraqi government removed the majority of these political 
officers and stressed its commitment to creating a more professional military.  Ineffective 
commanders were removed, irrespective of their loyalty to the Baath Party or family ties to 
members of the Iraqi government.  These changes reflected a move towards a Western-type of 
civil-military relations (i.e. civilian control over a professional military) and enhanced Iraqi 
military effectiveness on the battlefield.  Therefore, over the long-run the Iraqi government did 
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what it believed worked best for Iraqi interests, rather than what its suppliers recommended or 
pressured it to do. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
For Recipient States 
Between 1968 and 1990 Iraq transformed from a relatively-unknown country into one of the 
strongest political, economic, and military powers in the region and international system.  As this 
research showed, contrary to expectations by defence dependence theorists, it was able to do so 
while maintaining mostly independent foreign and internal policies.  Nevertheless, Baathist 
policies did have a number of long-run costs.  For example, despite a relatively successful 
diplomatic outreach to political, military, and defence industry elites in various military supplier 
states, its use of chemical weapons in the mid-and-late 1980s tainted its image in the 
international arena and made continuing military aid to it more difficult.  Furthermore, Iraq’s 
high military spending (which became necessary as a result of the Iran-Iraq War) contributed to a 
large-scale debt.  Whether the economic crisis that was occurring in Iraq during early 1990 was 
the “primary force behind the invasion”11 or whether the “arrogance that came with [Iraq’s 
military] strength [in 1990] prompted Baghdad to overreach itself in Kuwait”12 is beyond the 
scope of this paper.13  Nevertheless, the twenty-two year period leading up to that point poses 
several lessons for recipient states.   
                                                 
11 Chaudhry, “On the Way to the Market,” 14. 
12 Pollack, Arabs at War, 553. 
13 For an examination of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 based on Iraqi government documents, see Kevin 
Woods, The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein’s Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War (Annapolis, Md.: 
Naval Institute Press, 2008.) 
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A key dilemma that most policymakers in recipient states face is the perceived trade-off 
between the ability to defend their sovereignty and their ability to generate independent policies.  
To enhance a country’s sovereignty (i.e. the central government’s ability to maintain internal and 
external security), a recipient state must import some weapons from abroad.  In so doing, 
contemporary wisdom suggests that it must give up a part of its political autonomy (i.e. it must 
modify its internal or external policies, allow the supplier to stage a foreign military presence on 
its soil, and so on.)  This research showed that a recipient can enhance its sovereignty through 
foreign military aid while maintaining its autonomy.  However, it can only do so by pursuing a 
number of counter-dependence strategies that improve its bargaining position vis-à-vis more 
powerful suppliers, including military diversification and indigenous production.  Stockpiling of 
weapons is also crucial since a supplier state may decide to cut off military aid during a conflict.  
Furthermore, a recipient state’s diplomatic outreach to foreign political leaders, military officials, 
public audiences, and defence industry representatives in supplier states is also important for its 
ability to receive arms on a sustained basis.  Undeniably, Baghdad’s oil wealth contributed to the 
expansion of the Iraqi armed forces, but here credit must be given to Baghdad on two fronts.  
Firstly, the decision to nationalise Iraq’s oil in 1972 put it in a better position to benefit from the 
increase in oil prices during the rest of the decade.  Secondly, after Syria’s closure of Iraqi oil 
pipelines cut Iraq’s oil exports by two-thirds, through increased diplomacy with different states 
Baghdad was able to get enough financial assistance from the USSR, Arab states, and Western 
countries to allow it to sustain the war for eight years.  Other recipient states which may not have 
the same access to oil revenues as Iraq may have to opt for Baghdad’s approach during the 1980s 
(i.e. extensive, diversified diplomacy.) 
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Some counter-dependence strategies have both costs and benefits.  For example, 
diversification of military partners can generate competition amongst suppliers which results in 
better terms for weapons purchases, but can also contribute to weak supplier-recipient relations 
over the long-run if the recipient state is viewed as a non-loyal partner.  Similarly, investment in 
the production of weapons of mass destruction may lower a recipient state’s need to purchase 
more costly conventional weapons, but their use may taint the recipient’s image and make future 
arms imports more difficult as a result of sanctions.  Today, the Iraqi military (known as the Iraqi 
Security Forces, or ISF) has virtually no combat aircraft, a diminutive navy, and its army has one 
of the smallest arsenals of conventional weapons in the region.14  Furthermore, Iraq’s chemical, 
nuclear, and biological weapons programs have also been dismantled.15   
The lack of military power (and political leadership) on the part of the Iraqi central 
government has allowed the Islamic State (IS) to gain control over large areas of western and 
northern Iraq.  To defeat IS fighters, Baghdad has sought to military assistance from a wide 
range of suppliers, including Moscow, Washington, and Paris.  As was the case during the 1970s 
and 1980s, this policy has resulted in a modicum of supplier competition as Moscow and 
Washington have provided military aid to Baghdad for commercial reasons and to exert 
influence over Iraqi internal and external affairs.  In contrast to the period under study, however, 
Baghdad supports the peshmerga in its fight against the IS insurgency, which threatens both the 
                                                 
14 In December 2013, Iraq had three combat aircraft (compared to 316 in 2003 and 689 in 1990), 336 main battle 
tanks (2,200 in 2003 and 5,500 in 1990), 193 armoured infantry fighting vehicles (compared to 1,300 in 2003), and 
nearly non-existent naval assets.  See Anthony Cordesman, Sam Khazai, and Daniel Dewit, “Shaping Iraq’s Security 
Forces,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, US-Iranian Competition Series (December 16, 2013) and 
Pelletiere and Johnson, Lessons Learned, 3; Military Balance, 1989-1990, London: Brassey’s, 1989, 99-101. 
15 In 1991 Iraq agreed to destroy its WMD stockpiles.  However, later during the 1990s it refused to admit 
inspection of certain military sites, which resulted in perceived ambiguity about the state of its WMD programs.  
According to some post-2003 analyses, Baghdad’s strategic ambiguity was designed to deter an external invasion 
(from Israel or Iran) and bolster Iraq’s image in the Arab world.  See Kevin Woods, James Lacey, and Williamson 
Murray, “Saddam's Delusions: the View from the Inside,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 2006) and Woods, Palkki, and 
Stout, The Saddam Tapes, 254-257. 
Page 308 of 355 
 
Iraqi central government and the Kurdish region.  Although foreign military aid will be 
necessary to the survival of the current Iraqi regime, it remains to be seen whether the political 
regime in Baghdad will be able to convince foreign powers to provide enough military aid to 
defeat the IS. 
 
For Supplier States 
Supplier states normally justify arms transfers on the basis of the amount of perceived leverage 
that they will bring vis-à-vis a recipient state.  Nevertheless, a supplier’s goal for a recipient to 
modify its foreign or domestic policy is often not met.   For example, since the onset of the Arab 
Spring in 2010, American officials have threatened to cut off military aid to Egypt in order to 
pressure the post-Mohammed Morsi regime led by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to adopt an open, 
democratic system of government.  Nevertheless, Washington’s threat to cut military aid to 
Baghdad was ineffective in bringing about democratic reform – or stability – in Cairo.  Between 
1968 and 1990, the Soviet Union, Iraq’s primary military supplier, repeatedly tried to use 
military aid to impact the internal and external affairs of the Baathist regime in Baghdad.  
Archival evidence in the SHC suggests that Soviet arms embargos only led Iraqi leaders to adopt 
a number of counter-dependence strategies, including diversification of its military suppliers, 
building an indigenous defence industrial base, and stockpiling its weapon supplies.   
Some similarities to Iraq’s military imports can be seen today in terms of the policies that 
the Egyptian government has pursued in recent years.  For example, after the U.S. Congress 
threatened to cut off military supplies to Egypt following the military’s overthrow of Mohammed 
Morsi, the interim military regime in Cairo began to court Russia to receive great military aid, 
which Moscow has gladly agreed to do.  Furthermore, despite American pressure for democratic 
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reform, the Muslim Brotherhood, the main opposition party, was recently banned from running 
in elections.  Similar attempts by the Soviet Union during the 1970s and 1980s to pressure the 
Baathist regime to modify its internal policies were met with similar rebukes.  Consequently, my 
research argues that policymakers in military supplier states must be cautious in using military 
aid as an instrument of diplomacy.  In terms of Iraq’s military imports, the strong international 
support of Baghdad during the 1980s does seem to have encouraged a perception amongst 
Baathist leaders that they could get away with using chemical weapons on opposing troops and 
their own civilians.  However, the use or threat of an embargo to achieve a certain end (for 
example, to push for open elections) may only drive the recipient to request military aid from 
elsewhere.  U.S. policymakers should therefore treat each military recipient on a case-by-case 
basis and combine their efforts with a pragmatic understanding of that particular country’s 
political realities, rather than trying to tie military aid to abstract visions of Western-style 
democracy. 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
Although Iraq’s military build-up between 1968 and 1990 challenges conventional thinking on 
arms imports, the Iraqi case is not necessarily representative of the behaviour of all recipient 
states.  Further analysis of recipients’ decision-making is therefore suggested where there are 
good records.  For example, a researcher may attempt to analyse the drivers of Israeli arms 
import policies during the 1950s and 1960s (including the switch from France to the United 
States becoming the primary military supplier) by looking at declassified government 
documents.  Other important studies which are feasible and may be looked at include Iranian 
arms imports policies during the Shah-era, the drivers of Australian security cooperation with the 
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United States, and the impact of Tokyo’s post-WWII arms imports on Japan’s domestic and 
foreign policies.  While getting access to recipient government archives is a difficult task given 
the secrecy of the information that is often associated with arms transfers, some of the recipients 
above are known for keeping relatively good archives.  Furthermore, some governments 
declassify archival documents after 25 years.  Conducting research that looks at the government 
archives of these or other recipient states can help us to understand better recipient-supplier 
relationships and what drives recipient states to pursue security cooperation in the first place. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Since 1990 Iraq has occupied international media coverage to an extent that only few others 
countries have.  However, academics, journalists, and historians have focused primarily on the 
decline of Iraqi power: the military loss that the Iraqi armed forces suffered in 1991, the 
economic poverty that ensued as a result of international sanctions (1991-2003), and the 
increasing chaos and political instability that followed after the overthrow of the Baathist regime 
(2003-present.)   If one were to look at the Iraqi armed forces in 2014, it would seem that Iraq is 
essentially in a similar position to that when the country was founded in 1920.  Toby Dodge 
draws parallels between the British-trained Iraqi armed forces during the 1920s and the post-
2003 U.S.-trained Iraqi military after 2003.16  Similarly, Al-Marashi and Salama refer to the ISF 
as “mandate army redux.”17  Phebe Marr, one of the most prominent historians of Iraq, has 
commented that “historians and political analysts of modern Iraq have focused on two major 
                                                 
16 Dodge, Inventing Iraq, 20. 
17 Al-Marashi and Salama, Iraq’s Armed Forces, 201-224. 
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realities structuring Iraq’s foreign policy -- the creation of the state by foreign powers and its 
continued subjection to foreign control and manipulation.”18   
Nevertheless, looking at the bookends of Iraqi history leads one to make an incorrect 
assumption: that in the nearly one hundred year period of its existence, Iraq was always a weak 
and dependent state.  As the preceding chapters showed, nothing could be further from the truth.  
Lost in contemporary accounts of international politics is just how ambitious and unexpected the 
rise of Iraqi military, political, and economic power between 1968 and 1990 was.  The opening 
of the SHC allows for an inside-look at how the Iraqi government achieved what it set out to do 
during that period.  Because Iraq has become more reclusive in the period between 1990 and 
2003, the SHC may also answer many questions that scholars and journalists had about the Iraqi 
government’s behaviour in the period between the start of the sanctions and the 2003 invasion.  
Ultimately, the Baathist regime’s attempt to wield influence on the same level as great powers 
failed: the year in which this research ends (1990) marks both the zenith of Iraqi military power 
under the Baath Party and the beginning of its rapid decline.  But the complete history of post-






                                                 
18 Marr, “Iraqi Foreign Policy,” in Brown (editor), Diplomacy in the Middle East, 181. 
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APPENDIX  
Excerpt from “Study Issued by the Special Office of the Iraqi Intelligence Services Regarding 
Factors that Determine the Priorities of IIS Work Outside Iraq.”19 
 
 
                                                 
19 SH‐IISX‐D‐000‐365.  “Study issued by the Special Office of the Iraqi Intelligence Services regarding factors that 
determine the priorities of IIS work outside Iraq.”  (Jan 1986 to Jun 1986.) 
 










ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
CDD Iraqi Development Directorate 
DCS Direct Commercial Sales 
DISAM Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management 
DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
ICP Iraqi Communist Party 
ISF  Iraqi Security Forces 
KDP  Kurdistan Democratic Party 
FMFP Foreign Military Financing Program 
FMP Foreign Military Presence 
FMS Foreign Military Sales 
GOI  Government of Iraq 
GSID Iraqi General Security Intelligence Directorate 
GMID Iraqi General Military Intelligence Directorate 
SHC Saddam Hussein Collection 
IQAF  Iraqi Air Force 
NASSR NASSR State Establishment for Mechanical Industries 
MIC  Military Industrialisation Commission 
MIMI Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialisation 
RCC Revolutionary Command Council 
SHC Saddam Hussein Collection 
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
SOTI State Organisation for Technical Industries 
SPC Strategic Planning Committee 
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